

COASTAL PARKS FOR A METROPOLITAN NATION:
HOW POSTWAR POLITICS AND URBAN GROWTH SHAPED AMERICA'S SHORES

by

Jacqueline Alyse Mirandola Mullen

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Abstract

Between 1961 and 1975, the United States established thirteen of the nation's fourteen National Seashores and Lakeshores. This unprecedented, nation-wide initiative to conserve America's coasts transformed how the National Park Service made parks, catalyzed the shift in conservation definitions in America, and created new conservation coalitions that paved the way for the environmental movement. The Department of the Interior began shoreline park establishment as a concerted effort to protect the nation's more natural shores from the tourist development rapidly covering American coasts in the post-World War II period. The Park Service's urgency on coastal conservation arose from concerns of overdevelopment, overpopulation, and overuse. America's coastal buy-up began as a federal initiative, a top-down bureaucratic idea presented to local communities to provide increased recreational opportunities. By the mid-1960s, however, new coalitions begged the Park Service to conserve the shorelines into their backyards. This dissertation considers five case studies, all coasts proposed for federal protection in the late 1950s and all near metropolitan areas that experienced significant suburban expansion in the postwar period.

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Introduction: Early Piecemeal Coastal Park Plans

In 1955, National Park Service Director Conrad Wirth penned a short introduction to a National Park Service report. “One of our greatest recreation resources – the seashore—is rapidly vanishing from public use,” Wirth warned the public in the foreword to *Our Vanishing Shoreline*. “Nearly everyone seems to know this fact, but few do anything to halt the trend.” With this report, and the “alarming” facts uncovered by the survey, Wirth and the Park Service hoped to create a sense of urgency for coastal conservation initiatives.¹ A century-long penchant for beach-going had coupled with a prosperous postwar economy to strain America’s beaches. More Americans visited and built homes on the shore than ever before, but most of the country’s coasts remained unregulated and became increasingly private, greedily swallowed up by the highest bidder.² To address this “Seashore Fever,” the Park Service insisted that the federal government needed to step in. The “signs of the times” along America’s Eastern Coast were “Private Property,” “No Trespassing,” and “Subdivision: Lots for Sale.” Gone were the days when a boy could “go five miles from the city of Boston, spend the day combing the beach or digging mud clams in the estuaries, and seldom see another human being within shouting distance.”³ With their nostalgic and foreboding report, the Park Service started a chain of events that led, in just 15 years, to the establishment of 14 new National Seashores and Lakeshores. Why the sudden rush? And how did the Park Service act so quickly?

¹ Conrad Wirth, Foreword, in U.S. National Park Service, *Our Vanishing Shoreline* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955).

² On beach popularity rising in Europe and the United States during the Victorian era, then increasing in popularity with a broader segment of the population in the twentieth century, see Alain Corbin, *The Lure of the Sea: Discovery of the Seaside in the Western World 1750-1840*, trans. Jocelyn Phelps (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994); Gary S. Cross and John K. Walton, *The Playful Crowd: Pleasure Places in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); John K. Walton, *The English Seaside Resort: a Social History 1750–1914* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983); Cindy S. Aron, *Working at Play: A History of Vacations in the United States* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

³ U.S. National Park Service, *Our Vanishing Shoreline* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), 8-9.

The creation of National Seashores and Lakeshores transformed how the National Park Service made parks, catalyzed the shift in conservation definitions in America, and created new conservation coalitions that paved the way for the environmental movement. The Department of the Interior (parent department to the National Park Service) began shoreline park establishment as a concerted effort to protect the nation's more natural shores from the tourist development rapidly covering American coasts in the post-WWII period.⁴ The Park Service's urgency on the matter arose from concerns of overdevelopment, overpopulation, and overuse. America's coastal buy-up began as a federal initiative, a top-down bureaucratic idea presented to local communities to provide increased recreational opportunities. By the mid-1960s, however, new coalitions begged the Park Service to conserve the shorelines into their backyards.

The debates over the nation's metropolitan beaches brought urban residents, summer homeowners and ranchers, shellfishermen and tourists, loggers and urban residents, conservation groups and gay communities, planners and legislators, steel companies and unions all in conversation with one another. All had a stake in these metropolitan coastal parks. Coasts that lay within a short drive of major cities were familiar day trips for millions of urban residents, who got involved in the conservation conversation. The seashore initiative engaged a broad swath of the American population, including those not traditionally associated with conservation issues. The diverse coalition that supported National Seashore establishment helped to solidify urban support for the National Park Service and for a new type of conservation that touched on

⁴ For more on the increasing leisure time and the subsequent growth in tourism in the postwar period, see Cindy Aron, *Working at Play: A History of Vacations in the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Hal Rothman, *Devil's Bargain: Tourism in the Twentieth-Century American West* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000); Susan Sessions Rugh, *Are We There Yet? The Golden Age of American Family Vacation* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008). On the general affluence of the postwar period and its influence on American culture, see David Potter, *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958); Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumer's Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003)

issues of pollution, overpopulation, and suburban growth. National Seashores connected these issues to traditional land conservation, thus aiding in the mid-twentieth century transition of urbanites from a “conservation” to an “environmental” ideology.

Coastal Parks: between Progressive Era Conservation to Environmentalism

The federal national seashore initiative in the 1950s and 1960s catalyzed the shift in conservation thinking from Progressive Era conservation ideology to the environmentalism of the 1970s.⁵ A few core tenants continued from the Progressive Era conservation movement into the National Seashore push. These included land conservation, the activism of women, and the continuation of the wilderness strand that began during the interwar years. On the other hand, the federal coastal conservation initiative of the 1960s included new concerns that had not been a part of early twentieth century conservation concerns. These included a much stronger focus on recreation for the masses, creation of federal parks in proximity to urban areas, sensitivity to a Cold War fear of the state even amid federal land purchases, newly broad coalitions, ecological conservation, overdevelopment fears, and concerns about air and water pollution. In working with the National Park Service in the 1960s, coastal conservationists addressed new concerns by leaning on traditional conservation policies and procedures in which bureaucrats drew lines on a map to protect natural areas. Federal coastal conservation initiatives in the 1960s thus help to explain the transition from “conservation” to “environmental” thinking that occurred during the Cold War by capturing a type of natural protection thinking that lies somewhere between the two movements.

⁵ While historians like Adam Rome and Scott Hamilton Dewey have pinpointed the rise of environmentalism as occurring as early as the 1940s, their analysis of the environmental movement does not consider the coastal conservation movement and the broad range coalitions it developed. Adam Rome, *Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Scott Hamilton Dewey, *Don't Breathe the Air: Air Pollution and U.S. Environmental Politics, 1945-1970* (College Station: Texas. A&M University Press, 2000).

Historians have explored a myriad of interpretations of the Progressive Era conservation movement, the late-twentieth century environmental movement, and the continuity or break between the two. Early histories of environmentalism in the U.S. saw the Progressive Era conservation movement as movement separate from the wilderness and ecologically-oriented environmental movement of the postwar period. In developing this interpretation, historian Samuel P. Hays emphasized the postwar increase in prosperity and consumerism in the U.S. as a trigger for a new, consumptive environmentalism that developed in the 1960s and onward.⁶ He contrasted this consumptive focus with the scientific focus on professionalism and technical efficiency in the Progressive Era conservation movement.⁷

By the 1990s, historians began to argue that more continuities than breaks existed between the Progressive Era conservation movement and the postwar environmental movement. Historians began to strike down the strict binary between Gifford Pinchot-style “wise use” conservation and John Muir’s call for the complete protection of (rather than sustainable use of) natural resources as advocated for by early environmental historians like Roderick Frazier Nash. In *Forcing the Spring*, Robert Gottlieb identified post-World War II environmentalists as consuming nature in the same way that Hays had, but he located the roots of that consumptive relationship in the Progressive conservation movement. Gottlieb argued for seeing the two movements as continuous, with new urban, ecological, public health, and recreational concerns

⁶ On postwar consumer society and how it contributed to the environmental movement, see Samuel P. Hays, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985* (*Studies in Environment and History*) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). For more on prosperity and consumerism in the postwar U.S., see David Potter, *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Elizabeth Cohen, *A Consumer’s Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 11, 253-254, 392-395; Roderick Frazier Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind* (2001 reprint; New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1967), especially 238-271.

⁷ Samuel P. Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).

distinguishing the environmental movement from its predecessor.⁸ Others have followed Gottlieb's lead in arguing for continuity between the Progressive era conservation movement and the environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s, but identify different strands of connection. Neil Maher, for example, argues that the origins of broader conservation concerns that incorporated public health, ecology, wilderness, and a more urban, democratized constituency had its roots in the Civilian Conservation Corps and New Deal conservation projects of the 1930s.⁹ I add to Maher's analysis by examining how these early "environmental" concerns extended to the nation's coasts. By extending his theory to the postwar, but pre-environmental period, I look at how this changing definition of conservation intersected with the emergence of prosperous postwar consumer society to create a demand for beaches and a government with the funding and ideological tools to preserve them.¹⁰

One continuity between the conservation and environmental movements that played a significant role in postwar coastal conservation was the notion of wilderness. Wilderness advocacy developed out of the interwar years and strengthened during the Cold War. Wilderness came to define postwar environmentalism and provided language and context for coastal conservationists. While these seashores were not wilderness by any stretch of the imagination –

⁸ Robert Gottlieb, *Forcing the Spring: The Transformation Of The American Environmental Movement* (Washington, Covelo, and London: Island Press, 1993), 78.

⁹ Like Maher, I argue that the Echo Park Dam controversy in 1955, thought to be "won" by preservationists, thus ushering in a new era of preservationist dominance over "wise-use" conservation in the United States, was not the strict break between conservation and preservation that earlier historians suggested. Neil Maher, *Nature's New Deal: The Civilian Conservation Corps and the Roots of the American Environmental Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), esp. 220-224. Robert Gottlieb also argues for a continuum in how we look at these two movements. For earlier histories that see Echo Park as the postwar counter to Yosemite's Hetch Hetchy controversy and pin it as the major shift from "conservation" to "environmental," see Roderick Frazier Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind* (2001 reprint; New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1967), 159-182, 200-228; Hays, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence*, 459; Hal K. Rothman, *The Greening of a Nation? Environmentalism in the United States Since 1945* (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998), 34-44; Gottlieb, *Forcing the Spring*, 78.

¹⁰ On postwar consumer society and how it contributed to the environmental movement, see Samuel P. Hays, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence*; David Potter, *People of Plenty: People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumer's Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 11, 253-254, 392-395.

all had homes dotting them and many had some sort of resource extraction on them – the roadless and romantic rhetoric of the wilderness movement aided preservation attempts at these metropolitan peripheries. The vocabulary of the wilderness movement and its legislative momentum in the late fifties and early sixties (Congress passed the Wilderness Act in 1964) provided citizens a national forum in which to discuss the conservation of land around their coastal homes.¹¹ Coastal park advocates in different parts of the nation used the language of wilderness to argue for pollution controls, to slow down coastal industrial growth, to stop road building, and to control unrestrained suburban growth. The interwar roots of the wilderness movement provided a framework for coastal residents to argue for the protection of land that overwhelmingly did not meet the legal criteria of wilderness.¹²

Many of the residents who did the most grassroots organizing for protecting natural areas in the postwar period and the Progressive Era were women. In postwar coastal conservation initiatives, women assumed this well-defined role of community organizers in support of a land conservation cause. When Adam Rome identifies liberals, antiestablishment young people, and middle class women as important for the development of the environmental movement in the

¹¹ For more on the wilderness movement as it developed in the 1930s, see Paul Sutter, *Driven Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002). On how the National Park Service incorporated the wilderness movement over the 20th century, see David Louter, *Windshield Wilderness: Cars, Roads, and Nature in Washington's National Parks* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2006). On how the wilderness movement shaped environmental politics from the 1960s onward, see James Morton Turner, *The Promise of Wilderness: American Environmental Politics Since 1964* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012). For a criticism of American wilderness ideals, see William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness: or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” ed. William Cronon, in *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995), 69-90.

¹² There was not yet a legal definition of wilderness at the time that the move towards federal coastal parks began. With the passage of the Wilderness Act in 1960, the definition of wilderness became legally codified. The legal definition of wilderness is “an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammelled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.” It further specifies that wilderness areas must be “without permanent improvements or human habitation” where “the imprint of man's work [is] substantially unnoticeable, that “has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation,” has “at least five thousand acres of land” and “may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.” National Seashores narrowly met the penultimate criterion and did meet the last point, but most national seashore and lakeshore areas were nowhere near the first several criteria. *The Wilderness Act*, Public Law 88-577 (16 U.S. C. 1131-1136) 88th Congress, Second Session September 3, 1964. Accessed on February 21, 2015. Public Law 94-544, Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second session, Oct. 18, 1976, Accessed on February 21, 2015.

1960s, he cites middle class women as key to grassroots organizing. Other historians like Richard Walker, Robert Gottlieb, and Thomas Wellock have identified women as vital in the development of grassroots support for conservation in the 1950s.¹³ At places like the Indiana Dunes and Point Reyes, women wrote letters, attended congressional hearings, and organized clubs to fight for preservation of their coastlines. These strong volunteer networks to promote a new conservation paralleled the networks of middle to upper class suburban women that created a new conservatism in the same period.¹⁴

Women who argued for coastal preservation distinguished their movement from the Progressive Era conservation movement through the Cold War approach they took to conservation. Recently, historians have incorporated an analysis of Cold War apocalyptic fears of nuclear annihilation into interpretations of the environmental movement. A newly popular ecological view of nature in the postwar period combined with focuses on overpopulation, resource limits, and the intransigence of the earth to form a more doomsday and all-encompassing environmental movement, the same that gave birth to the first earth day.¹⁵ While most recent histories that incorporate Cold War culture into analyses of the environmental movement look at either nuclear power or international relations, I argue that the domestic

¹³ Robert Gottlieb, *Forcing the Spring: The Transformation Of The American Environmental Movement* (Washington, Covelo, and London: Island Press, 1993), 286-305; Richard Walker, *The Country in the City: The Greening of the San Francisco Bay Area* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 126-135; Thomas R. Wellock, *Preserving the Nation: The Conservation and Environmental Movements 1870 – 2000* (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 166-167; Vera Norwood, *Made from this Earth: American Women and Nature* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993).

¹⁴ I build on the work of Lisa McGirr, who notes the phenomenon of female leadership in 1950s and 1960s grassroots conservatism. Lisa McGirr, *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001). Adam Rome has also noticed the importance of middle class, suburban women in the formation of the postwar environmental movement. See Adam Rome, “Give Earth a Chance: The Environmental Movement and the Sixties,” *Journal of American History*, 90, 2 (September 2003): 525-554.

¹⁵ Thomas Robertson, *The Malthusian Moment. Global Population Growth and the Birth of American Environmentalism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012), 564, 584; Michael C. Barbour, “Ecological Fragmentation in the Fifties,” *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature*, ed. William Cronon (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995), 233-255.

culture of the Cold War also shaped the language of conservation and critiques of conservation in the 1950s and 1960s.

Coastal residents used the language and fears of the Cold War to argue against government takings of their property and thus shape postwar land protection into a kind of conservation favorable to homeowners.¹⁶ At Cape Cod, residents even connected the government's interference in real estate to invasions of the American sanctity of the home.¹⁷ National Seashores, a welcome cause for some, sparked the need for domestic containment *against conservation* for other homeowners within potential parkland.¹⁸ In order to establish new coastal parks, the National Park Service would have the onus of proving that they were not an overreaching government and that they respected the sanctity of the home – new territory for the National Park Service. The changing conservation movement was not immune to domestic Cold War culture. My research adds to a growing body of environmental history on the Cold War by adding a much-needed domestic strand.¹⁹

¹⁶ The anti-federal concerns and strong stance against federal control of public lands foreshadows the “sagebrush rebellion” of the 1980s. At National Seashores and National Lakeshore, this attitude extended beyond the Western United States, as East Coast residents included the same fears of federal land controls. On the East Coast, however, residents generally had a stronger connection to federal power structures and negotiated to keep their land and administrative control of their locales, thus quelling much of the opposition. For more on the development of anti-federalism in western states because of public lands policies, see Karen Merrill, *Public Lands and Political Meaning: Ranchers, the Government, and the Property between Them* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002); On the sagebrush rebellion in the 1980s, see Jacqueline Vaughn Switzer, *Green Backlash: The History and Politics of Environmental Opposition in the United States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1997), 171-90; Margaret Knox, “The grass-roots anti-environmental movement,” *Utne Reader* (July-August 1992), 108-109; Harvey M. Jacobs, “The Anti-Environmental 'Wise Use' Movement in America,” *Land Use Law & Zoning Digest*, 45, 2 (February 1995): 3-8; James Morton Turner, “‘The Specter of Environmentalism’: Wilderness, Environmental Politics, and the Evolution of the New Right,” *Journal of American History*, (June 2009): 123-149.

¹⁷ Cold War rhetoric against property takings occurred at nearly all potential National Seashore and Lakeshore parks. I have condensed this portion of my argument to Cape Cod primarily in order to show its strength at one location and focus on other controversies in other case studies.

¹⁸ Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (1988, reprinted New York: Basic Books, 1999). See also Elizabeth Carney, “Suburbanizing Nature and Naturalizing Suburbanites: Outdoor-Living Culture and Landscapes of Growth,” *The Western Historical Quarterly*, 38, 4 (Winter, 2007): 477-500.

¹⁹ For other environmental histories of the Cold War, see the recent edited collection by J. R. McNeill, Corinna R. Unger, *Environmental Histories of the Cold War*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Thomas R. Wellock, *Preserving the Nation: The Conservation and Environmental Movements 1870 – 2000* (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 135-188; Martin V. Melosi, *Atomic Age America* (Boston: Pearson, 2012). Americans in the West also fought centralization of power in the context of Cold War politics. Sarah Elkind's research of Angelinos'

Federal Coasts and the National Park Service

Of the nation's fifteen national seashores and lakeshores, I have chosen five case studies based on the time of their establishment and their proximity to major metropolitan areas. At all five, congressional legislation to establish the park began in the late 1950s. All but one became a National Park site by 1966: Fire Island National Seashore (an approximately 60-mile drive from New York City), Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore (a 50-mile drive from Chicago), Point Reyes National Seashore (35 miles from San Francisco), and Cape Cod National Seashore (a 90-mile drive, or 45 miles by ferry, from Boston).²⁰ The only coastal park I examine that did not meet this criteria is the Oregon Dunes, a strip of sand dunes seventy miles southwest of Eugene, Oregon (population just 50,977 in 1960).²¹ I include an analysis of the Oregon Dunes as a counterexample: it was the only proposed National Seashore or Lakeshore that the Park Service pursued at length that still failed to pass Congress and never became a National Park Service site. Since complex private ownership was one of the features that made these parks different from their predecessors, studying metropolitan parks provides a full picture of areas whose residents built summer homes on small coastal plots. Proximity to major urban areas also created a link to the burgeoning environmental movement and its concerns, most of which originated in urban areas. Changing recreation policies at this time focused on large population centers and providing them with recreational opportunities. Looking at metropolitan parks allows me to

rejection of federal water policy echoes the same fears of centralization that residents of potential federal coastal parks directed at the National Park Service. Sarah S. Elkind, *How Local Politics Shape Federal Policy: Business, Power, & the Environment in Twentieth-Century Los Angeles* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), esp. 171-177.

²⁰ 1960 population of these cities, according to the U.S. Census: New York – 7,781,984; Chicago - 3,550,404; Boston - 697,197; San Francisco – 740,316. Accessed February 28, 2015, <https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab19.txt>.

²¹ 18th Census of the United States. U.S., Census Bureau, "Number of Inhabitants: Oregon," (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1960), accessed March 11, 2015, <http://www2.census.gov/prodpopulation2/decennial/documents/37749197v1p39ch2.pdf>.

analyze how these new recreation policies intersected with the nascent environmental movement and property rights issues in the 1960s.

These coastal areas acted as a sort of tourism hinterland to their nearby major cities. I borrow the language of “hinterlands” from *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West*, in which William Cronon explores the influence a city has on a wide-ranging landscape. Cronon traces the commodities that farmers ship into the city, brokers trade, and from which builders build the city's physical landscape.²² Cities, however, equally shape their hinterlands based on their residents' desires to escape crowded city life; in effect, tourism shapes the surrounding landscape. Ellen Stroud explores the consequence of this in Northeastern Forests in *Nature Next Door: Cities and Trees in the American Northeast*. Just as forests in the northeastern mountains re-grew as cities expanded, so too did city dwellers want to their coasts to retain what they considered a sort of naturalness. David Stradling also noted this phenomenon in Northeastern forests in the nineteenth century. He argues that New York City's increasingly urban cultural created the desire for a major natural park in the Catskills in his book *Making Mountains: New York City and the Catskills*. Both Stradling and Stroud attribute reforestation to the desire of urban dwellers for a dual mountain retreat. Those same citizens wanted a coastal retreat as well, but it was not until the 1950s that they felt the coasts were threatened enough to merit their widespread preservation.²³

In America's rapidly expanding postwar suburbs, homeowners looked to the federal government to tame local development. Residents of coastal suburbs and exurbs contributed to the changing priorities of the postwar environmental movement. Like historian Adam Rome, I

²² William Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991).

²³ Ellen Stroud, *Nature Next Door: Cities and Trees in the American Northeast* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2012); David Stradling, *Making Mountains: New York City and the Catskills* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2007). For an example of literature on tourist hinterlands specific to Cape Cod, see James O'Connell, *Becoming Cape Cod: creating a seaside resort* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2002).

argue that home building and suburban expansion strengthened conservation movements in the 1950s.²⁴ At coastal parks, the Park Service used fears of development as the main driver to pass legislation that promoted recreational development. Constituents supported recreational pursuits, but also fought suburban development and promoted the preservation of ecological diversity, to protect wilderness, to save pastoral landscapes (even if not the agriculture on them), to protect their own real estate, and to prevent against natural disasters. Coastal parks show how conservationists applied tried and true political pathways to argue for new conservation and public health priorities in the 1950s and 1960s. Both Rome and historian Christopher Sellers see the suburbs as crucible for environmentalism as it emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Sellers argues that postwar environmentalism developed in a more grassroots way than Rome identifies.²⁵ I argue that in exurban coastal areas, bottom-up and top-down conservation worked together, often because of the political influence of coastal residents.

The wealth and status of locals at coastal parks distinguished them from occupants of parkland in early Park Service history. Coastal locals who vocalized their opinions were far from the first residents of potential parkland. Many of the earliest national parks had long been home to Native Americans. When the National Park Service declared areas like Yosemite and the Grand Canyon to be National Parks, they “dispossessed” these Natives without their input, legislative representation, or fair compensation for property.²⁶ In places like the Adirondacks, white settlers dependent on resource-extractive economies found their livelihoods suddenly

²⁴ Rome, *Bulldozer in the Countryside*, especially 8-9, 119-152. See also Lincoln Bramwell’s recent work on vacation home building in the rural West and the “unexpected” nature that builders and residents, looking for pastoral landscapes, find. Bramwell does not examine coastal building in much detail, but a further study into this area could be fruitful. Bramwell, *Wilderburbs: Communities on Nature’s Edge* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014).

²⁵ Christopher C. Sellers, *Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Nature & the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth-Century America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012).

²⁶ Mark David Spence, *Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making of the National Parks* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Theodore Catton, *Inhabited Wilderness: Indians, Eskimos, and National Parks in Alaska* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997).

outlawed when state or federal governments declared their homes a park.²⁷ In contrast, at National Seashores and Lakeshores in metropolitan areas, the Park Service negotiated with landowners with wealth, political connections, and a leisure-based relationship with the nature around them. The opinions of these landowners mattered to the Park Service. The Park Service worked with landowners at coastal parks and even allowed some to stay in their homes, but in all cases creating a discussion that included the locals. This inclusion was a drastic departure from nineteenth century park creation that disenfranchised local citizens. The history of coastal park creation sheds light a new era of park planning that enfranchised locals and made the National Park Service an agency that middle- to upper-class beach homeowners *wanted* in their backyards.

While leisure activities dominated the landscapes of Cape Cod and Fire Island, potential coastal parks on the West Coast were home to industries dependent on physical work. Coastal economies on Cape Cod and Fire Island depended primarily on tourism, recreation, and real estate (much of it second homes).²⁸ At Point Reyes, by contrast, the primary economic driver was agriculture, while at the Oregon Dunes, the timber industry employed and supported most of the region. At the Indiana Dunes, a mix of East and West played out: a strong steel industry influenced the greatest influence over the state of Indiana and competed with a growing tourism strand and a market for second homes for Chicago residents.²⁹ Work within a parkscape was

²⁷ Karl Jacoby, *Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves and the Hidden History of American Conservation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), Louis Warren, *The Hunter's Game: Poachers and Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). For a Canadian example, see John Sandlos, *Hunters at the Margin: Native People and Wildlife Conservation in the Northwest Territories* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007).

²⁸ On the decline of other industries at Cape Cod and Fire Island, see Cumbler, *Cape Cod*, 149-172; Matthew McKenzie, *Clearing the Coastline: Ecological and Cultural Transformation of Cape Cod* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2010), 137-173; Robert F. Sayre, *Fire Island Past, Present, and Future: The Environmental History of a Barrier Beach* (Iowa City: Oystercatcher Books, 2013), 29-33.

²⁹ On the industrial development of northwest Indiana and the environmental justice movement, see Andrew Hurley, *Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana 1945-1980* (Chapel Hill, London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995). For more on environmental justice activism in the postwar

acceptable to the Park Service on the East Coast because it was leisure-based work that contributed to the unique character of the area. Clamming, shellfishing, and home owning (think: the “Cape Cod” architectural style) were a part of the unique landscape the Park Service sought to protect at Cape Cod. On the West Coast and in the Midwest, work was still for profit, it was industrial and done out of necessity rather than for pleasure. In this way, the Park Service fed into the distrust of work that the conservation and environmental movements both espoused. Historian Richard White identifies this “divorce” between work and nature as a fundamental tenant of the modern environmental movement, but one where environmentalists deemed “certain types of archaic work” acceptable because of their quaint, non-essential nature that added to the landscape.³⁰ At America’s National Seashores, an anti-industrial work, but pro-nostalgic work attitude by conservationists and the Park Service explains why shellfishing causes controversies at Point Reyes but has never been an issue at Cape Cod or Fire Island.³¹

The coastal initiative was also unique in the Park Service’s willingness to create piecemeal, noncontiguous parks for the sake of protecting a particular type of ecosystem. While early National Parks were primarily land with no productive use, at coastal zones, real estate was

period, see Robert D. Bullard, *Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), Fred Rose, *Coalitions Across the Class Divide: Lessons from the Labor, Peace, and Environmental Movements* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000); Sylvia Hood Washington, *Packing Them In: An Archaeology of Environmental Racism in Chicago, 1865-1954* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005). On the increase of tourism of Chicagoans in the twentieth century to Indiana’s dunes, see Ronald D. Cohen and Stephen G. McShane, *Moonlight in Duneland: The Illustrated Story of the Chicago South Shore and South Bend Railroad* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004).

³⁰ Richard White, *It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the American West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 171. For more on work and the environmental movement, see Chad Montrie, *Making a Living: Work and Environment in the United States* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Stefania Barc, “Laboring the Earth: Transnational Reflections on the Environmental History of Work.” *Environmental History*, 19, 1 (October 2014), 3-27.

³¹ For more on recent controversies around shellfishing at Point Reyes, see Laura Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation: Wilderness and Working Landscapes at Point Reyes National Seashore* (Under contract with the University of California Press, forthcoming 2015); Michael Ames, “The West Coast Oyster War,” *Browsings: The Harpers Blog in Harper’s Magazine*, July 26, 2013, accessed January 7, 2015, <http://harpers.org/blog/2013/07/the-west-coast-oyster-war/>; Robin Ancarian, “After a long battle, Drake’s Bay Oyster Co. packs it in,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 14, 2014; Matt Brown, “Drakes Bay Oyster Co. agrees to shut down,” *Santa Rosa Press Democrat*, October 6, 2014, accessed January 7, 2015, <http://www.pressdemocrat.com/news/2927908-181/drakes-bay-oyster-co-agrees>. On shellfishing at Cape Cod and Fire Island, see chapters 1 and 4.

a primary economic driver.³² Even the most undeveloped beaches had private owners on small lots. Piecemeal parks were a new thing for the Park Service. The myriad of private owners in potential shoreline parks meant the National Park Service had to take a more hands-on approach in passing the park legislatively through Congress in handling the purchase, transfer, and demolition of structures, and in maintaining relations with those whose houses remained within park boundaries. Drastically different land and water uses at coasts meant the Park Service approached these piecemeal coastal buy-ups place by place – what worked at Cape Cod was not necessarily successful at Point Reyes. At National Seashores and Lakeshores, the Park Service tore down homes to re-create nature for recreation. This willingness to establish noncontiguous parks in order to protect areas close to cities marked the beginning of a new era in Park Service planning, one that left idealism at the door and took a pragmatic, gritty approach in order to save whatever it could of particular natural areas.

Coastal parks also changed the funding mechanisms the National Park Service used to create new park units. Conrad Wirth wrote in his 1980 retrospective that Cape Cod National Seashore was the first park that made federal funding available for park creation land purchases. Wirth calls it the Park Service’s first departure from the “beg, borrow, or steal” method of acquiring future parkland.³³ Although historians have disputed this, National Seashores and Lakeshores were still ground-breaking in their method of acquisition.³⁴ These coastal parks were

³² Runte, *National Parks*, esp. Chapter 3, “Worthless Lands,” 48-64. The declining of fishing and shellfishing industries could also account for why recreation was now possible as a major land use in these coastal areas. See Cumbler, *Cape Cod*, 149-172; Matthew McKenzie, *Clearing the Coastline: Ecological and Cultural Transformation of Cape Cod* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2010), 137-173; James C. O’Connell, *Becoming Cape Cod: creating a seaside resort* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2002).

³³ Conrad L. Wirth, *Parks, Politics, and the People* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 260. Alfred Runte also agrees that purchasing land from appropriated funds was against NPS policy at the time. Alfred Runte, *National Parks: The American Experience, Third Edition* (1979, reprinted Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 147.

³⁴ Although Conrad Wirth wrote that Cape Cod was the first park for which Congress appropriated funds for its purchase, historians have found this to be untrue. Paul Sadin found evidence that Congress appropriated funds for the purchase of parts of Independence National Historic Park and Manassas National Battlefield. Paul Sadin,

the first areas where the National Park Service looked at areas of mostly private land – some of which had extensive development on it – and attempted to make a park. In previous decades, the National Park Service had created parks from already federal land, or land that private individuals or foundations bought and then donated to the government.³⁵ At these coastal parks, the congressional legislation that established the park also included appropriation money to buy the bulk of the land needed for the park – a first in federal park creation.

Historians of National Parks have generally spent very little time on the Park Service’s turn toward coastal park creation, despite recognizing the significance of this shift. Historian Alfred Runte, in his book on the National Park Service, called Cape Cod National Seashore an “important precedent” in the establishment of “nontraditional parks” in the 1970s, but then glosses over the details of this important precedent. Runte also claims that coastal parks were possible due to a “redefinition of the term significance” in the Park Service lexicon. In the case of coastal areas, Runte asserts, ‘significance’ by the 1960s just meant being free of “unrestrained and intensive development.”³⁶ Other historians of the National Park Service have also neglected seashores when they discuss 1950s and early 1960s Park Service policies.³⁷ In contrast, Canadian

Managing a Land in Motion: An Administrative History of Point Reyes National Seashore (Seattle: Historical Research Associates, 2007), 83. See also Binkley, Binkley, *The Creation and Establishment of Cape Hatteras National Seashore: The Great Depression Through Mission 66* (National Park Service, August 2007), 15. A fairer assessment would be that the coastal parks were the first parks where Congress appropriated large sums to cover nearly the total cost of land acquisition for a new park.

³⁵ Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 94; Wirth, *Parks, Politics, and the People*, 49, 54; Barry Mackintosh, *The National Parks: Shaping the System* (Washington: National Park Service, 1991), 23, 49.

³⁶ Runte, *National Parks*, 226.

³⁷ Ethan Carr, *Mission 66: Modernism and the National Park Dilemma* (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007); Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 177-212; Ronald Foresta actually cited Fire Island and Indiana Dunes as examples of National Parks that failed to live up to Park Service criteria for establishing parkland (which, in fairness, Alfred Runte critiqued scathingly in a review of Foresta’s book). Ronald Foresta, *America’s National Parks and Their Keepers* (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1984), 281. Alfred Runte, Review of *America’s National Parks and Their Keepers*, by Ronald Foresta, *Agricultural History*, 59, 3 (July 1985), 484-486.

scholars have looked closely at a similar coastal buy-up program occurred in Canada around the same time as the U.S. Park Service entered the beach real estate market.³⁸

Other historians of coasts generally (rather than federal coasts specially) have written of coastal changes and conservation from the pre-European period to the present's complicated climate change era. Many of the best coastal histories focus on one area and give a thorough analysis of how a particular coastal area and its wetlands changed over time.³⁹ Local historians have also been particularly prolific when writing about the coastlines in their own neighborhood.⁴⁰ Fewer studies take a comprehensive look at how coastal communities fought for protection of the nature in their backyards in the twentieth century. One exception is John Gillis' intellectual history of coasts. Gillis notes that while middle-class tourism accounted for the growth in attraction to the sea in the first half of the twentieth century, the 1960s saw a new phenomenon in coastal settlement. From the sixties on, Gillis writes, "shore communities not only grew in size but became ever more like suburbs. . . . At the turn of the twenty-first century,

³⁸ Alan MacEachern's book on Atlantic Canada's coastal parks investigates this phenomenon in depth, and Claire Campbell also looks closely at coastal parks in Canada. Alan MacEachern, *National Parks in Atlantic Canada, 1935-1970* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001); Claire Elizabeth Campbell, *Shaped by the West Wind: Nature and History in Georgian Bay* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004).

³⁹ Matthew Morse Booker, *Down by the Bay: San Francisco's History Between the Tides* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013); Christopher Pastore, *Between Land and Sea: The Atlantic Coast and the Transformation of New England* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); Michael Rawson, *Eden on the Charles: The Making of Boston* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010). Andrew Kahrl tells an important cultural history of coasts in *The Land Was Ours: African American Beaches from Jim Crow to the Sunbelt South* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012). Several environmental histories of rivers has also provided detailed looks at changes in riverine coastlines and human interactions with them. See Ari Kelman, *A River and Its City: The Nature of Landscape in New Orleans* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Mark Cioc, *The Rhine: An Ecobiography, 1815-2000* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002); Jim Clifford, "The River Lea in West Ham: a river's role in shaping industrialization on the eastern edge of nineteenth-century London," in *Urban Rivers: Re-making Rivers, Cities and Space in Europe and North America*, edited by Stéphane Castonguay and Matthew Evenden. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 34-56.

⁴⁰ Kay Franklin and Norma Schaeffer, *Duel for the Dunes: Land Use Conflict on the Shores of Lake Michigan* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983); Robert F. Sayre, *Fire Island Past, Present, and Future: The Environmental History of a Barrier Beach* (Iowa City: Oystercatcher Books, 2013); D. B. Wright, *The Famous Beds of Wellfleet* (Wellfleet, MA: Wellfleet Historical Society, Inc., 2009); Alice A. Lowe, *Nauset on Cape Cod – A History of Eastham* (Falmouth, MA: Kendall Printing Co., 1968); Nancy Kelly and Kenji Yamamoto, *Rebels with a Cause*, Documentary Film, directed by Nancy Kelly, (2012, : Kelly+Yamamoto Productions and KRCB/Distributor, 2013), DVD; Lee Koppelman and Seth Foreman, *Fire Island National Seashore: A History* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008). Countless travel literature publications exist for each of these locations, as well.

millions were abandoning the suburban crabgrass frontiers for those of the seafront.”⁴¹ This dissertation looks at how residents of coastal areas, whether year-round or seasonal, argued for or against coastal protection in their towns. It adds a growing body of coastal histories that extend beyond one shoreline.

National Seashores marked a turning point in National Park Service purchasing and administrative strategies. By examining broad federal plans for coastal parks, this dissertation fills the shoreline-shaped gap in histories of the Park Service. To understand shoreline conservation in the 1960s, it is important to know the background of federal conservation. The initiatives that led to National Seashores and Lakeshores actually began in the 1930s. The first chapter examines why the federal government prioritized some level of shoreline conservation in the 1930s, why it in large part failed (as opposed to other conservation programs in the New Deal), and how the postwar National Park Service picked up the seashore cause with renewed vigor.⁴²

⁴¹ John R. Gillis, *The Human Shore: Seacoasts in History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).

⁴² Cape Hatteras National Seashore was authorized by Congress in 1937, but the law did not actually create a National Seashore. The state of North Carolina did not hand over enough land for the establishment of Cape Hatteras National Seashore until 1953. See Binkley, *The Creation and Establishment of Cape Hatteras National Seashore: The Great Depression Through Mission 66* (National Park Service, August 2007).

Chapter One: Federal Beaches from the Progressive Era to the Cold War

As early as 1915, the first Director of the National Park Service, Stephen Mather, petitioned Congress to establish a Sand Dunes National Park on Indiana's Lake Michigan shore. Botanists knew Indiana's dunes as the "birthplace of American ecology" and wanted the Park Service to preserve it as a landscape of national heritage.⁴³ Despite this ecological heritage, a sandy beach park had no precedent in the National Park Service. Park Service historians have written that the early Park Service only protected areas with "vertical landscapes."⁴⁴ Even the one National Park on a coastline in the early 1910s, Acadia National Park in Maine, had vertical landscapes where rocks and trees shot out of the water to form a semi-mountainous coast.⁴⁵ When famous, Midwestern-based landscape architect Jens Jensen argued that Indiana's coast merited protection, even he relied on the trope of a vertical landscape, confident it would convince the Park Service to preserve it better than the area's ecological credentials might:

Just think of us poor prairie folks, who have not the Adirondack Mountains, as our good friend from New York, and who have not the mountains of California, as has our good friend Mr. Mather. In fact the only thing in the world that we have that has any similarity at all to the Adirondacks and the Rocky Mountains is our dunes over in Indiana. The 200 feet of Mount Tom look just as big to me as the Rocky Mountains did when I visited them some years ago, and bigger to me, in fact, than did the Berkshires when I made my pilgrimage to those wonderful hills of Massachusetts. [Applause.]⁴⁶

In Indiana, a sand dune could qualify as a vertical landscape, Jensen argued. His noble effort to make a mountain out of a mole hill did not impress members of Congress, who passed on

⁴³ Robert P. McIntosh, "Ecology Since 1900," *History of American Ecology*, ed. Frank N. Egerton (New York: Arno Press, 1977): 353-354.

⁴⁴ Alfred Runte discusses the importance of vertical landscapes in *National Parks: The American Experience* 197, 210-211; For more on vertical landscapes see Paul Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 40-41.

⁴⁵ George B. Dorr, *Acadia National Park: Its Origin and Background* (Bangor: Burr Printing Co., 1942). Acadia's acquisition was also traditional for early National Parks. John D. Rockefeller bought the land and donated it to the National Park Service. See Joseph W. Ernst, ed. *Worthwhile Places: Correspondence of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and Horace M. Albright* (New York: Rockefeller Archive Center, 1991).

⁴⁶ Stephen T. Mather, U.S. Department of the Interior, *Report on the Proposed Sand Dunes National Park, Indiana* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1917), 24.

Indiana's park proposal entirely. Federal coastal parks had struck out legislatively for the first time. In 1917, the National Park Service could not decide whether beaches were nationally significant landscapes – were they truly worthy of *federal* protection and the high scenic standards that the Park Service tried to maintain?



Figure 1: Stephen Mather with an expedition at the Indiana Dunes, 1917, NPS Photo, accessed March 27, 2015, http://www.nps.gov/indu/learn/historyculture/early_development.htm.

Stephen Mather and Jens Jensen believed beaches and dunes were worth protecting, but Congress disagreed. They failed to pass a Sand Dunes National Park bill and the legislation died quietly with the onset of World War I.⁴⁷ After the failure of Sand Dunes National Park in 1917, the National Park Service did not attempt to create a coastal park for the next twenty years. In 1934, the Park Service designated its first flat National Park, the Everglades. Its establishment was not without controversy. Historian Alfred Runte admits that Everglades had trouble passing

⁴⁷ Kay Franklin and Norma Schaeffer, *Duel for the Dunes: Land Use Conflict on the Shores of Lake Michigan* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 34-36, 40-42.

due to its lack of rugged terrain.⁴⁸ The idea of a swampy, flat National Park sounded revolutionary to many Americans – what was worth preserving? Conservationists argued that the unique biology of the Everglades qualified it for federal protection. “Why not,” asked Dr. John K. Small of the New York Botanical Garden, “also have a unique area exhilarating by its lack of topography and charming by its matchless vegetation and animal life?”⁴⁹ Everglades National Park opened up the Park Service, albeit reluctantly, to parks with horizontal landscapes. Everglades became the first park whose value centered on biological uniqueness and the first flat National Park. Botanists and conservationists were delighted.⁵⁰

While the Park Service tried to decide whether flat landscapes merited federal protection, the American masses hit the beach in record numbers.⁵¹ Automobiles increased the mobility of middle-class Americans at unprecedented rates. Beach vacations had been popular since Victorian England, but the automobile democratized tourism and allowed more middle-class folk to leave the city for a quick day trip to the shore.⁵² Places like Cape Cod had been nearly unreachable before the automobile and asphalt. When Henry David Thoreau visited the Cape in the 1850s, a carriage ride from Sandwich to Provincetown took several days. In 1935, it took

⁴⁸ Runte, *National Parks*, 127-134.

⁴⁹ Runte, *National Parks*, 136, on the Everglades, 130-136.

⁵⁰ Robert Sterling Yard to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 21, 1924. Folder “FDR: Family, Business and Personal, Subject File. National Parks Association,” Box 30, Roosevelt, Franklin D. Family, Business and Personal Papers. Subject File. Miscellaneous Memorabilia-Naval Matters. Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library. Runte, *National Parks*, 130-137.

⁵¹ For a history of tourism at the beach in the United States, see Lena Lencek and Gideon Bosker, *The Beach: The History of Paradise on Earth* (New York: Viking, 1998). Thomas Weiss, “Tourism in America before World War II” *The Journal of Economic History*, 64, 2 (June 2004): 289-327, especially 300-307; For a history on the transition of Cape Cod into a tourist beach area, see James C. O’Connell, *Becoming Cape Cod: Creating a Seaside Resort* (Durham, NH: University of New Hampshire Press, 2002) and John T. Cumbler, *Cape Cod: An Environmental History of a Fragile Ecosystem* (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2014), 113-172. The transition of beach areas from reliant on fishing and sea-related extractive industries to tourism-based economies was a phenomenon in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as well. See Sue Farrant, “London by the Sea: Resort Development on the South Coast of England 1880-1939,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, 22, 1 (January 1987): 137-162; Ellen Furlough, “Making Mass Vacations: Tourism and Consumer Culture in France, 1930s to 1970s,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40, 2 (April 1998): 247-286;

⁵² Anne Mitchell Whisnant, *Super-Scenic Motorway: A Blue Ridge Parkway History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 17-24; Marguerite S. Shaffer, *See America First: Tourism and National Identity, 1880-1940* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 137-161.

about two hours by car. Thoreau wrote of the carriage having trouble navigating the “heavy” roads of the Cape that only improved after a rain, when the water hardened the sand. Asphalt laid in the 1920s made a trip through the sandy soil as easy as a drive through the city.⁵³ Even during the Depression, an increasing number of Americans gained access to automobiles that could bring them on day, weekend, or summer trips away from the city. As more and more Americans visited the beaches, individual states, local governments, and the Roosevelt Administration all began to consider: what was the best way to accommodate this beach-going public?

Federal officials in the New Deal recognized that beaches were not “adequately represented” in the National Park system, despite the “recognized fact that the seashore has a strange appeal to a wide range of the population.”⁵⁴ Beachgoers, drawn by this “strange appeal” of the shore, had few choices: less than 1% of the U.S. coast was in public ownership and available for recreational use in 1937.⁵⁵ As of 1935, the National Park Service administered no sandy beaches and the only coastal park it administered was Acadia. The Park Service began commissioning studies on potential coastal parks, surveying the nation’s coasts looking for beaches that might merit inclusion in the park system.

They started at Cape Hatteras. Cape Hatteras was one of the only coastal Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) sites in the 1930s. A job-creating program, the CCC helped put men back to work while also improving the built and natural infrastructure of America’s National

⁵³ Thoreau visited the Cape four times between 1849 and 1957, then narrated the four trips as one single journey in *Cape Cod*. Henry David Thoreau, *Cape Cod* (1864; reprinted New York: Houghton, Mifflin, & Co, 1893), 20. On paving of roads in the interwar period, see Christopher Wells, *Car Country: An Environmental History* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012). On increased automobile tourism at this time, see James Agee, “The Great American Roadside,” *Fortune* (September 1934); Warren James Belasco, *Americans on the Road: From Autocamp to Motel, 1910-1945* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979).

⁵⁴ Oscar L. Chapman, Acting Secretary of the Interior, to Honorable Rene L. DeRouen, Chairman, Committee on the Public Lands, July 19, 1937. *Report to accompany H.R. 7022, Establishment of Cape Hatteras National Seashore. August 9, 1937*. Calendar No. 1247, 75th Congress, 1st Session, Senate, Report No. 1196.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

Parks.⁵⁶ Future National Park Service Director Conrad Wirth oversaw the CCC units within the National Park Service's jurisdiction, which included Cape Hatteras.⁵⁷ Wirth, convinced Cape Hatteras could be part of the National Park Service, secured funding through the CCC for the National Park Service to conduct surveys of America's coasts in 1934 and 1935.⁵⁸ The initial surveys were followed by a 1937 study of Point Reyes, California and a 1939 study of Cape Cod, Massachusetts. These National Park Service reports specifically detailed information on land acquisition costs, acreage, and administrative priorities of potential coastal parks.⁵⁹

One major Congressional act in 1936 legitimized the Park Service's foray into beach park studies and mitigated its aversion to flat, watery, or marshy landscapes. The Park, Parkway, and Recreational Area Study Act of 1936 expanded the Park Service's purview to include a strong focus on recreation. While the study that the Act commissioned was not completed until 1941, the authorizing language "significantly expanded the range and type of land areas that could be preserved and managed by the NPS."⁶⁰ With this new mandate to provide recreational resources for millions of Americans living in cities, beaches—especially those near large metropolitan

⁵⁶ For much more on the CCC, see Neil Maher, *Nature's New Deal*.

⁵⁷ A few Cape Hatteras locals relentlessly tried to get Wirth to transition the State Park (where the CCC camp was) into a National Seashore. This began Wirth's long interest in National Seashore establishment. Binkley, *The Creation and Establishment of Cape Hatteras National Seashore*, 15-26.

⁵⁸ Douglas W. Doe, "New Deal Origins of the Cape Cod National Seashore," *Historical Journal of Massachusetts*, 25, 2 (Summer 1997): 144-145. Although *Our Vanishing Shoreline* references it, Conrad Wirth references it in his book, and numerous NPS memos and letters reference it, no one can actually find this study. Historian Larry Dilsaver believes that the majority of copies may have been thrown out with massive archival purges that occurred at Harpers Ferry in the 1970s. The 1959 Pacific Coast survey references a 1935 report (the one no one can find), saying, "The only reference available prior to the 1955 report was a similar study completed in 1935, but development on the eastern seaboard had expanded tremendously in the meantime, thereby making the former twenty-year-old study almost completely obsolete." United States. National Park Service, *Pacific Coast Recreation Area Survey* (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, 1959). *Our Vanishing Shoreline* stated that "private and commercial developments" in coastal areas between 1935 and 1955 meant the 1935 report "represented the ghosts of departed opportunities." U.S. National Park Service, *Our Vanishing Shoreline* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), 9, 23.

⁵⁹ Emerson Knight, *Point Reyes Peninsula, CA - Study of a National Seashore Recreation Area 1935*, 1935, Box 5, Folder 12, Emerson Knight Collection, BANC 79/2 C, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; Thomas H. Desmond, "A Proposed Seashore and Historic Parkway on Cape Cod, Massachusetts," commissioned by U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service (Simsbury, CT, 1939), 3-4.

⁶⁰ Binkley, *The Creation and Establishment of Cape Hatteras National Seashore*, 32-33.

areas – suddenly became a logical landscape for National Park Service expansion. This added to the expanded federal obligation to control beaches that came with the establishment of the Beach Erosion Control Board in 1930. Together, the Beach Erosion Control Board and the 1936 Park, Parkway, and Recreation Area Study Act together created a federal climate that brought beaches within the scope of the National Park Service’s mission.⁶¹

Despite this increased focus on recreation, the only coastline that was authorized as a National Seashore in the 1930s was Cape Hatteras. Its authorization came with substantial caveats. Hatteras differed from postwar National Seashores in that much of its land was publically owned (having been a CCC camp at the time) and the rest was in large chunks of private land.⁶² Fewer owners made purchasing more manageable. Yet, a decade and a half passed between the 1937 act authorizing the creation of Cape Hatteras National Seashore and its establishment. This was thanks to provisions in the 1937 bill that specified that the state of North Carolina would be required to acquire a sufficient acreage in the designated area, either through purchase or donation, which they would then turn over to the National Park Service once a minimum threshold had been reached.⁶³ North Carolina was not able to deliver the promised acreage until 1953, so the 1937 Congressional Act establishing Cape Hatteras had little in the way of teeth.⁶⁴ Although Yellowstone Superintendent Roger W. Toll called Cape Hatteras a

⁶¹ Mary-Louise Quinn, “The History of the Beach Erosion Board, U.S. Army, Corps of Engineers, 1930-1963. Miscellaneous Report No. 77-9 (August 1977), Prepared for U.S. Army, Corps of Engineers, Coastal Engineering Research Center.

⁶² Binkley, *The Creation and Establishment of Cape Hatteras National Seashore*, 2-41.

⁶³ At Shenandoah National Park in the late 1930s, the state appropriated one million dollars (an “unprecedented” move, according to historian Sarah Gregg) to purchase land for Shenandoah National Park, which the state would then turn over to the federal government. As a general policy, however, the Park Service did not appropriate funding in the establishment of National Parks. This would be a major change with the addition of seashores and lakeshores to the system. Sarah Gregg, *Managing the Mountains: Land Use Planning, the New Deal, and the Creation of a Federal Landscape in Appalachia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 117-119; Wirth, *Parks, Politics, and the People*, 260, 328.

⁶⁴ Some appropriations for parkland acquisition occurred during the Keynesian federal budgets of the early 1930s, but the conservative backlash against the New Deal starting in 1937 made any appropriations for purchasing new coastal parkland politically infeasible. Binkley, *The Creation and Establishment of Cape Hatteras National*

“prototypical National Seashore Park,” the long delay between authorization and establishment was not a model that the National Park Service wanted to follow in future seashore parks. The next go around, the Park Service would bring money to the table, even if they had to do it themselves.

Conrad Wirth would make sure of that. The most outspoken proponent of coastal parks in the 20th century, Wirth’s advocacy for Cape Hatteras National Seashore carried over into the postwar period. The time Wirth spent personally involved in land planning and coastal erosion control at Cape Hatteras, the only National Seashore authorized by Congress before WWII, familiarized him with coastal areas.⁶⁵ Others have also identified Wirth as the driving force behind federal coastal parks. George Palmer, former National Park Service Assistant Mid-Atlantic Regional Director, once said the genesis of the national seashore idea originated “pretty much in-house, a Connie Wirth contribution.”⁶⁶ Once Conrad Wirth became Director of the Park Service in the 1950s, he resurrected the seashore idea.

Back to the Beaches in 1955

The National Park Service saw its budget shrink to nearly nothing during the war years. In 1942, the Park Service moved its Headquarters from Washington, D.C. to Chicago to make room for essential agencies during the war years. The move reified the symbolic pushing aside of the Park Service –and other domestic, non-war related agencies – during World War II.⁶⁷ Any available funds went, logically, to the war effort. Like civilian citizens, civilian agencies were

Seashore, 15. For more on the conservative backlash against the New Deal, see William Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 252-274.

⁶⁵ Conrad Wirth, *Parks, Politics, and the People*, 52-58, 192-200.

⁶⁶ George Palmer, Interview by Robert F. Gibbs, Francis P. Burling, and Charles H. W. Foster, October 10, 1975, 6–7, Burling papers, Salt Pond Visitor Center, Cape Cod National Seashore, National Park Service (hereafter SPVC).

⁶⁷ John C. Miles, *Wilderness in National Parks: Playground or Preserve* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 115; Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 151. Sellars says that “the Park Service’s ability to function effectively was further diminished” with the move to Chicago.

expected to tighten their belts and do their part. Conrad Wirth notes that the Park Service budget dropped to \$4.74 million in 1945, which was less than one-seventh its budget in 1940 (\$28.8 million).⁶⁸ Gasoline rations meant that few Americans could visit the park during these years anyway. As the war ended and the GIs came home, National Parks flooded with young families, newly middle class thanks to the GI Bill and a strong economy.⁶⁹ They drove to parks and found them in a state of utter disrepair – ten years of little to no funding, followed by exponential increases in visitation, left the National Park Service searching for a solution, some way to breathe life into the system again.

Park Service leaders came up with Mission 66. Conrad Wirth dreamed up Mission 66 as a reinvigoration of the federal park system. It would increase emphasis on recreation and bring parks back to their glory days of pre-war funding. Wirth formed a committee and had them work out the details of how to fix old parks, improve visitation, and expand the system. All told, not including the addition of new areas, Mission 66 pumped \$1 billion into the National Parks over a ten year period.⁷⁰ Mission 66 took a pro-development approach to National Park administration. Structural and recreational development within the park, Wirth hoped, would save the parks from being loved to death. Criticism of Mission 66 generally revolved around this “paradox of protection by development,” in the words of former Yellowstone Superintendent Lon Garrison.⁷¹ This was an automobile-heavy era in NPS planning—the American Automobile Association even co-sponsored the banquet formally initiating Mission 66 in February of 1956.⁷² Mission 66

⁶⁸ Wirth, *Parks, Politics, and the People*, 318.

⁶⁹ Elizabeth Cohen, *A Consumer's Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), Hays, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence*, 129-130.

⁷⁰ Wirth, *Parks, Politics, and the People*, 256; Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 173-177.

⁷¹ Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 181.

⁷² Louter, *Windshield Wilderness*, Chapter 4, “A Road Runs Through it: A Wilderness Park for the North Cascades,” 105-133; Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 183.

programs focused heavily on recreation, automobile tourism, and accommodating the huge postwar tourist crowds.⁷³

Park Service leaders wanted seashores to be an integral part of Mission 66. Despite several detailed plans and reports on potential national seashores written under Wirth in the 1930s, building that occurred on coasts in the late 1940s and early 1950s left them outdated.⁷⁴ In the meantime, Mission 66 increased the Park Service's emphasis on recreation even more than the 1936 Park, Parkway, and Recreational Area Study Act had.⁷⁵ The National Park Service commissioned a comprehensive report on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts in 1955, and then followed that with surveys of the Pacific and Great Lakes coasts in 1959.⁷⁶ The Park Service published results from the first survey in a condensed format for the public, entitled *Our Vanishing Shoreline*.⁷⁷

⁷³ For more on Mission 66, see Roy E. Appleman, Department of the Interior, National Park Service, *A History of the National Park Service Mission 66 Program* (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958); Ethan Carr, *Mission 66: Modernism and the National Park Dilemma* (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007).

⁷⁴ DOI, NPS, *Our Vanishing Shoreline*, 9.

⁷⁵ Louter, *Windshield Wilderness*, Chapters 3-4.

⁷⁶ The Department of the Interior conducted a series of studies between 1955 and 1959 that identified 16 areas on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, 5 on the Great Lakes shores, and 5 on the Pacific Coast to be included in the National Park system. Of 26 proposed National Seashores and Lakeshores, the DOI established 14 between 1961 and 1975. U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, *Report on the Seashore Recreation Area Survey of the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955) (That highest priority be given to the acquisition of the following 16 areas: Great Beach, Cape Cod, Massachusetts, Cumberland Island, Georgia; Fire Island, New York; Shinnecock Inlet, Hew York; Padre Island, Texas; Smith Island, North Carolina; Bogue Banks, North Carolina; St. Joseph Spit, Florida; Mosquito Lagoon, Florida; Parramore Island, Virginia; Kiawah Island, South Carolina; Marco Beach, Florida; Debidue Island, South Carolina; Popham-St. John, Maine; Crescent Area, Maine; Brazos Island, Texas, DOI, NPS, *Pacific Coast Recreation Area Survey* (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, 1959); DOI, NPS, *Our Vanishing Shoreline* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955); DOI, NPS, *Our Fourth Shore: Great Lakes Shoreline Recreation Area Survey* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959).

⁷⁷ U.S. National Park Service, *Our Vanishing Shoreline* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955).



Figure 2: An Illustration from *Our Vanishing Shoreline, U.S.* National Park Service, *Our Vanishing Shoreline* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955).

Published in an easy-to-read booklet accompanied by colorful illustrations, *Our Vanishing Shoreline* was “widely read” across the U.S. and helped to intensify public support and opposition for seashores around the affected coastal areas in the late 1950s.⁷⁸ Park historian Larry Dilsaver suggested that these reports “galvanized the campaign for recreation areas, particularly coastal ones.”⁷⁹ Newspapers published on the findings of the report, bureaucrats sent copies to politicians, local advocates of particular shorelines asked to see it, and Department of the Interior officials couldn’t wait to get copies in the hands of politicians with potential seashores in their districts.⁸⁰ As the press around seashore proposals intensified, citizens began

⁷⁸ Larry Dilsaver, *Cumberland Island National Seashore: A History of Conservation Conflict* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004), 80.

⁷⁹ Dilsaver has written on Cumberland Island National Seashore and also researched National Seashore and Lakeshore creation extensively. Dilsaver, *Cumberland Island National Seashore*, iv. Circulation of *Our Vanishing Shoreline* picked up in 1958, when legislators introduced bills for several individual seashores and lakeshores across the country. For example, in of how the report was widely read and how that picked up in 1958 and 1959, consider how often the *New York Times* mentioned either “national seashore,” “national lakeshore,” or “vanishing shoreline” in: 1955: 4 articles (two of which were real estate ads for Fire Island), 1956: 5 articles (three of which were Cape Hatteras ads or classifieds), 1957: 3 articles, 1958: 6 articles, 1959: 19 articles, 1960: 15 articles, 1961: 38 articles, 1962: 63 articles. That’s a 300% jump in mentions between 1958 and 1959, after already doubling in the previous year. The press on National Seashores clearly did not pick up nationally until 1959.

⁸⁰ Letter, Hatfield Chisolm, Undersecretary of the Interior, to John F. Kennedy, September 16, 1957, Box 620, “Cape Cod Canal, Cape Cod National Park, 6/11/57 – 9/16/57” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, John F. Kennedy Library (hereafter JFKL); Letter, Leslie Moore, Executive Editor, *Worcester Telegram – The Evening Gazette Sunday Telegram* to Senator John F. Kennedy, March 12, 1957, Box 663, “Cape Cod Canal, Cape Cod National Park,

forming opinions and furiously writing their Congressmen. They wrote of their love of beaches, about what some saw as a great need for public coastal lands, and of their worries about private property in proposed parks.⁸¹




Figure 3: Department of the Interior, National Park Service, *Our Vanishing Shoreline* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955). Image digitized by google, accessed April 28, 2015, <http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112104107385;view=lup;s>.

A small but vocal opposition to the recommendations of *Our Vanishing Shoreline* took issue with the mysterious source of funding for the study. While it is now clear that Andrew Mellon’s Old Dominion and Avalon Foundations funded the 1954-1955 study, the National Park Service kept the donors under wraps at the time.⁸² Mellon’s foundations provided a good deal of funding for coastal park creation in the U.S., in addition to the 1950s surveys. In the late 1960s, Mellon’s foundations contributed \$6 million to land acquisition at Cumberland Island and they

1/31/56 – 4/9/57” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. Letter, E.T. Scoyen, Acting Director, DOI, to Mrs. Adrian Murphey, May 1959, Box 687, “Cape Cod National Park, 4/1/59 – 6/29/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

⁸¹ Many advocates of seashore preservation referenced *Our Vanishing Shoreline*. Some did so explicitly like Maurice Barbash of Fire Island, who said “our rapidly vanishing shoreline” was part of “our irreplaceable natural heritage” in the U.S., while others used its language. For example, James Randall wrote to Kennedy, “one need only look at our vanishing shoreline with its ever increasing abundance of neon signs, hot dog stands, and other misplaced vulgarity to know that a bill of this nature must take the highest precedence if such natural beauty spots are not to be lost forever.” Randall to Kennedy, September 10, 1959, Box 713, “Cape Cod National Park, 9/7/59 – 9/29/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. Maurice Barbash, Chairman, Citizens’ Committee for a Fire Island National Seashore, Senate Committee on Public Lands, *Fire Island National Seashore; Hearings*, December 11, 1963, 41.

⁸² Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 46; Wirth, *Parks, Politics, and the People*, 55-58, 193.

also contributed to land acquisition costs at Cape Hatteras.⁸³ This continued a long tradition of the National Park Service depending on the industrial elite of the United States for funds to expand National Park Service territory.⁸⁴ The Mellons continued in the tradition of wealthy families like the Rockefellers who bought and then donated huge tracts of land to the National Park Service for future public use.⁸⁵ That private funds began the foray into coastal parks is particularly significant since later seashores were groundbreaking for the later mass appropriation of public moneys for their establishment.



Figure 4: An Image from the Pacific Coast Recreation Area Survey. Department of the Interior, National Park Service (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, 1959), Introduction.

⁸³ Dilsaver, *Cumberland Island National Seashore*, 81, 101-102.

⁸⁴ The first National Park Service Director, Stephen Mather had a personal fortune from his borax mining empire which he often used to supplement Park Service funding in its early years – Richard Sellars writes that for a while, Mather “even paid the salary of the national parks’ chief publicist, Robert Sterling Yard.” Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 31. Railroad companies also subsidized early National Parks and contributed heavily to their development, attendance, and publicity. Marguerite S. Shaffer, *See America First: Tourism and National Identity, 1880-1940* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001).

⁸⁵ Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 94; Robin W. Winks, *Laurance S. Rockefeller: Catalyst For Conservation* (Washington, D.C. and Covelo, CA: Island Press, 1997), 36; Wirth, *Parks, Politics, and the People*, 49, 54; Barry Mackintosh, *The National Parks: Shaping the System* (Washington: National Park Service, 1991), 23, 49.

Onlookers to the 1955 study whose influence did not quite equal that of the Mellons were aware only that funds came from a private foundation. Residents of these coastal areas worried that this spelled corruption, charges that Department of the Interior denied. Acting Director of the U.S. Department of the Interior, E. T. Scoyen, responded in 1959 to a resident of Truro, Massachusetts (an area recommended for inclusion in a Cape Cod National Seashore) with a good summary of the DOI's view on private donations – which, of course, failed to reveal any names of the donors. Note in particular Scoyen's insistence that the National Park Service's growth was not just appreciative of but explicitly dependent on private funding, and also his unapologetic secret-keeping of the donors' identity:

We note with some dismay your statement that 'apparently the National Park Service has been in the position of circumventing usual procedure because of what it refers to mysteriously as 'donated, non-government funds.' Much of the growth of the National Park System has been on the basis of such generous donations. The lands for nearly all of the parks east of the western public land states have been acquired with donated funds. The surveys of the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts and more recently of the Pacific Coast were financed by donated funds, as was the further study of the National Seashore potentialities of a portion of Cape Cod which resulted in the reports which you have seen. . . The foundations which made the donations available are educational and philanthropic foundations with no property or other interests involved in the Cape Cod proposal. They ask to be kept anonymous presumably because they do not wish to advertise their philanthropies.⁸⁶

Within two years of Scoyen's letter, Congress would appropriate millions for the procurement of land for Cape Cod National Seashore. At the time of the 1950s surveys and studies into potential seashore parks, however, the Department of the Interior clearly still saw private funds as the best chance at acquiring coastal lands for a new National Park site.

Other residents of shorelines studied in *Our Vanishing Shoreline* were strongly in favor of National Park status for their backyard beach. The report prompted the creation or, as the case may be, increased activity of community groups in favor of a National Seashore or Lakeshore in

⁸⁶ Letter, E.T. Scoyen, Acting Director, DOI, to Mrs. Adrian Murphey, May 1959, Box 687, "Cape Cod National Park, 4/1/59 – 6/29/59" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

their backyards. At the Indiana Dunes, the “Save the Dunes Council” had begun as an all-women’s group in the early 1950s, but they pushed forward with renewed vigor as *Our Vanishing Shoreline* recommended the dunes for some sort of federal protection. In the 1960s, the Izaak Walton League started a “Save Our Seashore” campaign.⁸⁷ The Sierra Club editorialized about coasts in its magazine’s pages.⁸⁸ At Cape Cod, the editorial board of the *Cape Codder* got to work editorializing in favor of a Cape Cod National Seashore Park, and citizens began writing letters to their congressional representatives asking for legislation action to establish a coastal park in their backyards. The bureaucracy, the public, and private funders all had beaches on their minds – now it was time to bring in the politicians.

The Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (ORRRC) sought to bring together politicians, industry leaders, conservation groups, and bureaucrats to plan out a comprehensive recreation policy in postwar America. Seashores were a major part of that policy. Commissioned by Congress in 1958, the ORRRC was tasked with determining the next forty years of outdoor recreation demands and supplies to craft a policy that could help the latter keep up with the former.⁸⁹ The ORRRC “crystallized [a] transition” in outdoor recreation occurring the late 1950s. The commission solidified outdoor recreation as both a resource and a service protected and offered by all levels of government. Originally proposed by Joseph W. Penfold of

⁸⁷ Kennedy asked Izaak Walton League Conservation Director Joseph Penfold outright if he would help with the shoreline preservation in 1960: “It would be most helpful if the Izaak Walton League will devote special efforts next year to the national seashore issue.” John F. Kennedy to J. W. Penfold, Conservation Director, Izaak Walton League of America, September 19, 1959, Box 754, “Cape Cod National Park – Correspondence, 9/11/59 - 10/30/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. See also to J. W. Penfold to John F. Kennedy, September 15, 1959, Box 754, “Cape Cod National Park – Correspondence, 9/11/59 - 10/30/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. The Izaak Walton League ramped up their support of seashores in the early 1960s under Penfold’s leadership.

⁸⁸ The Sierra Club devoted a whole issue in 1959 to supporting Point Reyes National Seashore. See “Report on Point Reyes: Shoreline Park for the Future,” *Sierra Club Bulletin*, 43 (September 1958). The Sierra Club continued to editorialize on national seashores, with a particular focus on Point Reyes. George Collins, *The Art and Politics of Park Planning and Preservation, 1920-1979*, an oral history conducted 1978-1979, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, 268-271, esp. 264.

⁸⁹ Winks, *Laurance S. Rockefeller*, 122, George H. Siehl, “The Policy Path to the Great Outdoors: A History of the Outdoor Recreation Review Commissions.” Prepared for the Outdoor Resources Review Group. *Resources for the Future Background Study* (October 2008), 2-3.

the Izaak Walton League, the ORRRC's reports were the first attempt to inventory the nation's recreational resources. Penfold hoped that having solid numbers to cite—numbers that other outdoor interests like timber and grazing already had – would help conservationists better argue the imperative for outdoor recreation.⁹⁰ Penfold also hoped that these numbers might help to address America's overburdened parks and outdoor areas.⁹¹ The commission had three goals: to assess America's recreation needs and wants, determine the resources currently available to meet those needs, and to recommend policies and program that could be implemented to better meet current and future needs.⁹²

The ORRRC brought together an incredibly broad array of interests, all of whom had a stake in the recreation debate.⁹³ Members included state conservation agency directors; “conservationists” like Senators Richard Neuberger and Senator Gracie Pfof; the Director of the American Forestry Association; the Vice President of the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company; Joseph Penfold of the Izaak Walton League; the President of the Prudential Insurance Company; and experts on grazing and parkland.⁹⁴ The advisory council included leaders of dozens of federal agencies whose missions in some way intersected with recreation.⁹⁵ Broad goals, broad

⁹⁰ Joseph Penfold was a Western Representative of the Izaak Walton League when he proposed the ORRRC. He later became Conservation Director of the League. Winks, *Laurance S. Rockefeller*, 121; Jack Lorenz, “Joe Penfold, No Ordinary Joe,” *Outdoor Writers Association of America*, Accessed March 9, 2015 from <http://owaa.org/owaa-legends/joe-penfold-no-ordinary-joe/>.

⁹¹ Conrad Wirth was fond of saying the National Parks were being “loved to death,” a phrase then picked up by many conservation groups and used for better protection of nature in National Parks. See Ethan Carr, *Mission 66: Modernism and the National Park Dilemma* (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007), 61.

⁹² For more, see George H. Siehl, “The Policy Path to the Great Outdoors: A History of the Outdoor Recreation Review Commissions.” Prepared for the Outdoor Resources Review Group. *Resources for the Future Background Stud.* (October 2008); Brent A. Olson, “Paper trails: The Outdoor Recreation Resource Review Commission and the rationalization of recreational resources,” *Geoforum*, (2010). Accessed March 4, 2015 from <http://brentaolson.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Olson-2010-01-01-Geoforum.pdf>; Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, “Outdoor Recreation for America” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962).

⁹³ Winks, *Laurance S. Rockefeller*, 123-124, Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 194.

⁹⁴ I put “conservationist” in quotes because the nominating forms listed both Pfof and Neuberger as specialists in “conservation.” Winks, 125.

⁹⁵ Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, “Outdoor Recreation for America” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962). iv, v, 194-195.

coalitions, and broad topics for study – twenty-seven sub-reports ranged from wilderness to coasts, hunting to urban parks—brought diverse constituencies into the conversation.

Laurance Rockefeller, the brother of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, was tapped to be Chair of the Commission. The Eisenhower Administration chose Laurance Rockefeller because he was “informed on national parks but also understood the wide scope of the recreational issue and was unlikely to be opposed by the Department of Agriculture or the Forest Service.”⁹⁶ Conrad Wirth, Director of the National Park Service and an huge proponent of recreation—his agency was the target of Sierra Club criticism that the Park Service over-emphasized recreation at the expense of nature protection—had hoped former Park Service Director Horace Albright might chair the commission.⁹⁷ Anticipating Wirth’s request for Albright, the Director of The Forest Service wrote to President Eisenhower asking specifically that Albright not be selected, for fear his chairmanship might lead to too many “national park-type proposals.” By this, the Forest Service Director meant recreation plans that did not include room for resource extraction and allowed for too much recreation-based development. Eisenhower, hoping to appoint a Republican anyways, happily listened to the Forest Service Director’s advice and chose Rockefeller.⁹⁸

Rockefeller later called the ORRRC “one of the most successful commissions in history in terms of legislative results.” His biographer added, “This was not an understatement.”⁹⁹ The Commission created the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, paved the way for the Land and Water Conservation Fund, shifted National Park Service focus to areas closer to urban population centers, applied Forest Service “multiple use” legislation to other areas, increased federal/state

⁹⁶ Winks, *Laurance S. Rockefeller*, 125.

⁹⁷ James W. Feldman, *A Storied Wilderness: Rewilding the Apostle Islands* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011), 204; Gottlieb, *Forcing the Spring*, 78.

⁹⁸ Winks, *Laurance S. Rockefeller*, 124-125.

⁹⁹ Winks, *Laurance S. Rockefeller*, 125.

cooperation on conservation issues, and became “the basis for much of the environmental program of [Lyndon B. Johnson’s] Great Society.” In addition to its summary report, submitted to John F. Kennedy on January of 1962, the ORRRC created 27 individual reports covering “virtually every permutation of recreation” and totaling over 4000 pages.¹⁰⁰

The ORRRC’s seashore report didn’t change Park Service policy as much as it added fuel to the fire. It also propelled National Lakeshore legislation in the late 1960s by establishing a Presidential directive and a designated funding source to purchase private land for new parkland, the Land and Water Conservation Fund. Passed by Congress in 1965, the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) used royalties from offshore oil and gas drilling to “create and protect national parks, areas around rivers and lakes, national forests, and national wildlife refuges” and to provide grants for state and local parks to do the same.¹⁰¹ The establishment of the LWCF did not enable national seashore legislation passage, but it helped make land purchases in already established areas financially possible. Ultimately, the ORRRC legitimized many goals the Park Service had already, particularly in coastal park expansion. It greatly assisted the passage of National Seashores and Lakeshores post-1962 by establishing a numerical baseline from which to argue that expanding recreation necessitated more attention and funding.¹⁰² The report also kept the issue of shorelines in the press and at the tip of

¹⁰⁰ Winks, *Laurance S. Rockefeller*, 131-134.

¹⁰¹ “What is the Land & Water Conservation Fund?” *Land and Water Conservation Fund Coalition*, accessed March 27, 2015, <http://lwcfcollection.org/about-lwcf.html>. For more on the LWCF, see Sara Dant, “LBJ, Wilderness, and the Land and Water Conservation Fund,” *Environmental History*, 19, 4 (October 2014): 736-743; Margaret Walls, “Federal Funding for Conservation and Recreation: The Land and Water Conservation Fund,” *Resources for the Future* (January 2009), accessed January 22, 2015, http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-BCK-ORRG_LWCF.pdf.

¹⁰² Ironically, the report also ended up temporarily removing recreation from the National Park Service’s control upon the establishment of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR). The BOR was under the Department of the Interior, which gave Interior the win over the Forest Service regarding control of recreational issues, but that was no consolation for Conrad Wirth who felt stripped of recreation, what he saw as one of the NPS’s major aims. Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 195.

conservationists' tongues.¹⁰³ The Kennedy and Johnson administration's embracing of the report led conservationists to use recreation-based arguments when courting federal funding for natural conservation. Federal funds, baseline studies, administrative support, and new cooperative avenues were all now available for recreation. Seashores and Lakeshores were at the forefront of this recreational push and benefitted from its largesse.

National Seashores Go Political

Before the ORRRC report concluded and a few years after the release of the *Our Vanishing Shoreline*, Congressional proposals for seashore parks began. Senator Paul Douglas (D-IL) introduced legislation to establish Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore as early as 1958, Senator Richard Neuberger (D-OR) introduced the first Oregon Dunes bill in 1958, and Representative Stuyvesant Wainwright (R-NY) introduced Fire Island legislation by 1958.¹⁰⁴ By 1959, Senators John F. Kennedy (D-MA) and Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA) had introduced the legislation to establish Cape Cod National Seashore.¹⁰⁵ The legislative and administrative push for National Seashores extended to other park units.¹⁰⁶ Seashores were the newest type of park in

¹⁰³ Rockefeller appointed *New York Times* reporter Marian Dryfoos Heiskell to the commission to ensure that its results would be widely publicized in the press. Winks, *Laurance S. Rockefeller*, 126.

¹⁰⁴ Kay Franklin and Norma Schaeffer, *Duel for the Dunes: Land Use Conflict on the Shores of Lake Michigan* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 159. Derek Larson, *Preserving Eden: The Culture of Conservation in Oregon, 1960-1980* (PhD diss, Indiana University, 2001), 44; "Fire Island National Park Wins Support," *Suffolk County News (Sayville)*, March 8, 1957, 1.

¹⁰⁵ In the House, Representatives Thomas P. ("Tip") O'Neill and Edward Boland introduced the first Cape Cod National Seashore legislation in 1958 in the House. Momentum and publicity did not pick up until late 1958/early 1959 when Kennedy and Saltonstall's Senate bill hit the floor and the National Park Service completed their official Cape Cod National Seashore proposal. For legislative history, see Peter Healey, "The Legislative History of the Cape Cod National Seashore Act: How an Executive Agency Assisted in Resurrecting and Expanding a Dormant Public Policy" (Master's Thesis, Georgetown University, 1967); Francis P. Burling, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore* (Plymouth, MA: The Leyden Press, 1978). Department of the Interior, National Park Service, *Cape Cod National Seashore - A Proposal* (Washington, D.C., 1958).

¹⁰⁶ These five seashores were the earliest legislative proposals in Congress. By the early 1960s, other National Seashore and Lakeshore legislation entered the pipeline—for Assateague National Seashore in 1963 and Sleeping Bear Dunes in 1961, for example. See Barry Mackintosh, *Assateague Island National Seashore: An Administrative History* (Washington, D.C.: History Division, National Park Service, Department of the Interior, 1982), Chapter I; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation,

the late 1950s, but the Park Service also added to its inventory in more traditional park units.¹⁰⁷

The first seashore, Cape Cod in 1961, paved the way for eleven other National Park units designated by the 87th Congress (1961-1962). Seashores played a prominent role in the expansion of the federal park system over the next decade; between 1961 and 1972, the National Park Service added seventy-nine new units to its system. Of those seventy-nine new units, eleven were National Seashores and Lakeshores.¹⁰⁸

Initial legislative approaches to National Seashore and Lakeshore creation show how comprehensively the Department of the Interior thought of the coastal preservation project. Several early bills to establish national seashores and lakeshores involved many sites on all shores of the country. One such bill, introduced by Senator Richard Neuberger of Oregon and written by Interior officials, was so much a product of bureaucratic (and not political) thinking that Neuberger soon opposed his own bill.¹⁰⁹ Other early multiple-seashore bills followed the lead of Neuberger's orphaned bill. Senate Bill 543, introduced in 1961 after several seashore individual seashore bills were already in the mix, provided funds for studies of twelve possible coastal National Parks and of National Forest coastal lands that could be suitable for recreational uses.¹¹⁰ Like Neuberger's bill, S. 543 never made it out of committee.¹¹¹

Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore. Hearings, Eighty-ninth Congress, first session, on S. 936 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 3.

¹⁰⁷ Runte, *National Parks*, 111-114.

¹⁰⁸ For a complete list of new National Park units in this time period, see Conrad Wirth, *Parks, Politics, and the People*, 325-328.

¹⁰⁹ Kennedy wrote to Nathaniel Saltonstall (an architect who designed many famous modern homes in Wellfleet who was also related to Leverett Saltonstall, co-sponsor of the Cape Cod National Seashore bill) that "The bill [S. 2010] has generated no visible support as yet, though it has had no active consideration. Senator Neuberger himself is not a proponent of this legislation and merely introduced it on request by the Department of the Interior." John F. Kennedy to Nathaniel Saltonstall, June 29, 1959, Box 713, "Cape Cod National Park, 4/1/59 – 6/29/59" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

¹¹⁰ U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Shoreline Recreation Areas: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on S.543: A bill to promote the preservation, for the public use and benefit, of certain portions of the shoreline areas of the United States, March 8 and 9, 1961* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 2.

Politically, the vast differences in land use, power structures, state and local control over beaches and upland areas, and local political persuasions made any omnibus bill on seashores difficult to pass. In order to successfully pass congressional legislation establishing federal coastal parks, legislators and their staff soon found it more effective – although perhaps not simpler – to introduce piecemeal legislation, a separate bill for each coastal park. The Department of the Interior approached coastal park legislation individually, even as they saw the push for buying up coastal land as a concerted national conservation effort. The legislative separation foreshadows just how differently Park Service and Interior had to approach each coastal park.

It is with this reality in mind that I divide this dissertation into chapters by locale, rather than staying focused on the federal story and moving chronologically through the process of coastal park creation at the grand scale. The story is still very much a federal one, but the reactions of local citizens and politicians in each coastal town shaped the legislative and administrative approaches to these new coastal parks. The legislative proposals to establish these parks occurred concurrently, but I arrange my chapters in order of the establishment of each park. The major studies, events, and recreational development I have outlined in this introduction provides context for the following case studies. I begin, then, with the first coastal park that used Congressional appropriations for all required land acquisitions and allowed continued homeownership by the area’s residents. Cape Cod National Seashore passed Congress in 1961

¹¹¹ While some of the areas the bill provided funding for surveys on did become federally protected areas, others never did and remain lesser known. Some became state parks, others experienced heavy building over the remainder of the 20th century. A full list (exclusive of the Michigan parks that were funded separately) is Cumberland Island, Georgia; Huron Mountains, Michigan; Channel Islands, California; Fire Island, New York; Cape Flattery, Washington; Leadbetter Point, Washington; Mosquito Lagoon, Florida; Pigeon Point, Minnesota; Debidue Island, South Carolina; Kiawah Island, South Carolina; Popham-Saint John, Maine; Parramoure Island, Virginia; and Smith Island, North Carolina” Larry Dilsaver cites several other Senate bills that would have provided for the establishment of several seashores, none of which were successful. Dilsaver, *Cumberland Island National Seashore*, 85-86.

and laid a legislative framework for the subsequent establishment of other coastal parks. Its “Formula” is the topic of my next chapter.

Chapter Two: The Cape Cod Formula: Listening to “locals”




Figure 5: “Cape Cod National Seashore,” Map, Google Maps, Google, March 25, 2015, <https://www.google.com/maps/place/Cape+Cod+National+Seashore/@41.8036129,-70.0066211,88137m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m2!3m1!1s0x89fb42dcc768c5df:0xa8d1f6c2f162f608>

Renowned American artist Edward Hopper spent forty of his eighty-four summers on Cape Cod. During one of these summers, in June of 1959, he sat down in his tranquil Truro home, nestled in rolling sand dunes, to write his Congressman about recent proposals for a Cape Cod National Seashore. Hopper, whose summer home sat within the boundaries of the proposed park, found the plan to make a park out of privately owned land disturbing. “Amazing that this

could happen in America,” he wrote, “People turned out of their houses, their private land desecrated, their life work demolished.” He finished with a flare: “This is tyranny and Russia.”¹¹²

Esther Wiles of Wellfleet agreed with Hopper’s Cold War-flavored sentiment, Wiles, who owned property near Wellfleet’s kettle ponds, had a different communist country in mind. Including a magazine clipping in a letter to her congressman, she wrote, “The enclosed picture reminds me so much of the way people seem to think we Cape Codders should feel about the govt. taking our land.” Unlike patriotic Shanghai businessmen, her reference suggested, Cape Codders would not hand over property to their government, either willingly or otherwise.¹¹³



Figure 6: Magazine Clipping. Caption reads: “The Shanghai businessmen ‘voluntarily’ handed over their privately owned enterprises to the Communist state. Here they dutifully celebrate the occasion.” Source: Included in letter from Esther Wiles to Congressman Hastings Keith. April 29, 1959, Box 2, Folder 1, Hastings Keith papers, SPVC.

Wiles and Hopper’s opinions, dramatized by the Cold war rhetoric of their time, were reactions to a new type of National Park. Coastal parks transformed the National Park Service into piecemeal land purchasers, entangled in local land use issues. Because much coastal land was privately owned, the only way to make a park was to buy the land back from private

¹¹² Edward and Josephine Hopper to Hastings Keith, June 7, 1959, Box 2, Folder 15, Hastings Keith Papers, Salt Pond Visitor Center, Cape Cod National Seashore (hereafter SPVC); Gregory Dicum, “Cape Cod, in Edward Hopper’s Light,” *The New York Times*, August 10, 2008, TR3. For more on Hopper, see Gail Levin, *Edward Hopper: An Intimate Biography* (New York: Knopf, 1995).

¹¹³ Esther B. Wiles to Hastings Keith, April 29, 1959, Box 2, Folder 1, Hastings Keith Papers, SPVC.

citizens. Deemed by its creators “The Cape Cod Formula,” this new process included innovative zoning, new methods of cooperation with locals, substantial federal appropriations, and a piecemeal approach to park creation.¹¹⁴ The Cape Cod Formula enabled the National Park Service to curry favor with the often powerful residents within future coastal parks in order to garner support necessary for legislative park establishment. The NPS worked fast: only two years before Hopper and Wiles wrote their Congressman, residents of coastal areas remained largely unaware of the Department of the Interior’s grand plans for coastal parks. Those who had heard rumors feared the worst: a state takeover of private lands, with little to no public involvement, à la China, Russia, or the communist country du jour. Yet, by 1961, most Cape Codders had come around to the idea of a National Seashore. Why?

This chapter follows the evolution of public views and federal plans from 1957, the year of the first legislation that would provide for the establishment of a Cape Cod National Seashore, to 1961, when the bill establishing Cape Cod National Seashore finally passed. The process that the National Park Service would one day call the “Cape Cod Formula” worked at its namesake because politically influential residents of the Cape were deeply involved in the process of creating the park’s authorizing legislation. Unlike at parks created in the nineteenth century rural West, the wealth and political status of Cape Codders gave them access to national politicians

¹¹⁴ Jim Feldman calls Cape Cod National Seashore and the Indiana Dunes National Seashore “important models” for Apostle Islands National Seashore, established in 1970. Feldman, *A Storied Wilderness: Rewilding the Apostle Islands* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011), “important models” quote from 176. A good example from the time period of other regions looking to Cape Cod as a model can be found in Don Smith, “Cape Cod: Fire Island: Planners of a New National Seashore Study an Older One to the North,” *Newsday*, December 23, 1964, 20. Federal officials referred to Cape Cod as the model for other national seashores outright. Undersecretary of the Interior James K. Carr, called Fire Island National Seashore’s enabling legislation the “Cape Cod formula on a more generous basis” in 1963 Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands hearings. *Fire Island National Seashore Hearings, April 10, 1964* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 26. Ethan Carr is currently working on an administrative history on Cape Cod National Seashore, the first to be done on the park, which will chronicle its enabling legislation and the administration of the park up to today. He will likely be focusing very heavily on the “Cape Cod Formula” and how the National Park Service applied it at other National Seashores and Lakeshores. For a political science take on the Cape Cod formula for coastal zone management, see Michelle Portman, “Coastal protected area management and multi-tiered governance: the Cape Cod Model,” *Journal of Coastal Conservation*, 11, 2 (November 2007): 121-131.

and the Department of the Interior. Interior officials listened to Cape Cod locals, addressed their concerns, and ultimately created a park according to their standards. Cape Cod residents made their voices heard through public relations efforts, private attempts by several influential Cape Cod homeowners (many of whom had the ear of the nation's most powerful politicians) to shape the future park, and through the rising political status of one of the Cape Cod National Seashore bill's original sponsors: John F. Kennedy.

Interior officials saw Cape Cod as a litmus test, a run-through of sorts that the Department could then repeat in other regions. Strong political collaboration between residents and federal officials, combined with an influx of cash from the National Park Service's Mission 66 appropriations produced the Cape Cod Formula model. Cape Codders' Cold War-infused fears in the late 1950s gave way to a cautious complacency by 1960. The National Park Service did not change the minds of Cape Codders to facilitate this transition. Rather, Cape Codders' demands changed the approach of the National Park Service. Cape Cod National Seashore set precedents, but the case met so much success only because the "feds" and the "locals" were *the same people*. Those authoring and promoting Cape Cod National Seashore legislation for the park had homes in and around its boundaries. The Cape Cod Formula worked on Cape Cod in 1961, but would these same ingredients exist at other parks later in the decade?

Rather than focus on the legislative origins of this law or the administrative history of the park (a story already told by locals involved in the establishment of the park and by the National Park Service itself), I examine instead the people who the land buy-up affected and how communities came to grips with the federal government buying up over 50% of the land in their towns.¹¹⁵ I catalogue their reactions to new physical and political landscapes in the late 1950s

¹¹⁵ Francis Burling, a newspaper reporter with the *Cape Coddler*, wrote a book detailing the legislative origins in Cape Cod National Seashore, based on interviews with over 50 individuals involved in the establishment of the park.

and early 1960s. The National Park Service had a limited history of purchasing small tracts of private land to turn into parkland—they had done it in small part for the Blue Ridge Parkway and the Appalachian Trail— but no area with land as expensive and residents as prestigious as those of Cape Cod had ever been bought from private landowners to turn into public park.¹¹⁶

Coastal parks marked a radical departure from nineteenth century National Park creation. Unlike mid-twentieth century parks, the federal government established most nineteenth century National Parks by drawing a line on a map and ignoring indigenous habitation and claims to the land.¹¹⁷ Recent historians of National Parks have acknowledged how National Park dispossessed Natives Americans of their land.¹¹⁸ Other environmental historians like Karl Jacoby and Louis Warren have written about how early National Parks forced locals off their land and criminalized rural economic practices like hunting and trapping.¹¹⁹ Parks like Yellowstone forced residents to

Charles H. W. Foster, an environmental policy expert who would later become dean of the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies (F&ES), collaborated on those interviews with Burling and wrote a book in 1985 about the Cape Cod National Seashore Advisory Commission based on the interviews and his experiences as Chairman. Transcripts of these interviews are at Cape Cod National Seashore's Salt Pond Visitor Center. Francis P. Burling, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore* (Plymouth, MA: The Leyden Press, 1978), Charles H.W. Foster, *The Cape Cod National Seashore: A Landmark Alliance* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1985). For general histories of Cape Cod, see Henry Kittredge, *Cape Cod: Its People and Their History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1930); Josef Berger, *A Cape Cod Pilot: Federal writers' project, Works progress administration for the state of Massachusetts* (Provincetown, MA: Modern Pilgrim Press, 1937). More recent histories of Cape Cod include John T. Cumbler's, which focuses on the history of the Cape generally, not the National Seashore specifically. John T. Cumbler, *Cape Cod: An Environmental History of a Fragile Ecosystem* (Amherst and Boston : University of Massachusetts Press, 2014).

¹¹⁶ Gregg, *Managing the Mountains*, 117-119; Whisnant, *Super-Scenic Motorway*.

¹¹⁷ Early histories of National Parks and preservation make little mention of the inhabitants who lived in the parks before Congress set them aside. Roderick Nash discusses American Indians as they relate to the intellectual history of wilderness, but does not address how the U.S. government removed them from the areas that became the first parks. See Roderick Frazier Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind* (2001 reprint; New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1967), 24, 36-37, 50, 245. Alfred Runte discusses how early National Parks saw Natives as part of the 'natural' scenery, rather than recognizing any claims they might have to the land or disputes Native tribes might have with the Park Service. See Runte, *National Parks*, 200-206, 239.

¹¹⁸ Mark David Spence, *Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making of the National Parks* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Theodore Catton, *Inhabited Wilderness: Indians, Eskimos, and National Parks in Alaska* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997). Richard Sellars mentions the expulsion of Native tribes briefly in *Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997); 23.

¹¹⁹ Karl Jacoby, *Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves and the Hidden History of American Conservation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), Louis Warren, *The Hunter's Game: Poachers and Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

relocate their homes and classified land in which Crow, Shoshone, and Bannock tribe members seasonally lived as “unoccupied.”¹²⁰ In contrast, the twentieth century “local” at Cape Cod—wealthy, politically influential, and well-connected within East Coast power structures—was able to negotiate both to keep their vacation home and to establish a park in their backyard. In the nineteenth century Adirondacks, Jacoby notes, only a handful of residents were “wealthy summer home owners who were politically well-connected and difficult to dislodge” from their land. At Cape Cod, this description characterized almost all residents.¹²¹ National Seashore proponent Senator Jacob Javits admitted in 1964 that politicians and Park Service officials who pushed park creation in wealthy eastern coastal resorts (like Cape Cod and Fire Island) catered to the “very important right of those owning property in the area.”¹²²

Cape Codders articulated their concerns about federal land purchases through familiar Cold War language. They connected federal conservation politics with Cold War politics as they played out in the home. Like the women in Elaine Tyler May’s seminal work, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, Cape Codders practiced a sort of “domestic containment” in protecting their homes from the U. S. federal government. In fighting to protect the sacredness of the home, Cape Codders fought the 1960s federalization of private land for parks and recreation.¹²³ They accused the Department of the Interior of communist tactics that

¹²⁰ Spence, *Dispossessing the Wilderness*, 51.

¹²¹ Jacoby, *Crimes Against Nature*, 33-34.

¹²² Property rights quote from Statement of Senator Jacob Javits, Subcommittee on National Parks, *Fire Island National Seashore Hearings, April 10, 1964* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964). The proximity of these new parks to cities on the U.S. East Coast changes the class dynamics and shifts this story from a rural to urban tale. Although Alan MacEachern has written a comprehensive look at Canadian National Parks on the Atlantic Coast, few historians studied the establishment of National Parks on America’s eastern seaboard. See Alan MacEachern, *Natural Selections: National Parks in Atlantic Canada 1935-1970* (McGill-Queens University Press, 2001).

¹²³ Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (1988, reprinted New York: Basic Books, 1999). See also Elizabeth Carney, “Suburbanizing Nature and Naturalizing Suburbanites: Outdoor-Living Culture and Landscapes of Growth,” *The Western Historical Quarterly*, 38, 4 (Winter, 2007): 477-500.

invaded the sanctity of their homes.¹²⁴ The story of Cape Codders' reactions to potential federal purchase of their land for recreational parkland connects domestic Cold War ideology to federal conservation policy in a new and underexplored way.

A Brief Geologic History of Life on Cape Cod

Nothing about Cape Cod is permanent. The entire landmass—once dubbed by Henry David Thoreau the “bared and bended arm of Massachusetts”—consists of glacial deposits from the last ice age.¹²⁵ As glaciers retreat, they leave behind sand, pebbles, rocks, and other debris that accumulate on the earth, freed from their former icy prison. Geologists call this discarded sediment “glacial till.” All of Cape Cod is a pile of this millennial-old debris. No bedrock exists in the shape of Massachusetts' most prominent peninsula. Only 18,000 years old today, geologists estimate that the landmass will cease to exist entirely in another 2,000 years.¹²⁶

The erasure of Cape Cod occurs on an annual, erratic, and very visible basis. While most geologic changes happen on timescales too huge for humans to see, coastal systems change rapidly. The high cliffs of sand and pebbles on the outer Cape erode easily; one strong winter storm can wash away twenty feet of a sandy bluff.¹²⁷ Cape Cod differs from other coastal

¹²⁴ See examples later in the chapter.

¹²⁵ Henry David Thoreau, *Cape Cod* (1864; reprinted New York: Houghton, Mifflin, & Co, 1893), 2.

¹²⁶ For more on the geology of Cape Cod, see Robert N. Oldale, *A geologic history of Cape Cod*. *U.S. Geological Survey* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Geological Survey, 1980).; Robert N. Oldale, *Cape Cod and the islands, the geologic story* (East Orleans, Mass.: Parnassus Imprints, 1992); Marjorie G. Winkler, “A 12,000 year history of vegetation and climate for Cape Cod, Massachusetts,” *Quaternary Research*, 23, 301 (1985). For an estimate of when the Cape will be just a collection of sandy shoals that takes climate change into account, see Oldale's quote in “At 50, The Cape Cod National Seashore Is Literally Washing Away” *90.9WBUR: Boston Radio*, August 5, 2011, accessed September 12, 2014, <http://radioboston.wbur.org/2011/08/05/cape-cod-erosion>.

¹²⁷ In recent years, a 20 foot erosion of the cliffs in Wellfleet and Truro on just one day, in one storm, is not uncommon. See Cape Cod experiences over 10 years of erosion in one storm,” *WCVB5 ABC*, February 13, 2013, Accessed March 31, 2015, <http://www.wcvb.com/news/local/boston-south/Cape-Cod-experiences-over-10-years-of-erosion-in-one-storm/18537432>; “Cape Cod National Seashore issues post-storm report: Nauset Light Beach stairs lost again; CCNS looks into ‘storm-smart’ infrastructure solutions,” *Cape Cod Today*, February 4, 2015, accessed March 31, 2015, <http://www.capecodtoday.com/article/2015/02/04/28808-Cape-Cod-National-Seashore-issues-post-storm-report>.

ecosystems in its consistency of retreat. Unlike barrier islands, Cape Cod does not ebb and flow with every wave's turbulence. Rather, it rotates and retreats. Over the last 130 years, geologists have measured changes in the Cape's coast and found that the high bluffs of Wellfleet and Truro erode an average of three feet per year.¹²⁸ As the wind and waves erode the sand, longshore currents smooth the Cape's forearm and redeposit the particles of sand north and south of the bluffs. Thus, as the coasts of Wellfleet and Truro erode, the sandy spits of Monomoy and Provincetown grow. As the Cape rotates, the fist of the Provincelands curves ever inward while the forearm gets thinner and thinner at Wellfleet and Truro. With the increasingly intense storms that climate change causes, some geologists have revised their estimates as to when the Cape will disappear – maybe even sooner than 2,000 years. As one Cape Codder from inland Harwich put it, “Someday I'll have beachfront property.”¹²⁹

¹²⁸ H. L. Marindin, “Encroachment of the sea upon the coast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, as shown by comparative studies, cross-sections of the shore of Cape Cod between Chatham and Highland Lighthouse,” *Annual Report of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey* (1889) Appendix 13, 409-457.

¹²⁹ Quote from Cape Cod National Seashore Park Ranger and Harwich resident Valerie Bell, interview by the author, August 5, 2014.




Figure 7: Blue arrows show the movement of net sediment transport. Arthur Strahler, *A Geologist's View of Cape Cod*, 1988.

Cape Cod's unique geology has shaped building patterns on its land. The Wampanoag tribes who lived on the Outer Cape – the Pamets, Nausets, and Monomoy—established summer camps near the marshy waters and relatively calm summertime Atlantic beach. They spent the harsh winters in the Cape's uplands. Because the entire Cape is a glacial landmass, the trees and vegetation of protected uplands resembled those of any hardwood New England forest.¹³⁰ The Wampanoag tribes collected quahogs and steamers in the summer mudflats, cranberries and oysters in the fall, and hunted the forests' game and ate the summer's corn (buried deep in the

¹³⁰ This changed somewhat after European settlers cleared much of the forest and ocean winds blew away the topsoil. The forest of Cape Cod's uplands today are in an early stage of ecological succession and consist primarily of pitch pine, but if left alone, will grow into a hardwood forest once again. This is beginning to happen already in parts of Eastham and Wellfleet. For a natural history of Cape Cod, see Elisabeth C. Schwarzman, *The Nature of Cape Cod* (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 2002); Dorothy Sterling, *The Outer Lands: A Natural History Guide to Cape Cod, Martha's Vineyard, Nantucket, Block Island, and Long Island* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1967).

sand for preservation) in the winter.¹³¹ When the first permanent European settlers, Puritans, arrived on the Mayflower in 1620 and then settled on the Cape in 1637, they emulated the building patterns of the Wampanoags as they gradually took over their safe settlement areas in the Cape's relatively erosion-free uplands.¹³² As farmers, Puritans settled on arable land and protected as commons areas whose soil was infertile and whose land was too unstable for homebuilding, like the Provincelands.¹³³ The only houses in the Provincelands sit next to Provincetown's ideal harbor, the second deepest natural harbor in the world.¹³⁴ This harbor has made Provincetown over the years a fishing power, a naval base, and a favorite stopping point for prohibition era rum-runners.¹³⁵ In Truro, just south of Provincetown, we find a town where only limited building ever took place, but where most settlers build homes in inland glacial woods, protected from the eroding cliffs of the Atlantic coast.¹³⁶ Wellfleet's town center is on a bayside harbor, also protected from the Atlantic's erosion.¹³⁷ The communities of Eastham and Orleans are inland as well, but with ready access to the fertile marshlands, home to an important source of food and identity for Cape Codders: shellfish.¹³⁸

¹³¹ For more on the Wampanoag tribes of the Outer Cape, see John T. Cumbler, *Cape Cod*, 13-23; Francis P. McManamon, "Prehistoric Land Use on Outer Cape Cod," *Journal of Field Archaeology*, 9, 1 (Spring 1982): 1-20; Richard F. Whalen, *Truro: The Story of a Cape Cod Town* (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2007), 19-42; Karen Christel Krahulik, *Provincetown: From Pilgrim Landing to Gay Resort* (New York and London: New York University Press, 2005), 23-27.

¹³² Cumbler, *Cape Cod*, 33-35

¹³³ On the protection of the Provincelands, see Krahulik, *Provincetown*, 26-28; Henry C. Kittredge, *Cape Cod: Its People and Their History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1930); Burling, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore*, 1-2.

¹³⁴ Michelle E. Portman, Di Jin, Eric Thunberg, "The connection between fisheries resources and spatial land use change: The case of two New England fish ports," *Land Use Policy*, 28 (2011): 523-533.

¹³⁵ Krahulik, *Provincetown*, 112-117.

¹³⁶ Whalen, *Truro*, 167-179.

¹³⁷ Judy Stetson, *Wellfleet: A Pictorial History* (Wellfleet, MA: Wellfleet Historical Society, Inc., 1963).

¹³⁸ D. B. Wright, *The Famous Beds of Wellfleet* (Wellfleet, MA: Wellfleet Historical Society, Inc., 2009); Alice A. Lowe, *Nauset on Cape Cod – A History of Eastham* (Falmouth, MA: Kendall Printing Co., 1968).



Figure 8: Winslow Homer, "A Basket of Clams," 1873.

Shellfishing has long been a part of the mythos surrounding Cape Cod. In Henry David Thoreau's *Cape Cod* (1858), he meets a Wellfleet Oysterman and regales the reader with stories of his hard-scrabble life. Thoreau's book on Cape Cod represents one of the earliest pieces of travel literature on the Cape and helped to ignite the next 150 years of tourism on the Cape.¹³⁹ Thoreau's nostalgic idealization of shellfishing set precedents. Another famous early artist who worked on Cape Cod, Winslow Homer, painted scenes of shellfishing. As shellfishing and fishing as a profession declined and tourism rose, the quaint image of the clammer on the mudflats or the oysterman in Wellfleet came to represent Cape Cod and New England's cultural heritage. Shellfishing helped to ground the Park Service's case for making Cape Cod a National Seashore.¹⁴⁰ Tourism guidebooks of the 1930s through the 1950s also mentioned clamming and oystering as a popular recreational pastime for tourists.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ O'Connell, *Becoming Cape Cod*, 3-11.

¹⁴⁰ Department of the Interior, National Park Service, *Cape Cod National Seashore - A Proposal* (Washington, D.C., 1958); Thomas H. Desmond, "A Proposed Seashore and Historic Parkway on Cape Cod, Massachusetts," commissioned by U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service (Simsbury, CT, 1939), 3-4.

¹⁴¹ Paul Smith, *A modern pilgrim's bayshore guide to Cape Cod* (Provincetown, MA: self-published, 1935); William J Finn, *Tourists guide to Boston harbor, Hull, Nantasket, along the south shore to Plymouth, Cape Cod canal and*

As tourism on Cape Cod rose, people began building homes in places Puritans and Wampanoags avoided: atop Truro's sand dunes and on the sandy, eroding cliffs of the outer Cape's Atlantic side.¹⁴² New demands for summer homes and an influx of retirees contributed to this building rush in the postwar period.¹⁴³ They bought 19th century Cape Cod-style houses and re-patched the cedar shingles, they built modernist homes on sand dunes, and they filled the population void caused by decades of decline in the fishing industry.¹⁴⁴ These new Cape Codders were wealthy members of New England's elite: Harvard professors, national politicians, and industrial giants. They knew Cape Cod's sandy shore through their homes, through recreational shellfishing and beach going, and as the quaint, New England towns that the villages were before postwar population and visitation surges. These new Cape Codders wanted to keep the Cape in the quiet, environmentally healthy state that they had found it. The same harsh realities of erosion on the Outer Cape that contributed to millennia of avoiding home building near the Outer Cape's Great Beach created the ecologically intact coastal landscape that Cape Codders and the National Park Service wanted to protect in the 1950s.

Provincetown (Boston: self-published, 1914); Katharine Dos Passos and Edith Shay, *Down the Cape: the complete guide to Cape Cod* (New York, Dodge Pub. Co., 1936).

¹⁴² Emily Donaldson, Margie Coffin Brown, Gretchen Hilyard, *Cultural Landscape Report for Dune Shacks of Peaked Hill Bars Historic District* (Boston: National Park Service and Olmsted Center for Landscape Preservation, 2011); Peter McMahon and Christine Cipriani, *Cape Cod Modern: Midcentury Architecture and Community on the Outer Cape* (New York: Metropolis Books, 2014).

¹⁴³ Cumbler, *Cape Cod*, 138, 148-150.

¹⁴⁴ University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Landscape Architecture and Regional Planning, Department of History, *People and Places on the Outer Cape: A Landscape Character Study* (National Park Service, Olmsted Center for Landscape Preservation, Northeast Regional Ethnography Program, 2004), 2.



Figure 9: Dune Shacks of the Peaked Hill Bars Historic District, NPS Image, accessed March 27, 2015, http://www.nps.gov/cultural_landscapes/snp/650111.html.

Beginnings of Cape Cod National Seashore Idea

Despite the important role John F. Kennedy played in the creation of Cape Cod National Seashore, he learned about the Department of the Interior’s Cape Cod plans incidentally and indirectly. In early 1956, Kennedy had been working with the Department of the Interior and Massachusetts officials to investigate the possibility of a national park along the Cape Cod Canal, on the opposite side of Cape Cod from the Great Beach.¹⁴⁵ In August of 1957, Francis Sargent, Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Natural Resources and future

¹⁴⁵ See Massachusetts Forest and Park Association to Senator John. F. Kennedy, July 5, 1956, Laurence Minot Channing to Hon. Donald W. Nicholson, January 11, 1957 in “Cape Cod Canal, Cape Cod National Park, 1/31/56 – 4/9/57” Folder, State Senator Edward C. Stone to Senator John F. Kennedy, April 23, 1957, Box 663, “Cape Cod Canal, Cape Cod National Park, 6/11/57 – 9/16/57” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

Massachusetts Governor, wrote to Kennedy asking for his support—or, if fundamentally opposed, for at least his “reservation of rights”—for a Cape Cod National Seashore.¹⁴⁶ Sargent, a national leader in the field of outdoor recreation, was also a home and business owner on the Outer Cape.¹⁴⁷ He cited a “relatively small but vocal opposition” to a Cape Cod National Seashore that was “being whipped up by real estate developers and would be subdividers,” indicating that the public discussion of a potential park was well underway.¹⁴⁸

Senator Kennedy had no idea such park plans existed within his state. Within days of hearing from Sargent, Kennedy wrote directly to National Park Service Director Conrad Wirth to request additional information on the proposed park.¹⁴⁹ This was two years after the release of *Our Vanishing Shoreline* and yet, one of the two Senators from the nation’s highest priority coastal park had not been briefed on federal plans for his state. Undersecretary of the Interior Harold Chisolm promptly caught Kennedy up and sent him a copy of *Our Vanishing Shoreline* to peruse.¹⁵⁰ Chisolm called the Great Outer Beach of Cape Cod,

not only the longest continuous stretch of undeveloped beach in New England but also . . . one of the two outstanding coastal areas studied along the entire Atlantic and Gulf

¹⁴⁶ Francis W. Sargent to Senator John F. Kennedy, May 14, 1958, Box 687, “Cape Cod Canal, Cape Cod National Park” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

¹⁴⁷ Sargent would soon become the Executive Director of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission. U.S. Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, *Outdoor Recreation for America: A Report to the President and to the Congress* (Washington, D.C.: The Commission, 1962).

¹⁴⁸ Sargent and his wife started a sporting goods store, “Goose Hummock,” in Orleans in the 1940s. See Richard A. Hogarty, *Massachusetts Politics and Public Policy: Studies in Power and Leadership* (Amherst, Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002), 69-70. *The Encyclopedia of Massachusetts* (St. Clair Shores, MI: Somerset Publishers, Inc., 1999), 145. In keeping with Cape Cod traditions of having old American lineage, Sargent is remembered also as a distant relative of the famous painter John Singer Sargent. Robert Gold, “Orleans’ Goose Hummock Ship changes hands,” *The Cape Cod Times*, March 13, 2013. Accessed September 14, 2014 at <http://www.capecodtimes.com/article/20130313/NEWS11/130319892>. Sargent quotes from Francis W. Sargent to Senator John F. Kennedy, August 23, 1957, Box 663, “Cape Cod Canal, Cape Cod National Park, 6/11/57 – 9/16/57” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

¹⁴⁹ Kennedy wrote to NPS Director Wirth on August 29, 1957, ““Commissioner Sargent has recently called my attention to a proposal to establish a national park running between Orleans and Eastham to Provincetown and including 33 miles of unbroken beach as well as other areas” and “I would appreciate receiving any information you have on this proposal.” John F. Kennedy to Conrad Wirth, August 29, 1957, Box 663, “Cape Cod Canal, Cape Cod National Park, 6/11/57 – 9/16/57” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

¹⁵⁰ *Our Vanishing Shoreline*’s widespread circulation really picked up in 1958/1959 once National Seashore legislation began and politicians helped to publicize it through press releases and speeches on their own legislation.

Coasts . . . Accordingly, it has been concluded that the Great Beach area is of national significance and that all possible measures should be taken to assure its preservation for appropriate public use.¹⁵¹

Chisoln paraphrased *Our Vanishing Shoreline* in his praise of Cape Cod's natural features. The report concluded that the Great Beach on the Outer Cape contained:

practically every feature desirable for preservation for ordinary recreational purposes and for the additional use of historical and nature study. In spite of its ready accessibility, it has the priceless feeling of remoteness.¹⁵²

Cape Cod was listed as one of the top three priorities for federal coastal conservation in *Our Vanishing Shoreline*. Yet, Interior officials had failed to communicate with legislators who would have to take up the cause in Congress in order to make the park a reality in the two years after the report's publication. As of 1957, the Department of the Interior might have paid lip service to the idea of a Cape Cod National Seashore, but they weren't willing to put muscle behind it to realize the plans.

That changed when Kennedy learned of Park Service plans for the Outer Cape and with the broad recreation initiatives underway by 1958.¹⁵³ Within one year, Kennedy and Leverett Saltonstall, the senior Senator from Massachusetts, had drafted and introduced a bill to establish a Cape Cod National Seashore.¹⁵⁴ Legislative staffers Fred Holborn in Senator Kennedy's office

¹⁵¹ Hatfield Chisoln to Senator John F. Kennedy, September 16, 1957, Box 663, "Cape Cod Canal, Cape Cod National Park, 6/11/57 – 9/16/57" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

¹⁵² U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, *Our Vanishing Shoreline*, 33. An important point to note about the Great Beach of Cape Cod is that no one built too closely to it because the sandy cliffs towering above the beach eroded an average of three feet per year, often taken during fierce winter storms. Houses crumbled off the sandy cliffs during winter storms (and still do) as the Atlantic Ocean ate away at real estate. Cape Cod is a geologic land mass, one that is entirely made of glacial till. In 10,000 years, estimated geologists before climate change possibly moved the timeline up, the Cape will no longer exist, scattered entirely by the force of the Atlantic. For more on the Cape's geology, see Robert N. Oldale, "Geologic History of Cape Cod, Massachusetts," (Woods Hole Field Center, Massachusetts: U.S. Geologic Survey, 1994?).

¹⁵³ 1958 was the same year that Congress commissioned the ORRRC report. See George H. Siehl, "The Policy Path to the Great Outdoors: A History of the Outdoor Recreation Review Commissions." Prepared for the Outdoor Resources Review Group. *Resources for the Future Background Stud.* (October 2008).

¹⁵⁴ Earlier bills, introduced by Representatives Edward P. Boland, Thomas P. O'Neill and Philip J. Philbin in 1957 and 1958, went nowhere legislatively. Kennedy and Saltonstall's was the first with legs. It also coincided with the National Park Service's release of the official Cape Cod National Seashore proposal (based on surveys conducted

and Jonathan Moore and David Martin in Senator Saltonstall's office began aggressively writing letters and press releases on Cape Cod National Seashore. These three men hoped to channel sentiment on the Cape into support for a National Seashore and mold legislation into a model that could work for all parties.¹⁵⁵ They had their work cut out for them.

Early Reactions: Anti-Communism and Homeownership Fears

Confusion abounded in the late 1950s about what a park on Cape Cod would mean. As residents heard that the federal government might be buying private land to turn into a public park, their first fear was that their houses and property would be taken from them. These fears permeated town hall meetings and clambakes on the Cape in 1958 and 1959. Staffers Holborn, Martin, and Moore spent hours reading complaints like the one from Frederick A. Smith, a summer homeowners in Wellfleet, who protested the seizure of private land. As a "small toad in a large pond," Smith felt helpless, and complained to Kennedy,

It begins to look as if some of the tactics of the Kremlin which you and your brother have been fighting is being adopted by our central government, that of the "State" owning all property through seizure, regardless of the owners' wishes.¹⁵⁶

Mary Meigs of Wellfleet agreed with Smith that this park creation was anything but benign—it threatened the very heart of the American psyche: home ownership.¹⁵⁷ Meigs warned that seizure

the previous two years), which also assisted its legitimacy. See also the legislative timeline in the appendix of Francis Burling's book on Cape Cod National Seashore, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore*.

¹⁵⁵ Francis Burling claimed the three staffers' work was essential in the passage of Cape Cod National Seashore legislation: The key to the success of the National Seashore legislation were Fred's patience and political insight, David's inventiveness and drafting skill, Jonathan's sympathetic understanding, springing from his roots in the Cape, of the concerns of the most affected citizens." Burling, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore*, ix.

¹⁵⁶ Frederick A. Smith to Senator John F. Kennedy, March 16, 1959, Box 713, "Cape Cod National Park, 2/24/59 – 3/31/59" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

¹⁵⁷ This concern was especially heightened at Cape Cod because rural areas seemed, according to Elaine Tyler May, the safest "escape from nuclear attack and a retreat into a vision of old-fashioned family life." Tyler May cites a 1950 *New York Times* article that reported "a boom in rural real estate was directly linked to civil defense concerns." Tyler May, *Homeward Bound*, 94.

of land for parkland might appear innocent, but, like Smith, she believed it took the first step in a slippery slope towards communism.

I should like to point out that the freedom of every citizen of the United States to choose a home and to live there is being jeopardized by the government policy of taking property away from individuals in what is called the public interest. The public interest is also composed of individual interests, which it seems, need no longer be consulted. No matter where one settles in the United States now, one is shadowed by the spectre of possible eviction—with “recompense”, to be sure. But recompense is no exchange for “home”. I see very little difference in principle between the policy of the Federal Government and that of the Chinese or Russian governments. In each case, large groups of people are ousted from homes that they love, for the sake of the “public welfare.”¹⁵⁸

Meigs’ evocation of Chinese and Russian governments rings an alarmist note, but it is not an outlier when compared to the worries of other Cape Codders. Florence Mayo and Joshua Nickerson, both descendants of historically prominent Outer Cape families, both privately wrote of the disregard for private property inherent in Cape Cod park plans. Mayo mused that “it seems the right of the common citizen amount to but little, these days,” and Nickerson ranted about the “utter disregard for liberty and private ownership” in the Department of the Interior’s park creation plans.¹⁵⁹

Although even the earliest Cape Cod legislation had at least some provisions for homeowners to retain their property, Cape Codders could not bring themselves to believe that the Park Service would not be buying up their land. Park Service Director Conrad Wirth encountered particularly hostile Cape Codders when he visited the area for public meetings in 1959. Wirth

¹⁵⁸ Mary Roberts Meigs to John F. Kennedy, April 15, 1959, Box 713, “Cape Cod National Park, 4/1/59 – 6/29/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. Meigs’ use of “spectre” to connote her property rights fears also points back to the Soviet Union, it being a commonly used word to describe the existential threat of the Soviet Union felt in America. See Melvyn P. Leffler, *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1933* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994).

¹⁵⁹ Florence Mayo wrote that it “seems unfair that the Federal Government should have the power to seize the property and disturb the peaceful existence of those who enjoy peace and quiet, rather than carousing and picking up beer bottles and cans and lunch papers.” Florence S. Mayo to John F. Kennedy, July 4, 1959, Box 713, “Cape Cod National Park, 7/1/59 – 8/28/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. Joshua Nickerson to John F. Kennedy, July 9, 1959, Box 713, “Cape Cod National Park, 7/1/59 – 8/28/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

refused to answer a question from a man who began aggressively, “The family is the basic unit of our society,” and then continued “and you are proposing to take homes. That will destroy families. The Communist doctrines set forth the idea of destroying families first. Are you proposing to do this?”¹⁶⁰ Citizens from these fiercely independent New England townships had a hard time believing that the federal government would protect their homes. Their fears show how rooted, in the words of Elaine Tyler May, “domestic aspirations were rooted in the postwar success effort.”¹⁶¹ The thought of federal seizure of that success as embodied in homeownership seemed unreasonable and un-American to Codders.¹⁶²

Homeowner Protection in Early Legislation

Early Cape Cod National Seashore legislation actually included extensive protections for homeowners, in addition to other innovative legislative provisions. Senator John F. Kennedy and Leverett Saltonstall both dedicated at least one staffer nearly full-time to the Cape Cod issue during the 1959-1960 congressional session to assuage homeownership fears of Cape Codders: Fred Holborn in Senator Kennedy’s office and David Martin in Senator Saltonstall’s. Fred Holborn was a Harvard-educated young man who had previously been a fellow of the Littauer Center at Harvard and had worked with the Department of the Interior for a year in Washington as a management intern for a year for the Displaced Persons Commission. Holborn followed

¹⁶⁰ Burling, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore*, 13.

¹⁶¹ For more on protecting the home from communism as a sort of domestic containment, see Tyler May, *Homeward Bound*, 156-162.

¹⁶² Massachusetts Senator Leverett Saltonstall, a sponsor of the legislation, sent out an informative mailing to voters in December 1959, reminding them that for pre-1959 homes, the bill “assures the right of homeowners whose property lies within the diagram of the Park to continue to own and occupy their home without interruption or interference if their town adopts and keeps zoning which meets standards defined by the Secretary of the Interior,” and for those built after September 1959, the bill “gives each residential landowner a minimum guarantee of electing either life occupancy or occupancy for 25 years.” Leverett Saltonstall, “Report to Massachusetts: The Cape Cod Seashore Park—Preservation for Future Generations.” December 17, 1959, 2, Box 2, Folder 7, David Martin Papers, SPVC; Cape Codders quote from Margaret J. Campbell to Hastings Keith, March 20, 1959, Box 2, Folder 15, Hastings Keith Papers, SPVC.

Kennedy to the White House and later became known as a “foreign policy guru” who taught for decades at the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.¹⁶³ Before he began working on the National Seashore legislation, Holborn had been to the Outer Cape a few times before.¹⁶⁴ Martin, an attorney from Danbury, Connecticut who entered Yale at the age of 16, had never been to the lower Cape until a 1959 exploratory trip. Martin drafted the legislative mechanisms to enable the passage of Cape Cod legislation¹⁶⁵ The two men dedicated considerable time and effort to the public relations task of appeasing Cape Codders. An editor at the *Cape Codder* wrote that Martin and Holborn both found that the “the Cape Cod project intrigued them greatly” and it “became a crusade for them both.”¹⁶⁶ They were later joined by a young staffer in Saltonstall’s office, Jonathan Moore, “who could claim two sets of grandparents from the Cape.”¹⁶⁷ The political acumen of Holborn and Martin, coupled with the localness of Moore, created a team of staff that Cape Codders felt familiar with and who many came to trust.

¹⁶³ Joe Holly, “Foreign Policy Guru Frederick Holborn Dies” *Washington Post*, June 9, 2005, accessed March 30, 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/08/AR2005060802579.html>.

¹⁶⁴ Burling, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore*, 17.

¹⁶⁵ Martin’s obituary in the *New York Times* remembers him as the one who “conceived the idea and created the mechanism that allowed the preservation of Cape Cod’s natural seashore while allowing private citizens to maintain their property within the protected area.” Robert McG. Thomas, Jr., “David Martin, 69, Innovator in Government Programs, Dies,” *New York Times*, October 2, 1995, accessed March 30, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/02/us/david-martin-69-innovator-in-government-programs-dies.html>; Burling, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore*, 17.

¹⁶⁶ Burling, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore*, 17.

¹⁶⁷ Burling, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore*, 22.



Figure 10: Fred Holborn, *Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. White House Staff Files of Frederick L. Holborn, JFKL*, accessed April 28, 2015, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHSEFLH.aspx>.

These staffers all received hundreds of Cold War complaints like those of Hopper, Wiles, and Meigs. To prevent alienating homeowners and to secure political support for the park, Holborn and Martin needed to include strong homeowner provisions in any Cape Cod National Seashore legislation. The major innovative tenants of Saltonstall and Kennedy's initial Cape Cod National Seashore legislation (introduced September 3, 1959) included the following provisions:

- The Secretary of the Interior's **power to condemn** "improved property" would be suspended for one year.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ Park Service policy was always to include some provisions for condemnation, which the proposed legislation included. Section 4(a)(8), *An Act to provide for the establishment of Cape Cod National Seashore*, Public Law 87-126, 87th Congress, 1st Session (August 7, 1961), 289.

- “**Improved property**” was defined as “a **private noncommercial dwelling**, including the land on which it is situated, whose construction was begun **before September 1, 1959**, and structures accessory thereto” (*By this, the legislation meant to include just single-family residential homes. The cut-off date was intended to curb speculative building within the proposed seashore area.*)
- **Towns could draft their own zoning laws, which** then must be approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
- If towns implemented and enforced zoning laws approved by the Secretary, **condemnation powers could be suspended indefinitely.**
- The Secretary would furnish a **certificate proving this suspension of condemnation** to anyone who requested it.
- The Secretary must pay **fair market value** for any improved property it purchased.
- After selling improved property to the Secretary of the Interior, the owner could elect to **retain the rights of use and occupancy** “for a term not to exceed twenty-five years or for a term ending at the death of such owner, whichever term he shall elect.”
- A “reasonable” amount of **noncommercial development would be allowed** within the park, provided the Secretary of the Interior approved and it complied with zoning bylaws.
- Payments in lieu of taxes would be paid to towns for two years to account for private property removed from the tax rolls.
- **Traditional hunting, foraging, and shellfishing** would be allowed
- The Secretary of the Interior would create a **Cape Cod National Seashore Advisory Commission** consisting of town residents, the state of Massachusetts, a Park Service representative, and a Chairman elected by the Secretary. No compensation or formal decision making would accompany the commission except that no permits for commercial or industrial uses of property within the park could pass without its consent.
- Authorized **\$15 million of appropriations** to purchase the parkland (*the first time Congress appropriated funds to buy an entire park*)¹⁶⁹

All of these provisions were fairly innovative. Most of them were duplicated in future legislation for other national seashore parks. The Department of the Interior eventually struck down the provision that would provide payments in lieu of taxes to towns that lost developable acreage to the park. While the towns gained more from early bills than they did in the final legislation, provisions to homeowners in Cape Cod bills were generous from the beginning.¹⁷⁰ No Cape Codders would have supported legislation that did not include strong homeowner protections.

¹⁶⁹ United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Cape Cod National Seashore Park. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, Eighty-sixth Congress, first[-second] session, on S. 2636, a bill to provide for the establishment of Cape Cod National Seashore Park* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 3-8.

¹⁷⁰ Wirth in House Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Cape Cod National Seashore Park: Hearings* (1960), 83-89.

As the Cape's Congressional Representative, Hastings Keith, put it, the bill's sponsors and their constituents were,

not concerned with the usual, relatively undeveloped national park area. As you have seen, several well-developed and prosperous communities are involved in this proposal. Therefore, any legislation creating a national seashore on the Cape must recognize the unique character of the area and its problems.¹⁷¹

Homeowner protections were a must for acquiring and maintaining local support. Freedom from condemnation was the issue Cape Codders lobbied on the most. When Cape Cod homeowners first heard of a park proposal, they complained vocally to their representatives. Legislators and the Park Service recognized that homes would be a part of any plausible Cape Cod National Seashore. Yet, Cape Codders remained unconvinced and were unwilling to go along with a park that might endanger their individual rights to property.¹⁷² Part of the issue was a communications one: the homeowner protections even in the original Cape Cod bill were actually quite generous and a marked departure from previous National Park legislation. Park Service officials and legislators needed to figure out how to convince Cape Codders that their homes would be safe even after a park.

Kennedy and Saltonstall had their staff thus spend a good deal of time clarifying the enabling legislation in order to prevent accusations of communist land-grabs. One form response to a Mrs. George C. Reeser of Wilmington, Delaware from January 1960 consisted of three

¹⁷¹ Keith in U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Cape Cod National Seashore Park: Hearings, December 16 and 17, 1960, Eastham, Massachusetts, 86th Congress, 2nd session* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960). 4.

¹⁷² For more on how a myriad of political interests used the language of rights in the 1960s and after, see Felicia Kornbluh, *The Battle for Welfare Rights: Politics and Poverty in Modern America* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), Nancy MacLean, *Freedom is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Workplace* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2006), Kim Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2009), 129. Grace Hale, *A Nation of Outsiders: How the White Middle Class Fell in Love with Rebellion in Postwar America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 237-276.

pages of Q & A, signed jointly by Senators Saltonstall and Kennedy. Questions that Mrs. Reeser had posed included the following:

- If a condemnation clause is written into the legislation, what protection would one have even if one were given life tenancy or 25 year occupation rights?
- If a mortgage is still against the property, how is that taken care of?
- Would one be permitted to make any improvements or additions after selling the property to the Federal Government? I know from Mr. Wirth's answer to someone's question that one is responsible for repairs and maintenance. What about insurance a) of the property b) of the contents of the house?¹⁷³

Kennedy's office answered to Mrs. Reeser's questions with form responses. The replies included legalistic jargon hardly suitable for reprinting, such as the following clear-as-mud gem:

The guarantee under subsection 4(a) would be significant to any home owner whose property was liable to possible condemnation through failure of his town to adopt zoning, in accordance with section 6, because of such failure not bringing into play the suspension of condemnation authority provided in subsection 4(b).¹⁷⁴

Form answers of Congressional offices assured concerned citizens that at the very least, even if their house was built after the September 1, 1959 cut-off date, they would retain use and occupancy for 25 years. At the very best, they would retain complete control over their house and property indefinitely. Writing letters might quell some homeowners' fear, but other Cape Codders took their concerns to a national audience.

"One of the best Yankee types"¹⁷⁵

Cape Codders who feared invasion by the masses of their quiet coastal retreat numbered among the most influential citizens in the early 1960s United States.¹⁷⁶ Nationally influential

¹⁷³ Senators Leverett Saltonstall and John F. Kennedy to Mrs. George C. Reeser, January 6, 1960, John F. Kennedy to Reeser, January 6, 1960, Box 730, "Cape Cod, 9/30/59 – 1/26/60" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. I apologize for not including her first name – neither she nor Kennedy's staff included her first name in the correspondence.

¹⁷⁴ Senators Leverett Saltonstall and John F. Kennedy to Mrs. George C. Reeser, January 6, 1960, John F. Kennedy to Reeser, January 6, 1960, Box 730, "Cape Cod, 9/30/59 – 1/26/60" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

¹⁷⁵ Fred Holborn to Serge Chermayeff, June 28, 1960, Box 731, "Cape Cod, 6/8/60 – 6/28/60" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

residents of the land zoned to become a park included, in no particular order: Arthur P. Schlesinger, Jr. (Harvard Professor of History and close advisor to John F. Kennedy), Francis Biddle (former U.S. Attorney General and judge at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg), Edward Hopper (famous American realist painter), Mark Rothko (famous abstract expressionist), Elliot Richardson (Future U.S. Attorney General), Serge Chermayeff (modern architect, Harvard professor, industrial designer, and co-founder of a few international architectural societies), Charles Eliot (Harvard landscape architect), Waldo Frank and Edmund Wilson (novelist and critics), Walter P. Chrysler, Jr. (son of the founder of Chrysler Corporation), and Nathan Saltonstall (famous modern architect and brother to a Massachusetts Senator Leverett Saltonstall).¹⁷⁷ This who's-who of 1960s politics, academia, art, and architecture lived side-by-side (or, more often, under the same roof) with Cape Codders whose pedigree would make the most staid New Englander blush. Lest Conrad Wirth think he could buy private land with no fuss, these individuals liked to remind him that it had been in their family since 1640 when the 'original' Outer Cape settler families, twenty years removed from the Mayflower, left Plymouth to farm the plains of Nauset (today Eastham).¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ A group of famous artists who lived at least part-time on the Outer Cape circulated a petition in favor of Cape Cod National Seashore. They also rooted their fears in class-based assessments, worrying that commercial development slow down and "would make of Cape Cod an enlarged version of Coney Island." Signers of the petition included: Signatures: Adolph and Esther Gottlieb, Paul and Barbara Bodin, Frances Krushenick, Frederick Rash, Admiral Donald B. MacMillan, Ida Rauh Eastmen, Jaqueline Miller, Mark Rothko, Margaret De Silver, Peter D. Martin, M. R. Werner, Joan Sinkler, Stephen Pace, Antoinette Laselle, Ross Moffett, and dozens more. Artist petition list to John F. Kennedy, September 18, 1959, Box 713, "Cape Cod National Park, 9/7/59 – 9/29/59" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

¹⁷⁷ The names I listed consist only of individuals who owned homes in the towns of Eastham, Wellfleet, Truro, and Provincetown This includes neither President John F. Kennedy, who did not live in the section of the Cape that would become a National Seashore and was therefore seen as an outsider to the Outer Cape, nor the many individuals whose families descended from Pilgrims or their contemporaries and thus claimed a good deal of political influence on Cape Cod.

¹⁷⁸ Obviously the Puritans were not the first inhabitants of the Cape. One archeologist knew this and argued for a park on archaeological grounds, for the wealth of Wampanoag history in the area: "The opportunity is unique in New England for no where else has it been possible for us to recommend to the Park Service that an attempt be made to present the story of the development of the Indians so thoroughly. As perhaps you know the proposed area includes a large number of the former sites of Indian villages. The data concerning these, already collected, can be used by the Park Service to great advantage." Frederick Johnson, Curator, Robert S. Peabody Foundation for

The politically well-connected and academically influential shaped the legislation establishing Cape Cod National Seashore to a degree unheard of in earlier parks. When thwarted by the problematic zoning statutes and questions of their jurisdiction, Kennedy's staffer Fred Holborn wrote to Donald F. Melhorn, Jr. at Harvard asking for his help. By December 1959, Melhorn's students at the Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau had written a report recommending specific zoning ordinances for use in and around the proposed park.¹⁷⁹ No national park had ever been established in such a heavily populated area, and with such an eye to preserving the historic, seaside character of towns outside of the park's boundaries. Professors and students in landscape architecture, legislation, and forestry studied the park-making process at Cape Cod with intensity. Harvard's tight connection with Kennedy and Saltonstall and their staffs, as well as Cape Cod residents, exaggerated the already substantial influence that Harvard-affiliated individuals had on the crafting of Cape Cod National Seashore legislation.

Because Cape Cod became a model for other parks, the New England elite had a disproportionate say in the types of coastal parks that the NPS created all over the country. The Harvard zoning report helped the Department of the Interior shape its zoning standards for Cape Cod towns, and it was only one among several Ivy League research groups involved in the development of Cape Cod National Seashore legislation. A forestry policy seminar at Yale also

Archaeology, Phillips Academy, to John F. Kennedy, June 9, 1959, Box 713, "Cape Cod National Park 4/1/59 – 6/29/59" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. For a good history of the Wampanoags and the tribes on the outer Cape – the Monomoy, Nausets, and Pamets – see Cumbler, *Cape Cod*, 24-27. Jill Lepore, *The Name of War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998). On Puritan settlement of the Cape, see Cumbler, *Cape Cod*, 31-38. Kittredge, a *Cape Cod: Its People and Their History*.

¹⁷⁹ Donald F. Melhorn, Jr. to Frederick Holborn, March 9, 1960, Box 730, "Cape Cod, 3/60" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL; Frederick L. Holborn to Ben Thompson, March 14, 1960, Box 730, "Cape Cod, 3/60" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. The full report can be accessed in Serge Chermayeff's papers at Columbia. Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau, "Suggestions Relating to the Zoning Provisions of a Bill to Provide for the Establishment of Cape Cod National Seashore Park." Series 1, Subseries A, Box 3, Serge Chermayeff architectural records and papers, 1909-1980, Columbia University Libraries Archival Collections.

studied the legislation during its creation as a novel approach to park establishment.¹⁸⁰ Other Harvard professors made it their business to proselytize about a park on Cape Cod. The efforts of Serge Chermayeff and Charles Eliot, professors in architecture and landscape architecture, respectively, at Harvard, greatly influenced the founding legislation for Cape Cod National Seashore. Both owned houses on Cape Cod, in Wellfleet and in Truro, and both spent a good deal of time communicating with the staff of the bill's sponsors and their staff.

Chermayeff played the role of convincer for Cape Codders reluctant to support the National Seashore plan and collaborator for those already on the “pro” side. Fred Holborn updated Chermayeff regularly on the progress of the legislation. Holborn even provided Chermayeff with names and addresses of other individuals who supported the National Seashore with whom Chermayeff might collaborate in his personal relations efforts. Passing along the name of one such supporter, Henry Guild, Holborn noted that “he is one of the best Yankee types and imperturbable on an issue of this character.”¹⁸¹ Both Holborn and Chermayeff recognized how the tight circles of New England's academic and/or genealogical elite could propel Cape Cod National Seashore legislation forward if these powerful individuals worked together. Chermayeff and Holborn worked together frequently, often meeting informally, to discuss plans for the future park and best practices for drumming up support. Chermayeff made it his business to keep an eye on development occurring on the Cape, especially in Wellfleet. His reports on Cape Cod builders Charles Frazier and Antoine Duarte shaped Martin and Holborn's view of

¹⁸⁰ Albert C. Worrell to John F. Kennedy, October 29, 1959, Box 713, “Cape Cod National Park, 10/1/59 – 12/17/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

¹⁸¹ Fred Holborn to Serge Chermayeff, June 28, 1960, Box 731, “Cape Cod, 6/8/60 – 6/28/60” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, Legislation, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. See also Henry Guild to John F. Kennedy, June 3, 1960, Box 731, “Cape Cod, 5/14/60 – 6/7/60” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

suburban development on the Cape and paved the way for the establishment of a cutoff date for home protections to help stall development.¹⁸²

Landscape architect and Harvard Professor Charles W. Eliot (the second) had a similarly informal relationship with Fred Holborn that Holborn utilized in developing organized Cambridge support for Cape Cod National Seashore.¹⁸³ Eliot wrote to Holborn asking for updates on the bill's progress on Congress, and Holborn replied promptly with personal notes.¹⁸⁴ Eliot developed detailed testimony for the Congressional record on his thoughts on the Cape Cod bill. Since Eliot was also on the Board of Directors of the National Parks Association and as a Trustee of the American Planning and Civic Association, his testimony is thorough (“strike out Section 5 providing for 10% elimination, and . . . adjust the boundaries of the park now instead of later”) and legislative staffers took it to heart. Eliot, who also owned a house in Wellfleet, was one of the many residents of Cape Cod who also claimed expert-level credentials in the field of park planning. Policymakers likely would have listened to Eliot's opinion on the park even if he did not frequent the Cape, but his interest as both a professional and homeowner led him to support a park that protected private inholdings.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² Serge Chermayeff to Wayne Aspinall, November 21, 1960, Box 754, “Cape Cod National Park – Chermayeff Letters” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. David Martin also credited Chermayeff with helping to establish a cut-off date for buildings to be included in the park and thereby limit development. Interview with David Martin by Francis P. Burling, Charles H. W. Foster, and Robert F. Gibbs, November 3, 1975, 11, Burling papers, SPVC.

¹⁸³ Eliot II was the great-grandson of former Harvard Professor Charles Eliot and the nephew of landscape architect and Olmsted contemporary Charles Eliot. Keith N. Morgan, “Charles Eliot, Landscape Architect: An Introduction to His Life and Work,” *Arnoldia* 59, 2 (Summer 1999): 19.

¹⁸⁴ Eliot also mixed business with personal – he casually requested tickets to the Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles for his son, to which Holborn replied with uncertainty, while also asking for updates in Cape Cod National Seashore legislation. Charles W. Eliot to Fred Holborn, January 26, 1960, Box 730, “Cape Cod, 9/30/59 – 1/26/60” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

¹⁸⁵ Charles W. Eliot to Fred Holborn, January 26, 1960, Box 730, “Cape Cod, 9/30/59 – 1/26/60” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL; Fred Holborn to Charles Eliot, February 3, 1960, Box 730, “Cape Cod, 2/1/60 – 2/19/60” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL; Charles W. Eliot to House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, June 17, 1960, Box 731, “Cape Cod, 6/8/60 – 6/28/60” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, Pre-Presidential Papers, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

Other Boston Brahmins and their prodigy gallivanted around the shores of Cape Cod with great frequency, and they did not hesitate to express their concerns to their elected officials. Quincy Adams Shaw, Jr., grandson of the founder of a major mining company in Boston (the *Boston Globe* once called his grandfather the “heaviest individual taxpayer” in the state of Massachusetts) and owner of a large chunk of land in Eastham, wrote elected officials and testified extensively in attempts to retain his private property.¹⁸⁶ Worried about homeowner protections, Shaw wrote in August 1959,

Unless there is a meticulous revision of the outlines of this initial Park plan, so as to exclude all homes and farms, which are not essential to the actual protection of our Beaches and Dunes, there will be widespread resentment and opposition, which might well result in defeating the entire plan.¹⁸⁷

Shaw wanted to protect homes and private property, many acres of which were his. A park that only protected the beach and left the uplands alone would have been amenable to Shaw.

Shaw reminded Kennedy, “Parks haven’t made America great – but homes have!”¹⁸⁸ He laid it out in political terms that legislative staffers certainly understood—appeasing these wealthy landowners was essential in gathering support for Cape Cod National Seashore. Shaw himself had once developed a full golf course in the Nauset Marsh area as an antidote for stress, at the recommendation of his doctor.¹⁸⁹ When someone with the wealth and pedigree of Shaw warned that “widespread resentment and opposition” could occur and defeat the plan, Kennedy’s staff knew that they could mitigate that opposition with a few simple phone calls and homeowner

¹⁸⁶ “Quincy A. Shaw Passes Away, Head of Noted Family Was 83 Years Old, Gave Large Sums of Money for Philanthropic Purposes, Heaviest Individual Taxpayer in the State,” *Boston Globe*, June 13, 1908.

¹⁸⁷ Quincy Adams Shaw, Jr. to John F. Kennedy, August 24, 1959, “Cape Cod National Park, 7/1/59 – 8/28/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

¹⁸⁸ Emphasis Shaw’s. Quincy Adams Shaw, Jr. to John F. Kennedy, August 24, 1959, “Cape Cod National Park, 7/1/59 – 8/28/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

¹⁸⁹ The Shaw family later donated much of their land, including parts of what is today Coast Guard Beach, to the National Park Service. Addendum, “Shaw Family Donates Coast Guard Beach Parcel for Conservation,” February 5, 2007 in *To Live Lightly on the Land: a guide to private land protection in the Cape Cod National Seashore* (Barnstable, MA: The Compact of Cape Cod Conservation Trusts, Inc., 2007), 28, accessed March 13, 2015, <http://www.thecompact.net/FINAL.Live%20Lightly.2014.small.pdf>.

safeguards. Ignoring the opinions of powerful residents really could defeat the entire Cape Cod National Seashore plan, as Shaw threatened.

Another part-time Outer Cape resident with political connections to rival presidents and a pedigree full of pilgrims was Francis Biddle.¹⁹⁰ Biddle's resume included Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board during the New Deal, Attorney General during World War II, and primary American judge during the Nuremberg trials following the war. Biddle attended Harvard (of course) and split his retirement between Wellfleet, Paris, and Philadelphia. His wife, Katherine Garrison Chapin Biddle, was a relatively well-known poet whose professional circles included the likes of T. S. Eliot, Thornton Wilder, and Robert Frost, as well as many other artists.¹⁹¹ Biddle and his wife owned an 18th century Cape Cod house on Wellfleet's bayside that was set to be included in the park. The home had previously been owned by Lorenzo Dow Baker, founder of the United Fruit Company and popularizer of bananas in America.¹⁹² Biddle had serious doubts as to whether a Cape Cod National Seashore could protect homeowners and the quiet sanctity of the Cape, which we will discuss later in this chapter. Biddle and other nationally influential Cape Codders shaped National Seashore legislation from the inside.

Kennedy's campaign for President began in the midst of Cape Cod National Seashore legislative wrangling and certainly helped the park proposal garner national—and even international attention. Concerned Americans, many of whom came from the upper echelons of

¹⁹⁰ Francis Biddle, *In Brief Authority* (New York: Doubleday, 1962), front endpaper. More on Biddle's lineage later in the chapter.

¹⁹¹ Katherine Garrison Chapin, *Outside of this World* (New York: Duffield and Company, 1930). For more on Garrison Chapin Biddle, see the biographical note to her papers, accessed September 12, 2014, <http://www.library.georgetown.edu/dept/speccoll/biddlek/scope.htm>.

¹⁹² For more on the Biddle property, which was recently purchased by the Trust for Public Land and donated to the National Park Service, see Trust for Public Land, "Historic Biddle Property Conserved For Cape Cod National Seashore," March 1, 2011, accessed March 31, 2015, <https://www.tpl.org/media-room/historic-biddle-property-conserved-cape-cod-national-seashore>; Trust for Public Land, "Biddle Property," accessed March 31, 2015, <https://www.tpl.org/our-work/parks-for-people/biddle-property>. For more on Lorenzo Dow Baker, see Dan Koepfel, *Banana: The Fate of the Fruit that Changed the World* (New York: Hudson Press, 2008), 52-56.

society, heard of the Cape Cod National Seashore proposal from across oceans simply because of the media attention focused on Kennedy at the time.¹⁹³ So many New Englanders had spent summers on the Cape as a child or with their children, and these fond memories prompted them to comment on the proposed park from hundreds of miles away. A Mr. C. F. Jenkins, who lived in Sandwich (a town on the upper Cape) when in the United States, expressed support for Cape Cod National Seashore from Bangkok, where business had taken him. Jenkins admitted that he did not know the other Senator from Massachusetts. The news about Cape Cod traveled to Thailand because it was attached to Kennedy, but news of Senator Saltonstall, who had been serving in Congress for fourteen years by 1959, did not.¹⁹⁴

While the rest of the world looked to Kennedy for a national park on Cape, crusty Cape Codders reminded Kennedy that he wasn't one of them—whether or not they supported a park. Kennedy summered with his family at Hyannisport, which, to residents of the lower Cape where the proposed park was, might as well be New York City. Hyannis, technically a village within the town of Barnstable was the closest thing to an 'urban' space as anywhere in Barnstable County, the county that encompassed all of Cape Cod.¹⁹⁵ Hyannis was a far cry from the miniscule year-round populations of the Outer Cape. Outer Cape residents saw Kennedy as an outsider who did not belong in their circles and did not understand their troubles. Cape Codders loved to repeat the line that Kennedy spent little time on the Outer Cape, but that he had “flown

¹⁹³ Historian Douglas Brinkley cites seashores legislation as a major component of Kennedy's conservation platform in 1960. See Brinkley, “Rachel Carson and JFK, an Environmental Tag Team,” *Audubon Magazine* (May – June 2012), accessed September 12, 2014, <http://www.audubon.org/magazine/may-june-2012/rachel-carson-and-jfk-environmental-tag-team>.

¹⁹⁴ C. F. Jenkins to John F. Kennedy, August 3, 1959, Box 713, “Cape Cod National Park, 9/7/59 – 9/29/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

¹⁹⁵ Barnstable, Bourne, and Falmouth all had populations above 10,000 each in the 1960 census, while the next most populous town, Yarmouth, had 5,504 residents, or less than half of Barnstable's 13,465. Outer Cape towns Wellfleet, Truro, and Eastham all had less than 1,500 people each, while Provincetown rang in at 3,389 residents. By 1970, Barnstable was the clear leader in population at 19,842, or roughly 4,000 more than the next most populous town of that year, Falmouth.

over it in a helicopter once.”¹⁹⁶ This typifies the unenthusiastic response from Cape Codders to a non-Republican, non-Anglican introducing Cape Cod National Seashore legislation. Kennedy carried the Cape Cod National Seashore bill through Congress and the White House, but he couldn’t carry Barnstable County in the 1960 election.¹⁹⁷

An element of anti-immigrant, anti-Catholic sentiment imbues these Outer Cape claims of belonging.¹⁹⁸ What Mayflower descendent did the Kennedys trace back to? None, and old-time New Englanders who resided in Eastham, Wellfleet, and Truro often reminded him of that. In probably the funniest showing of New England’s obsession with lineage, the front and back end papers of Francis Biddle’s memoirs are filled with family trees: one from his mother’s side, which brings us back to Colonel William Randolph and Pocahontas, and the other of his father’s side, who came to America first in 1681.¹⁹⁹ This type of lineage-tracing in occasions that don’t appear to have anything to do with lineage was (and is) incredibly common in New England.²⁰⁰ Many letters to Kennedy arguing for or against the park used genealogical connections or length

¹⁹⁶ Like most legends, this popular story of Kennedy only seeing the Outer Cape by helicopter came from a grain of truth: the Senators who sponsored the bill and who were on the committees passing the Cape Cod National Seashore legislation took a helicopter tour of the proposed seashore area to give the lawmakers a better idea of the proposed park’s area. See “Field Trip Itinerary for the House Sub-Committee Inspection of the Proposed Cape Cod National Seashore Park PH (Dec 1960) in “Cape Cod National Seashore: Correspondence, Mar-Apr 1961” Folder, Charles H.W. Foster Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. Kennedy had grown up spending summers in Hyannisport and likely took day trips to the beaches of the Outer Cape often. Yet, the temptation to pin Kennedy as a national politician who didn’t understand the Outer Cape – a mere 45 minute drive from Hyannis – was a temptation into which many Outer Cape Codders fell. Francis Burling had a role in expanding this slant of Kennedy, writing, “Although a long time summer resident of Hyannisport with great love for sailing in the Nantucket Sound waters, Kennedy had no detailed knowledge of the lower Cape area involved in the Seashore proposal. He did fly over it in a helicopter, however, and drove over much of it before the legislation was enacted.” Burling, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore*, 16. Douglas Brinkley even falls for this, mentioning it in his article on JFK and Rachel Carson: “As a longtime resident of Hyannis Port, Kennedy had no detailed knowledge of the lower Cape area, but he routinely flew over it in helicopters as the seashore legislation circulated through Congress.” Brinkley, “Rachel Carson and JFK, an Environmental Tag Team,” *Audubon Magazine* (May – June 2012), accessed September 12, 2014, <http://www.audubon.org/magazine/may-june-2012/rachel-carson-and-jfk-environmental-tag-team>.

¹⁹⁷ Election results from <http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?year=1960&fips=25&f=0&off=0&elect=0>

¹⁹⁸ For more on John F. Kennedy and perceptions of anti-Catholicism, see John T. McGreevey, “Catholics, Democrats, and the GOP in Contemporary America,” *American Quarterly*, 59, 3 (September 2007), 669-691, here 669-670.

¹⁹⁹ Biddle, *In Brief Authority*, front and back endpaper.

²⁰⁰ New England has a long history of emphasizing genealogy to a greater extent than other regions of the country. See Francesca Morgan, “Lineage as Capital: Genealogy in Antebellum New England,” *The New England Quarterly* 83, 2 (June 2010), 250-282.

of time descendants had lived on Cape Cod or in the New World as arguments for why their opinions mattered so much. Despite the outward ridiculousness of their arguments, these residents *did* have power and influence. They used it to publicize their concerns to the entire nation.

Cape Cod National Seashore hits the national press

By 1959, stories about Cape Cod National Seashore had hit the *New York Times*, the *Saturday Evening Post*, the *Boston Globe*, *Sports Illustrated*, *The New Yorker*, and just about every local Massachusetts paper from Cape Cod to Worcester.²⁰¹ The Department of the Interior and the lawmakers drafting the Cape Cod bill frequently issued explanatory press releases to steer the discussion into a favorable direction. Press about Cape Cod came from the top; the Department of the Interior very obviously wanted to begin their coastal park establishment and wanted to get Cape Codders on board with the idea.

Much of the early press on Cape Cod, and coastal parks in general was not as positive as the Department of the Interior would have liked. Perhaps most crowd-churning was a July 18, 1959 *Saturday Evening Post* editorial entitled, “National Parks Shouldn’t Be Set Up by Decree.”²⁰² The article came out strongly against Senator Richard Neuberger’s omnibus bill for National Seashore creation (S. 2010) that would provide for the establishment of “no more than

²⁰¹ In 1957, Sargent wrote to Kennedy, “Already there is tremendous public interest throughout the Commonwealth in this proposal with unusually strong editorial support in the newspapers across the state, i.e., Boston, Worcester, Springfield, Pittsfield, etc. including the Christian Science Monitor” Francis W. Sargent to Senator John F. Kennedy, August 23, 1957, Box 663, “Cape Cod Canal, Cape Cod National Park, 6/11/57 – 9/16/57” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. Paul L. Schultz, “U.S. Park Service to Study Great Beach Area on Cape,” *Worcester Evening Gazette*, March 9, 1957; Kennedy cites several *Boston Globe* articles in his correspondence. For example, see John F. Kennedy to Charles Eliot, October 16, 1959, Box 754, “Cape Cod National Park – Correspondence, 9/11/59 - 10/30/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. An article in the Berkshire Eagle said of the Cape Cod National Seashore legislation, “The bill can probably be labeled as the finest victory ever recorded for the cause of conservation in New England.” Burling, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore*, 54.

²⁰² “National Parks Shouldn’t Be Set Up by Decree,” Editorial, *Saturday Evening Post*, July 18, 1959, 10.

three national seashore recreation areas.”²⁰³ The *Post*’s editorial staff questioned the legality of potential federal land purchases at Cape Cod:

Possibly to circumvent local opposition, Sen. Richard Neuberger of Oregon has introduced, on behalf of the Interior Department, a bill which would empower the Secretary of the Interior arbitrarily to take over sections of Cape Cod or any other area regarded by the National Park Service as suitable for a park, with scant regard to local interest. Instead of adhering to the usual practice of designating specific areas desired for park purposes, Senator Neuberger’s bill authorized the Secretary of the Interior to take over not more than 100,000 acres distributed as he may decide among any three areas in the whole country.²⁰⁴

The “arbitrary” powers of land condemnation that the Secretary of the Interior so greedily wanted, “with scant regard to local interest” seemed dictatorial to the *Saturday Evening Post* editors, in the same way it had been to local residents writing to their elected officials. The editorial further warns of “vague, blanket authorizations” that the Neuberger bill allowed. To reinforce the weight of the issue, it quoted nationally influential Cape Cod residents Francis Biddle and Quincy Adams Shaw, Jr. as concerned citizens aghast at the excessive federal powers flexed to acquire land with “no outstanding natural wonders.”²⁰⁵

Biddle, ever the public figure, proved one of the biggest thorns in side of the National Park Service. In the same *Saturday Evening Post* article that caused such a ruckus in the summer of 1959, Biddle did his part to incite mass protest: “The late President Roosevelt’s attorney general [Biddle] said at a meeting of cape residents, according to the *Cape Cod Standard-Times*, that the powers granted in the Neuberger bill were greater than either he or the late Secretary of

²⁰³ Larry Dilsaver, *Cumberland Island National Seashore* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004), 85-86.

²⁰⁴ “National Parks Shouldn’t Be Set Up by Decree,” Editorial, *Saturday Evening Post*, July 18, 1959, 10.

²⁰⁵ See discussion of coasts as mundane, horizontal landscapes in the introduction. For more on shorelines as not worthy of preservation due to their high volume of swamps and much, see chapter on Fire Island and the Indiana Dunes.

the Interior Harold Ickes would have dared proposed even in wartime.”²⁰⁶ Biddle utilized his public persona and his stacked resume to galvanize Cape Codders into opposing a park that would take private property. Behind the scenes, he used his political connections to influence the nuts and bolts of such legislation.²⁰⁷

Judging by the uptick in letters sent to Kennedy, Saltonstall, and Keith in the several weeks following the *Saturday Evening Post* editorial, the piece made a big splash. Not all letter writers saw the Cape as bereft of “natural wonders.” Many, from Cape Cod or other parts of the United States, responded positively to the article to support a park on Cape Cod. Others changed their mind after reading the *Post* article on the Neuberger bill. Mary Norton Allen wrote to John F. Kennedy to retract her previous support of the Cape Cod proposal. Allen wrote that usually, in “appealing to you for conservation matters, I know more about the local situation and the particular bill under consideration than I did in this case. In my eagerness to see something saved on Cape Cod, before the whole area is paved or turned into a Coney Island, I wrote without enough detailed information.”²⁰⁸ After realizing that condemnation of homes would be possible on the Cape, Norton no longer wanted to support the proposed park. If the Department of the Interior wanted to create coastal parks, the general public’s outcry suggested, it would have to do so on a case-by-case basis with stronger homeowner protections.

Influential Cape Cod residents continued putting public pressure on the Park Service to ensure popular support for a Cape Cod National Seashore that included homeowner protections. Not two months after the *Saturday Evening Post* editorial, a small group of powerful Cape Cod residents collaborated to write an editorial to the *New York Times*. Among the authors were

²⁰⁶ “National Parks Shouldn’t Be Set Up by Decree,” Editorial, *Saturday Evening Post*, July 18, 1959, 10.

²⁰⁷ Serge Chermayeff to Fred Holborn, November 1959, Box 754, “Cape Cod National Park – Correspondence, 11/2/59 - 11/18/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

²⁰⁸ Mary Norton Allen to John F. Kennedy, July 31, 1959, Box 713, “Cape Cod National Park, 7/1/59 – 8/28/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

Schlesinger and Biddle. Their *New York Times* editorial on August 30, 1959 critiqued the Cape Cod proposal more publically than ever before, building on the momentum of the July *Saturday Evening Post* opinion piece. Kennedy's staff was ready for it this time, though; C. J. Lewin, editor of the *Times*, telegrammed Holborn to give him a heads-up that the editorial would appear. The editorial emphasized the cultural richness of Cape Cod homes and the value these structures added to the New England heritage of the region:

There are many charming old Cape Cod houses, and many modern homes built to harmonize with the old houses and the land; these are owned by people who have lived in them for generations, or by writers, artists, musicians and members of the learned professions who have been attracted by the beauty of the Cape.

The present plan offered by the National Park Service would take most of these houses and, eventually, they would be torn down. This action would practically wipe out three of the oldest townships in New England: Truro, Wellfleet, and Eastham.

This seems to us wanton waste—and waste which could easily be avoided. For there is no doubt that a national park plan which was sensitively worked out could save these homes, and at the same time conserve the natural beauties of the Cape for future generations. . . while the wild life of the Cape is important, the human way of life is at least equally so.²⁰⁹

Despite its façade of measured criticism, the editorial took a somewhat unfair position against a Cape Cod National Seashore. No Park Service plan ever threatened to take homes from within the town centers of towns of Eastham, Wellfleet, and Truro. Even the early bills that included coastal uplands and had fewer protections for homeowners drew the towns out of the park boundaries and allowed for continued expansion within a nucleus zone. Yet, by suggesting that a park would threaten the very roots of the nation's Puritan heritage, the writers accomplished their goal. Schlesinger and Biddle steered the discussion to the cultural resources of the Cape and

²⁰⁹ Francis Biddle, Marcel Breuer, Phyllis Duganne, Waldo Frank, George J. Higgins, Edwin O'Connor, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Herbert Wechsler, Edmund Wilson, John C. Worthington, Letter to the Editor, "Park Plan for Cape Cod: Legislation Criticized as Failing to Weigh Communities' Problems," *The New York Times*, August 30, 1959, E10.

prompted the bill's legislative and bureaucratic authors to include even more protections for homeowners, lest more complaints by high-profile residents leak to the press.

Economic Worries about the Park: Real Estate and Construction

Influential homeowners on Cape Cod strategically voiced their concerns publically to ensure not only their continued homeownership but also the economic health of their towns. In Chatham, the town at Cape Cod's elbow and generally regarded as the wealthiest town on the Cape, residents successfully blocked the Park Service from taking two islands whose development would bring in substantial property tax revenues to the town.²¹⁰ At a vote taken at a February 1961 Wellfleet town hall meeting, only four Wellfleetians voted to support the Cape Cod bill that eventually passed Congress.²¹¹ They directed this message at their Congressman, Hastings Keith, to ensure that their homes would have protections.²¹² These Wellfleetians worried a park would cement the Cape's status as a seasonal economy. Wellfleet town leaders recognized that the "non-resident taxpayer and the summer visitor provide[d] the main source of

²¹⁰ Chatham's successful opposition to Cape Cod National Seashore extending beyond its ocean beach is chronicled in wonderful detail in Douglas Doe, "The Road to Monomoy: Chatham, Massachusetts, and The Cape Cod National Seashore (Master's Thesis, University of Massachusetts, Boston, 1995).

²¹¹ *Annual Reports of the Officers of the Town of Wellfleet for the year ending December 31, 1955* (Provincetown, MA: The Provincetown Printery, 1956), 9. The timing of this vote was likely strategic, since summer homeowners would likely be unable to attend a February town hall meeting. Many of the Cape Cod residents who lived their only seasonally and benefitted only from recreational use of the land tended to favor the park at higher rates than those who lived on the Cape year round and found employment in the construction industry. Fishing was no longer a major economic driver for the Cape in the 1950s. For more on the transition from sea-related industries to tourism, see Cumbler, *Cape Cod*, 149-172. For more on the decline of fishing-related industries on Cape Cod in the 20th century, see Matthew McKenzie, *Clearing the Coastline: Ecological and Cultural Transformation of Cape Cod* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2010), 137-173.

²¹² In contrast to other National Seashore areas, even the most ardent opponents of Cape Cod National Seashore did not have a problem with the National Park Service as an entity. Joshua Nickerson wrote as much to Kennedy in 1959: "I can say that in my discussions with the Park Service I have noted little arrogance and certainly no calculated effort to steamroll over the rights and views of individuals on Cape Cod and other parts of the country. In response to any of my inquiries the Park Service, whatever be the merits of any of the legislation which is pending, has been frank, courteous and informative. I personally feel that this is a subject which can be sensibly approached and gradually solved by reason rather than by the ventilation of sinister charges." Joshua Nickerson to John F. Kennedy, July 9, 1959, "Cape Cod National Park, 7/1/59 - 8/28/59" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

revenue to the Town” in ever-increasing amounts. Despite this turn that had already begun, Wellfleetians wanted to ensure they would be able to make it through the quiet winters.²¹³

Those in the construction industry especially worried that broad Park Service purchases of Cape Cod homes would quash any hope of Cape Cod keeping its economy running in the winter.²¹⁴ Frank Joy, who owned a self-named general contracting company, felt that construction was much preferable to the tourism industry for the long-term health of the Cape: “Our economy is primarily supported by the annual construction growth, without this there is very little left in the way of year round activity; and the lack of year round activity has been killing us for years.” Like others, Frank Joy wondered, “What is going to keep us all going in the winter?” Frank’s brother Thomas Joy owned Cape Cod Ready Mix Concrete and had the same fears, verbatim, as Frank.²¹⁵

Other business owners that chimed in to oppose the park were almost exclusively involved in an industry that in some way related to home building: from R.B. Corcoran Company of Hyannis (“Plumbing, Heating, Well and Industrial Supplies”), to A. F. Smith & Sons of Orleans (“Hardware – Plumbing – Heating”), to the Cape Cod Realty and Building Co. of Wellfleet, to a bank in Hyannis that financed construction on the Outer Cape. The men representing these companies feared for their businesses as well as their personal livelihoods. Outer Cape resident Luther Crowell wrote frankly to his Congressman, “There is not going to be

²¹³ John F. Kennedy, Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Remarks of the President on Signing S. 857, an act to provide for the establishment of the Cape Cod National Seashore,” August 7, 1961, Presidential Papers, JFKL; Interview with Charles Frazier by Francis P. Burling, Charles H. W. Foster, and Robert F. Gibbs, October 21, 1975, 5, Burling papers, SPVC; Blair Associates, *Eastham, Massachusetts: a study of Eastham in relation to the proposed Cape Cod National Seashore Park* (Providence, RI: The Associates, 1959).

²¹⁴ By 1960, 25% of Eastham’s labor force worked in the construction industry. John Cumbler writes that, in addition to the flocking of retirees to the Cape in the postwar period, the construction business lured in new residents and led to the first increase in Barnstable County’s population in almost a century. Cumbler, *Cape Cod*, 114, 153.

²¹⁵ Frank Joy to Hastings Keith, April 7, 1959, Box 2, Folder 15, Hastings Keith papers, SPVC; Thomas Joy to Hastings Keith, April 7, 1959, Box 2, Folder 15, Hastings Keith papers, SPVC. By “the same fears,” I mean the exact same. Both used the same letter, only changing the name they signed at the bottom.

any way for a family in my position to remain in Wellfleet” without the year-round income that the construction industry brought. By abruptly and permanently barring new homes in what would become the park, Joseph Higgins of Wellfleet feared, construction and therefore business activity on the Cape would slow to a trickle.²¹⁶

Complicating the matter, the construction business fed the ever-increasing real estate tax revenues on the Outer Cape. Approximately 90% of Wellfleet’s tax revenue came from real estate taxes (see chart).²¹⁷ The percentage remained relatively steady, although it increased slightly in 1961. What’s even more striking is the doubling of real estate taxes in the years of the Cape Cod National Seashore debate. The proposal to create a park on Cape Cod increased the housing boom in the late 1950s. Wellfleetians, aware of this, wanted to be sure to protect their rising real estate prices and some opportunities for new home building within their town boundaries.

Town of Wellfleet Tax Incomes				
	Real Estate Tax Revenue	Total Tax Revenue	Total non-Real Estate Tax Revenue	Percentage of Tax Revenue from Real Estate Tax
1957	\$ 166,385.00	\$ 186,730.30	\$ 20,345.30	89%
1958	\$ 175,818.30	\$ 197,900.50	\$ 22,082.20	89%
1959	(unavailable)	\$ 224,924.75	-	-
1960	\$ 210,273.30	\$ 239,832.40	\$ 29,559.10	88%
1961	\$ 223,339.40	\$ 258,868.20	\$ 35,528.80	86%
1962	\$ 312,529.63	\$ 342,072.47	\$ 29,542.84	91%

²¹⁶ Robert Corcoran to Hastings Keith, April 27, 1959, Box 2, Folder 15, Hastings Keith papers, SPVC; Alton L. Smith to Hastings Keith, April 1, 1959, Box 2, Folder 15, Hastings Keith papers, SPVC; Luther A. Crowell to Hastings Keith, April 7, 1959, Box 2, Folder 15, Hastings Keith papers, SPVC; A. Harold Castonguay to Hastings Keith, August 3, 1959, Box 2, Folder 15, Hastings Keith papers, SPVC.

²¹⁷ By 1961, total real estate value of Wellfleet was \$6,003,650.00 , as assessed by the town. *Annual Reports of the Officers of the Town of Wellfleet for the year ending December 31, 1961* (Provincetown, MA: The Provincetown Printery, 1962), 42. All tax information in chart from Wellfleet Town Reports, 1957-1962. Available at Wellfleet Public Library, Wellfleet, Mass.

Charles Frazier of Wellfleet provides a great example of how deeply intertwined the municipal government and the construction business were. A town Selectman from 1939 to 1961 who served on the town building committee and was an assistant attorney general of the state of Massachusetts, Frazier also operated a real estate agency on the lower Cape. He also owned Griffin Island, an area on the bay side of Wellfleet that was in the proposed National Seashore. Rumors abounded, as Frazier himself admitted, that he only opposed a park that took anything more than just the beach because he did not want to sell his own real estate investments. Frazier worked with powerful national figures to protect his own investments and keep as much private property out of the park as possible. He and former U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle, also a resident of Wellfleet's bayside, "tried to devise a scheme whereby we could limit the amount of the taking by the Government."²¹⁸

Frazier is just one example of the deep ties between real estate, town government, and state or federal influence on the Cape, but he is far from atypical. Joshua A. Nickerson of Chatham, an outspoken opponent of the park who later became chair of the Cape Cod National Seashore Advisory Commission, owned a lumber company on the Outer Cape that sold primarily to home builders and had a branch in Wellfleet. Nickerson felt that too much land on the Outer Cape was included in the National Seashore, as was successful with others in lobbying to exclude much of the land in Chatham from the park's bounds.²¹⁹ Nickerson, Frazier, and builder Anton Duarte formed the backbone of the "year-round" opposition to Cape Cod National

²¹⁸ Interview with Charles Frazier by Francis P. Burling, Charles H. W. Foster, and Robert F. Gibbs, October 21, 1975, 2-8, Burling papers, SPVC; *Annual Reports of the Officers of the Town of Wellfleet for the year ending December 31, 1961* (Provincetown, MA: The Provincetown Printery, 1962), 55. Cumbler says Charles Frazier "had close ties to development interests" and claims he organized most of Wellfleet's opposition to the park. See Cumbler, *Cape Cod*, 165.

²¹⁹ Interview with Joshua A. Nickerson, by Francis P. Burling, Charles H. W. Foster, and Robert F. Gibbs, October 8, 1975, 10-11. For more on Chatham's successful campaigns to have Morris and Stage Islands and Monomoy excluded from the National Seashore, see Douglas W. Doe, *The Road to Monomoy: Chatham, Massachusetts, and the Cape Cod National Seashore* (Master's Thesis, University at Massachusetts, Boston, 1995)

Seashore (in contrast to summer residents who often supported once they confirmed the inclusion of homeowner protections). Their foothold in real estate ventures tied the Cape's year-round opposition, perhaps unfairly, to the speculative pursuits of these three men.

Cape Cod National Seashore = Better than Hot Dog Stands?

Nickerson, Frazier, and Duarte fit the bill of who Cape Codders vilified as “developers,” a term used in an often vague, but always negative, way to describe those in construction or real estate.²²⁰ Other Cape Codders actively supported a National Seashore. For instance, S. Osborn Ball, a Wellfleetian who was willing to sell his \$400,000 worth of land to the government, had specific criticism of developers in Wellfleet:

I note that Mr. Frazier and Mr. Anton Duarte, Jr. are spear-heading the opposition. I like them both. Both of them, however, have made large plans to exploit these park areas—they are steeping in real estate development. It is doubtful if such minds can shoulder the responsibility which I have set forth in Item 5 above [selling land as a “sacrifice and a risk that must be undertaken”].²²¹

Ball was not alone in his criticism of Frazier's opposition to the park as economically self-serving. Jonathan Moore, legislative aide to Senator Saltonstall, called Frazier “yeasty” and a

²²⁰ The Department of the Interior joined in on vilifying developers in attempts to create more urgency behind passage of the Cape Cod National Seashore bill. A 1961 press release state, “The Department feels that little time remains to save a representative and significant portion of Cape Cod for the enjoyment of future generations. Unless action is taken in the near or immediate future to acquire and preserve lands at Cape Cod for public enjoyment, it seems quite evident that the Cape's traditional atmosphere and character will vanish under construction activity now underway there.” Stewart Udall, Department of the Interior, Press Release, March 7, 1961, Box 21, “Cape Cod, 1961-1962” Folder, Orren Beaty Personal Papers, JFKL.

²²¹S. Osborn Ball had a good sense of humor. During congressional hearings, Ball asked Senators, “please don't be misled by my initials.” U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Cape Cod National Seashore Park, hearing on S. 2636 before Subcommittee on Public Lands, Eastham, Mass., December 9, 1959* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 113. For quote above, see S. Osborn Ball to Hastings Keith, May 22, 1959, Box 2, Folder 1, Hastings Keith papers, SPVC. It's important to note that Ball was willing to sell his land, but he also intended his offer as a dare of sorts. In 1960, the nation's medium home value was \$11,900. At roughly 33 times that, \$400,000 was not cheap. On home values, see U.S. Census Bureau, “Historic Census of Housing Tables: Home Values,” accessed March 12, 2015, <https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/values.html>.

part of the Wellfleet leadership that he considered “so bloody provincial.”²²² Their views did not receive the same traction with congressional staff that the nationally influential and academic elite enjoyed.

Cape Codders who opposed development felt that the true threat to the economy was the potential for the Outer Cape to become “one large hot dog stand” or worse, another “Jersey shore.” The real threat to the Cape’s economy, members of the pro-park camp feared, was the roadside commercial development—and lower classes of tourists—that new construction could bring from the upper to the lower Cape in the absence of the protections a park would bring.²²³

Cape Codders slowly began to realize in the late 1950s that a Cape Cod National Seashore might be able to keep out this development and riff-raff that they were so worried about.²²⁴ Fears of becoming another “Coney Island” or a mecca of “hot dog stands” ran wild on the Cape in the fifties and had a decidedly class-based tint to them. To Cape Codders, “hot dogs” symbolized all that was wrong with mass America. If Kennedy and Keith got a nickel for every hot dog complaint they received, they could probably each buy . . . a whole mess of hot dogs! James E. Randall of Waltham, MA wrote of the “increasing abundance of neon signs, hot dog stands, and other misplaced vulgarity” that threatened to forever ruin America’s beaches.²²⁵ Paul Carr of Chatham connected development of “shacks and shanties” with the “hot dog stands and

²²² Interview with Jonathan Moore conducted by Dr. Charles H.W. Foster, Robert C. Gibbs, and Francis P. Burling, October 29, 1975, 27, Burling Papers, SPVC.

²²³ Hot dog stand quote from Anne G. Fuller to Representative Hastings Keith, March 31, 1959, Box 2, Folder 1, Hastings Keith Papers, SPVC; Jersey Shore quote from Rebecca W. Mosher, (Chatham, MA) to Hastings Keith, March 31, 1959, Box 2, Folder 8, Hastings Keith papers, SPVC.

²²⁴ A 1959 economic survey assuaged some Cape Cod residents (mostly in Eastham, not Wellfleet) by making the case that tourism dollars and tax revenue would more than offset the hits taken by the construction industry when the park effectively removed real estate from the towns. Blair Associates, *Eastham, Massachusetts: a study of Eastham in relation to the proposed Cape Cod National Seashore Park* (Providence, RI: The Associates, 1959).

²²⁵ James E. Randall to John F. Kennedy, September 10, 1959, Box 713, “Cape Cod National Park, 9/7/59 – 9/29/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

other Coney Island-like developments” that followed them.²²⁶ Hot dog stands had begun to represent the “hodge-podge mess of commercial development” common on shorelines.²²⁷

Without conservation measures on beaches, advocates warned, “there will be one large Hot Dog stand” and coastal natural beauty “will be forever destroyed.”²²⁸



Figure 11: Richard Huffstutter, "Hot Dogs on City Beach, Laguna, CA," 2009, accessed October 15, 2014, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/huffstutterrobertl/7692130486/in/photostream/>.

Middle-class vacation homes brought low-class amusement parks and the base, hand-held foods that came with it, Cape Codders overwhelmingly feared. Another Outer Cape resident,

²²⁶ Paul W. Karr to John F. Kennedy, May 9, 1960, Box 731, “Cape Cod, 5/14/60—6/7/60,” Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

²²⁷ A professional City Planner on the Boston City Planning Board, wrote that “this is the last area on the Cape untouched by hot dog stands, motels and neon signs. Let’s keep it that way!” Tourism was an important industry in Massachusetts, “but no one will come if all they can see is a highways lined with a hodge-podge mess of commercial development.” Frederic N. Holland to John F. Kennedy, March 28, 1959, Box 713, “Cape Cod National Park, 2/24/59 – 3/31/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. For more on the history of the hot dog stand and its association with roadside coastal development, see the author’s article on the blog of the Network of Canadian History & Environment, “Hot Dog Stands and Overcivilized Beaches,” *The Otter-La Loutre*, Network in Canadian History & Environment, published October 22, 2014 at <http://niche-canada.org/2014/10/22/hot-dog-stands-and-overcivilized-beaches/>.

²²⁸ Ruth Alexander to Hastings Keith, April 13, 1959, Box 2, Folder 1, Hastings Keith papers, SPVC.

Thomas Kane of Truro, also saw suburban-style development as related to hot dogs. To him, the bulldozer paved way for the frankfurter:

Each day sees an encroachment of sawtooth monstrosities, modern shed roofs, and tawdry hot-dog stands . . . Every week sees another beautiful sand dune devoured by a bulldozer.²²⁹

While some opposed Cape Cod National Seashore for fears of hot dog stands coming with the park, most, like Kane, believed that a National Seashore was the best way to keep such undesirable development out and save the quiet, frankfurter-free nature in their backyards.²³⁰

When Cape Codders saw the bulldozer in the countryside and the hot dog stand that followed it, they were able to appeal to federal powers to save the nature around them and thus protect their real estate values, as well.²³¹ Residents like Dean M. C. Galanti figured the NPS would be the best caretakers of the land and that backing the park would be the best chance to keep the Cape as undeveloped as possible. “I have seen many of our National Parks,” Galanti wrote, “and I don’t recall and ‘Coney Island’ atmosphere.”²³² Kennedy agreed, and vented to Galanti that it was “wholly unfair of those opposed to this position to suggest that it is our intention to have these areas overrun by careless roamers and picnickers.”²³³ Kennedy and his staff shared the same class-based assumptions of “picnickers” and “roamers” (the type of people who would likely frequent hot dog stands, no doubt) as undesirable elements in a serene, upper-class, naturally beautiful vacation area like Cape Cod. Because Cape Codders and those writing

²²⁹ T. Kane to John F. Kennedy, May 18, 1959, Box 754, “Cape Cod National Park – Correspondence, 5/26/59 – 9/5/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

²³⁰ Frederic N. Holland to John F. Kennedy, March 28, 1959, Box 713, “Cape Cod National Park, 2/24/59 – 3/31/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

²³¹ See Adam Rome on how suburban development led to suburban homeowners pushing for land conservation measures in the 1950s. Rome, *Bulldozer in the Countryside*, esp. 255-270.

²³² Dean M. C. Galanti to John F. Kennedy, January 19, 1960, Box 730, “Cape Cod, 9/30/59 – 1/26/60” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

²³³ Fred Holborn probably wrote the letter to Galanti, based on where the letter was in the files. Holborn took care of most of Kennedy’s Cape Cod National Seashore correspondence unless it was of important individuals or personal friends. John F. Kennedy to Dean M. C. Galanti, January 25, 1960, Box 730, “Cape Cod, 9/30/59 – 1/26/60” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

the legislation both operated within a social circle that saw itself above hot dog stands, the protections for homes and against “tawdry” development safeguarded their way of life.

Winning Over Schlesinger and Biddle: A Case Study

Kennedy and his staff knew that they would have to prioritize getting the support of influential Cape Codders in order to pass any National Seashore legislation. Francis Biddle’s repeated public criticism of the Cape Cod National Seashore plan proved one of the biggest challenge for Kennedy and his staff. Kennedy’s handling of Biddle and another initial skeptic, Arthur Schlesinger, shows how politicians included certain Cape Codders’ opinions into the final legislation disproportionately. This hyper-consideration of the opinions of just a handful of residents clarifies how a park ultimately passed Congress successfully in 1916.

Residents as high profile as Biddle could easily vent their dissatisfaction in public forums, which could then turn the tide of public opinion as it had with the *New York Times* editorial in 1960. Holborn, hoping Biddle could turn that public opinion in favor of a park rather than against it, wrote Biddle frequently. Biddle responded from Paris or other jaunts and always offered Holborn strong opinions. When public hearings began in Washington in 1960, Biddle asked Holborn to keep him informed of the exact date so that he could attend. From Paris, DC, or Philadelphia, Biddle enjoyed this close correspondence with John F. Kennedy’s staff during Kennedy’s presidential campaign; he frequently gave advice or opinions on the status of the race.²³⁴

²³⁴ Francis Biddle to Fred Holborn, October 5, 1960, Box 731, “Cape Cod, 10/11/60 – 1/12/61” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL; David Martin to Francis Biddle, March 25, 1960, Box 754, “Cape Cod National Park – Correspondence, 12/9/59 - 4/28/60” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.




Figure 12: Francis Biddle, FDR Library, Digital Resource, accessed March 30, 2015, <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/daybyday/resource/september-1941-3/>.

Holborn enlisted the help of Harvard history professor and Kennedy confidant Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in his attempts to get Biddle behind a Cape Cod park. Schlesinger had reached out to Holborn about Biddle's opposition in late 1959. Schlesinger worried that builders Frazier and Duarte were using Biddle to push a covertly pro-development agenda. Schlesinger asked Holborn about,

possible pitfalls . . . in connection with the possibility that Francis Biddle and others may be used as a cat's paw by local commercial interests. Francis is a good friend of mine and, without involving your office, I would like to spare him any embarrassment.²³⁵

Holborn hoped that in helping Schlesinger talk Biddle down, he could convince Schlesinger to support a Cape Cod National Seashore. Holborn felt that Biddle was "not the ideal spokesman in the matter" of the National Seashore and hoped that Schlesinger could "have a salutary influence on Mr. Biddle." Holborn saw Biddle's predicament as follows, in the words he confided to Schlesinger:

I have the impression that Biddle has maneuvered himself into a very unfortunate position in which he is trying to act as counsel to several interests at once, on the one hand, he quite naturally as an individual landowner with an historical house is fearful of a park proposal which gives indiscriminate authority to the National Park Service. In the

²³⁵ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. to Fred Holborn, October 29, 1959, Box 754, "Cape Cod National Park – Correspondence, 9/11/59 - 10/30/59" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

second place, he holds a rather shaky title as spokesman for the Selectmen of Truro and Wellfleet (he is closest, of course, to Charles Frazier an extreme and practically unrecognized by a man such as Selectman Worthington in Truro.) Third, he has assumed an informal legal role for a few large landowners like Alec Henderson and his wife. As a result, he really has no coherent philosophical position on the park, nor has he taken the trouble to try to acquaint himself with the manner in which such a park would in fact be operated. Indeed, I am a little bit worried that Biddle may allow himself unwittingly to become a screen for objections which are motivated purely upon the hope of future commercial gain.

I believe that you could have a salutary influence on Mr. Biddle. Certainly both Senator Saltonstall and Jack [Kennedy] are most anxious to avoid any injury to Mr. Biddle, especially since his anxieties were originally quite reasonable and wholly honorable.²³⁶

Holborn saw Biddle as unwittingly tied up in local real estate quarrels on the Cape Cod and feared that Biddle's tendency to hog the spotlight would hurt the cause of Cape Cod National Seashore regardless of its merits. Biddle's support was clearly still important to both Kennedy and Saltonstall politically, however. Schlesinger, as a fellow Harvard man and Wellfleetian, was the perfect go-between to calm down Biddle.

Holborn knew Schlesinger had his own qualms about the Cape Cod park plan, but felt that as an insider to the Kennedy camp, he could be persuaded to support the park and then do so in a public forum. Holborn knew they could not alienate Schlesinger politically on the issue of Cape Cod – Kennedy was courting Schlesinger's endorsement for the 1960 election – so Holborn offered to show Schlesinger working drafts of the bill. As Holborn later he put it, "Jack realizes that this whole enterprise has been troubling you somewhat," and Kennedy's Senate office hoped to put those fears to rest.²³⁷

²³⁶ Fred Holborn to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., October 16, 1959, Box 754,, "Cape Cod National Park – Correspondence, 9/11/59 - 10/30/59" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

²³⁷ Fred Holborn to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., October 16, 1959, Box 754, "Cape Cod National Park – Correspondence, 9/11/59 - 10/30/59" Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

A Wellfleet summer homeowner, Schlesinger publically expressed skepticism at the park proposal in its early stages.²³⁸ He was also very opinionated about the type of park that he thought should exist. Schlesinger worried that a potential National Seashore might focus too much on recreation and not enough on conservation of natural resources. He wrote extensively to the legislators on the committees through which Cape Cod legislation passed. By 1960, Schlesinger claimed he was “very much in favor of the idea of a National Park,” but believed that the bill, “as presently drafted, is unsatisfactory and unconvincing.” Schlesinger saw the two goals the bill addressed, conservation and recreation, as “two manifestly irreconcilable objectives.”²³⁹ Schlesinger worried that the language of the bill “assign[ed] priority to ‘recreational activities’ over conservation,” which might undermine the goal of the bill to “save this land within the designated area from further commercial exploitation and degradation.”²⁴⁰

²³⁸ Kennedy wrote disapprovingly of Schlesinger’s public skepticism and its detrimental effect on Cape Cod legislation in a letter to Harvard Professor Elliot Perkins in 1960. Kennedy wrote, “This is one of the few matters on which Professor Galbraith has never expressed a judgment, and Professor Schlesinger as a summer resident of Wellfleet, I regret to say, is a persistent skeptic about the whole proposal.” John F. Kennedy to Elliot Perkins, June 21, 1960, Box 731, “Cape Cod, 6/8/60 – 6/28/60” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. See also Biddle, et. al, Letter to the Editor, “Park Plan for Cape Cod: Legislation Criticized as Failing to Weigh Communities’ Problems,” *The New York Times*, August 30, 1959, E10.

²³⁹ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. to Senator Clinton Anderson, May 6, 1960, Box P-1, “Cape Cod National Park: Correspondence” Folder, Arthur M. Schlesinger Personal Papers (#206), JFKL.

²⁴⁰ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. to Congressman Wayne Aspinall, December 5, 1960, Box P-1, “Cape Cod National Park: Correspondence” Folder, Arthur M. Schlesinger Personal Papers (#206), JFKL.



Figure 13: ST-322-1-62. President John F. Kennedy with Special Assistant to the President, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., July 26, 1962, Photograph by Cecil W. Stoughton, Series 02, "Meeting with Presidential Aide Arthur Schlesinger, Jr." Folder, White House Photographs, JFKL.

John F. Kennedy agreed with Schlesinger about the importance of conservation and hoped to assuage his fears. Kennedy, however, did not see conservation and recreation as the strict binary that Schlesinger saw. Kennedy wrote to Schlesinger in 1960:

We cannot accept as inevitable a harsh conflict between 'recreation' and 'conservation'. Both of these terms mean little by themselves; the real question is conservation for what and what kind of recreational uses would be involved. It is clear that a balance must be struck. There are some areas within the park which should remain pristine and others which could absorb considerable additional use. We cannot seal up a park without access, nor would it be sensible, if there is to be any park, for us simply to delete recreation as one of the purposes of this public venture. . . . If, however, it is your feeling that this area

should become a wilderness sanctuary (which is suggested in your proposed amendment) then we think it is unreasonable to expect Congress to take action on any Cape Cod National Seashore Park bill.²⁴¹

Kennedy understood that the Park Service impetus behind this bill and much of the justification to create this park came from recreational needs of urban Northeasterners. If the Park Service were to “seal up a park without access,” there would be no impetus for Congress to preserve the land: creating recreation for urban populations *was* the justification.²⁴² Kennedy further understood pragmatically through his frequent discussions with Park Service officials that any more stringent wilderness designation (which Schlesinger hoped for) would be highly unlikely at Cape Cod, even in the event of the Wilderness Bill’s passage, due to the widespread human influence in the area and the need to allow homeowner protections to make the park politically feasible.²⁴³ Schlesinger’s conservationist idealism thus contrasted with Kennedy and the Park Service’s pragmatism on the Cape Cod bill.

Although he phrased his concerns as conservation-related, Schlesinger’s worries also took on a class-based language similar to that of the anti-hot dog stand crowd. “If Conrad Wirth is interested in saving some seashore,” Schlesinger wrote to Kennedy in 1960, “does he really think that the way to go about doing it is by inviting one third of the population of the United States into the area?”²⁴⁴ Keeping the hoards out of the Outer Cape was central to Schlesinger’s objection to recreation. He worried that the National Park Service’s entry in the area could make the area a crowded beach resort, spoiling the quiet nature that he enjoyed in his vacation home on

²⁴¹ Senator John F. Kennedy to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., May 27, 1960, Box P-1, “Cape Cod National Park: Correspondence” Folder, Arthur M. Schlesinger Personal Papers (#206), JFKL.

²⁴² ORRRC, *Outdoor Recreation for America*.

²⁴³ On the legislative history of the Wilderness Bill, see Turner, *The Promise of Wilderness*, 17-42; Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind*, 220-226.

²⁴⁴ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. to Senator Clinton Anderson, May 6, 1960, Box P-1, “Cape Cod National Park: Correspondence” Folder, Arthur M. Schlesinger Personal Papers (#206), JFKL.

Cape Cod. Schlesinger's opposition on these grounds is not unique, but is worth mentioning because of his closeness to John F. Kennedy.²⁴⁵

After a flurry of letter-writing in 1960, Schlesinger discontinued his public skepticism of a Cape Cod National Seashore. As Schlesinger joined the Kennedy White House as an advisor, he kept tabs on Cape Cod National Seashore legislation and ensured the continued inclusion of extensive homeowners and natural protections. Schlesinger also reached out to Biddle and was able to have the “salutary effect” on his colleague for which Holborn had hoped. The final bill addressed Schlesinger's concerns by including provisions for the “appreciation of historic sites and structures and natural features of Cape Cod” in the same clause providing for recreational use.²⁴⁶ It also added a sub-clause that protected homeowners like Schlesinger, one strong enough to keep Schlesinger happy with the final bill:

In developing the seashore the Secretary shall provide public use areas in such places and manner as he determines will not diminish for its owners or occupants the value or enjoyment of any improved property located within the national seashore.²⁴⁷

Schlesinger's worries, couched in the language of conservation, really boiled down to his desire to retain a peaceful seashore retreat home. When he had the ear of the President in the bill's final year in Congress, Schlesinger was able to ensure that adequate protections existed for his personal home in the middle of a new National Park. Cape Cod locals like Biddle and Schlesinger won their homes and the nature around it.

By February of 1961, with Cape Cod National Seashore legislation in its final form, some legislators believed extensive homeowner protections weakened the bill. Senator Saltonstall

²⁴⁵ For more on Schlesinger in the White House, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy In the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965); John Patrick Diggins and Michael Lind, *The Liberal Persuasion: Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and the Challenge of the American Past* (Princeton University Press, 1997).

²⁴⁶ Section 7(b)(1), *An Act to provide for the establishment of Cape Cod National Seashore*, Public Law 87-126, 87th Congress, 1st Session (August 7, 1961), 292.

²⁴⁷ Section 7(b)(2), *An Act to provide for the establishment of Cape Cod National Seashore*, Public Law 87-126, 87th Congress, 1st Session (August 7, 1961), 292.

admitted that the bill went far—perhaps too far—to protect Cape Cod homeowners. He spoke on the Senate floor of the extraordinary allowances already made by the park for homeowners and towns. Fifteen hundred acres had been removed from the park area “in an attempt to consider reasonably the genuine growth needs of the towns concerned and at the same time to preserve the contiguity of the park so necessary to proper administration and conservation.” Those exclusions were almost too much, Saltonstall believed. He wanted, on the floor of Congress, to “point out candidly that the land exclusions included in the bill we are filing today, made in the interest of the local towns, already to some degree threaten sound, conservation planning.”²⁴⁸

Homeowners on the Cape received so many concessions, Saltonstall argued, that it actually threatened the conservation goals of the Cape Cod National Seashore bill. Perhaps Saltonstall was correct, but those compromises were enough to convince Cape Codders that a park in their backyards would be okay. The Senate passed the bill soon after Saltonstall’s speech and on August 7, 1961, Kennedy signed legislation establishing Cape Cod National Seashore into law. The first National Seashore existed thanks to legislative compromises and innovations that catered to the ultra-elite.

²⁴⁸ Congressional Record – Senate. February 9, 1961, 1768, Box P-1, “Cape Cod National Park: Congressional Record” Folder, Arthur M. Schlesinger Personal Papers (#206), JFKL.



Figure 14: Signing the Cape Cod National Seashore bill into law, August 7, 1961, White House Photographs, Digital Identifier JFKWHP-1961-08-07-A, JFKL. <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-1961-08-07-A.aspx>.

The Cape Cod Formula: A Model for Other National Seashore Parks?

Four simple but pioneering compromises the Park Service made with Cape Codders constitute the backbone of the FINAL Cape Cod Formula. One was the Certificate of Suspension of Condemnation (CSC), which allowed homeowners whose houses had been built after the

September 1, 1959 cut-off date to retain their homes in perpetuity.²⁴⁹ In addition to drawing out the Outer Cape towns of Provincetown, Truro, Wellfleet, Eastham, and Orleans from the park boundaries (and giving them room to expand), any house built before the cut-off date would, provided it continuously met zoning law, be able to keep their home in perpetuity with zero chance of condemnation.²⁵⁰ The second component of the Cape Cod Formula was the “traditional use” clause, which allowed for activities like shellfishing, berry harvesting, and hunting, and agriculture to take place within the park. The third innovation was federal funds; Cape Cod was the first time that Congress appropriated money to buy the bulk of the land for a new National Park.²⁵¹ The final compromise was the reluctant allowance of an Advisory Committee. All of these were concessions on the part of the Department of the Interior to the leading advocates—those wealthy, Ivy League-educated Cape Cod summer residents who had given so much input during legislation drafts. For the first time in National Park history, locals played a lead role in shaping the type of national park the Interior Department created in their backyards. For the first time, they had the power and money to do so.

The Certificate of Suspension of Condemnation (CSC) was essential in order to appease homeowners and assure that they would support a park. It took their fears about government taking their land and turned it into assurances that their homes would be forever surrounded by

²⁴⁹ Section 6, *An Act to provide for the establishment of Cape Cod National Seashore*, Public Law 87-126, 87th Congress, 1st Session (August 7, 1961), 291.

²⁵⁰ David Martin, “S. 857 (February 1961), P.L. 87-126,” 12, Box 2, Folder 9, David Martin Papers, SPVC. Debate over who came up with the idea of suspending condemnation still ensues within the Park Service and at Cape Cod. By now, most agree that the legislative director for Massachusetts Senator Leverett Saltonstall, David Martin, came up with it while drafting an early bill to establish Cape Cod National Seashore. As Martin put it, the idea came from “my head . . . to my knowledge I don’t remember ever finding it anywhere, and I do remember drafting it in the bill.” Francis Biddle also claimed to have come up with the idea. The debate over the idea’s origins could be the subject of a paper in its own right, so I will not investigate it further here.. Interview with David Martin by Francis P. Burling, Charles H. W. Foster, and Robert F. Gibbs, November 3, 1975, 5; Interview with Charles Frazier by Francis P. Burling, Charles H. W. Foster, and Robert F. Gibbs, October 21, 1975, 11, Burling papers, SPVC.

²⁵¹ As I mentioned in the introduction, Paul Sadin, Sarah Gregg, Anne Mitchell Whisnant have all shown that Congress did appropriate funds to purchase parts of other parks. I argue that the difference is that at Cape Cod, the bulk of the land was private and would need to be purchased before a National Seashore came into existence.

parkland, leading to higher real estate prices. Homes built after the cut-off date would have to sell their homes to the Park Service and then be allowed 25 years to life of occupancy.²⁵² Cape Codders ultimately came around to the idea of a National Seashore with the once protections for their homes existed. Homeowners realized that, with these safeguards in place, their real estate values would actually increase. The legislation establishing the park required that all landowners sell all but three acres of their property, keeping only the area that included “improved property.”²⁵³ Once the federal government bought the remaining acreage, it would be forever public and undeveloped. Thus, the landowner now had a *guarantee* that land surrounding them would remain unbuilt upon and, as an added bonus, the landowner would no longer have to pay property taxes on the undeveloped land to ensure that. A win-win for those who could afford a house on the Outer Cape. As Cape Codders saw their home values go up and the land around them preserved, feeling safe in their homes that would never be condemned, they felt less aggressive towards the idea of a park.²⁵⁴

²⁵² Cape Cod residents were often confused by the CSCs. Massachusetts Senator Leverett Saltonstall, a sponsor of the legislation, sent out an informative mailing to voters in December 1959, reminding them that for pre-1959 homes, the bill “assures the right of homeowners whose property lies within the diagram of the Park to continue to own and occupy their home without interruption or interference if their town adopts and keeps zoning which meets standards defined by the Secretary of the Interior,” and for those built after September 1959, the bill “gives each residential landowner a minimum guarantee of electing either life occupancy or occupancy for 25 years.” Leverett Saltonstall, “Report to Massachusetts: The Cape Cod Seashore Park—Preservation for Future Generations.” December 17, 1959, 2, Box 2, Folder 7, SPVC, David Martin Papers; Burling, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore*, 13.

²⁵³ The final legislation defined “improved property” as a “detached, one-family dwelling the construction of which was begun before September 1, 1959 . . . together with so much of the land on which the dwelling is situated, the said land being in the same ownership as the dwelling . . . *Provided*, however, That the Secretary [of the Interior] may exclude from the land so designated any beach or waters, together with so much of the land adjoining such beach or waters as the Secretary may deem necessary for public access thereto.” Section 3(d), *An Act to provide for the establishment of Cape Cod National Seashore*, Public Law 87-126, 87th Congress, 1st Session (August 7, 1961), 290.

²⁵⁴ A key part of the success of the CSC was that the Park Service made it a physical piece of paper that homeowners would have to prove their homes would be private indefinitely. Malcolm Hobbs, editor a newsweekly on Cape Cod, remembered that it “took a long time for people to absorb” the idea of the Secretary suspending powers of condemnation, but “obviously the key to [acceptance of the park] was the masterful clause in the enabling legislation which allowed people to retain ownership in their property.” Hobbs writes that having CSCs “unmanned the opposition and convinced a good many of them that this was not a bad idea.” Even with the CSCs, it took Cape Codders a while to believe that their property could still be owned, sold, built upon, and lived in after the park came in. “We said it so much that people seemed to ignore it so much that we debated about printing it in 24 point type

CSCs also slowed down development and speculation during Congressional debates over coastal parks. The cut-off date for keeping property within the park helped to stall development in park boundaries somewhat, but developers still built up some coastal areas on Wellfleet's Atlantic side and areas surrounding Provincetown.²⁵⁵ Charles Foster, who became Massachusetts Commissioner of Natural Resources after Sargent (and served as the first President of the Cape Cod National Seashore Advisory Committee), wrote that Outer Cape builders thought the Park Service was bluffing with their talk of condemnation of post-1959 homes. When the NPS called their bluff in 1962 and began condemning recently built structures, Foster writes, "the lower Cape was astonished that government could move so rapidly, and this fact had a remarkable effect on other builders who had planned to test the development control features of the Act."²⁵⁶ The Park Service did exercise leniency in some cases, however. To account for the importance of summer visitors, the Park Service allowed summer cottage rental homes to be counted as residential improved property and not commercial. That meant these cottages would be eligible for CSCs and not required to acquire a commercial permit to operate.²⁵⁷

Outside of park boundaries, however, the park proposal led to a rush in land development. From 1959 to 1961, the number of building permits issued by Wellfleet jumped from 90 to 146.²⁵⁸ Builders like Charles Frazier of Wellfleet, a vocal opponent of the park, found new ways to keep the real estate market going by buying "about 500 or 600 acres of land in

(that particular clause) to try to get this across." Interview with Malcolm Hobbs, by Francis P. Burling, Charles H. W. Foster, and Robert F. Gibbs, 1975, Burling papers, SPVC.

²⁵⁵ Peter McMahon and Christine Cipriani, *Cape Cod Modern: Midcentury Architecture and Community on the Outer Cape* (New York: Metropolis Books, 2014).

²⁵⁶ Foster, *The Cape Cod National Seashore*, 18-19.

²⁵⁷ Foster, *The Cape Cod National Seashore*, 18.

²⁵⁸ *Annual Reports of the Officers of the Town of Wellfleet for the year ending December 31, 1957* (Provincetown, MA: The Provincetown Printery, 1958), 82; *Annual Reports of the Officers of the Town of Wellfleet for the year ending December 31, 1961* (Provincetown, MA: The Provincetown Printery, 1962).

Brewster,” a town outside of the park’s parameters.²⁵⁹ Developers like Frazier built up nearby towns on the mid- and upper-Cape. Potential buyers could now be sold on the prospect of having a National Park in their neighborhood. Joshua Nickerson later commented that the National Seashore actually enhanced his lumber business, although he had feared the park would do the exact opposite. Nickerson simply switched the majority of his business to the mid-Cape and other areas outside of the National Seashore.²⁶⁰ National Seashore establishment actually increased development on other parts of the Cape.²⁶¹

Foreseeing this exterior development, Cape Cod National Seashore legislation also required that towns adopt zoning laws that must be approved by the Secretary of the Interior.²⁶² The Park Service hoped zoning laws would limit town development and preserve the cultural and historic character of the Cape.²⁶³ Studies like the 1959 planning study out of Harvard aided town Selectmen in determining the best zoning to retain a rural, culturally distinct character on the Cape. Making the town zoning laws DOI-approvable ensured that structures not part of the park—within the boundaries but privately owned and lived in—would remain part of the cultural resource of the ephemeral “Cape Cod character” that Interior officials and wealthy individuals sought to protect. This was a new type of park, designed as a cooperative cultural and natural preservation project with the towns.

The traditional use clause in the Cape Cod Formula appeased hundreds of Cape Cod landowners and tourists. Cape Cod residents had that these practices had been a way of life on

²⁵⁹ Interview with Charles Frazier by Francis P. Burling, Charles H. W. Foster, and Robert F. Gibbs, October 21, 1975, Burling papers, SPVC.

²⁶⁰ Interview with Joshua A. Nickerson, by Francis P. Burling, Charles H. W. Foster, and Robert F. Gibbs, October 8, 1975, 10-11.

²⁶¹ For more on growth on Cape Cod in the last fifty years, see Cape Cod Commission and Woods Hole Research Center, *Losing Cape Cod, Saving Cape Cod: Land Use and Climate Change Over Time* (2012).

²⁶² Section 5(a), *An Act to provide for the establishment of Cape Cod National Seashore*, Public Law 87-126, 87th Congress, 1st Session (August 7, 1961), 290-291.

²⁶³ Even before the park proposal, Cape Cod towns had begun cooperating to implement zoning laws and craft the type of development occurring in Barnstable County. Cumbler, *Cape Cod*, 161.

the Cape for thousands of years and that they fell under the category of cultural protection. In recommending a park in the final months of legislation, Stewart Udall cited the “traditional atmosphere and character” as core tenants of the Cape to save.²⁶⁴ In the 2014 version of the Superintendent’s Compendium at Cape Cod National Seashore, these “traditional uses” included berry harvesting, “unoccupied seashell” collecting, hunting, mushroom gathering, shellfishing, fishing, beach fires, and off-road vehicle usage.²⁶⁵ Shellfishing, in particular, remained an important industry on the Cape in regards to tourism.



Figure 15: Shellfishing at the Salt Pond, 1963, Cape Cod National Seashore Archives, Salt Pond Visitor Center.

To many Cape Codders, the most important traditional use was shellfishing. Mariculture, or the intentional growing of marine organisms, had begun on the Cape as early as 1800 when Wellfleetians first depleted their oyster beds and shellfishermen began importing oyster seed

²⁶⁴ Stewart Udall, Department of the Interior, Press Release, March 7, 1961, Box 21, “Cape Cod, 1961-1962” Folder, Orren Beaty Personal Papers, JFKL.

²⁶⁵ For a full list of current allowed uses as of 2013, see “Cape Cod National Seashore Superintendent’s Compendium,” May 3, 2013, 11-14.

from the Chesapeake.²⁶⁶ Towns insisted to the Park Service that they remain in control of the muddy marsh bottoms of the Outer Cape, home to the quahogs and oysters and steamers. By the 1950s, recreational shellfish permits were a major revenue source for Wellfleet and Eastham.²⁶⁷ In 1955, Wellfleet had four shellfish constables. They reported that the years was “not too financially productive for the commercial shellfishermen of Wellfleet, but was an excellent year for non-commercial fishermen and Summer residents.”²⁶⁸ Families visiting the Cape bought a permit to harvest shellfish, many of which were (and still are) planted by the towns at a fraction of the cost of a permit.²⁶⁹ Wellfleet and other Outer Cape towns successfully argued for control over these family shellfish permits and the revenue they created.

In addition to control over family permits, towns retained control over commercial shellfishing permits. Park Service legislation allowed them to continue issuing grants on marsh bottoms to commercial shellfishers. Conrad Wirth, trying to pick his battles in regards to Cape Cod National Seashore, assured an angry Joshua Nickerson (a vocal park opponent), “I think we

²⁶⁶ Alison Rieser, “Oysters, Ecosystems, and Persuasion,” *Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities*, 49 (2006), 50; Christine Kleiner, *W. K. Brooks and the Oyster Question: Scientists, Watermen, and the Maryland Chesapeake Bay since 1880* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009). Cumber, *Cape Cod*, 60. For a general history of fishing and shellfishing on Cape Cod, see Matthew McKenzie, *Clearing the Coastline: Ecological and Cultural Transformation of Cape Cod* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2010).

²⁶⁷ *Annual Reports of the Officers of the Town of Wellfleet for the year ending December 31, 1959* (Provincetown, MA: The Provincetown Printery, 1960), 13; *Annual Reports of the Officers of the Town of Wellfleet for the year ending December 31, 1961* (Provincetown, MA: The Provincetown Printery, 1962), 42.

²⁶⁸ *Annual Reports of the Officers of the Town of Wellfleet for the year ending December 31, 1955* (Provincetown, MA: The Provincetown Printery, 1956), 43. Massachusetts was active in recreation shellfishing at the turn of the 1960s, as well. As part of their shellfish propagation program., “Twenty towns utilized plastic screen to promote the reseeded of depleted clam flats, and the transplanting of quahogs from contaminated waters was again a popular cooperative program. Attempts were also made to utilize salt ponds as sources of oyster seed for transplant to suitable growing areas.” Charles H. W. Foster, Massachusetts Department of Natural Resources, “Highlights of Department Field Activities, Fiscal Year 1959, 2, Box 1, “Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Natural Resources, 1957-1959” Folder, Charles H.W. Foster Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.

²⁶⁹ Wellfleet reported that “created much good will and favorable reaction by our seasonal guests as well as year round residents.” *Annual Reports of the Officers of the Town of Wellfleet for the year ending December 31, 1955* (Provincetown, MA: The Provincetown Printery, 1956), 43.

are staying out of the shellfish business.”²⁷⁰ At Cape Cod, even the earliest bills allowed the continuation of shellfishing and town control of that practice.²⁷¹ Shellfishing in a park never presented a problem at Cape Cod, where the Park Service saw it as part of the area’s cultural landscape. The Park Service saw Cape Cod as a recreational unit where culturally important resource extraction was part of the area’s fabric.²⁷²

The third major compromise by the Interior Department was allowing the formation of a Cape Cod National Seashore Advisory Commission. This group would consist of representatives of each town adjacent to the National Seashore, the State of Massachusetts, the National Park Service, and the park itself. Conrad Wirth had opposed the idea of Advisory Commissions for some time, so his agreement to establish such a body was a major concession to Cape Codders. The Advisory Commission would have no formal authority, but major decisions would run past it.²⁷³ Members of the initial Advisory Committee included park skeptics Joshua Nickerson and Esther Wiles, but also park proponents like Charles H. W. Foster.²⁷⁴ The Advisory Committee made the towns of Cape Cod feel they had a voice in the seashore administration. It was just one

²⁷⁰ Conrad Wirth in “Official Report of Proceedings before the U. S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, February 16, 1962, Meeting 1, Cape Cod National Seashore Advisory Committee,” Series 3, Box 2, Folder 1, Cape Cod National Seashore Collection, Nickerson Archives, Cape Cod Community College.

²⁷¹ Section 7(c), *An Act to provide for the establishment of Cape Cod National Seashore*, Public Law 87-126, 87th Congress, 1st Session (August 7, 1961), 292. In constituent mailings, Saltonstall reminded Cape Codders that the Cape Cod National Seashore bill did allow towns to continue controlling shellfishing. A December 1959 mailing reminded constituents that the bill “protects the traditional shellfish rights of the towns and allows waterfowl and upland game hunting under state law.” Leverett Saltonstall, “Report to Massachusetts: The Cape Cod Seashore Park—Preservation for Future Generations.” December 17, 1959, 2, Box 2, Folder 7, David Martin Papers, SPVC.

²⁷² Their recalcitrance to allow ranching at Point Reyes indicates some of the East/West Coast ideas of nature and wilderness pervasive in NPS and conservation thinking at the time. See Point Reyes Chapter for more. In some sense, Schlesinger was right about the NPS focusing too much on recreation, but even Schlesinger did not object to shellfishing in the park.

²⁷³ Section 8, *An Act to provide for the establishment of Cape Cod National Seashore*, Public Law 87-126, 87th Congress, 1st Session (August 7, 1961), 292-293. For more on Wirth’s opposition to an Advisory Committee at first, see Burling, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore*, 21.

²⁷⁴ “Official Report of Proceedings before the U. S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, February 16, 1962, Meeting 1, Cape Cod National Seashore Advisory Committee,” Series 3, Box 2, Folder 1, Cape Cod National Seashore Collection, Nickerson Archives, Cape Cod Community College.

part of the Cape Cod Formula that catered to local residents in order to win their support for a Cape Cod National Seashore.

Increasingly, over the course of the Department of the Interior's concessions to Cape Codders, the National Park Service and the Kennedy administration broadly began to see Cape Cod as the example that other coastal areas would follow. As I discussed in chapter one, legislators and bureaucrats from many states had proposed different ways to conserve shoreline before Cape Cod-specific legislation. Kennedy opposed Senator Richard Neuberger's (D-OR) omnibus National Seashore bill in 1959. He believed—and was further convinced so when his constituents also believed—that approaching several new National Seashores through one piece of legislation would not be successful. He and his staff preferred a place-by-place approach, where legislators would present separate a bill for each coastal area. Such an approach allowed legislative staff to more easily bend to the desires of citizens of each locale and anticipate the regional issues that might come up in that particular location.

The national attention that Cape Cod's establishment as a National Seashore received led the Kennedy administration and its National Park Service to see Cape Cod as the example that other coastal areas would follow. Residents from other coastal areas hoped their backyards could become a National Seashore like Cape Cod, whether or not the Department of the Interior wanted them. People from other part of the country wrote to Kennedy, Udall, and Wirth explaining that they wanted National Seashore like the new one at Cape Cod.²⁷⁵ The Kennedy administration was aware that all eyes looked to Cape Cod in the early 1960s for the future of coastal conservation and recreation programs. Conrad Wirth conveyed as much when he wrote to Stewart Udall in 1960 that the National Park Service was aware of the attention on Cape Cod and

²⁷⁵ Leon M. Despres, Alderman, 5th Ward, Chicago, to President John F. Kennedy, September 27, 1962, Box 657, "PA 3, 8-26-62 – 10-31-62" Folder, Presidential Papers, White House Central Subject Files, JFKL.

was therefore “anxious to make a good showing in all respects.”²⁷⁶ Even when writing the legislation, Kennedy and his staff knew that this new formula could become a “proper framework” for establishing new “great national parks.”²⁷⁷

People who lived in coastal areas that had not been included in *Our Vanishing Shoreline* even started writing into Kennedy asking for National Seashore parks like the one on Cape Cod. At other seashores, park supporters modeled legislation after those at Cape Cod. While the Department of the Interior might not have had the resources to do so in case after case, local organizations began taking on the education responsibility in less prestigious parks than Cape Cod. Aware of how Kennedy’s transition to a higher profile public office aided in the publicity and therefore the ultimate passage of Cape Cod National Seashore legislation, these supporters of other national seashores pushed the President to promote their parks publically, just as he had done with Cape Cod.²⁷⁸ Cape Cod National Seashore may have been a priority of the Park Service because of its magnificently intact beaches, but conservationist insiders knew it actually passed because it had friends in high places.

President John F. Kennedy signed into law the bill establishing Cape Cod National Seashore on August 7, 1961. By 1962, Stewart Udall and Conrad Wirth had turned their attention (that not taken by the rollout of Cape Cod National Seashore) to other coastal areas in need of saviors from development. Cape Cod had been the highest priority for the administration; now they could turn to other potential seashore parks.²⁷⁹ Content that they had secured at least one

²⁷⁶ Memorandum, Conrad Wirth to Stewart Udall, April 5, 1962, Box 21, “Cape Cod, 1961-1962” Folder, Orren Beaty Personal Papers, JFKL.

²⁷⁷ John F. Kennedy to George A. Sagendorph, September 10, 1959, Box 713, “Cape Cod National Park, 9/7/59 – 9/29/59” Folder, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.

²⁷⁸ Senator Philip A. Hart (MI) to President John F. Kennedy, February 8, 1962, Box 657, “PA 3 – Parks” Folder, Presidential Papers, White House Central Subject Files, JFKL.

²⁷⁹ Saltonstall quoted Udall on the Senate Floor on this matter in 1961: “Secretary Udall said that he regarded this project as priority No. 1 on the list of important seed economic shore proposals.” *Congressional Record*, 87th

coastal park near a major metropolitan area on the East Coast, the leaders of the U.S. Interior turned their attention to the West.

Chapter Three: “The Vanishing Dairy Rancher”? Point Reyes and Work




Figure 16: “Point Reyes National Seashore,” Map, Google Maps, Google, March 25, 2015, <https://www.google.com/maps/place/Point+Reyes+National+Seashore/@37.9059825,-122.8226578,79501m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m2!3m1!1s0x8085c56d4c1ce53f:0x664921d294079397>.

Both growth and natural beauty define twentieth-century California and the American West.²⁸⁰ By the post-World War II era, historian of the West James Findlay argues, “It became steadily clearer . . . that two of the region’s distinguishing traits, its rapid growth and appealing

²⁸⁰Historian James Findlay says that California has offered a unique opportunity for Americans to “live according to their preferences” in *Magic Lands: Western Cityscapes and American Culture After 1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 2. For the seminal work on how the growth made possible by the frontier shaped American history, see Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1921). For more on the history of the American West and the strong role the environment played in that story, see Richard White, *It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the American West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Patricia Nelson Limerick, Clyde Milner II, and Charles E. Rankin, eds., *Trails: Toward A New Western History* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991); Gary Clayton Anderson and Kathleen P. Chamberlain, *Power and Promise: The Changing American West* (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2008).

environment, were to a significant extent mutually exclusive.”²⁸¹ As Americans began blaming population growth and automobile inroads for the despoliation of the West, Senator Ernst Gruening, a Democrat from Alaska, joined the chorus.²⁸² His relatives had moved to California in the early 1950s, but the paradise they first encountered less than a decade previously was now “being ruined” by relentless population growth. Gruening, like many conservationists, used this example of population growth to advocate natural preservation:

As we drive along, they point to a valley and say, ‘Look, this used to be a beautiful valley filled with citrus trees. Now look at it, filled with hundreds of boxes called houses. / A couple of years ago I . . . drove from Los Angeles to Long Beach, and I could see nothing of beautiful scenery. I think this legislation [to protect Point Reyes as a National Seashore] is certainly long overdue and desperately needed. I will certainly vote for it. I think 50 years from now we will feel that we have not done enough.’²⁸³

To Gruening, creating new federal parkland in the form of a national seashore in California’s Bay Area was a direct response to the West’s unbridled postwar population growth. Left unchecked, Gruening, park planners, and conservationists feared, humans would build up what little bit of California’s coast remained relatively natural. Creating a National Seashore at Point Reyes, conservationists hoped, was one small way to check that growth.

Not everyone believed land preservation was the best solution to problems caused by California’s rapid growth. Over twenty-five ranchers made their living on Marin County’s Point Reyes peninsula. These ranchers, who owned their land but watched as wealthy speculators

²⁸¹ Findlay, *Magic Lands*, 300.

²⁸² On the growth of western tourism and the automobile’s role in it, see Hal K. Rothman, *Devil's Bargains: Tourism in the Twentieth-Century American West* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998); Findlay, *Magic Lands*, 36-38; Kevin Starr, *Golden Dreams: California in an Age of Abundance, 1950-1963* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); 245-265.

²⁸³ Senator Ernst Gruening, from United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, on S. 476, a Bill to Establish the Point Reyes National Seashore in the State of California, and for Other Purposes. March 28-31, 1961* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 37 (hereafter *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*).

bought up similar agricultural land in metropolitan areas, felt population growth threatened their own livelihoods more than it threatened the natural world.²⁸⁴ A Marin County attorney who represented ranchers on the Point Reyes peninsula, Bryan McCarthy, alluded to the 1955 National Park Service report *Our Vanishing Shoreline* to make the point that agriculture had the most to fear from unbridled population growth.

Do you know who is really vanishing today? Do you know who is going to vanish if you act in the way you have been requested to act, almost urged to act, almost pushed into an act? Do you know who it is? It will be the vanishing private property owner, the vanishing dairy rancher, the vanishing man who built your county.²⁸⁵

McCarthy, and the dairy ranchers he represented, agreed with Gruening that unplanned growth presented a problem for California. The two split ways when pinpointing the victims of that growth. Conservationists believed creating new parkland and wilderness areas could protect the West from unchecked growth. Agriculturalists believed that farmers, ranchers, and private property owners needed protection from suburban growth, and that conservation victories often came at the expense of agricultural productivity and farmers' welfare. Farming became more and more difficult in the postwar period with rising populations and spiking land values on California's coast. Ranchers found themselves squeezed out not only by suburban growth, but also by the growth of greenspace.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁴ In the mid-1950s, land economists worried about the "decline of agricultural land in the state" as farmers rapidly sold land near urban areas to home developers. See Howard F. Gregor, "Urban Pressures on California Land," *Land Economics*, 33, 4 (November 1957): 311-325; Marion Clawson, "Urban Sprawl and Speculation in Suburban Land," *Land Economics*, 38, 2 (May 1962): 99-111. In the U.S. overall between 1950 and 1960, America's farm population went from 25 million to 15.6 million, and total farms declined by over 1.5 million, from 5.4 million to 3.9 million. For more on the decline in the U.S. farming population and farmland area, see Laura Kolar, "'Selling' the Farm: New Frontier Conservation and the USDA Farm Recreation Policies of the 1960s," *Agricultural History* 86, 1 (Winter 2012): 55-77, here 61, and David B. Danborn, *Born in the Country: A History of Rural America* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 232, 236;

²⁸⁵ McCarthy, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 83.

²⁸⁶ Douglas Sackman explores the effect of suburbanization on California's farmland in its early, pre-WWII years in Sackman, *Orange Empire: California and the Fruits of Eden* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005). For more on California's growth and environmental consequences and politics thereof, see Starr, *Golden Dreams*; William Deverell and Greg Hise, eds., *Land of Sunshine: An Environmental History of Metropolitan Los Angeles*

This chapter looks at how population growth and development pressures in California led the Park Service and conservationists to accept a park with ranchers, grazing, and agriculture—activities previously deemed by the National Park Service unacceptable on preserved lands. The steadily top-down manner in which the Park Service promoted Point Reyes exposed the growing power of conservation groups like the Sierra Club in national politics of the 1960s. Point Reyes National Seashore did not pass due to grassroots efforts, as was the case at the Indiana Dunes (see Chapter 6), nor did it pass thanks to the direct communication between powerful residents, politicians, and the Park Service as was the case at Cape Cod. Rather, the Park Service tapped into the political strength of the Sierra Club in the Bay Area and nationally, who used their wilderness era coalitions to orchestrate local support and quell opposition. Ranchers who resided and worked on Point Reyes, while not completely ignored, were not as closely connected to the federal power structure as conservationists and NPS officials. Thus, unlike Cape Cod where residents had direct lines to federal offices, ranchers at Point Reyes were often isolated from the federal decision-making process and ended up with a deal that had strings attached. Still, their ability to retain at least some of their land shows how growing development concerns pushed the Park Service into quicker action and a broader understanding of land conservation. Cows, Park Service officials and conservationists agreed, were better than subdivisions.

Authorized by Congress in 1962, Point Reyes National Seashore has seen more controversy since its inception than any other federal coastal park. These controversies spring from the groups both firmly established in the Bay Area by 1962: ranchers and conservationists. No other potential federal shores had both a thriving agricultural economy and a cohesive land conservation movement with deep, half-century old roots and strong political ties to

(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005); Sarah S. Elkind. *How Local Politics Shape Federal Policy: Business, Power, and the Environment in Twentieth-Century Los Angeles* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

Washington.²⁸⁷ Conservationists and ranchers had a difficult time empathizing with each other's points of view because of National Park Service and conservationist opinions that natural parks should be places free of work. Most leaders of the National Park Service and the fifty year-old, Bay Area-based Sierra Club subscribed to an ethos of nature conservation that prioritized scenic beauty, middle class leisure and recreation, and undisturbed nature.²⁸⁸

Point Reyes National Seashore's (albeit fraught) passage shows how heavily the Park Service leaned on conservation networks to pass National Seashore legislation in the sixties. In the Bay Area, those networks were so strong that residents of the peninsula—mostly ranchers—had little say in the fate of their land. Point Reyes shows how strong these networks were and how they relied on national rather than local support. By the time Point Reyes legislation passed Congress in 1962, the National Seashore movement was strong enough and closely enough attached to wilderness coalitions to propel a park forward in the face of local opposition.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁷ I use the word "conservationist" in this chapter to refer to the Sierra Club and like-minded (often overlapping) groups in the Bay Area. These activists worked mostly for what environmental historians today would consider "preservation" goals, the protection of land for the sake of preserving land alone. This contrasts the ideals of conservationists in the Progressive Era, who advocated for "wise use" of land and its natural resources. Although the Sierra Club ethos grew out of John Muir's preservationist focus, but the 1960s they referred to themselves as conservationists. This term, to those who self-identified with it, encompasses land protection, anti-pollution, and natural resource conservation ideals—in short, those who called themselves conservationists in the early 1960s were very close to what we today would consider "environmentalists." Because the groups I discuss predate wide use of the term environmental, I refer to them as they referred to themselves, as conservationists. For more on conservation vs. preservation debates in the Progressive Era, see Samuel P. Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959); Roderick F. Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

²⁸⁸ For more on Bay Area conservation groups, see Richard Walker, *The Country in the City: The Greening of the San Francisco Bay Area* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007); Michael P. Cohen, *The History of the Sierra Club, 1892-1970* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1988). Susan R. Schrepfer, *Nature's Altars: Mountains, Gender, and American Environmentalism* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), Finis Dunaway, *Natural Visions: The Power of Images in American Environmental Reform* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), especially Chapter 5, "Nature on the Coffee Table," 117-147. Starr, *Golden Dreams*, 413-435; David Brower, *For Earth's Sake: The Life and Times of David Brower* (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1990)

²⁸⁹ For more on the wilderness movement and the coalitions it formed, see Roderick Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), James Morton Turner, *The Promise of Wilderness: American Environmental Politics Since 1964* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012). For more on changing environmental politics and coalitions generally in the early 1960s, see Samuel P. Hays, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Gottlieb, *Forcing the Spring*; Thomas Raymond Wellock, *Preserving the Nation: The Conservation and Environmental Movements, 1870-2000* (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, 2007).

Because the Sierra Club/National Park Service partnership enabled the passage of Point Reyes National Seashore legislation, conservationists' historic notions of appropriate work on natural land shaped the character of the park and clouded it with decades of controversy. Mid-century conservationists tended to "equate productive work in nature with destruction," to borrow a phrase from Richard White's landmark essay "Are you an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?"²⁹⁰ The National Park Service allowed ranchers to remain on their peninsula, but only begrudgingly. Within ten years, many ranchers had sold their land to the Park Service and leased it back to live and work. Point Reyes became part of the same newly federalized landscape in the 20th century that Louis Warren discusses in *The Hunter's Game*.²⁹¹ At Point Reyes, ranchers were able to organize and bring their grievances to the federal government, but they still found their opinions came second to federal plans. Unlike many of Warren's examples, Point Reyes ranchers were successful enough in their organized opposition to ensure some sort of continued ranching even under federal protection – albeit to a lesser extent and under less ideal circumstances than before the park existed. While Point Reyes ranchers would not call this a success, their ability to become one of the earliest national park areas with widespread agriculture was path breaking. The Park Service accepted work within Point Reyes National Seashore because their fear of overpopulation and suburbanization trumped their fear of a working landscape in parkland.

Rapid population growth in the State of California and in the United State in general informed many conservation stances as early as the 1940s, as Adam Rome argues in *The*

²⁹⁰ Richard White, "Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?": Work and Nature," in *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature*, William Cronon, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 171-185.

²⁹¹ Louis Warren, *The Hunter's Game: Poachers and Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997).

Bulldozer in the Countryside.²⁹² General population growth concerns propelled worries about suburban growth in San Francisco and among conservation organizations. Tom Robertson pinpoints how influential population growth worries were in the early postwar era and how these pervasive concerns contributed to the formation of the environmental movement. Robertson argues that “in the 1950s and 1960s, concerns about overpopulation touched everything from family structure and race relations to ideas about poverty and Cold War strategy.”²⁹³ Derek S. Hoff also argues that “the early 1960s was a crucial period for the evolution of the population-resources debate in the United States.”²⁹⁴ Population concerns, expressed in maps of suburban growth and exponential statistics, pushed forward National Seashore establishment in San Francisco and other major metropolitan areas. The year after Point Reyes legislation passed Congress, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall published a book on conservation in America that touched upon the dangers of unmanaged growth.²⁹⁵ Population growth was on everyone’s minds. Sierra Club Executive Director David Brower spoke on population growth as early as 1959 and wrote the “apocalyptic foreword” to Paul Ehrlich’s *The Population Bomb*, a decade later.²⁹⁶

²⁹² Adam Rome, *The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), especially Chapter 4, “Open Space: The First Protests Against the Bulldozed Landscape,” 119-152.

²⁹³ Thomas Robertson, *The Malthusian Moment. Global Population Growth and the Birth of American Environmentalism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012), 4.

²⁹⁴ Derek S. Hoff, *The State and the Stork: The Population Debate and Policy Making in U.S. History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 164.

²⁹⁵ Stewart Udall, *The Quiet Crisis* (Introduction by John F. Kennedy) (New York, Chicago, and San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963). Udall’s history is of land in the United States – he starts before Europeans arrive and titles Chapter 1 “The Land Wisdom of the Indians”—but his point in telling this history is to give the reader a platform for the “quiet conservation crisis of the 1960’s.” Udall writes in the forward: “America today stands poised on a pinnacle of wealth and power, yet we live in a land of vanishing beauty, of increasing ugliness, of shrinking open space, and of an overall environment that is diminished daily by pollution and noise and blight. . . It is not too late to repair some of the mistakes of the past, and to make America a green and pleasant—and productive—land. We can do it if we understand the history of our husbandry, and develop fresh insight concerning the men and the forces that have shaped our land attitudes and determined the pattern of land use in the United States.” (viii).

²⁹⁶ Brower, Hoff writes, “articulated Malthusian themes” at a 1959 conference on wilderness. Hoff, *The State and the Stork*, 170. For more on Brower’s population growth message and how it directly led to the end of his tenure as Executive Director, see Cohen, *The History of the Sierra Club*, 232-233, 369.

In trying to control the growth around metropolitan areas, Bay Area conservation groups looked to suburban Los Angeles as the foil, the example of what not to do. To northern Californians, historian James Findlay argues, “always, Los Angeles seemed to represent the worst possible case,” and suburban growth was no exception.²⁹⁷ By 1959, the time of the NPS Pacific Coast Survey, Park Service officials noted that “there was almost no virgin land down there [in southern California].”²⁹⁸ Conservation groups in the Bay Area knew that populations were also on the rise in northern California. Marin County’s population alone nearly tripled from in the immediate postwar period, jumping from 52,907 people to 146,820 in 1960.²⁹⁹ Sierra Club President Edgar Wayburn believed that protecting Point Reyes, a large chunk of land so close San Francisco’s population center, from development was, “urgent and vital to public interest.”³⁰⁰ The intense, rapid growth of California’s metropolitan regions motivated the Sierra Club and other conservation organizations to fight for the protection of Point Reyes. Conservationists, too, saw farmland disappearing in the path of growing metropolitan suburbs. They believed it was only a matter of time before Point Reyes ranchers sold out, and

²⁹⁷ Findlay notes that “always, Los Angeles seemed to represent the worst possible case,” and coastlines were no exception. From *Magic Lands*, 46. “Out of control quite from Findlay, *Magic Lands*, 16. Greg Hise. *Magnetic Los Angeles: Planning the Twentieth Century Metropolis* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). Kevin Starr also discusses the importance of coastal preservation specifically in the development of California’s anti-growth movement. Starr, *Golden Dreams*, 427-432.

²⁹⁸ George Collins, *The Art and Politics of Park Planning and Preservation, 1920-1979*, an oral history conducted 1978-1979, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, 274. United States. National Park Service, *Pacific Coast Recreation Area Survey* (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, 1959).

²⁹⁹ Census numbers retrieved from *Bay Area Census*, <http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/counties/MarinCounty50.htm> Accessed October 20, 2014.

³⁰⁰ Edgar Wayburn to J. T. Rutherford, July 5, 1961, Carton 26, Folder “Point Reyes National Seashore (proposed) 1959-1961,” Edgar Wayburn papers, 1923-2010, BANC MSS 96/48 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Northern Californians had watched rapid urban and suburban growth in southern California that, by the 1960s, in the words of historian John Findlay “seemed to be out of control.” Findlay, *Magic Lands*, 16.

conservationists wanted the land to be protected first.³⁰¹ Better that ranchers sell out to the feds than to developers, conservationists figured.

This chapter only deals with the first authorization of Point Reyes National Seashore, not the 1969-1972 controversy that eventually led to a revised and fully established park. I have focused on the initial battle for the park because it is the one that was part of the broad National Seashore initiative by the Department of the Interior, which is the focus of this dissertation. The second fight over Point Reyes occurred once the environmental movement was nearly mature and came from a different strand of Park Service thinking than the original coastal conservation initiative. In contrast, the controversy over the park's creation from 1957-1962 shows how this National Seashore proposal contributed to the development of the environmental movement, its expansion to include new issues like population growth, and a reluctant acceptance of work in natural spaces.³⁰²

Background on Point Reyes and related park proposals

³⁰¹ Marin County dairy ranches were on the decline in the 1950s well before the park proposal. Marin County had about 200 total ranches; by 1960, there were 150. John Hart, *Farming on the Edge: Saving Family Farms in Marin County, California* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 54. Joel Gustafson, President of the Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation, accused Marin County officials and ranchers of not being able to resist developers. Joel Gustafson, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 161.

³⁰² Because my analysis is of the Point Reyes movement's contribution to the formation of the environmental movement and not on Point Reyes alone, I rely heavily on two histories of Point Reyes for this chapter. The first is the National Park Service's official administrative history of Point Reyes National Seashore, written by Paul Sadin. Sadin's thorough history considers both ranching and conservation perspectives, but his NPS-commissioned history gives the Park Service's viewpoint more time and credence than other groups. Still, Sadin's meticulous history remains an indispensable resource for this chapter. Laura Watt's history of Point Reyes provides a solid counterweight to Sadin's Park Service viewpoint. Watt takes ranchers' opinions very seriously and she criticizes the National Park Service in their administration, land acquisition, and leasing policies. Watt's history is an important look at Point Reyes' history from the perspective of ranchers and those performing work on the peninsula. Laura A. Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation: Wilderness and Working Landscapes at Point Reyes National Seashore* (Under contract with the University of California Press, forthcoming 2015). A note on Watt: I read these chapters when they were still in draft form, so the page numbers may not correspond to the final book form. When I edit this manuscript for publication, I will re-write her citations according to the page numbers in her published version. Paul Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion: An Administrative History of Point Reyes National Seashore* (Seattle: Historical Research Associates, 2007).

Since the 1850s, the Point Reyes Peninsula has been a place of dairy ranching. The area's human history goes back much further, however. The peninsula was home to Coast Miwok tribes centuries before Europeans arrived. Coast Miwok dined on the peninsula's acorns and the sea's fish, crabs, oysters, and kelp. They used clam shells for currency and traded with other tribes across northern California. About 1,500 to 2,000 Coast Miwok lived in the area of current-day Marin County at the time of the first European arrivals to the area.³⁰³ Marin County was actually named after a Chief from the Coast Miwok tribe who resisted Spanish rule in the early 19th century.³⁰⁴ By the mid-nineteenth century, some Coast Miwok worked as hired hands on Point Reyes' ranches.³⁰⁵ The first record of Europeans on Point Reyes is a disputed one: Sir Francis Drake spent six weeks repairing his ship, the *Golden Hind*, somewhere on the California coast in 1579. While many local historians (including overeager NPS officials) have wanted that place to be on Point Reyes, archaeologists have never confidently determined the actual site of Drake's landing.³⁰⁶

In addition to its possible sixteenth century fame, Point Reyes acquired fame in the nineteenth century for its dairy products. Point Reyes's dairies formed what was in the late nineteenth century one of the largest butter districts in the world. At that time, Point Reyes butter

³⁰³ Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 11-13; Harold Gilliam, *Island in Time: The Point Reyes Peninsula* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Press, 1962), 26.

³⁰⁴ Betty Goerke, *Chief Marin: Leader, Rebel, and Legend* (Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2007).

³⁰⁵ Stephen Silliman, *Lost Laborers in Colonial California, Native Americans and the Archaeology of Rancho Petaluma* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004).

³⁰⁶ The mystique surrounding Drake's landing fueled an elaborate hoax in the mid-twentieth century, when California historians found the legendary "plate of brass" supposedly left behind by Drake to mark his landing spot. At the time of the Point Reyes National Seashore proposals, this story was in full swing. At the 1966 dedication of the park, handouts to guests even included a commemorative copy of Drake's brass plate. By 1974, however, Harvard Professor Samuel Eliot Morison determined the plate was a hoax. Subsequent investigation identified a California historical club as perpetrators of the hoax. The plate of brass hoax is important for the establishment story of Point Reyes because the NPS and Sierra Club used it as a prop in pushing Point Reyes National Seashore legislation through Congress, embellishing a perhaps questionable Euro-American cultural important of Point Reyes. Sadin, *Managing a Land In Motion*, 11-14; Gilliam, *Island in Time*, 15, 26-30; Harry Kelsey, "Did Francis Drake Really Visit California?" *Western Historical Quarterly*, 21, 4 (Nov. 1990): 444-462; Edward Von der Porten, Raymond Aker, Robert W. Allen, and James M. Spitze, "Who Made Drake's Plate of Brass? Hint: It wasn't Francis Drake," *California History*, 81, 2 (2002): 116-133.

was “widely considered to be the highest quality butter in the state.”³⁰⁷ This successful dairy industry kept most of Marin’s land fairly rural well into the twentieth century. The first study for a possible Point Reyes National Seashore, written Landscape Architect Emerson Knight and approved by then Chief Land Planner Conrad Wirth in 1935, credited the dairies with keeping Point Reyes natural, with intact “primitive and wilderness aspects.” “Such values,” the report concluded, “Have thus far been happily safeguarded because large private ranches and hunting clubs have excluded the general public and prevented any consequent spoliation by human use in mass form.”³⁰⁸



Figure 17: Image of a Point Reyes ranch from Emerson Knight, Point Reyes Peninsula, CA - Study of a National Seashore Recreation Area 1935, 1935, Box 5, Folder 12, Emerson Knight Collection, BANC 79/2 C, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

³⁰⁷ D. S. Livingston, *A Good Life: Dairy Farming in the Olema Valley: A History of the Dairy and Beef Ranches of the Olema Valley and Lagunitas Canyon, Golden Gate National Recreation Area and Point Reyes National Seashore, Marin County, California* (San Francisco: National Park Service, Department of the Interior, 1995), vii.

³⁰⁸ Emerson Knight, *Point Reyes Peninsula, CA - Study of a National Seashore Recreation Area 1935*, 1935, Box 5, Folder 12, Emerson Knight Collection, BANC 79/2 C, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, Foreword.

The 1935 National Park Service report on a potential Point Reyes federal park operated under the assumption that ranchers would have to give up their land in order for a park to exist on the Point Reyes peninsula. Knight noted that purchasing the land would be “one of the main difficulties” in establishing the park. He warned that “large ranch holders” would not want to “surrender their property for public recreation use.”³⁰⁹ Even in the face of pushback, the National Park Service would have to persevere, Wirth and Knight concluded. Their report never mentioned a park option where ranchers would keep some of their land. In discussing the ranches, the 1935 report always recommended “acquiring” the land.³¹⁰ The Park Service never acted on Knight’s study. It joined many other 1930s coastal park plans that died a quick death with the onset of World War II, when Park Service funding slowed to a trickle.³¹¹

Point Reyes did not receive national attention as a possible federal coastal park until the mid-1950s, when the publication of *Our Vanishing Shoreline* got conservation groups talking about coastal preservation. Although Pacific Coast Survey was not complete until 1959, Park Service Director Conrad Wirth made clear that plans for a Point Reyes National Seashore were in the pipeline by the mid-1950s.³¹² By 1955, with the publication of *Our Vanishing Shoreline* and a renewed emphasis on coastal parks, the Director of the National Park Service was none other than Conrad Wirth—that same park planner who had recommended Point Reyes for National Seashore status twenty years earlier. Wirth saw Point Reyes as a region of “prime importance” whose “exceptional qualities, manifold interests . . . quickly convenient accessibility

³⁰⁹ Emerson Knight, *Point Reyes Peninsula, CA - Study of a National Seashore Recreation Area 1935*, 1935, Box 5, Folder 12, Emerson Knight Collection, BANC 79/2 C, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 14.

³¹⁰ Emerson Knight, *Point Reyes Peninsula, CA - Study of a National Seashore Recreation Area 1935*, 1935, Box 5, Folder 12, Emerson Knight Collection, BANC 79/2 C, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

³¹¹ Cameron Binkley, *The Creation and Establishment of Cape Hatteras National Seashore: The Great Depression Through Mission 66* (Atlanta: Cultural Resources Division, Southeast Regional Office, National Park Service, 2007); Larry Dilsaver, *Cumberland Island National Seashore: A History of Conservation Conflict* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004).

³¹² Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 47-48.

to the concentrated population of central California, [and] its miles of superb beaches” rendered it an ideal location for a park “of interstate and national scope.”³¹³

Wirth happily picked up the Point Reyes banner in his new role. One Marin County advocate for Point Reyes National Seashore cited Wirth’s “infectious enthusiasm” for the park as a driving force behind the seashore’s establishment.³¹⁴ This time, however, Wirth was not the only national figure with a passion for preserving Point Reyes. George Collins, a National Park Service planner out of the San Francisco Office, joined Wirth in getting the Point Reyes project going. Collins lived in Kent Woodlands, an upscale neighborhood at the base of Mount Tamalpais bordering San Anselmo (a Marin County town of 11,584 as of 1960).³¹⁵ Collins’ personal connection to Marin County certainly contributed to his resolve in trying to protect Point Reyes as a National Seashore. Collins became a member the Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation and worked closely with high-profile Sierra Club officials. Upon his retirement from the National Park Service in 1960 he founded the “Conservation Associates,” a private consulting firm that worked with both the Park Service and the Sierra Club.³¹⁶ Other Bay Area activists called Collins the “father of Point Reyes” and the “prime, though often modestly

³¹³ Emerson Knight, *Point Reyes Peninsula, CA - Study of a National Seashore Recreation Area 1935*, 1935, Box 5, Folder 12, Emerson Knight Collection, BANC 79/2 C, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, Foreword.

³¹⁴ Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 75.

³¹⁵ U.S. Census Data, 1960. Retrieved from <http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/cities/SanAnselmo50.htm>. Kent Woodlands has been a fairly upscale neighborhood since its creation. The current Kent Woodlands Property Owners’ Association has a website with a map, available here: <http://kwpoa.com/>. Information on Collins’ residence from Margaret Azevedo, “Civic Leader and Save Our Seashore Board Member,” an oral history conducted in 1990, in *Saving Point Reyes National Seashore, 1969-1970: An Oral History of Citizen Action in Conservation*, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1995, 171; News Clipping, 1960 (?), Box 2, “Clippings” Folder, Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation Records 1959-1962, BANC MSS C-A 362, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

³¹⁶ “Acreage Cutback: Marin Board Won’t Budge on Pt. Reyes,” *San Rafael Independent Journal*, March 20, 1961, Box 2, “Clippings” Folder, Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation Records, 1959-1962, BANC MSS C-A 362, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; George Collins, *The Art and Politics of Park Planning and Preservation, 1920-1979*, an oral history conducted 1978-1979, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, 268-271.

inconspicuous, mover both within and outside the Park Service in establishing Point Reyes.”³¹⁷

Collins’s intersecting affiliations with the National Park Service and national and local conservation organizations typified the complex allegiances, dually to the federal government and conservation groups, of many leaders of the movement to create Point Reyes National Seashore.

A third important national figure who helped shepherd Point Reyes legislation through Congress was a politician: Clem Miller. Like Collins and Wirth,

Miller also was well-connected with Bay Area environmental groups.

In 1958, Miller was a newly elected congressman representing

California’s first district, which stretched from Bolinas to the

California border. Miller and his wife Katharine (“Katy”) had grown

up in Delaware and, like many Californians of their generation, had

left the East Coast to resettle in the West. Katy Miller said that

California attracted Clem, who felt discouraged after his difficult

experience on the ground in Europe in 1945, because it was “a place

where you can make a new start.”³¹⁸



Figure 18: Clem Miller.
Wikimedia Commons.
Accessed March 27, 2015.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clement_Woodnutt_Miller#/media/File:ClementWMiller.jpg.

Even amidst their search for freedom in the West, the Millers retained strong political

connections in the East that would help them when Clem first ran for national office in 1956:

Clem was loosely a member of the famously wealthy DuPont clan, his grandfather, Charles R.

Miller, had been the Governor of Delaware, and his Uncle Thomas W. Miller had worked in

Warren Harding’s administration (although he moved West after he was convicted in the Teapot

³¹⁷ George Collins, *The Art and Politics of Park Planning and Preservation, 1920-1979*, an oral history conducted 1978-1979, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, 250. (quote attributed to Lowell Summer by interviewer Ann Lage)

³¹⁸ Katy Miller Johnson, “Catalyst and Citizen-Lobbyist in Washington,” an oral history conducted in 1990, in *Saving Point Reyes National Seashore, 1969-1970: An Oral History of Citizen Action in Conservation*, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1995, 8.

Dome scandal of 1927).³¹⁹ By the time Clem Miller ran for Congress successfully in 1958, he and Katy had bought a summer cottage in Inverness, the town on Point Reyes with the most thriving tourist market.³²⁰ With their East Coast political connections, personal attachment to Point Reyes, and the conservationist idealism typical of newly minted Westerners, the Millers gladly picked up the NPS's Point Reyes National Seashore proposal and brought it to Congress.

Miller introduced his first legislation proposing a Point Reyes National Seashore in 1959. He did not make Point Reyes a major issue in his 1958 campaign, however. In the words of his wife, there was “not a consensus yet” on the park among his constituents. Katy Miller remembered years later that Clem still had to “convince the local people of West Marin that this would be advantageous.”³²¹ Most of the “local people of West Marin” who Miller needed to convince were dairy ranchers. Convincing them that a park would be a better use for Point Reyes than ranching was a tall order, but one that Clem Miller was prepared to take on.

Cows and People Don't Mix: Dairies on Point Reyes

In 1961, 4,000 milk cows lived on Point Reyes. This was in addition to beef cattle in ranches in southern, hillier parts of the Point Reyes peninsula. From 1865-1919, nearly all ranchland on Point Reyes belonged to one family, the Schafters, who created a “network of tenant-operated dairies.” This network quickly grew to the “largest and most successful [dairy]

³¹⁹ Katy Miller Johnson, “Catalyst and Citizen-Lobbyist in Washington,” an oral history conducted in 1990, in *Saving Point Reyes National Seashore, 1969-1970: An Oral History of Citizen Action in Conservation*, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1995, 8.

³²⁰ Katy Miller Johnson, “Catalyst and Citizen-Lobbyist in Washington,” an oral history conducted in 1990, in *Saving Point Reyes National Seashore, 1969-1970: An Oral History of Citizen Action in Conservation*, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1995, 10.

³²¹ Katy Miller Johnson, “Catalyst and Citizen-Lobbyist in Washington,” an oral history conducted in 1990, in *Saving Point Reyes National Seashore, 1969-1970: An Oral History of Citizen Action in Conservation*, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1995, 17.

operation in California over the next seventy years.”³²² Beginning in 1919, tenant dairy ranchers started to buy the land on which they worked from the Schafter family and then operate the same land as owners. Most of these dairying families were relatively recent immigrants with ancestral roots in Italian-speaking Switzerland and the Portuguese Azores.³²³ When Park Service Point Reyes National Seashore proposals gained traction in the late 1950s, these dairy farmers had only owned their own ranches for 30 or 40 years. National Park Service plans drew boundaries that encompassed twenty-five ranches. Only six of these ranches were operated by lessees; the other nineteen were owned by the operators of the ranch.³²⁴



Figure 19: Eric Chan, “Cows by the blue, blue sea,” accessed March 7, 2014, <http://www.flickr.com/photos/maveric2003/1068870029>.

³²²The “alphabet ranches” had their origins in this period—many families through today have kept the alphabetical designation of their ranch initially developed by the Schafter family who owned the land. Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 21.

³²³ Livingston, *A Good Life*, 41-42.

³²⁴ Watt *The Paradox of Preservation*, 8-11 (of Chapter 4).

What complicates the issue of ranching on Point Reyes is that the century-old practice of farming cattle actively *created* the scenic landscape that the National Park Service and conservation groups wanted to preserve in the 1950s. Cattle are ungulates, large mammalian grazers, whose presence chomping grass leads to a landscape free of shrubs, dominated by open fields, and thus open to wide and spectacular scenic vistas. On Point Reyes, those vistas were of the ocean, which made the fields even more awe-inspiring. The Park Service and conservation groups often overlooked the inconvenient reality that the very landscape they sought to protect arose from those very same agricultural practices.³²⁵ Early park legislation allowed for a 25-year Residence of Use and Occupancy (RUO) period for ranchers to stay on their land, but only after they had sold their land to the federal government.³²⁶ Ranchers, happy with the role of landowners, rejected park proposals that would remove their status as private property owners and relegate them again to the role of lessees.

The National Park Service and conservationists had eyed ranchers skeptically ever since John Muir famously referred to sheep in Yosemite as “hoofed locusts.” Muir’s ungenerous characterization of woolly ungulates reflected, in the words of Park Service historian Richard Sellars, “reflected the anger he felt about the threats to native flora and fauna through grazing and trampling.”³²⁷ The Park Service adopted Muir’s negative view of grazing in Park lands early on, establishing a fundamental break between their mission and that of other federal land

³²⁵ Douglas A. Frank, Samuel J. McNaughton, and Benjamin F. Tracy, “The Ecology of the Earth’s Grazing Ecosystems,” *BioScience*, 48, 7 (July 1998): 513-521; McNaughton, S. J., “Ecology of a Grazing Ecosystem: The Serengeti,” *Ecological Monographs*, 55, 3 (September 1985): 260-294; M. L. Floyd, T. L. Fleischner, D. Hanna, and P. Whitefield, “Effects of historic livestock grazing on vegetation at Chaco Culture National Historic Park, New Mexico,” *Conservation Biology*, 17, 6 (December 2013): 1703-1711; Gary S. Kleppel and E. LaBarge, “Using sheep to control purple loosestrife (*Lythum salicaria*),” *Invasive Plant Science and Management*, 4 (2011): 50-57.

³²⁶ “An Act to establish the Point Reyes National Seashore in the State of California, and for other purposes.” Public Law 87-657. Eighty-seventh Congress, Second session, September 13, 1962. Accessed February 21, 2015 from <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/87/s476/text>.

³²⁷ John Muir, *The Yosemite* (New York: Century, 1912); Richard Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), 26.

agencies like the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. Army Rangers who patrolled early parks confiscated weapons or detained herders if they trod on NPS lands. Sellars classifies the relationship that then arose between Western ranchers and the NPS as one of animosity:

This firm anti-grazing policy would at times be compromised by the political influence of Western stockmen, who angrily objected to restrictions on grazing public lands and who would form a hard core of resistance, even to the very concept of national parks.³²⁸

In the 1916 Organic Act, the NPS tried to quell protests of these Western cattlemen by allowing some livestock grazing in all parks except Yellowstone. This provision became part of the final bill for political expediency, and in spite of then-NPS Director Stephen Mather's strong opposition to grazing in parkland.³²⁹ Mather only supported grazing "as a means of securing congressional support."³³⁰ After a brief allowance of increased grazing on NPS lands during World War II, the Park Service began the postwar era by enacting a formula that put ceilings on grazing and applied "very restrictive grazing criteria" to all park lands. This was part of Park Service strategies in which they "hop[ed] eventually to eliminate grazing from all national parks."³³¹

Condescending treatment by the Park Service stung ranchers especially deep because of their role in creating the very ecosystem and scenic views that Park Service sought to preserve. Joe Mendoza reminded Senators that pioneering ranchers like his father had actually *created* the beautiful green hills of Point Reyes that the NPS now wanted to own. When Mendoza's father came to Point Reyes from Switzerland,

³²⁸ Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 26. For other examples of previously legal resource extractive activities becoming instantly outlawed with the creation of parkland, see Karl Jacoby, *Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves and the Hidden History of American Conservation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001).

³²⁹ Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 44, 84-85.

³³⁰ Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 84.

³³¹ Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 154.

“He got bare property. . . If it weren’t for those people at that time that took all of the pains and hard work to plant a variety of grass that we use—it is an Australian grass on those sand dunes to control them—there wouldn’t be any Point Reyes, and there wouldn’t be any green hills and lots of these places there wouldn’t be any buildings/ It was practically built there. I, as a young boy, helped them and all of those conservation practices, and those green hills that are there today, it is through private capital and it is through home-owned ranches that they go out there and do that.³³²

Private land ownership and the rugged capitalism of the West, Mendoza maintained, provided the atmosphere through in which ranching thrived. That same ranching created the physical landscape of Point Reyes’s green pastures through the daily grazing of cattle. Another rancher, Al Grossi, tried to hammer home to Congressional representatives this ecological point:

I have worked very hard on improving my ranch, such as buildings, good fences, permanent pastures, and many other things. I do know this: if the cattle were taken off of these pastures, there would be no beautiful green hills as you see today. It would turn to nothing by brush in a very short time.³³³

Grossi and Mendoza were, ecologically speaking, completely correct. Without grazing ungulates, open fields quickly turn to shrub and then forest. Disturbance from the hooves, fertilization from manure, and that continuous chomping encourages grass growth and prevents the growth of woody shrubs or trees. All grasslands operate this way, whether the ungulates are sheep, cows, wildebeest, zebras, buffalo, caribou, or elk.³³⁴ The alternative management plan to ranching (one which in 2014 concurrently exists with ranching on Point Reyes) was the reintroduction of tule elk to the peninsula. Herds of elk operate in the same way as cattle in terms of maintaining grasslands. Therefore, in the absence of ranchers, Point Reyes could still remain green pasture. Mendoza and Grossi’s point still holds, however: because of declining tule elk and deer

³³² Joe Mendoza, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 120.

³³³ Alfred Grossi, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 108.

³³⁴ Douglas A. Frank, Samuel J. McNaughton and Benjamin F. Tracy, “The Ecology of the Earth’s Grazing Ecosystems,” *BioScience*, 48, 7 (Jul., 1998): 513-521; S. J. McNaughton, “Ecology of a Grazing Ecosystem: The Serengeti,” *Ecological Monographs*, 55, 3 (Sept. 1985): 260-294.

populations in the early 20th century, the grassy knolls of Point Reyes continued to exist through to the 1950s thanks primarily to the stewardship and use of ranchers and their cattle.³³⁵



Figure 20: Miguel Vieira, “Point Reyes Tomales Point Hills in May,” accessed March 7, 2014, <http://www.flickr.com/photos/migueltviera/3548132566>.

Although Point Reyes was proposed as a National Seashore and not a National Park proper, the Park Service remained generally skeptical of grazing within park lands. Although a new concept, the Park Service hoped that National Seashores would be “a step below a national park in the sense that more uses would be permitted.”³³⁶ National Park Service interactions with ranchers in Western states, where ranchers often dominated rural areas, informed NPS officials views on Point Reyes ranching. The Park Service’s broad anti-grazing won them no friends on Point Reyes and set a hostile tone for the conversation between Point Reyes ranchers and the Park Service.³³⁷ Ranchers reacted skeptically to the Park Service on Point Reyes because they feared losing their land or having little control over land they did own.

³³⁵ McCreia Cobb, “Current Trend in Population Growth of Tule Elk at Point Reyes National Seashore,” National Park Service (July 2006), Accessed Feb. 21, 2015, http://www.sfnp.org/download_product/1158/0 Kim Linse, “Tule Elk: The Return of a Species” National Park Service, 1998. Accessed Feb. 21, 2015, http://www.nps.gov/pore/planyourvisit/upload/resourcepaper_tuleelk.pdf.

³³⁶ Clem Miller, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 70. Miller reminded constituents, “This is a national seashore recreation area bill. It is not a national park bill. It is a step below a national park in the sense that more uses would be permitted.” Many early national seashore bills included “recreation” in the title of the park, but the NPS fought hard to remove that word in order to ensure stronger emphasis on ecological conservation. (Cite JFK letters that discuss this)

³³⁷ Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, 8-11 (of Chapter 4).




Figure 21: Early 20th Century Dairying in West Marin County. Photo courtesy of the Jack Mason Museum of West Marin History, accessed March 27, 2015, <http://ediblemarinandwinecountry.com/uncategorized/til-the-cows-come-home/>.

Point Reyes ranchers particularly feared a park because they saw the rapid loss of agricultural land in California generally and the Bay Area specifically. When the ranchers' attorney Bryan McCarthy spoke of the “vanishing dairy rancher,” he got to the core of a major issue in mid-century agriculture – suburbs rapidly replacing farmland.³³⁸ This happened to a slightly greater extent in the Los Angeles metro area than in the Bay Area – between 1950 and 1955, 25% in Los Angeles County shifted from agricultural to urban use.³³⁹ A 1957 report estimated that “California is now losing 100,000 to 500,000 acres of productive land annually.”³⁴⁰ In the South Bay, farmland disappeared at Southern California-esque rates—from 1940 to 1973, the total acreage in orchards in Silicon Valley went from 101,000 to 23,500, or three-quarters of the original.³⁴¹ Such rapid declines in farmland echoed national trends in the

³³⁸ Rome, *Bulldozer in the Countryside*, 122-123, 144.

³³⁹ Gregor, “Urban Pressures on California Land,” 311

³⁴⁰ Gregor, “Urban Pressures on California Land,” 312.

³⁴¹ Walker, *Country in the City*, 86.

1950s.³⁴² Marin ranchers noticed these trends—they read trade journals, spoke with friends – but from the outside looking in. Their farms were still intact and doing well in the late 1950s.

In 1959, Marin dairy farmers had their all-time most productive year, counting over \$40 million of total production.³⁴³ While Southern California dairies had transitioned to concentrated, dry-lot, industrial dairying, dairy farmers in the Bay Area (particularly in Marin County) had been able to retain pastures and grazing cattle in the North Bay’s foggy, moist and mild landscape. In Southern California, farmers had over 1,000 cattle on a relatively small, grass-less tract. North Bay farms at the same time averaged less than 300 cattle on over 1,000 acres of land.³⁴⁴ Marin’s ranchers saw how Southern California’s dairy industry had changed. Rather than emulate it, they fought hard to retain their traditional style of dairying. Rancher Joe Mendoza, a second-generation Point Reyes dairy farmer, said that Point Reyes’ climate and extensive grassy areas made grazing an “economically sound” option that allowed ranchers to avoid “dairy like they do in Los Angeles,” meaning factory feedlot dairies with no grass.³⁴⁵ Point Reyes’ unique geography and climate, Mendoza argued, made grazing possible. The same pressures forcing Los Angeles dairies out of the metropolitan area there made land in the Bay Area—especially relatively good pasture land – prohibitively expensive for ranchers to simply relocate their ranch area. Mendoza commented he knew of rangeland in Marin County that went for \$10,000 an acre, but it was “going to be used for commercial and someone was looking ahead.”³⁴⁶ Suburban

³⁴² Kolar, “‘Selling’ the Farm,” 61, 75.

³⁴³ \$40 million is in 1980-1989 constant dollars. Greig Tor Guthey, Lauren Gwin and Sally Fairfax, “Creative Preservation in California’s Dairy Industry,” 93, 2 (Apr., 2003): 171-192, here 171.

³⁴⁴ Greig Tor Guthey, Lauren Gwin and Sally Fairfax, “Creative Preservation in California’s Dairy Industry,” 93, 2 (Apr., 2003): 171-192, here, 174-177. Marin County’s idyllic grazing landscapes have continued to inspire conservationists and ranchers. The California Dairy Industry filmed its “Happy Cow” commercials of the early 2000s on Point Reyes ranches.

³⁴⁵ Joe Mendoza, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 103. For more on the expansion of Los Angeles and the rapid disappearance of farms in its surrounding area, see Christopher C. Sellers, *Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Nature & the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth-Century America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012) and Doug Sackman, *Orange Empire*.

³⁴⁶ Joe Mendoza, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 106.

speculation's effect on Marin County land prices would force Point Reyes farmers to end their tradition of cattle grazing if they wanted to stay in their home county. In other places, small-scale farms had been "pushed out of the industry by technological and economic change."³⁴⁷ At Point Reyes, small ranches had held on and continued to be productive. They were not prepared to let that go.

In July of 1958, thirty-five ranchers formed the West Marin Property Owners' Association as a way to organize against the Point Reyes park plan.³⁴⁸ The organization was composed "almost exclusively" of dairy and cattle ranchers.³⁴⁹ Their attorney, Bryan McCarthy, very publically campaigned against Point Reyes National Seashore and often answered questions like this one (from Senator Alan Bible (D-NV) in 1961): "Does your organization embrace any representation of any people that are developing for residential purposes?"³⁵⁰ "No," was always McCarthy's answer, though, years later, the Park Service was still not convinced. In a 1978 interview, George Collins of the NPS alluded to objections the park faced by the realty people," but did not credit ranchers with voicing opposition to the park. In actuality, ranchers opposed a National Seashore on Point Reyes and they did so very vocally.³⁵¹

Ranchers on Point Reyes, in turn, harbored suspicions of the Park Service and the ways in which they embarked on the Point Reyes project. Many ranchers felt they had not been consulted early in the planning process, despite the park area being their private property. Point Reyes dairy farmer Joe Mendoza protested the top-down nature of the Point Reyes proposal that kept ranchers out of the loop on plans for their own land.

³⁴⁷ Kolar, "'Selling' the Farm," 73.

³⁴⁸ Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 85.

³⁴⁹ Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 81-82.

³⁵⁰ Alan Bible, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 96.

³⁵¹ George Collins, *The Art and Politics of Park Planning and Preservation, 1920-1979*, an oral history conducted 1978-1979, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, 252.

I do not know what the park people have in mind . . . We have never been consulted. During the whole thing we were never consulted. It was all done from Washington. Our local county government was not consulted, or the local ranchers . . . I don't know what the Park Service or anybody has in mind, but if there will be dogs and people running around you will have to keep your cattle home and they can't graze.³⁵²

Conservation groups and NPS officials defended the Park Service and claimed that ranchers had been consulted and involved in the planning process. Park Service officials had spoken to ranchers by 1961, through radio programs, public meetings, and door-to-door interactions.³⁵³ The dismissive way Wirth and Knight mentioned ranchers in their 1935 report on Point Reyes, however, suggested a relationship where the NPS treated ranchers a presence to be dealt with, not property owners with the same level of rights as, say, Cape Cod summer residents. The ranchers on Point Reyes were not treated as equals.

Dairy owners feared federal ownership of their ranches not only because of American ideals of property, but also because of the dairying cooperative system. In order to operate a commercial dairy business effectively, dairies pooled their milk and then created products like butter, cheese, and consumer-bound milk from that combined milk supply.³⁵⁴ The scale of the combined milk renders the dairying more profitable for all dairy ranchers; rather than each dairy buying packaging and bottling facilities, they can split the cost of these large investments. Many dairies still operate on this model—the Cabot Creamery Cooperative in Vermont is one major example. On Point Reyes, seven large ranchers belonged to one cooperative. Joe Mendoza, the

³⁵² Joe Mendoza, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 29.

³⁵³ Joel Gustafson argued that, contrary to the protestations of ranchers, the Park Service *had* been talking to the ranchers: “in fact, one man was specifically hired and he visited every single ranch there and talked to the people, explained what they were trying to do. He didn't nor did he attempt to get their approval, but he did explain the plan” – have also debated on the radio and on television and “none of this is a shock or news to these farmers.” Joel Gustafson, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 155. George Collins, *The Art and Politics of Park Planning and Preservation, 1920-1979*, an oral history conducted 1978-1979, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, 264.

³⁵⁴ For more on cooperation between Point Reyes dairy ranchers, see John Hart, *Farming on the Edge: Saving Family Farms in Marin County, California* (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991). For more on the changing dairy industry over the twentieth century, see Kendra Smith-Howard, *Pure and Modern Milk: An Environmental History Since 1900* (Oxford University Press, 2014).

dairy rancher we heard from earlier, argued that losing even one dairy ranch could put others out of business—even if their ranches lay outside of the seashore—just because of the declining volume of milk and lower investment in the cooperative:

So in summation, then, the dairy farmers of this area certainly feel with this park, taking this area, it will put them out of business and they also have a problem of milk contracts that they do not have. There is one large cooperative, for instance, that has seven large members in this area. This is something that has been built up for years and there is a unit in the area. Take all of these dairymen out of here and where are they going to go? Where are they going to replace these dairies? Are these milk contracts going to fit into the trucking area? / You don't replace milk contracts, and you are out of the business. In other words, if this thing is allowed to go ahead as written here [in the bill to establish Point Reyes National Seashore], you are just putting this whole group of people just completely out of business and there are no two ways about it.³⁵⁵

Disrupting dairy ranching at just a few farms could have rippling effects across Marin County, Mendoza argued. This created uncertainty for Point Reyes dairy ranchers—if one neighbor sold out to the feds and discontinued ranching, all other dairies could have to fold due to decreased volume. Ranchers needed to hold a strong, cohesive line if they were to maintain their livelihoods, they feared. McCarthy, the ranchers' legal representative, believe the disruption of dairy ranching in Marin was an unprecedented and overtly aggressive move by the Department of the Interior. “To my knowledge,” he testified, “the Interior Department has never before gone into an area and destroyed an industry and that is what they are doing.”³⁵⁶

Ranchers joined Western legislators in seeing Point Reyes National Seashore as a plan to kill their livelihoods just so that a bunch of San Franciscans could “play footsie wherever they want to.”³⁵⁷ Western states have, since their inclusion in the United States, retained relatively high levels of federal ownership compared to their East Coast counterparts. As of 1961, for

³⁵⁵ Mendoza, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 104.

³⁵⁶ McCarthy, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 86.

³⁵⁷ Senator Henry Dworshak, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 93.

example, 50% of California was in public ownership.³⁵⁸ Of 333,000 acres in Marin County, 32,500 (almost 10%) were in state parks, military reservations, and municipal water districts.³⁵⁹

The general feeling persisted in many rural parts of California and other Western states that the federal government had more control over local affairs—especially regarding land use—than state or local governments did.³⁶⁰ To cripple a dairy industry in order to create another "playground" for San Franciscans disgusted Marin ranchers. To them, and to Westerners in other states, the Sierra Club represented a frivolous pastime by wealthy urbanites to create playgrounds for themselves, with no thought to the harm they cause local industries along the way. Senator Henry Dworshak, a Republican from Idaho, sympathized with Point Reyes ranchers and echoed their irritation with the Sierra Club, in particular:

Let me tell you this, I can understand why the Sierra Club is for it [Point Reyes National Seashore], because under the preserved wilderness preservation system, legislation for which is pending before this committee, I attended a hearing at Bend, Oreg., 2 years ago, and spokesmen for the Sierra Club testified that they thought we should make a completely isolated wilderness of my own State of Idaho so that the people in California could go out there and play footsie whenever they wanted to. And we should be precluded from having any industrial development or economy which would sustain our people in the State of Idaho.³⁶¹

Dworshak's rural skepticism of urban interests and his Western skepticism of federal actions on public lands echoed the sentiment of Point Reyes ranchers and other rural Westerners (see

³⁵⁸ Bryan McCarthy, in U.S. Congress, House, *Point Reyes National Seashore : hearings before the Subcommittee on National Parks of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of representatives, Eighty-seventh Congress, first session, on H.R.2275 and H.R.3244, bills to establish the Point Reyes National Seashore in the State of California, and for other purposes* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 41.

³⁵⁹ John Taylor, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 123.

³⁶⁰ For examples of anger at federal control of Western lands, see R. McGreggor Cawley, *Federal Land, Western Anger: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Environmental Politics* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993); Karen Merrill, *Public Lands and Political Meaning: Ranchers, the Government, and the Property between Them* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002); James Morton Turner, "The Specter of Environmentalism: Wilderness, Environmental Politics, and the Evolution of the New Right," *Journal of American History*, (June 2009), 123-149. Jacqueline Vaughn Switzer, *Green Backlash: The History and Politics of Environmental Opposition in the United States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1997), 171-90; Brian Drake, *Loving Nature, Fearing the State: Environmentalism and Antigovernment Politics before Reagan* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013), especially 102-113.

³⁶¹ Henry Dworshak, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 93.

Chapter 4 for more). As urban populations increased, so too did their desire for rural recreation.³⁶²

Marin ranchers worried that these recreational land uses were incompatible with ranching. Unfortunately for them, both federal agencies owning the majority of public land, the Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture, adopted ambitious recreation policies in the 1950s and 1960s. While the Department of the Interior promoted National Seashores, Recreation Areas, and state or local parks, the USDA's Forest Service adopted recreation as one of its main priorities with the passage of the 1962 Multiple-Use Act (for much more on multiple-use policies, see Chapter 4). The USDA worked with farmers and ranchers in many areas to assist with recreation on farmland, as well.³⁶³ Marin ranchers, however, did not own the bucolic vegetable farms of New England that the USDA had in mind when they promoted a "new, hybrid farmscape" where the tourist and the farmer existed harmoniously.³⁶⁴ One Point Reyes rancher warned Congress that "You can't mix cattle and people."³⁶⁵ Farmers and ranchers across the nation shared this sentiment. The American Farm Bureau passed a resolution at their 1960 annual meeting in Denver that acknowledged an increasing federal focus on outdoor recreation. Farmers implored the federal government to please seek additional recreation land out of already federal areas that do not have value as farmland:

The use of land for recreation is increasing. Farmers have a vital stake in the sound development of recreational areas. In the expansion of the use of land and water resources for recreational purposes, we recommend maximum emphasis upon State and local responsibility and participation of private interests in such resource development. Needed recreation facilities should be developed on lands now owned by State or Federal Government. We oppose the purchase of additional land for this purpose at this time. We

³⁶² ORRRC, *Outdoor Recreation for America*.

³⁶³ Kolar, "'Selling' the Farm."

³⁶⁴ Kolar, "'Selling' the Farm," 57.

³⁶⁵ Watt cites rancher James Kehoe as saying, "You can't mix cattle and people." Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, 9 (of Chapter 4).

further recommend that, insofar as possible, land which is not adaptable to agricultural production, be used.³⁶⁶

Farmers felt the squeeze of both housing and recreation developers. On Point Reyes, ranchers agreed. Let agricultural land be used for agriculture, they insisted, and take unproductive land for recreation use. After all, cows and people did not mix well.

Western opposition to federal ownership and a history of animosity between ranchers and the National Park Service exacerbated existing tensions between agricultural and conservation interests on Point Reyes. Fears of the consequences of public ownership kept nearly all Marin County ranchers opposed to Point Reyes. Ranchers and farmers and their employees only accounted for 2% of Marin's population in 1960 – 996 people total—but since this group had the most to lose to the national seashore, they were vocal.³⁶⁷ But were they as vocal as the conservationists?

Before it's Too Late: Conservationists and Point Reyes

The National Park Service was able to successfully promote a Point Reyes National Seashore in spite of the opposition of most ranching landowners on the peninsula thanks to the deeply-rooted conservation movement in the Bay Area. Founded in 1892, the Sierra Club had grown up with San Francisco, and in many ways shaped its growth.³⁶⁸ Unlike other growing cities also caught up in postwar government largess, San Francisco remained wary of unrestrained growth and looked instead to Progressive planning and conservation strategies to

³⁶⁶ Revolution of the American Farm Bureau Federation, December 1960. Included in record of *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 124.

³⁶⁷ Joe Mendoza said that “all of the farmers in the area feel the same way. And, may I add, that our local board of supervisors feels that way and our local state senator feels that way and all of our county officials do, too.” Mendoza, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 194. For number of ranchers, farmers, and farm hands, see 1960 census (same Bay Area cite as above).

³⁶⁸ Walker, *The Country and the City*, esp. 12-33, 80-91.

control it.³⁶⁹ San Francisco historian Richard Walker has argued that this conservation planning focus in San Francisco arose from strong Progressive Era conservation groups with national leaders, of which groups like the Sierra Club were an instrumental part.³⁷⁰ National Park Service planners like Wirth in the thirties and Collins in the sixties saw federal protection of Point Reyes as an important component in San Francisco's "greenbelt" in the words of Progressive Era planners, or its "Rim of Christendom" in the words of George Collins.³⁷¹ The 1959 Pacific Coast study saw state, local, and federal parks as all essential parts of that green rim. California, in fact, had already established Tomales Bay State Park, on the northeastern shore of Point Reyes, in 1952. Private citizens, including a few ranchers, donated the land for Tomales Bay State Park.³⁷² The Bay Area had a history of park creation even as its urban and suburban areas grew. This growth, while in conflict with conservation priorities, "contributed to a Western sense of place" and brought the people who would then fight to save the remaining land around their backyards.³⁷³ Even with intense metropolitan development, the Bay Area still remained devoted to conservation and parkland.

³⁶⁹ For more on the population growth and the rise of conservatism in the sunbelt, see Darren Dochuk, *From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011); Kevin M. Kruse, *White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Bernard L. Weinstein and Robert E. Firestone, *Regional Growth and Decline in the United States: The Rise of the Sunbelt and the Decline of the Northeast* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978).

³⁷⁰ Walker, *Country in the City*, 13-133.

³⁷¹ George Collins, *The Art and Politics of Park Planning and Preservation, 1920-1979*, an oral history conducted 1978-1979, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, 251-252. Peter Hall., Wirth, and Ansell Hall (Chief naturalist of the NPS in the 1930s) called their vision of regional parks around San Francisco after Dr. Herbert E. Bolton's term for "encirclement, culturally, of some social order" in his book on Spanish North America. Walker calls this same push for greenspace the "country in the city" in his book. The title is a nod to Raymond Walker's *Country and the City*, a cultural analysis published in 1973 that has provided a base of analysis for much environmental history of the past fifty years. For more on greenbelts, see Ebenezer Howard, *Garden Cities of To-Morrow* (1902, reprinted Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965; Kermit C. Parsons and David Schuyler, eds., *From Garden City to Green City: The Legacy of Ebenezer Howard* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).

³⁷² Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 51-52.

³⁷³ Findlay, *Magic Lands*, 50.

The Sierra Club's years of action in San Francisco and nationally gave it strong ties to Washington and Sacramento lawmakers. This gave the National Park Service important allies in Marin County who were willing to do the political legwork that legislative staffers and other federal officials had done at Cape Cod. Although the Point Reyes National Seashore proposal stirred great controversy between Marin County residents conservationists and Marin County ranchers, the county's deeply-rooted conservation networks made Point Reyes National Seashore a relatively easy legislative case for the Park Service to make in Washington.




Figure 22: David Brower of the Sierra Club, early 1960s. William Hail/Colby Library photo files.

A good deal of the Point Reyes conservation advocacy was done by individuals who were members of the Sierra Club, but who were operating as individuals or under the auspices of other organizations. Close ties between the Sierra Club and Washington set the atmosphere in which Point Reyes specific conservation organizations could spring up. In 1959, Barbara Eastman, Bill Grader, and Margaret Azevedo founded the Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation (hereafter the Foundation).³⁷⁴ The Foundation formed at the behest of Congressman Clem Miller, who knew he would need to prove locals support if he wanted to his Point Reyes bill to pass in Congress.³⁷⁵ Azevedo later called the Foundation nothing but a “paper

³⁷⁴ Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 57; Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, 6 (of Chapter 4).

³⁷⁵ At the time of the Foundation's formation, much of the public opinion coming out of Marin County was negative. The San Rafael *Independent Journal* opposed any taking of private property in Marin County and several ranchers had gone public about what they considered to be underhanded tactics by the Park Service. Point Reyes Park Alternative Asked,” *San Rafael Independent Journal*, April 10, 1961, 1, Box 2, “Clippings” Folder, Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation Records, 1959-1962, BANC MSS C-A 362, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

organization.”³⁷⁶ National Park Service employee George Collins echoed Azevedo’s clinically political view of the Foundation’s role in proving local support

A small group of us organized it in the late fifties. We were aware that we need to have some such organization to have a special voice for this project, outside of government . . . representing citizen interest. The taxpayers associations, the realty boards, and all the rest were against us, so we organized.³⁷⁷

Keep in mind that Collins, the man who said that “we organized” to have a voice “outside of government” on the Point Reyes issue, still worked for the National Park Service.³⁷⁸ The Foundation was a sort of a grasstops organization.³⁷⁹ It did drum up local support, but Marin County women only created it because Congressman Clem Miller asked them to. The deep roots of conservation in Marin County’s mostly female-led conservation organizations and the Sierra

³⁷⁶ Azevedo noted that the PRNSF encouraged letter-writing “so that Clem could say, yes, there’s a constituency that’s for this.” Margaret Azevedo, “Civic Leader and Save Our Seashore Board Member,” an oral history conducted in 1990, in *Saving Point Reyes National Seashore, 1969-1970: An Oral History of Citizen Action in Conservation*, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1995, 172.

³⁷⁷ George Collins, *The Art and Politics of Park Planning and Preservation, 1920-1979*, an oral history conducted 1978-1979, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, 271.

³⁷⁸ Collins, in the aftermath of the Tioga Lake controversy that caused some ill will between the Sierra Club and the Park Service, said he and Sierra Club leader Doris Leonard “bent over backwards, long before I retired, to try to get the Sierra Club and the Park Service on some kind of common ground. . . . Doris and I, I think, with Dick [Doris Leonard’s husband Richard Leonard] advice and counsel, did quite a lot to help bridge over some of the ill-feeling.” I would argue that the ill-feeling may not have been as pervasive as Collins saw on a personal level. Publically, the Park Service and the Sierra Club worked very closely together in these years, especially on Western land use issues like Point Reyes and the Oregon Dunes. From George Collins, *The Art and Politics of Park Planning and Preservation, 1920-1979*, an oral history conducted 1978-1979, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, 173.

³⁷⁹ Smart Growth America, a present-day advocacy organization, defines “grasstops” activists as “activists or members of an organization or geographic area that have a high professional and/or public profile, may be part of the “political family” for a decision maker, and can raise public attention or influence decision makers through established connections. For example, an organization’s board members and founders, community leaders, and nationally recognized individuals (including experts, professionals, etc.) constitute potential grasstops advocates. Grasstops advocates can reinforce grassroots action, move an issue into the spotlight, and carry a message between the general public and more powerful targets.” From “Tip Sheets for Working with Grasstops.” *Smart Growth America*, accessed March 27, 2015, <http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/Tip-Sheet-for-Working-with-Grasstops.pdf>. For more on “grasstops” organizing in historical context, see Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, *Sunbelt Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

Club's foothold in the Bay Area ensured the success of the Foundation, while also exposing the overlapping relationships between the Park Service and conservation groups in the Bay Area.³⁸⁰

The Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation existed to ensure that local reactions were not just those of ranchers. If the Western-loaded House and Senate committees on the Interior and the public lands subcommittees only heard public comments from ranchers who opposed the park, Point Reyes National Seashore could never even pass out of committee.³⁸¹ Western Congressmen knew the struggle of ranchers and the burden of federal property.³⁸² Clem Miller knew he needed reinforcements to keep them from siding with the ranchers. Azevedo and Eastman, both of whom belonged to the Sierra Club and had histories of conservation activism, took on the task of publicizing pro-park arguments locally and working with the press, Sierra Club leaders, the Park Service, and politicians in order to shift public opinion in support of a park.

In the late 1950s, lines between the Sierra Club, the National Park Service, the Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation, and other conservation organizations blurred. As early as 1958, the Sierra Club devoted a full issue of the *Bulletin*, their periodical, to the Point Reyes issue. The Sierra Club Press also published *Island in Time* in 1962, a book-length treatise of

³⁸⁰ Walker, *Country in the City*, 88-89.

³⁸¹ The Committees who considered National Park legislation were overwhelmingly Western, which made any opposition by ranchers something that was not taken lightly: these individuals often represented many ranchers themselves. In 1960, for example, the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs consisted of 31 members, 21 of whom hailed from West of the Mississippi (or, 68%). On the Subcommittee on Public Lands, 11 of 15 (73%) came from Western states. In 1961, the Senate Committee was even more heavily tilted to the West: 100% of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 17 total, hailed from states west of the Mississippi. All 10 members of the Subcommittee on Public Lands were thus from the West, also. Western states had more public lands to deal with it and therefore remained more interested in them. Hurting ranchers or foresters through Park creation would certainly not help any bill on parks get out of the Subcommittee on Public Lands. Committee membership recorded from House Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Cape Cod National Seashore Park: Hearings* (1960) and U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Cape Cod National Seashore Park: Hearing, March 9, 1961* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961).

³⁸² For one example of a prominent Western Senator, Alan Bible, and how he dealt with concerns of ranchers regarding federal lands, see Gary E. Elliott, *Senator Alan Bible and the Politics of the New West* (Reno, Las Vegas, and London: University of Nevada Press, 1994), 101-102, 183-185.

photographs, poetry, and prose extolling Point Reyes's virtues, as a "campaign book" to advocate for the National Seashore.³⁸³ The author of *Island in Time* was Harold Gilliam, a writer with a weekly conservation column in the San Francisco *Chronicle*. The Sierra Club also backed some of the independent organizations that supported a National Seashore on Point Reyes. When George Collins retired from the NPS in 1960 and started his private consulting firm, Sierra Club member Dorothy Varian funded much of his new enterprise and the Club once paid for Collins to travel to Washington to a Congressional hearing on Point Reyes.³⁸⁴




Figure 23: Harold Gilliam, *Island in Time: The Point Reyes Peninsula* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Press, 1962)

³⁸³ Cohen, *The History of the Sierra Club*, 277. Gilliam, *Island in Time*.

³⁸⁴ Cohen, *The History of the Sierra Club*, 279; George Collins, *The Art and Politics of Park Planning and Preservation, 1920-1979*, an oral history conducted 1978-1979, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, 274. For more on Sierra Club photography and coffee table books in the 1960s conservation activism, see Finis Dunaway, *Natural Visions: The Power of Images in American Environmental Reform* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), especially Chapter 5, "Nature on the Coffee Table," 117-147 and Thomas Robertson, "'This is the American Earth,': American Empire, the Cold War, and American Environmentalism," *Diplomatic History*, 32, 4 (September 2008), 561-584, here 561-562.

Beyond Gilliam's book, Sierra Club leaders utilized existing connections with the press, other environmental organizations, and the federal government to promote Point Reyes National Seashore. Fred Gunsky, a writer for the San Francisco *Chronicle*, communicated often with then-Sierra Club President Edgar Wayburn about the extent and type of media attention the Point Reyes proposal was receiving. Before the establishment of the Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation, Gunsky also noted that only the dairy farmers and the Marin Board of Supervisors (all opposed to the park) were making their voices heard, while "those in favor seem to be waiting for someone to take initiative."³⁸⁵ Gunsky felt this was in spite of an editorial in his paper a year previously in which David Brower, the Sierra Club's Executive Director, called for wilderness preservation through "bold, foresighted action" in places like "Tamalpais and Point Reyes."³⁸⁶ Regardless of whether the issue had received positive media attention or not, Gunsky's enthusiasm helped to secure extensive favorable media coverage in the *San Francisco Chronicle* over the next several years. Gunsky and Wayburn remained in close contact personally and professionally throughout the Point Reyes legislative process. Sierra Club leaders' relationship with the *Chronicle* helped conservation organizations score points with Bay Area citizens who could help Point Reyes' cause politically and financially.

As in many conservation battles of the time, urban support for conservation – in this case from San Francisco – countered rural opposition from locals.³⁸⁷ When Clem Miller wanted legal advice on real estate transfers in his Point Reyes National Seashore legislation, he turned to San

³⁸⁵ Fred Gunsky to Edgar Wayburn, April 7, 1959, Carton 26, Folder "'Point Reyes National Seashore (proposed) 1959-1961,'" Edgar Wayburn papers, 1923-2010, BANC MSS 96/48 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

³⁸⁶ Newspaper Clipping, David Brower, "A Plan for Point Reyes: *San Francisco Chronicle*, July 17, 1958, Carton 26, Folder "'Point Reyes National Seashore (proposed) 1959-1961,'" Edgar Wayburn papers, 1923-2010, BANC MSS 96/48 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

³⁸⁷ For more on how urban populations have worked to preserve surrounding rural areas – these cities actually creating the forest around them – see Ellen Stroud, *Nature Next Door: Cities and Trees in the American Northeast* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012) and David Stradling, *Making Mountains: New York City and the Catskills* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007).

Francisco attorneys for advice. When public opinion of Point Reyes National Seashore in Marin County was still negative, the *Chronicle* editorialized in favor of the park. When State Senators representing Marin County or the Marin Board of Supervisors voted against a national park proposal, San Francisco politicians supported park proposals. On the same day that Marin's Board of Supervisors upheld its resolution requesting a park of only 20,000 acres (less than half of the Park Service's 53,000 acre proposal), San Francisco Mayor George Christopher "sent a letter to California Congressmen in Washington outlining San Francisco's support of the seashore bill and urging its passage."³⁸⁸ The heavy involvement of Sierra Club members and leaders in the Point Reyes controversy between 1959-1962 helped the case for the seashore by tapping into existing relationships and power structures between federal governments and major conservation groups. At Cape Cod, citizens with connections to the national political power structure were residents of the proposed park. At Point Reyes, the residents opposed the park, and those with federal political connections were the conservationists.

How to Get Ranchers and Conservationists to Talk? Suburban Development

By the time Congressional hearings on Point Reyes National Seashore legislation began in 1961, the extent to which landowners, ranchers, and conservationists talked past each other became clear. Publications like *Island in Time* emphasized the imminent threat of developers to the area. Meanwhile, landowners felt villainized, as in the case of Joseph Bonelli, owner of the "Drakes Beach Estates" subdivision. Bonelli threatened to sue the *San Francisco News-Call Bulletin* for libel (and threatened with well-funded flair—he took out a full page ad to say it)

³⁸⁸ George Christopher in U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Point Reyes National Seashore: hearings before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, Eighty-seventh Congress, first session, on S. 476, a bill to establish the Point Reyes National Seashore in the State of California, and for other purposes, March 28, 30 and 31, 1961* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 33.

concerning the “innuendos, insinuations, and false statements of facts concerning the undersigned Drakes Beach Estates subdivision.”³⁸⁹ Bonelli fumed further, “No schoolboy with an eighth grade knowledge of the Constitution or the slightest devotion to its principles would have the effrontery to make such a request to this board. Only a ruthless, arrogant, avaricious minority group dedicated to the disruption of orderly county government could do it.”³⁹⁰

Meanwhile, ranchers Joseph Mendoza and Alfred Grossi and the rest of the West Marin Property Owners Association kept trying to make the case for keeping their private property private. Politicians and the NPS, aware of the stir the ranchers and their association were making, began making concessions (at least in name, if not genuinely) to the dairy owners. “My own view,” Clem Miller wrote to his constituents in 1961, “is that I welcome expansion of the ranching area so as to save the dairies as I had recommended.” Miller reminded his constituents that this sort of compromise formed a basic tenant of our democracy. “It [compromise] enhances prospects for congressional enactment,” Miller wrote pedantically, “as both Congressman J. T. Rutherford and Senator Alan Bible, chairmen of the subcommittees directly involved . . . have made clear.”³⁹¹ To Miller, the primary sponsor of the bill in the House, allowing continuation of ranching represented a compromise, not a first choice.

Even as the Park Service and Congressional sponsors changed legislation to options more amenable to dairy ranchers, both groups remained deeply skeptical of ranchers’ ability not to sell

³⁸⁹ *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 113-115; “Point Reyes Developer Hits Back At Critics,” news clipping, 1961 (?), Box 2, “Clippings” Folder, Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation Records, 1959-1962, BANC MSS C-A 362, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; “Two New Angles Arise In Pt. Reyes Discussion,” *San Rafael Independent Journal* clipping, March 18, 1961, 7, Box 2, “Clippings” Folder, Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation Records, 1959-1962, BANC MSS C-A 362, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

³⁹⁰ “Point Reyes Developer Hits Back At Critics,” news clipping, 1961 (?), Box 2, “Clippings” Folder, Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation Records, 1959-1962, BANC MSS C-A 362, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

³⁹¹ Letter, Clem Miller to Constituents, September 1, 1961, Carton 26, Folder “Point Reyes National Seashore (proposed) 1959-1961,” Edgar Wayburn papers, 1923-2010, BANC MSS 96/48 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

out to “developers” and of the compatibility of National Parks and cattle. Pro-seashore residents of Marin County suspected that ranchers wanted to keep their property not to continue dairying, but so they could fetch a better price from developers. Robert Huston of Mill Valley reflected such sentiment when he admitted, "while fully in accord with the right of the dairymen to make a living, I cannot help but feel that their real concern is the lack of possible profits from selling their land to subdividers.” (57) Leaders of the Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation felt the same way. Joel Gustafson, who served as a President of the Foundation, didn’t think that the previously pro-development Marin Board of Supervisors could be trusted to protect their land adequately. Other conservationists agreed. The Izaak Walton League issued a statement expressing their skepticism that Marin County officials or the ranchers themselves could protect Point Reyes’ natural beauty:

We doubt that local zoning ordinances would offer firm protection from future irresistible real estate pressures on such lands as might be excluded from the national seashore. Judging by examples that can be taken from any expanding metropolitan region, public ownership is the only sure method for protecting parks, green belts, and open spaces.³⁹²

Saving Point Reyes from future suburban development, conservationists believed, would happen only in the hands of the federal government -- and only if ranchers could not sell their property. After watching other farming decline in other metropolitan areas, conservationists and the Park Service did not believe that, given the choice between a lucrative sale or continuing ranching, Point Reyes dairymen would ever choose the latter.

Ranchers mistrusted the Park Service as much as the Park Service did them. Some of the initial Park Service surveys—which George Collins, who had overseen them, even admitted may have been conducted too hastily—included gross errors. These flagrant mistakes suggested NPS

³⁹² Statement by Izaak Walton League, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 166-167.

carelessness that betrayed their assumption that rising land costs in the metropolitan San Francisco area would eventually push out ranchers, even without a park. Joe Mendoza stated in 1961 that some lands the legislation included in the ranch “lease-back” zone were not actually suitable for dairy farming due to their steep, rugged terrain.³⁹³

Conservationists and Parks Service officials used the threat of development to advocate for a Point Reyes National Seashore. Californians didn’t want East Coast beaches, where “hot dog stands” lined the oceans and Long Island potato farmers had already ago sold their land to subdividers like hotcakes.³⁹⁴ Conservation groups, worried about overpopulation pressures, saw California’s development elsewhere and reacted to it by trying to preserve Point Reyes’ open spaces.³⁹⁵ Point Reyes was the perfect place to preserve because it was close to San Francisco and the Park Service had already prepared 25 years of studies on it. Planners and land economists advising the Park Service did not believe that ranchers would hold out in the face of development pressures.³⁹⁶ Population and development fears thus strengthened the political alliance between the Sierra Club and the NPS and shaped the type of park ultimately created on Point Reyes. Bay Area conservation groups, overcame their distaste of work in parks because of the strength of these development fears. Because conservationists had the ear of Park Service

³⁹³ George Collins, *The Art and Politics of Park Planning and Preservation, 1920-1979*, an oral history conducted 1978-1979, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, 239. Mendoza quote from *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 100.

³⁹⁴ Peter Behr worried about “hot dog stands and other junk” that might circle the National Seashore. Peter Behr, “Marin County Environmentalist and Political Leader: Spearheading the Save Our Seashore Campaign,” an oral history conducted in 1990, in *Saving Point Reyes National Seashore, 1969-1970: An Oral History of Citizen Action in Conservation*, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1995, 140. See also Chapter 2 for more on the fear of hot dog stands. For more on Long Island farmers selling land to subdividers, see Barbara Kelly, *Expanding the American Dream: Building and Rebuilding Levittown* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993); Rome, *The Bulldozer in the Countryside*, 15-18; Sellers, *Crabgrass Crucible*.

³⁹⁵ Gregor, “Urban Pressures on California Land”; Clawson, “Urban Sprawl and Speculation in Suburban Land.”

³⁹⁶ Marion Clawson wrote in 1962 on the inability of farmers to hold out against developers: “Farmers in some areas, notably in California, have tried to protect their farm districts from encroachment. In general, such efforts have not been conspicuously successful, in part because such farmers are ambivalent: they want their land left in farms but they also want a chance to sell at the best possible price. It seems highly doubtful that agriculture can perfect an institutional barrier against urban expansion; at the most, it may help guide the direction and nature of the suburbs which develop.” Excerpt from “Urban Sprawl and Speculation in Suburban Land,” *Land Economics*, 38, 2 (May 1962): 99-111, here 100-101.

officials, national politicians, and the press, it also diminished the opinions of Point Reyes ranchers and grouped them with “real estate interests,” “developers” and “speculators,” all villains in the narrative that conservationists and the Park Service created in publications like *Island in Time*.³⁹⁷

Despite the reality of suburban growth in the Marin County, the Bay Area and California generally, there was not any widespread development threat to the Point Reyes peninsula specifically as of 1958. Laura Watt argues at length that NPS officials exaggerated development on the peninsula. The reality on the Point Reyes peninsula, Watt argues, was really much more limited than Park Service officials or the allies in the Sierra Club or San Francisco *Chronicle* offices intimated. Clem Miller warned constituents of the “rural slums” that would result if development occurred on Point Reyes (or the “slurbs” that conservation groups warned about) and Stewart Udall characterized suburban expansion on Point Reyes as a “relentless force,” but Watt maintains that these bordered on scare tactics. Suburbanization in the Bay Area was definitely real, but that development had not yet reached Marin County in full force as of the first introduction of Point Reyes National Seashore legislation in 1958. Conservationists, however, warned of the “slurbdom” that could enter Marin County at any minute.³⁹⁸ Watt argues that although Marin County’s population rose between 1950 and 1960, “The surge of suburbanization that was washing across the metropolitan Bay Area had not reached this far west” and was not a

³⁹⁷ Harold Gilliam, *Island in Time: the Point Reyes Peninsula* (San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1962).

³⁹⁸ Local newspapers used the headline, “Inverness spared ‘Slurbdom’” after Marin County Planning Commission assured the Committee to Save Inverness Waterfront that they would defer decision on development. The term “slurbs” is mentioned quickly in Adam Rome, when he cites a Bay Area resident names Raymond Dasmann using the word. A *New York Times* search of ‘slurbs’ only came up with 6 results, from 1962 to 1976 (so not that many), and Merriam-Webster cites its first usage as 1962. “Inverness Spared ‘Slurbdom,” news clipping, March 30, 1962, Box 68, Folder 18, Sierra Club Member Papers, BANC MSS 71/295 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; “ ‘Slurbs’ assailed by Californians: State’s Urban Growth Called ‘Slovenly’ and ‘Slipshod,’” *The New York Times*, January 14, 1962, p. 44; Ada Louise Huxtable, “ ‘Clusters’ Instead of ‘Slurbs’ ” *The New York Times*, February 9, 1964, p. SM36. Stewart Udall in Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Point Reyes National Seashore: hearings* (1961), 53, 68; Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, 9 (of Chapter 4).

problem on Point Reyes.³⁹⁹ This was primarily because ranchers owned the land and their dairies had remained profitable in the 1950s. If that slid, the Park Service, Sierra Club, and conservation groups feared, ranchers might sell out to housing developers.

Ranchers who belonged to the West Marin Property Owners Association vehemently rejected the notion of suburban development as an imminent threat to Marin County in 1961. Their attorney, Bryan McCarthy accused environmental groups of using subdividers as a “dog to get you away from the dairy farmers,” whose land was actually threatened by National Park Service plans.⁴⁰⁰ McCarthy argued that one man, years before the Point Reyes National Seashore proposal, started a small subdivision, but that was all. The rest of the land remained in dairy farms. What’s more McCarthy argued, the Park Service itself had fueled the recent land speculation. Since the proposal and “newspaper publicity by the proponents he has sold more lots faster than he ever would have.”⁴⁰¹

In hindsight, McCarthy was correct in his accusation that Park Service plans actually propelled development and created the menace of subdivisions of which they warned the public.⁴⁰² As of January 1960, 99% of land on the Point Reyes peninsula was held by 25 ranchers, while only 37 individuals owned the remaining 1% of land in small home-sized tracts.⁴⁰³ By August of 1962, three developers had 665 additional lots (only 104 of which had been sold) prepared in ten different subdivisions, all of which the Marin Planning Commission

³⁹⁹ Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, 9 (of Chapter 4).

⁴⁰⁰ Bryan McCarthy in Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Point Reyes National Seashore: hearings* (1961), 89. Joe Mendoza added that Point Reyes’ climate made it a poor place for development: “this hasn’t been developed because it isn’t climatically feasible to develop it. . . . We have a lot of wind and we have a lot of fog in the area and for dairying it is ideal” Mendoza in Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Point Reyes National Seashore: hearings* (1961), 103.

⁴⁰¹ McCarthy in Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Point Reyes National Seashore: hearings* (1961), 22.

⁴⁰² See Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, Chapter 4.

⁴⁰³ Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, 10 (of Chapter 4).

had approved “after the park had been proposed.”⁴⁰⁴ The Sierra Club kept publicizing these subdivisions, including a feature on development threats at Point Reyes in the *Sierra Club Magazine* in 1962.⁴⁰⁵ Although park advocates “consistently cited establishment of Point Reyes National Seashore as a crucial *solution* to the threat of subdivision,” Watt writes, and I agree, that development on the peninsula was “a problem that the park proposal itself contributed to and aggravated.”⁴⁰⁶

Compromise Reached – Or, the National Park Service Forces the Hand of Ranchers

Congress officially passed Point Reyes National Seashore legislation in 1962 and President Kennedy signed it into law on September 13 of that year.⁴⁰⁷ The final bill included provisions for the Secretary of the Interior to designate a 26,000 acre “pastoral zone” within the 53,000 acre potential park area.⁴⁰⁸ This land would remain in private ownership – a shift from early bill language – in an effort to win the support of ranchers while also conveniently lowering

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ Dave Brower, *Sierra Club Magazine Draft*, August, 1962, Box 68, Folder 17, Sierra Club Member Papers, BANC MSS 71/295 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

⁴⁰⁶ Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, 11 (of Chapter 4); Livingston, *A Good Life*, 65. Rancher Boyd Stewart agreed that the NPS stimulated speculation more than they suppressed it. Stewart noted that “development got very interested in the land when they [the NPS] started talking about the park.” (Livingston, *A Good Life* 65). Conservationists and Marin Board of Supervisors Member Peter Behr agreed, noting that the NPS “took a long time getting started on buying up properties” and that the prices they did eventually pay were overly generous, thus “establishing benchmarks which would come back to haunt them later.” Peter Behr, “Marin County Environmentalist and Political Leader: Spearheading the Save Our Seashore Campaign,” an oral history conducted in 1990, in *Saving Point Reyes National Seashore, 1969-1970: An Oral History of Citizen Action in Conservation*, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1995, 144.

⁴⁰⁷ Tragically, Clem Miller died in a plane crash less than two months after the passage of the Point Reyes bill he had fought so hard for. Joint Press Release from the Offices of Senator Clair Engle and Congressman Clem Miller, September 28, 1962, Box 68, Folder 17, Sierra Club Member Papers, BANC MSS 71/295 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Photos of signing: <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-1962-09-13-A.aspx> and remarks: <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-1962-09-13-A.aspx>. On Miller’s death, see Wallace Turner, “Congressman Clem Miller Dies in California Plane Crash,” *New York Times*, October 9, 1962, 30.

⁴⁰⁸ Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 84.

development costs.⁴⁰⁹ No private property larger than 500 acres could be purchased by the Park Service without the consent of the owner, a clause included to protect ranchers. The bill authorized \$14 million in appropriations to purchase private property on Point Reyes, a figure many saw as too small. Katy Miller Johnson recalled years later that Clem Miller set the acquisition number in his legislation at \$14 million for political expediency, not because he thought it would be enough: “Clem said the only way to get this thing through was get the boundaries set, ask for the \$14 million, which is what everybody thinks is an acceptable amount for a seashore, then come back later and get more money.”⁴¹⁰ The Millers were right. Within the year, the Park Service began acquiring land in the authorized boundaries of the park. However, the Park Service overpaid for the initial plot of land, leading to highly speculative pricing that greatly exceeded the allocated \$14 million intended for land acquisition.⁴¹¹

The National Park Service eventually compromised with ranchers because they did not take work in preserved scenic landscapes seriously. Just as the Park Service saw ranchers as weak in the face of developers, the Park Service figured ranchers would also eventually cave to federal priorities and sell out. Private ranch lands were included in the final Point Reyes bill, but the National Park Service never saw dairy ranching as a permanent or integral part of the Point Reyes park.⁴¹² The Park Service’s proposed legislation tolerated ranching as a way to quiet the vocal opposition of ranch owners. During the entire legislative process, the Park Service hoped

⁴⁰⁹ The Park Service called this strategy, of leaving substantial private agricultural inholdings within the park area, the “hole in the doughnut” approach. See Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 89; Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, 12 (of Chapter 4).

⁴¹⁰ Katy Miller Johnson, “Catalyst and Citizen-Lobbyist in Washington,” an oral history conducted in 1990, in *Saving Point Reyes National Seashore, 1969-1970: An Oral History of Citizen Action in Conservation*, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1995, 16.

⁴¹¹ Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 92.

⁴¹² The compromise to allow private ownership of 30,000 acres of agricultural lands, was called the “hole in the donut” approach, based on the NPS’s strategy in the Everglades. Watt says that “The ‘hole in the donut’ compromise not only kept the working ranches working, but also was anticipated to help reduce the cost of establishing the seashore, as public dollars would not need to be spent on 26,000 acres; Wirth estimated this would save the government as much as \$5.5 million.” Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, 12 (of Chapter 4).; Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 87-88.

to phase out ranching gradually after the establishment of a park. Conservationists felt the same—the Sierra Club had just sat on a 1944 Park Service committee that recommended against ranching on most federal parklands.⁴¹³ In Laura Watt’s words, keeping ranches was a “means to an end”:

The original legislation in 1962 represented a direct attempt to keep the pastoral lands within the park in private ownership, yet the NPS’ approach to land acquisition set in place not only conditions that would lead within ten years to complete NPS purchase of the peninsula, but also a developing sense of distrust of the NPS as a partner in land management, as the residents’ concerns were often overlooked or disregarded. Despite promises that retaining the pastoral landscape was a priority, the NPS tended to treat the ranches as a means to an end, something to tolerate as a way of getting the new seashore established.⁴¹⁴

By providing ranchers hope that they could keep their land, the Park Service got ranchers on board enough to pass legislation. This carrot became the “means to an end” to achieve the Park Service’s desired result, satiating ranchers and conservationists.

The Park Service believed that ranching near major cities was on its way out, thanks to the same developments in farming in the 1960s that helped the Park Service rally support to preserve parkland. George Collins of the NPS later remarked that the Park Service had been in no rush to remove the ranches, because “natural attrition would do that in time.”⁴¹⁵ Not even Sacramento lawmakers fought to keep ranchers for any reason more than to get ranchers on board with a National Seashore plan. Governor Jerry Brown’s administration thought the presence “of the existing agricultural way of life on the uplands bordering the Point Reyes area” was fine, “at least for the life of the residents being situated there.”⁴¹⁶ After that, the National

⁴¹³ Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 54-55.

⁴¹⁴ Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, 1 (of Chapter 4).

⁴¹⁵ George Collins, *The Art and Politics of Park Planning and Preservation, 1920-1979*, an oral history conducted 1978-1979, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, 259.

⁴¹⁶ Memo, Elmer Aldrich (California Public Outdoor Recreation Plan Committee) to Charles Johnson, March 31, 1960, Folder “Point Reyes Hearings, April 14, 1960”, Charles Alvin DeTurk Papers, 1950-1967, BANC MSS 70/197 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Park Service and the State of California agreed, ranchers would have been politically appeased and the park could continue to exist in peace without them.

The decade after Point Reyes National Seashore's Congressional passage brought far more controversy than the initial legislative fight did. Faced with escalating land prices, some of which it had brought upon itself, George Hartzog's Park Service proposed a new solution at Point Reyes in 1966. Hartzog's controversial proposal included selling some land within the approved park boundaries to developers in order to lessen land acquisition costs for the park.⁴¹⁷ New legislation drifted through Congress on this sell-off plan, one where the Park Service worked with the very subdividers and developers they had warned Marin County of just a few years earlier. Hartzog hoped that selling off some land would both raise funds and lessen acquisition costs by lessening the area of the total park.

Conservationists disagreed and felt slighted by the Park Service. Katy Miller Johnson, Peter Behr, and Sierra Club members started a new organization, "Save Our Seashore" (SOS), to fight what they saw as a betrayal of the promise to protect land from development that the Park Service had made in establishing Point Reyes National Seashore in the first place. Their SOS group existed far more than just on "paper" as Azevedo had characterized the short-lived Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation that had started a decade earlier for the first Point Reyes National Seashore fight. SOS had something to really fight against.⁴¹⁸ While conservationists fought Park Service sell-off plans, ranchers did not know what to do. Their land was now authorized to be a national park, but it was supposedly protected by the 1962 Point Reyes legislation. Yet, with the Park Service changing course at Point Reyes so dramatically under

⁴¹⁷ For more on Hartzog's plan to sell off parts of the proposed Point Reyes National Seashore, see Watt, *Paradox of Preservation*, 16-18 (of Chapter 4).

⁴¹⁸ Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, 16-24 (of Chapter 4); Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 135-141; Katy Miller Johnson, "Catalyst and Citizen-Lobbyist in Washington," an oral history conducted in 1990, in *Saving Point Reyes National Seashore, 1969-1970: An Oral History of Citizen Action in Conservation*, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1995, 65-66, x-xvii.

Hartzog, would ranchlands be safe to stay in private property? What's more, would the federal government be able to afford to buy any ranchlands if circumstances did change?




Figure 24: Dave Brower note in Sierra Club Magazine Draft article, 1963, Box 68, Folder 18, Sierra Club Member Papers, BANC MSS 71/295 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Ranchers shifted to this position from their staunch opposition to selling out in the late 1950s because of the increased development in the Bay Area, the changing economics of farming in the 1960s, and the Park Service's contribution to inflating land values and therefore taxes on the Point Reyes peninsula. By the late 1960s, ranchers were struggling and *wanted* to sell. They joined with the Save Our Seashore group to oppose a Point Reyes National Seashore plan that sold off some land to subdividers. If they were going to sell their land, they would prefer it be in parkland than in subdivisions. Selling their land to the Park Service still included a Residential Use and Occupancy program in which ranchers could continue dairying if they wanted to. Some, like Boyd Stewart, weren't sure if they wanted to continue dairying, but they at least wanted the financial certainty that selling to the feds would provide. Stewart told Congress,

“We will take our chances and decide whether or not we want to operate dairies after we have sold the land.”⁴¹⁹ By 1971, most Point Reyes ranchers sold their land to the federal government and operated the land on a lease-back system.⁴²⁰ Most did not abandon dairying immediately, but they no longer owned their own ranches.⁴²¹

This late 1960s battle over Point Reyes more fully reflected the aims of the coalescent environmental movements. By the time President Nixon signed revised Point Reyes National Seashore legislation in 1970, ranchers had come to terms with the lease-back system, the Park Service assumed they would eventually phase out ranching on the peninsula, and conservationists felt secure that the Park Service would not try to sell off land to subdividers to finance the rest of the park.⁴²² By 1970, dairy ranchers ended up in a compromised position, despite early Park Service promises. The Park Service never fully trusted ranchers in Point Reyes’s boundaries. Concessions to the dairies on Point Reyes were for political expediency—to pass National Seashore legislation—not because the Park Service changed its decades-old position to suddenly approve of ranching.

Despite their role in creating the open landscape that the public found so scenic, the Park Service saw ranchers as a presence to be tolerated at Point Reyes, not as an integral feature of the cultural landscape that the government should help to preserve. Unlike at Cape Cod, where the Park Service saw limited, nostalgic work and homeownership of summer cottages as part of the

⁴¹⁹ U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Point Reyes National Seashore*, 58.

⁴²⁰ Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, 21-22 (of Chapter 4); Boyd Stewart, “Point Reyes Rancher and Seashore Supporter,” an oral history conducted in 1990 in *Saving Point Reyes National Seashore, 1969-1970: An Oral History of Citizen Action in Conservation. Regional Oral History Office*, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1995, 243-244; Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 80.

⁴²¹ For more, see Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, Chapter 6, “Management of the Working Landscape.”

⁴²² The “Save our Seashore” movement and NPS Director Hartzog’s plan to sell of Point Reyes land to subdividers that precipitated it are covered fully in Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 132-141; Walker, *Country in the City*, 91, 102.

cultural landscape, ranchers at Point Reyes did not fit the National Seashore bill that Park officials had in mind. Historian Paul Sadin puts it this way:

Legislators paid close attention to property owners' rights, but the ranches and dairies were not elements that the NPS, park supporters, or legislators sought to protect as part of the larger national seashore idea. The terms *vernacular landscape* or *working landscape* were not yet part of the NPS lexicon in the early 1960s. The focus on ranchlands as cultural landscapes worthy of attention and protection did not emerge until years later. NPS policies formally identifying cultural landscapes did not appear until 1988. During debates regarding the authorization of Point Reyes National Seashore, many members of Congress described the ranches either as obstacles to overcome in gaining congressional authorization, or opportunities for obtaining the most territory without incurring an insurmountable price tag.⁴²³

Sadin is right that at Point Reyes, the Park Service did not see ranchers as an important part of the cultural landscape. However, despite a lack of official designation of cultural or working landscapes, the Park Service actively sought to preserve such a landscape at Cape Cod.

Ranchers, and the agricultural, for-profit, industrial-scale work that they performed, conflicted with the Park Service's concept of a National Seashore. West Coast land-based work was not the gentleman shellfisherman's work – it was gritty, destructive, and antithetical to the Park Service's idea of a recreational park.⁴²⁴ At Point Reyes and in Oregon, the Park Service did not welcome work performed on land in the same way that they valued quaint work and picturesque homes on East Coast shores.

Aftermath: Oysters on Point Reyes

Those familiar with Point Reyes in the news today might wonder why I have not mentioned any controversies surrounding oyster farming at Point Reyes. The controversy that exists today regarding oyster harvesting in Drakes Estero arose from a later law in 1976, which

⁴²³ Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 89.

⁴²⁴ White, "Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work For a Living?," 172-175. White writes that environmentalists distrust work, "particularly hard physical labor" like the type that ranchers undertook on Point Reyes, but that "play" in nature often mimics work in a non-mechanical, leisure-based way.

declared part of Point Reyes National Seashore a wilderness area.⁴²⁵ In 1962, by contrast, oyster farming within the potential Point Reyes National Seashore was one of the issues of least concern by all interested parties. Senator Engle, the primary Senate sponsor of Point Reyes legislation, mentioned in 1961 senate hearings that there was an oyster cannery “somewhere” in the proposed park boundaries, but that was all he knew. “I understand the Park Service intends to leave it there,” Engle began, “but I would ask Conrad Wirth to talk on that.”⁴²⁶ This oyster packing business was the Johnson Oyster Company, which had operated in Drakes Estero since 1954 and which brought in about \$150,000 of product annually.⁴²⁷ Oysters had been farmed in Drakes Estero since 1934. All farmed oysters were the nonnative Pacific Oyster (*Crassatrea gigas*), since the original native oyster, the Olympia oyster (*Ostrea lunda*) had been completely decimated in the area due to overharvesting.⁴²⁸

To say that Park officials and conservationists did not care if an oyster farm operated within park boundaries is an understatement: they barely acknowledged that the farm (and the other oyster farm operating in Tomales Bay) existed. Unlike the cattle ranching compromise, which had been made to appease ranchers but with the intention of discontinuing ranching on the

⁴²⁵ Because the Wilderness Act defines wilderness areas as places “untrammelled by man,” an area cannot become a designated wilderness area if any agriculture or mariculture exists within its boundaries. Laura Watt, Paul Sadin, NPS scientists, California Courts, environmental organizations, and oyster companies themselves have investigated this issue up to the present day far more than I ever could. I encourage all who are interested in the Drakes Estero debate and what it means for the wilderness, shellfishing, and local food movements to spend time with the aforementioned publications. The Wilderness Act, Public Law 88-577 (16 U.S. C. 1131-1136) 88th Congress, Second Session September 3, 1964. Accessed on February 21, 2015. Public Law 94-544, Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second session, Oct. 18, 1976, Accessed on February 21, 2015. http://www.nps.gov/pore/parkmgmt/upload/lawsandpolicies_publiclaw94_544.pdf.

⁴²⁶ Engle, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 41.

⁴²⁷ The term “Drakes Estero” is commonly used to refer to this body of water, rather than “Drakes Estuary,” because the relatively stagnant water actually makes it ecologically closer to a lagoon. For more on Drakes Estero and shellfishing, see Committee on Best Practices for Shellfish Mariculture and the Effects of Commercial Activities in Drakes Estero, Pt. Reyes National Seashore, California, National Research Council, *Shellfish Mariculture in Drakes Estero, Point Reyes National Seashore, California* (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2009), 12. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Point Reyes National Seashore: hearings* (1961), 41.

⁴²⁸ Committee on Best Practices for Shellfish Mariculture and the Effects of Commercial Activities in Drakes Estero, Pt. Reyes National Seashore, California, National Research Council, *Shellfish Mariculture in Drakes Estero, Point Reyes National Seashore, California* (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2009), 1.

peninsula eventually, no conservationists or Park officials spoke of a need to end oystering operations within the park. Stewart Udall specifically defended oystering at the 1961 Senate Hearings, stating that oystering and fisheries “would be able to continue operation and provide both recreation and economic value to the seashore.”⁴²⁹ Likewise, the 1961 Economic Feasibility Study for the potential park insisted that the “culture of oysters” contributed to the public value of Point Reyes National Seashore – the same approach the Park Service had taken at Cape Cod:

Existing commercial oyster beds and an oyster cannery at Drakes Estero, plus three existing commercial fisheries, should continue under national seashore status because of their public values. The culture of oysters is an interesting and unique industry which presents exceptional educational opportunities for introducing the public, especially students, to the field of marine biology.⁴³⁰

No draft of the bill ever considered phasing out shellfishing in the park—even the commercial mariculture that took place in Drakes Estero. As the economic feasibility study stated, Park Service officials and conservationists promoted fishing as a recreational and educational activity that visitors could do in the park, one that added to the overall justification for preservation.

Acceptance of water-based agriculture and work has been a long-running feature of Park Service planning. At Point Reyes, this acceptance of oystering appears strange in hindsight only because it contrasts so sharply with Park Service views of ranchers as an annoyance to be tolerated. Fishing, and shellfishing by extension, belonged to a category of leisure pursuits and was not threatening to the Park Service. Even historians of the Park Service have neglected to look critically at Park fishing policies.⁴³¹ Shellfishing in particular had acquired a cultural-

⁴²⁹ Stewart Udall, *Point Reyes National Seashore: Senate Subcommittee Hearings, March 1961*, 17.

⁴³⁰ U.S. National Park Service, *Land Use Survey and Economic Feasibility Report for Point Reyes National Seashore* (1961), 1.

⁴³¹ Other historians of National Parks devote very little time to fishing and shellfishing – whether ranching or forestry would be allowed receives a good deal of attention, but fishing is treated as a recreational activity whose merit Park Service leaders did not question. I believe that there is a need for National Park Service historians to devote more time to the history and politics of fishing and shellfishing in National Parks. For general NPS historians that do not address fishing in any real depth, see Alfred Runte, *National Parks: The American Experience* (Lincoln

practice status, a sort of institutional nostalgia that the establishment of Cape Cod National Seashore cemented as part of Park Service policy. At Cape Cod, the Park Service gave up control of marsh muck without a fight, thus allowing towns to regulate shellfish harvesting for recreational or commercial endeavors. At Point Reyes, shellfishing wasn't quite as culturally essential to the preservation narrative as it was to the Cape Cod story (no Henry David Thoreau and the Wellfleet Oysterman on Point Reyes), but the NPS was just as willing to cede control in the shellfishing arena.



Figure 25: Drakes Bay Oyster Company today, Jeffrey Strain, National Parks Blog, accessed march 27, 2015, <http://www.nationalparksblog.com/>.

The reason for the Park Service's complete lack of apprehension in allowing industrial oyster operations to continue can be found in the primary motivator for the Park Service to establish the Point Reyes National Seashore in the first place: development. Park Service officials did not want ranchers to continue owning their land because they feared ranchers would

and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1979); Barry Mackintosh, *The National Parks: Shaping The System* (Washington, DC: National Park Service, 1984). Richard Sellers does spend a bit more time on fishing in *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, but it remains relatively unexplored in his book. One notable exception is of a specific park, the Apostle Islands. James W. Feldman, *A Storied Wilderness: Rewilding the Apostle Islands* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011).

sell to developers to make a quick buck and then all of Point Reyes would be subdivisions. They did not *trust* ranchers. Oyster mariculture, in contrast, took place almost entirely in the water—buildings for packing and logistics were minimal, and the Johnson Oyster Co. did not own any more than 5 acres, a measly sum, especially since most was too marshy for building.⁴³² Thus, an oyster farm was not a threat to the Park Service in the way a ranch was in 1962. When the Park Service rooted the bulk of their justification for a park on Point Reyes in population growth and development threats, parties who owned land that could contribute to that growth became enemies—or, at least, someone to approach skeptically. Farmers in the water weren't going to build houses on their muck or sell it to a developer. Oystering, to Park officials, was thus a much safer practice within park boundaries.

Although controversial, Point Reyes National Seashore was the only West Coast National Seashore established in the 1960s, and it remains the only National Seashore west of the Great Lakes. In 1955, however, the Park Service had spelled out another coastal park they hoped to create: the Oregon Dunes National Seashore. Point Reyes exists today because of the personal investment of Park Service officials and Congressmen Clem Miller. At Oregon Dunes, not everyone in the federal government saw the park's establishment as inevitable. The result was a process with perhaps more public input, but one that did not result in a National Seashore on the Oregon coast.

⁴³² Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, 22 (of Chapter 4).

Chapter Four: “Needed: Somebody who isn’t mad”:⁴³³

Forest Service vs. Park Service at the Oregon Dunes




Figure 26: “Oregon Dunes National Recreation Area,” Map, Google Maps, Google, March 25, 2015, <https://www.google.com/maps/place/Oregon+Dunes+National+Recreation+Area/@43.6457454,-124.0067626,132045m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m2!3m1!1s0x54c3c6aa240bff39:0x7590e9c9e0b4eef4>.

The National Park Service’s 1959 Pacific Coast Survey that recommended Point Reyes for inclusion in the federal park system also recommended one other West Coast shoreline: the Oregon Dunes.⁴³⁴ Set in southwestern Oregon among some of the finest timberlands in the post-World War II U.S., the Oregon Dunes were a small strip of dunes—23 miles long—between Florence and Coos Bay, about 70 miles southwest of Eugene. The timberlands immediately

⁴³³ Editorial, “Needed: Somebody who isn’t mad,” *Eugene Register-Guard*, October 8, 1959, 12A.

⁴³⁴ United States. National Park Service, *Pacific Coast Recreation Area Survey* (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, 1959).

adjacent to the dunes were unprofitable, since huge piles of windswept sand often covered the towering Sitka Spruce, creating tree islands in the sand that no logging equipment could easily reach.⁴³⁵ Of the full 32,000 acres in the proposed park, timber company Crown Zellerbach owned about 1,500 acres in a tree farm and the Forest Service owned 14,000 acres as part of the Siuslaw National Forest. The remainder was primarily privately owned.⁴³⁶ The area was fairly rural, and its population consisted mostly of year-round residents who depended on forestry industries for their livelihood – a demographic divergence from the ranchers at Point Reyes or the summer home owners on East Coast shores.⁴³⁷ Less than 300 privately owned parcels lay in the proposed park area, far fewer than at Cape Cod or Fire Island.⁴³⁸ Minimal private inholdings and Forest Service ownership of a sizeable portion of the proposed park gave the Park Service confidence that they would be able pass the Oregon Dunes National Seashore through Congress. The NPS report called Oregon Dunes “one the finest remaining natural areas on the West Coast” and among the “10 best unspoiled seashores in the whole country.”⁴³⁹ Just like in the early years of the Park Service, the Oregon Dunes National Seashore could be a park crafted from Forest

⁴³⁵ United States, National Park Service, *The Oregon Dunes National Seashore proposal: A Report* (San Francisco: U.S. Department of the Interior, NPS, Region Four Office, 1959), 13; U.S. Forest Service, “Siuslaw National Forest: About the Forest,” accessed March 31, 2015, <http://www.fs.usda.gov/main/siuslaw/about-forest>.

⁴³⁶ U.S. National Park Service, *The Oregon Dunes National Seashore proposal*, i, 2.; J. M. Fulton of Crown Zellerbach, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings, Eighty-sixth Congress, first session on S. 1526, S. 2010, and s. 2460, bills pertaining to the establishment of the Oregon Dunes National Seashore Park and other shoreline areas, Reedsport, Oreg., October 5, 1959* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1959), 92; Derek Larson, *Preserving Eden: The Culture of Conservation in Oregon, 1960-1980* (PhD diss, Indiana University, 2001), 57.

⁴³⁷ William G. Robbins, *Hard Times in Paradise: Coos Bay, Oregon* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), 107-121.

⁴³⁸ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, Eighty-ninth Congress, Second Session, on S. 250 and H.R. 7524, a Bill to Establish the Oregon Dunes National Seashore in the State of Oregon and for Other Purposes, June 22 and 23, 1966* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 72.

⁴³⁹ U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 9.

Service lands.⁴⁴⁰ Buying Oregon's magnificently scenic coast to create a National Seashore, the Park Service assumed, would be a piece of cake.



Figure 27: Rebecca Kennison, "Sand dunes at the Oregon Dunes National Recreation Area, close to Reedsport," Creative Commons Attribution 2.5, accessed March 30, 2015, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:USA_Oregon_Dunes.jpg.

The Park Service was wrong. What its parent department, the Interior, did not bargain for was the fierce state, local, and Forest Service opposition to Park Service control of the Oregon Dunes area. Unlike later "sagebrush rebellions," this opposition was not to the federal government generally but to the Department of the Interior and its Park Service specifically.⁴⁴¹ Residents of Oregon's timber country spoke out in mass numbers to oppose the

⁴⁴⁰ Runte, *National Parks*, 103, 219-222.

⁴⁴¹ For more on the sagebrush rebellions in the 1980s, see R. McGregor Cawley, *Federal Land, Western Anger: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Environmental Politics* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993); Karen Merrill, *Public Lands and Political Meaning: Ranchers, the Government, and the Property between Them* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002); Gil Troy, *Morning in America: How Ronald Reagan Invented the 1980s* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

“dismemberment” of the Forest Service system.⁴⁴² An Oregon Dunes National Seashore under the Park Service would be a “duplication,” an “uncalled for and illogical national park,” argued Florence Oregon resident Leavitt O. Wright.⁴⁴³ The dunes, Wright maintained, “*are* being cared for *now* by the National Forest Service.”⁴⁴⁴ Other residents of Lane County, where the majority of the park would be located, agreed that the dunes were already in good hands. Frederick and Mildred Briody of Florence insisted that “no one is going to steal the Sand Dunes. They already belong to the public.” Furthermore, the Briodys argued, people from “many parts of the country” had told them “that they enjoy this area *because it is not a National Park.*”⁴⁴⁵ Lane County resident T. M. Derrickson harbored similar mistrust of the Park Service. He had moved to Oregon from Washington to “get away from Nat’l Parks.”⁴⁴⁶ Derrickson, in the vein of countless other southwestern Oregon residents in the 1960s pleaded with Congress:

The public now has the freedom of use, and access to the Dunes and Lakes for recreation and camping which they will *not* have once the area is tied down under the Nat’l Park Regime.

If more and more lands are taken by the Dep’t of the Interior—*where* are we taxpayers going to find property to purchase to pay taxes on???

We like the State Parks. We like the U.S. Forest Service. We are happy with them. We *don’t need* the Dep’t of the Interior. We *don’t want* the Dep’t of the Interior.

Please Mr. Bible, *don’t* let a Nat’l Park happen here!!!⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴² Jack Hayes, in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 272.

⁴⁴³ Leavitt O. Wright, U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 272.

⁴⁴⁴ Emphasis from Wright. Letter from Leavitt O. Wright to Senator Alan Bible, June 10, 1966, in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 103.

⁴⁴⁵ Emphasis that of the authors. Letter from Frederick and Mildred Briody to Senator Alan Bible, June 18, 1966, in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 103.

⁴⁴⁶ Letter from T. M. Derrickson to Senator Alan Bible, June 17, 1966, in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 102.

⁴⁴⁷ Letter from T. M. Derrickson to Senator Alan Bible, June 17, 1966, U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 102.

While the National Park Service wasn't always welcomed with open arms at other potential National Seashore or Lakeshore sites, they also weren't often passed over in favor of other blameless state and federal agencies.

Despite nine years of legislative wrangling after Oregon Senator Richard Neuberger first proposed an Oregon Dunes National Seashore to Congress in 1959, no national seashore ever materialized at Oregon's dunes. Instead, in 1972, five years after the Park Service had thrown in the towel on the Oregon Dunes proposal, the U. S. Forest Service quietly established a National Recreation Area on the same shoreline under Richard Nixon's pen.⁴⁴⁸ How did the easiest national seashore proposal – the only one with large federal inholdings in the proposed area, similar to early national parks—become the only national shoreline that the Department of the Interior failed to realize?

The Park Service failed to convert Oregon Dunes into a National Seashore because of the strength and influence of the timber industry and the Forest Service among the public in postwar Oregon. The sway the Forest Service held with Oregon's politicians and residents made it virtually impossible for the Park Service to turn the tide of public opinion against that beloved agency: forests were the state's lifeblood. Like any other potential coastal park in the 1960s, residents of Oregon's dunes worried about private property rights, industries fretted about the continuation of their business, and groups organized both in favor of and against the park. The only distinguishing feature about the Oregon Dunes battle, the only unique controversy, was the opposition of another federal agency to the seashore proposal.

⁴⁴⁸ Larson, *Preserving Eden*, 83-84.

The Forest Service actively undermined the Oregon Dunes proposal, fed up with years of what it saw as unfair land grabs in past rivalries between the agencies.⁴⁴⁹ Private citizens, happy with the positive effects of forestry on the postwar economy, defended the Forest Service. These citizens fought the Park Service to keep it out of Oregon, aiding the Forest Service when its hands were tied. The 1960s dispute at the Oregon Dunes showcases the amazing “regularity of conflict” between the National Park Service and the Forest Service – one that often “relied on old political stereotypes.”⁴⁵⁰ Like earlier battles, rural locals of resource-extractive economies defended the Forest Service while urbanites defended the National Park Service.⁴⁵¹

Yet, something distinguished the about the Oregon Dunes battle from earlier Park Service-Forest Service disputes. It took place in the midst of the wilderness movement, the Multiple Use Act debate and implementation, and during some of the largest clear-cutting in national forests that this country has ever seen. Rachel Carson published *Silent Spring* during this debate, all thirteen other National Seashores and Lakeshores passed Congress, Congress passed major clean air and clean water legislation and, eventually, the National Environmental Protection Act.⁴⁵² Amid the changing priorities and alliances among conservation organizations, agencies, and the public, the Oregon Dunes controversy turned into a battle over the very definition of conservation. Park Service failure at the rural, resource-extractive-based economy surrounding Oregon’s dunes illuminates how unevenly definitions of conservation changed across the United States, with major cities and East Coasters embracing what would become

⁴⁴⁹ In 1937, at an Izaak Walton League meeting, Forest Service founder Gifford Pinchot said, “With the possible exception of the national parks, and I underline the word ‘possible,’ the Interior Department has never had control of a single publicly owned natural resource that it has not devastated, wasted, and defiled.” Quoted in Karen Merrill, *Public Lands and Political Meaning: Ranchers, the Government, and the Property between Them* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2002), 246, note 86.

⁴⁵⁰ Karen Merrill, *Public Lands and Political Meaning: Ranchers, the Government, and the Property between Them* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2002), 206, 193.

⁴⁵¹ Paul Hirt, *A Conspiracy of Optimism: Management of the National Forests Since World War II* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 27-44.

⁴⁵² Gottlieb, *Forcing the Spring*, 121-160.

known as “environmental” causes much earlier than rural areas.⁴⁵³ The reluctance of Oregonians to embrace primarily recreational parkland foreshadows the late twentieth century resistance of loggers to environmentalism.⁴⁵⁴

Population growth, more than any other one factor, changed the conversation around conservation. The National Park Service, who was accustomed to building support from wealthy urbanites, built its expansionist agenda on urban fears that no natural land would remain after postwar housing booms had ripped through the country.⁴⁵⁵ The Forest Service, in contrast, who had so painstakingly cultivated vocal support in Forest areas, which were primarily rural, underestimated the fear of development building among suburbanites. On Oregon’s coast, the towns bordering the dunes had populations of less than 10,000 total, while the nearest big city, Eugene, was magnitudes smaller than Boston or San Francisco.⁴⁵⁶ Thus, the support recreation policies enjoyed out East, or even in the Bay Area, did not extend to rural Oregon’s timber

⁴⁵³ By 1925, Hal Rothman writes, the NPS and USFS “became engaged in a fight for the role of lead federal conservation agency . . . the Park Service had a wider constituency with an urban base, better promotional materials, a national focus, and an aggressive tradition of acquisitions that it converted into an advantage.” Hal K. Rothman, “‘A Regular Ding-Dong. Fight’: Agency Culture and Evolution in the NPS-USFS Dispute, 1916-1937” *Western Historical Quarterly* 20 (May 1989): 141-161, here 151. For more on the language of “locking up” resources and its historic use by western ranchers and foresters, see Merrill, *Public Lands and Political Meanings*, 193.

⁴⁵⁴ Historian Richard White discusses the conflict between loggers and environmentalists in the Pacific Northwest in his landmark essay, “‘Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?’: Work and Nature,” in *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature*, William Cronon, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 171-185.

⁴⁵⁵ Florence resident Henry Bryson insisted that Oregon’s shoreline wasn’t disappearing, stating “Oregon does not need another national park. Oregon shorelines are not vanishing. Neither are our forest lands being chipped away, except when large segments are sliced from Forest Service lands and locked up to rot under the national parks administration. U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 489. See also Rome, *Bulldozer in the Countryside*, especially 119-152.

⁴⁵⁶ Populations of towns near the Oregon Dunes in 1960: Coos Bay - 7,084; Florence - 1,642. Eugene’s population was 50,977. For comparison, Boston’s 1960 population was 697,197, while San Francisco’s was 740,316. Accessed February 28, 2015, <https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab19.txt>; <http://www.florenceoregon.net/demographics.htm>; 18th Census of the United States. U.S., Census Bureau, “Number of Inhabitants: Oregon,” (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1960), accessed March 11, 2015, <http://www2.census.gov/prod/decennial/documents/37749197v1p39ch2.pdf>.

country. This relatively limited suburban growth meant that some of Oregon's coastal residents did not feel that the shoreline was vanishing at all.⁴⁵⁷

The thirteen year Oregon Dunes National Seashore debate thus shifted the allegiances of conservation organizations towards the National Park Service and away from the Forest Service. It also exacerbated long-standing tensions between the Department of the Interior and communities reliant on extractive economies. This estrangement had already begun in the early 1950s, when the Sierra Club chose not to elect the Forest Service Chief as an honorary Vice President for the first time in decades.⁴⁵⁸ While the Park Service had been a “serious bureaucratic threat” to the Forest Service since its inception, it wasn't until the late 1950s that the overwhelming tide of urban public opinion turned against the Forest Service in favor of the Park Service.⁴⁵⁹ When Stewart Udall's Interior Department began to incorporate overpopulation concerns, worries about pollution, and a romantic attachment to the wilderness movement in the 1960s, the Forest Service allowed some of the highest levels of clear-cutting in its history. Rural Oregonians continued to support the Forest Service, as they did in the Oregon Dunes battle, but conservation organizations increasingly saw the Park Service as the agency most concerned

⁴⁵⁷ Harris Ellsworth of the Douglas County Board of Commissioners made the common point that Oregon's shoreline is not disappearing in the same way that other states' shores are at the 1959 hearings on Oregon Dunes. U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 127; Dennis Roth, “The National Forests and the Campaign for Wilderness Legislation,” in *America's Forests: Nature, Culture, and Politics*, ed. Char Miller (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 229-246.

⁴⁵⁸ Harold Steen, *The Chiefs Remember: The Forest Service, 1952–2001* (Durham, NC: Forest History Society, 2004), 17.

⁴⁵⁹ The missions of the two agencies overlapped enough that consolidation of the Forest Service into the Department of the Interior had been a real possibility on several occasions. During the Depression, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes took several stabs at trying to get the Forest Service back into the Department of the Interior. This put the Forest Service on the defensive and soured relations between the two agencies for decades thereafter. Char Miller calls the fight between Pinchot and Ickes in those years “one of the most bruising bureaucratic brawls in modern U.S. political history.” Char Miller, *Public Lands, Public Debates: A Century of Controversy* (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 2012), 33; Merrill, *Public Lands and Political Meaning*, 161. More recently, the U.S. Government Accountability Office issued a 2009 report on possible move of the Forest Service into the Department of the Interior. Feuds between the agencies are alive and well. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Observations on a Possible Move of the Forest Service into the Department of the Interior*, Published Feb 11, 2009, Publicly Released: Feb 24, 2009. Accessed February 27, 2015. <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-223>.

about the ecological health of the natural world.⁴⁶⁰ Historian Char Miller sees this as the Forest Service aligning itself against what would become the environmental movement:

In its fierce fight for survival, it [the U.S. Forest Service] may have missed an opportunity to engage in serious reconsideration of how conservationism had evolved and how it would be implemented in coming years . . . Its insularity would have dire consequences in the aftermath of World War Two, complicating the Forest Service's implantation of new forest management techniques, damaging its once-vaunted reputation, and hindering its ability to react to massive social changes, especially the emergence of a potent environmental movement. By the 1970s, the Forest Service and the public no longer saw eye-to-eye.⁴⁶¹

As of the 1960s, however, some members of Oregon's resource-extractive rural public still did see eye-to-eye with the Forest Service. The case of Oregon Dunes helped to change that. By the end of the Oregon Dunes battle in 1972, the Park Service had become the "environmental" agency. Oregon Dunes did not become a national seashore, but the Park Service held the banner of the new environmental movement. They had lost the battle, but won the war.

A Who's Who of Southwest Oregon, circa 1959

A handful of politicians, landowners, and private residents set the tone for the Oregon Dunes debate. The first was the original sponsor of Oregon Dunes National Seashore legislation, Senator Richard L. Neuberger. Neuberger was first elected to the Senate in 1956, the first Democrat elected to that body from Oregon since 1914.⁴⁶² For the previous three decades he had

⁴⁶⁰ Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 267-270; Louter, *Windshield Wilderness*, 81. Political scientist Henry B. Sirgo calls Udall the "foremost spokesperson for environmental and conservation matters" in the absence of other environmental organizations: "In later years, other departments and agencies became concerned with environmental issues such as; the Environmental Protection Agency, established during the Nixon administration; and the Department of Energy and Federal Emergency Management Agency, established during the Carter administration. In the Kennedy-Johnson years, that responsibility largely fell on the Department of the Interior. In this context Stewart L. Udall emerged as the foremost U.S. Government spokesperson for environmental and conservation matters." Sirgo, "The Moral Work of Stewart L. Udall to Extend Ethics to Encompass Ecological Thinking," *Global Virtue Ethics Review*, 4, 1 (2003): 58-82, here 63.

⁴⁶¹ Miller, *Public Lands, Public Debates*, 34.

⁴⁶² John M. Swarthout, "The 1956 Election in Oregon," *The Western Political Quarterly*, 10, 1. (Mar., 1957), 142-150.

been a journalist, specializing in the American West and often focusing on conservation. Neuberger's 1938 book, *Our Promised Land*, began with "The Last Frontier" and included chapter titles like "Promised Land," "Hydroelectric!," "No More Salmon," "Cockeyed Politics in the Hinterlands," and "The American Wilderness."⁴⁶³ In his writings, Neuberger extolled the values of the Civilian Conservation Corps and Franklin Roosevelt's "keen appreciation of the wide open spaces."⁴⁶⁴ After his election to the Senate, Neuberger accused the Eisenhower administration of "setting back the conservation clock."⁴⁶⁵ Neuberger belonged to the Izaak Walton League and the Oregon State Grange, and had been a press official for the Bonneville Power Administration. He publically and frequently advocated wilderness preservation in the United States, leading other Senators to call him "Mr. Conservation."⁴⁶⁶

In addition backing the wilderness movement strongly, Neuberger worried about chemicals and other pollutants in the environment. Like Carson, Neuberger battled cancer in the late 1950s and early 1960s.⁴⁶⁷ Neuberger lost his battle sooner than Carson – he died in March of 1960 of a cerebral hemorrhage.⁴⁶⁸ Obituaries called him a "crusading conservationist" who achieved "eminence and distinction as a Senator" in his five short years in office. They also

⁴⁶³ Richard L. Neuberger, *Our Promised Land* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1938).

⁴⁶⁴ Richard L. Neuberger, "Guarding Our Outdoor Heritage," in *Readings for Democrats*, Edward Reed, ed. (New York: Oceana Publications, 1960), 87.

⁴⁶⁵ Neuberger, "Guarding Our Outdoor Heritage," 86.

⁴⁶⁶ Bert E. Swanson and Deborah Rosenfield, "The Coon-Neuberger Debates of 1955; 'Ten Dam Nights in Oregon,'" *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, 55, 2 (1964), 55-66, here 57. An excerpt from the 1959 collection *Readings for Democrats* (for which Neuberger wrote the only chapter on conservation) exemplifies Neuberger's personal beliefs on the issue: "One persuasive theme threads through my own mind. Once wilderness is mined or grazed or logged, it never can be true wilderness again. This should induce Americans to proceed slowly when they alter the character of their few remaining primitive realms, because such a process inevitably becomes irreversible." Neuberger, "Guarding Our Outdoor Heritage," 89.

⁴⁶⁷ Neuberger did not publicize his battle with cancer until he went into remission in 1959, telling constituents instead that he was suffering from the flu. When he returned to the Senate, he used his battle to advocate increased funding for cancer research. Richard L. Neuberger, "When I Found Out I Had Cancer," *Harpers Magazine* (June 1959), 42-45.

⁴⁶⁸ "Neuberger, 47, Dies in Oregon; Was Seeking 2d Term in Senate," *New York Times*, March 10, 1960, 1. The root cause of Neuberger's death was cancer. Wayne Morse's biographer Mason Drukman says Neuberger knew he was dying for several weeks beforehand, but his death "caught almost everyone, and especially Morse, by surprise." Mason Drukman, *Wayne Morse: A Political Biography* (Portland, OR: The Oregon Historical Society Press, 1997), 298.

remembered the Oregon Dunes National Seashore as the project “dearest to Senator Neuberger’s heart. The *New York Times* editorialized in favor of the National Seashore in the wake of Neuberger’s death, arguing that

No more fitting tribute could be paid him by the Congress and the people of the United States than to adopt the Neuberger bill that would set aside forever this area in memory of a fine legislator and great outdoorsman who was determined that future generations should share in the great natural heritage of this country that he knew so well and loved.⁴⁶⁹



Figure 28: Richard and Maurine Neuberger. Oregon Historical Society 1141, accessed January 15, 2015, http://www.ohs.org/education/oregonhistory/historical_records/dspDocument.cfm?doc_ID=D39FEA43-F000-1881-0BAE0AC3AF51CE3A.

Upon Neuberger’s death, his wife, Maurine Neuberger, won a special election to fill his senate seat in 1960. Maurine Neuberger wanted to keep the dream of Oregon Dunes National Seashore alive – she assured her constituents that “she would follow her husband's path as a liberal Democrat but with a mind of her own.”⁴⁷⁰ In addition to carrying on her late husband’s stance on conservation issues, she made a name for herself in the Senate as the third woman ever elected to that body. She became most well-known for introducing the earliest legislation that mandated

⁴⁶⁹ “Richard L. Neuberger,” *New York Times*, March 10, 1960, 30.

⁴⁷⁰ Wolfgang Saxon, “Maurine Neuberger Dies at 93; Consumer Advocate in Senate,” *New York Times*, February 24, 2000. Accessed at <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/24/us/maurine-neuberger-dies-at-93-consumer-advocate-in-senate.html>. Accessed on February 28, 2015.

health-warnings on cigarettes and she vocally criticized the tobacco industry throughout her tenure.⁴⁷¹ Maurine Neuberger introduced Oregon Dunes National Seashore legislation in every session she sat in the Senate. When Oregon Dunes National Seashore finally died legislatively, it was because Maurine Neuberger no longer sat in the U. S. Senate.⁴⁷²

Oregon's Senior Senator during both Neuberger's times in office was Wayne Morse. Morse began his career as a Republican, became an independent for a few years in the early 1950s, and then finished his career as a member of the Democratic Party from 1955-1974. An aggressive independent, Morse is perhaps most well-known for being one of only two Senators to oppose the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.⁴⁷³ Morse and Richard Neuberger had a long and interesting relationship. Morse had been the Dean of the University of Oregon Law School when Richard Neuberger attended, and had served as Neuberger's mentor after college and into his political career. However, an instance of cheating in 1931 left Neuberger "a man flawed character" in the eyes of Morse.⁴⁷⁴ Morse advised Neuberger closely, but the relationship was always strained, one of scolding mentor and reluctant mentee. By 1957 the relationship between the two men had deteriorated to a series of angry letters sent daily between the two offices.⁴⁷⁵ The icing on the cake came when Morse decided not to endorse Neuberger in the 1960

⁴⁷¹ Wolfgang Saxon, "Maurine Neuberger Dies at 93; Consumer Advocate in Senate," *New York Times*, February 24, 2000. Accessed at <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/24/us/maurine-neuberger-dies-at-93-consumer-advocate-in-senate.html>. Accessed on February 28, 2015.

⁴⁷² For more on Maurine Neuberger, see a biography on her from the U. S. House of Representatives' "History, Art, & Archives" division. "Neuberger, Maurine Brown." Accessed February 24 from [http://history.house.gov/People/Listing/N/NEUBERGER,-Maurine-Brown-\(N000052\)/](http://history.house.gov/People/Listing/N/NEUBERGER,-Maurine-Brown-(N000052)/).

⁴⁷³ For more on Morse and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, see Larry Ceplair, "The Foreign Policy of Senator Wayne L. Morse," *Oregon Historical Quarterly*, 113, 1 (Spring 2012): 6-35.

⁴⁷⁴ Drukman, *Wayne Morse*, 260. Drukman says in the 1930s at the University of Oregon "Neuberger took his influence with Morse for granted, and saw himself alternately as Morse's intimate associate or as his favorite nephew." Interestingly, neither biographer of Morse mentions Oregon Dunes in discussing this feud at all, despite its importance to Neuberger up to his death and his staunch disagreement with Morse on the issues.

⁴⁷⁵ Drukman, *Wayne Morse*, 276-296; A. Robert Smith, *The Tiger in the Senate: The Biography of Wayne Morse* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), 339-354.

election.⁴⁷⁶ That came soon before Neuberger’s death, so the two never reconciled their differences.




Figure 29: Wayne Morse. Public Domain, accessed February 15, 2015, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0d/Wayne_Morse.jpg.

Morse’s staunch opposition on the Oregon Dunes always centered on property rights. Morse did not want any park – regardless of who created it – that would take away even an inch of private property. Morse was a man of his ideals. However, this did nothing to improve his relationship with Neuberger, who spent a good deal of his political capital on the Oregon Dunes case and would not easily forgive Morse for failing to see the importance of conservation issues. Morse’s reliance on property rights concerns allowed him to stick to his principles outwardly—he just wanted to protect private property!—while avoiding the politically risky move of alienating the Forest Service in Oregon.⁴⁷⁷

One last political player in the Oregon Dunes debate was Oregon Governor Mark Hatfield, who sat squarely in the camp of the Forest Service and forest products industries during the Oregon Dunes debate. Hatfield was a Republican, the youngest Governor of Oregon ever at the point of his election (he was 36). Hatfield had won the 1958 and 1962 elections by focusing

⁴⁷⁶ Morse privately called Neuberger a “political prostitute” before the 1960 race, and when Neuberger inevitably heard of it through the grapevine, he accused Morse of “ventilat[ing] a lot of malice and hatred merely by bragging privately as to what he is going to do to me or against me.” Smith, *The Tiger in the Senate*, 369.

⁴⁷⁷ Larson, *Preserving Eden*, 74-80.

on the fragile economy, so he was sure to support traditional and new industrial pursuits in Oregon.⁴⁷⁸ He worked to bring in new industrial development to Oregon while also encouraging the prosperity of the booming timber industry. Even his obituary, fifty years later, remembered his support of logging. In highlighting his time of Governor in one short paragraph, the obituary mentioned that he “helped local companies, especially the timber industry, supporting its requests for increased logging.”⁴⁷⁹

The final characters I would like to introduce before proceeding are the members of the Western Lane Taxpayers Association (WLTA). The WLTA formed in 1959 in direct response to Oregon Dunes National Seashore proposals, and it disbanded once the NPS dropped their proposal in 1967. The group was made primarily of private individuals who owned land in Western Lane County, the location of the majority of private property in the potential park.⁴⁸⁰ The group's leaders included John (“Jack”) M. Hayes, the first chairman, who believed that “the building of roads is progress; slum clearance is progress; national security developments are progress and necessary; but to tear down a man’s home and return his improved holdings to a wilderness on the flimsy excuse of needed recreation is retrogression.”⁴⁸¹ This property-rights oriented position was common among other WLTA members. A later chair, John S. Parker, had lived on Siltcoos Lake (south of the proposed park) for several decades and worried about fiscal

⁴⁷⁸ Mark O. Hatfield and Diane N. Solomon, *Against the Grain: Reflections of a Rebel Republican* (Ashland, OR: White Cloud Press, 2001), 105.

⁴⁷⁹ Adam Clymer, “Mark O. Hatfield, Champion of Liberal Causes, Dies at 89,” *New York Times*, August 8, 2011. Accessed February 23, 2015 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/us/politics/08hatfield.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

⁴⁸⁰ While much of the area of the park was actually in Douglas County, that land was mostly owned by the Forest Service or private timber companies. Total value of assessed private lands that would be included in park: \$550,220 (\$489,740 of which was on Lane County tax rolls; \$60,480 on Douglas County tax rolls – WLTA disputed those numbers, but they did not dispute that the majority of the private land that would be included in the proposed park was a part of Lane County. Don Brown, “Dunes Information Hazy, Speaker Says,” *Eugene Register-Guard*, September 26, 1959, 12.

⁴⁸¹ John M. Hayes in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 272.

irresponsibilities on the part of the federal government.⁴⁸² Merle Evans and her husband, prominent Music Professor in Oregon, John Stark Evans, also couched her opposition in concerns about “fiscal extravagance.”⁴⁸³ While the majority of members were individuals worried about property rights and economic issues, the group also received advice from a variety of associations and agencies, which the group publicized. These included several Chambers of Commerce, Granges and Farm Bureaus, State agencies, and the U. S. Forest Service.⁴⁸⁴

The U. S. Forest Service in Oregon

To understand Oregon politics in the 1960s, one must understand the U.S. Forest Service’s place in it. To say that the Forest Service influences Oregon is an understatement. Fifty-three percent of Oregon’s land is publically owned, and almost half of that is owned by the Forest Service. Not included in those 15.6 million acres of Forest Service land are the millions of acres of privately owned timberlands at lower elevation, owned by companies like Crown Zellerbach and International Paper Company in the Oregon Dunes area.⁴⁸⁵ In addition to cutting

⁴⁸² John S. Parker in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 104.

⁴⁸³ Merle Evans, Letter to John Parker, June 14, 1966 in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 101-102; Marian Lowry, “John Stark Evans to Leave Eugene For Portland Post,” *Eugene Register-Guard*, May 15, 1944, 2.

⁴⁸⁴ U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 305. Here is the full list of agencies providing advice to the WLTA: Lane County Farm Bureau, Oregon State Grange, Northwest Indian Council, Lane County Chamber of Commerce, Siuslaw Port Commission, Siuslaw Pioneer Association, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, Baker County Chamber of Commerce, Florence Chamber of Commerce, Association of State Soil Conservation Districts, State Committee on Natural Resources, City of Florence, Junior Chamber of Commerce (Florence), Ada Grange No. 570, Main River Grange, North Fork Grange, and the Siuslaw Pioneers. On another occasion, Chairman John Hayes listed a slightly different list of advising organizations, the “Land Pomons Grange, Main River, Ada and North Fork granges; the Lane County Chamber of Commerce; the Florence Chamber of Commerce, Junior Chamber of Commerce, City Council; the Siuslaw Soil Conservation District; Crown-Zellerbach Corp.; and a Florence organization that calls itself the ‘Citizens Information Group.’” Noteworthy in this second list is the inclusion of a paper company with major holdings in the area. Don Tacheron, “Taxpayers Group Shifts Dune Policy,” *Eugene Register-Guard*, June 7, 1959, 3C.

⁴⁸⁵ The other half of the federal land was owned by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which is housed under the Department of the Interior. However, the BLM never cultivated the public support that the Forest Service did, which explains why Oregon politically has historically been in the hands of the Forest Service. More on this later in

on their own lands, these companies also contracted with the Forest Service and relied on the substantial incomes that came from harvesting on federal lands.⁴⁸⁶ Crown Zellerbach even opened up some of their land in the dunes area to recreation by the public. While some wondered if logging would create an unsafe recreation environment for day-trippers, Crown Zellerbach official argued the contrary. When Senator Alan Bible expressed such skepticism that outdoor leisure activities could be safe on private timber lands. Bible asked Crown Zellerbach officials if they would “run over any of them?,” meaning the recreationists. For its part, Crown Zellerbach insisted that, of course, camping and fishing on active timber lands was safe for all parties.⁴⁸⁷

The 1950s and 1960s brought in peak harvests for Oregon lumber, adding to the already enormous influence the Forest Service peddled in Oregon. From 1950-1970, Oregon outpaced Washington, Idaho, and California in lumber production, precipitated by the postwar housing boom (especially in California) and Oregon’s relatively large chunk of virgin forest still remaining in the second half of the 20th century.⁴⁸⁸ The absolute peak in timber harvests came intermittently in the years between 1952 and 1973, when all but four years saw timber harvests over 8 billion board feet per year. For perspective, that’s well over twice the harvest in the year

the chapter. Numbers taken from William G. Robbins, *Oregon: This Storied Land* (Oregon Historical Society Press, 2006), 149.

⁴⁸⁶ Since the beginning of the Forest Service, the agency allowed private companies to cut reserved sections of National Forests when privately owned timberlands were heavily cut over and in regrowth cycles Harold Steen, *The U. S. Forest Service: A History* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), 302. For more on the Forest Service working with private agencies in “cooperative forestry,” see Steen, *The U. S. Forest Service*, 173-195, 280-282; Robbins, *Hard Times in Paradise*, Roth, “The National Forests and the Campaign for Wilderness Legislation,” 235.

⁴⁸⁷ J. M. Fulton in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 92. Bible, a Senator from Nevada, was extremely supportive of resource-extractive economies and federal projects while also supporting new National Parks and conservation issues as the Chairman of the Subcommittee of Parks and Recreation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. While he tended pro-park, it is notable that even legislators with resource-extractive economies in their states supported national seashores and questioned timber industry officials. See Gary Elliot, *Senator Alan Bible and the Politics of the New West* (Reno and Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 1994), 143-144.

⁴⁸⁸ Matthew David Ohlen, “The National Park Service under Mission 66: Oregon Dunes and Point Reyes National Seashore,” Master’s Thesis, Department of History, University of Oregon (June 2006), 42; Robbins, *Oregon: This Storied Land*, 144-145; Robbins, *Hard Times*, 107.

2000 (3.9 billion board feet).⁴⁸⁹ During the Oregon Dunes battles, 1964 and 1965 were the peak years.⁴⁹⁰ This dramatic increase in timber harvests was felt especially in the smallest towns in Oregon. Blue collar jobs often consisted of logging, working at paper or pulp mills, driving lumber, or some other variety of lumber-related services.⁴⁹¹

Coos Bay, on the southern end of the Oregon Dunes area, was no exception. Once a small logging town, newspapers called Coos Bay the “lumber capital of the world” by the late 1940s.⁴⁹² A rapid emergence of small, independent mills characterized the Coos Bay forestry economy at the time. Historian of Oregon William Robbins writes that the immediate postwar years in southwest Oregon were the “heyday of the gyppo logger and [small] sawmill operator, [and] the hardy individual who worked on marginal capital.”⁴⁹³ By the late 1950s, the small sawmill operators had declined, but Georgia-Pacific and Weyerhaeuser opened new facilities that kept southwest Oregon’s timber industry thriving and its population employed.⁴⁹⁴ When local economies slowed, local residents often pushed for additional harvesting more than timber companies; it meant more jobs. Mid-century local economies in Oregon depended on forestry-related jobs, payments in lieu of taxes, and other income that the Forest Service and lumber companies brought to the region.⁴⁹⁵ If the lumber market slowed, workers left the area in search of better employment elsewhere.⁴⁹⁶

⁴⁸⁹ Alicia Andrews and Kristin Kutara, “Oregon’s Timber Harvests, 1849-2004” (Oregon Department of Forestry, 2005). Accessed January 23, 2015, http://www.oregon.gov/odf/state_forests/frp/docs/oregonstimmerharvests.pdf.

⁴⁹⁰ Steen, *The U. S. Forest Service*, 122-130; Gerald Williams, *The U. S. Forest Service in the Pacific Northwest: A History* (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2009), 228; William G. Robbins, *Oregon: This Storied Land* (Oregon Historical Society Press, 2006), 144-145; Brian R. Wall, “1965 Oregon timber harvest: Resource Bulletin PNW-16” (Portland, OR: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station, June 1966), accessed January 23, 2015, http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_rb016.pdf.

⁴⁹¹ Robbins, *Hard Times*, 115-120.

⁴⁹² Robbins, *Hard Times*, 107; Robbins, “Social Context . . .”, 200.

⁴⁹³ Robbins, *Hard Times*, 110.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 115-120.

⁴⁹⁵ Robbins, *This Storied Land*, 149.

⁴⁹⁶ Robbins, *Hard Times*, 108-109.

Hoping to keep this prosperity going, paper companies in southwest Oregon wanted the Forest Service to open up additional lands for timber harvesting. Crown Zellerbach, a land owner in the potential National Seashore area, actually favored an Oregon Dunes National Seashore under certain conditions. They would be willing to trade their acreage near the Oregon Dunes to the Department of the Interior for a tract of land elsewhere in Oregon. To prove that Crown Zellerbach would be “happy to sell” their 300 acres west of the highway, company officials cited their request for a similar exchange with the Bureau of Land Management three years previously.⁴⁹⁷ The paper companies did not much care where their land was, and the timber land near sand dunes was by no means of the highest quality since sand often covered the timber or made the roads impassable. The area around Coos Bay, not the dunes themselves, harbored the best virgin timber in the country. That’s where the paper companies really wanted their land, and the locals wanted the paper companies there, too.⁴⁹⁸ To Crown Zellerbach, a park that gave them better timberland was more than acceptable. The Forest Service, however, was a different story.

The Forest Service and the “Land-grabbing Ogre”⁴⁹⁹

The Forest Service had a long history of losing their land to National Park Service projects.⁵⁰⁰ In the early years of the National Park Service, transferring land from the Forest

⁴⁹⁷ Testimony of J. M. Fulton of Crown Zellerbach in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 92-93.

⁴⁹⁸ Char Miller, “On Rewriting Forest History,” in Miller, ed., *America’s Forests: Nature, Culture, and Politics* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 1-11; William G. Robbins, “The Social Context of Forestry: The Pacific Northwest in the Twentieth Century,” 199-200, in Miller, ed., *America’s Forests*, 195-207.

⁴⁹⁹ Dan Sellard, “Dunes designation came after long, bitter battle,” *Eugene Register-Guard*, April 9, 1972, 2C.

Service had been the de facto method of creating new National Parks.⁵⁰¹ Other transfers had encompassed far more land than the Oregon Dunes, as National Seashore advocate Neuberger was careful to point out. Kings Canyon, Glacier, Rainier, Olympic, and Grand Canyon National Parks were all areas where legislation forced the Forest Service to surrender land to the National Park Service.⁵⁰² In Washington State, all three National Parks near Puget Sound— Rainier (established by Congress in 1899), Olympic (1938), and North Cascades (1968)— came from Forest Service land. All established in different eras, these three parks strained tensions between locals and the Park Service and caused the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to publically quarrel.⁵⁰³

The Western Lane Taxpayers Association looked to Washington’s National Parks as examples of what a Park Service-influenced future for southwest Oregon might be. From that parable, Oregonians saw a devastating economic message for Oregon’s forest products industry.⁵⁰⁴ T. M. Derrickson, a Florence resident and member of the Western Lane Taxpayers

⁵⁰⁰ As early as 1925, Forest Service Officials called the National Park Service “inchers,” since they were taking Forest land piece by piece. Rothman, ““A Regular Ding-Dong Fight,”” 155.

⁵⁰¹ For an excellent account of the early disputes between the Park Service and the Forest Service (primarily the 1920s and 1930s), see Hal K. Rothman, ““A Regular Ding-Dong. Fight’: Agency Culture and Evolution in the. NPS-USFS Dispute, 1916-1937”” *Western. Historical Quarterly* 20 (May 1989): 141-161, and his revised version, Hal K. Rothman, ““A Regular Ding-Dong Fight’: The Dynamics of Park Service-Forest Service Controversy During the 1920s and 1930s,”” in *America’s Forests: Nature, Culture, and Politics*, ed. Char Miller (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 109-124. See also Miller, *Public Lands, Public Debates*, 32.

⁵⁰² Testimony of Richard L. Neuberger, U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 60.

⁵⁰³ A *New York Times* article called the run-up to Cascades National Park “two-and-one-half years of careful inquiry and tense bureaucratic negotiations,” and expressed skepticism at the agreement that they found “fragile and incomplete” “National Park in the Cascades,” *New York Times*, February 13, 1966, 176. Conrad Wirth, who would later become the NPS Director, called the establishment of Olympic National Park and its boundaries a “rough period” for the NPS in Wirth, *Parks, Politics, and the People* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 349. For more on Cascades disputes, see David Louter, *Windshield Wilderness: Cars, Roads, and Nature in Washington’s National Parks*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 126-146, or the full book for more on disputes between locals, the Park Service, and the Forest Service for Rainier and Olympic, as well.

⁵⁰⁴ While many near Olympic did oppose the Park Service takeover (See Louter), other Washingtonians felt it had improved their region. John Ossewald, President of the Olympic Park Associates, Inc., worked closely with the Sierra Club and other conservation organizations and said that visitation had actually been a boom in the local economy. John Ossewald in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 350-351.

Association, pointed to the area surrounding Rainier National Park and claimed “they have lost their logging industry to a great extent because of the huge sums of timbered acres taken by the national park from the Forest Service.”⁵⁰⁵ Many rural Washingtonians shared the WLTA’s stance that Park Service preservation of landscapes without natural resource extraction was an economic waste.⁵⁰⁶ Loggers and landowners from Oregon and Washington thus engaged in friendly collaboration to trade strategies for opposing the Park Service and retain a logging-based economy.

Disdain of the Park Service had been a theme in the timber-dependent Pacific Northwest even before the Second World War. When Franklin Roosevelt visited the proposed Olympic National Park in 1937, regional foresters tried to convince him of the “folly of creating a national park” in the area. They “felt strongly that the standing timber in the area would be needed to product lumber in the future.” Instead of convincing Roosevelt to quit his plans for Olympic, however, they “antagonized him” and Roosevelt had the Pacific Northwest Regional Forester transferred out of Portland and put into a powerless position in D.C. for what he saw as insubordination at Olympic.⁵⁰⁷ When the WLTA compared Oregon Dunes to Olympic, they promoted a Forest Service position with decades of historic bitterness behind it.

The WLTA’s passionate defense of the Forest Service and their comradery with like-minded individuals in Washington State was possible thank to fifty years of careful strategizing by the Forest Service. Forest Service officials had long realized the importance of allying with locals. By definition, National Forests were in rural areas: they were un-urbanized, large-

⁵⁰⁵ Derrikson, U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 413; H. R. Glascock, Jr. (Forest Council, Western Forestry and Conservation Association), U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 379.

⁵⁰⁶ Richard White also touches on this animosity in the 1990s in his essay on work in nature, set in rural Washington, “‘Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?’: Work and Nature,” in *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature*, William Cronon, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 171-185.

⁵⁰⁷ The story of Roosevelt at Olympic National Park is told in hilarious detail by Gerald Williams in *The U. S. Forest Service in the Pacific Northwest* (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 2009), 126-127.

standing swaths of forested land. For an agency to establish trusting relationships with local populaces in these far-flung areas, Forest Service founder Gifford Pinchot deliberately formed the agency into a populist and agrarian bureaucracy of the people. In a 1907 handbook, Pinchot's agency declared:

National Forests are made for and owned by the people. They should be managed by the people. They are made not to give the officers in charge of them a chance to work out their theories but to give the people who use them or those who are affected by their use a chance to work out their own best profit.⁵⁰⁸

Such populist rhetoric was consistent with Forest Service policy since its inception in 1905. That year, Pinchot issued an edict that “local needs would receive first consideration.”⁵⁰⁹ The best way to deliver on that promise was to embed foresters deeply in local politics, writes historian Samuel Hays, “so that federal officials could become better acquainted with local interests”⁵¹⁰ Foresters regularly interacted with locals, lived in their towns, listened to their concerns, and concerned themselves with local economies. Robert Sterling Yard, a founder of the wilderness movement and in many ways a critic of the Forest Service, once called it “intensely human.”⁵¹¹ Visitors in Forest Service land have generally perceived the Forest Service as an agency of the area, rather than a high-profile, Washington, D.C.-centric administration. As Forest Service Historian Harold Steen puts it, “To the public—hiker or logger—the Forest Service is the ranger district.”⁵¹² In

⁵⁰⁸ Charles McKinley, *Uncle Sam in the Pacific Northwest* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1952), 318.

⁵⁰⁹ Steen, *The U. S. Forest Service*, 278. For more on the decentralized structure of the Forest Service and how that has helped it to develop a rural, working class core constituency, see Paul Wayne Hirt, “Predicting the Future by Understanding the Past: A Historian Considers the Forest Service,” in *A Vision for the U.S. Forest Service: Goals for Its Next Century. Resources for the Future*, Roger A. Sedjo, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 2000), 149-169.

⁵¹⁰ Samuel P. Hays, *Conservation And The Gospel Of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 139.

⁵¹¹ Steen *The U. S. Forest Service*, 154.

⁵¹² Steen *The U. S. Forest Service*, 278.

contrast, the Department of the Interior “had none of the rapport” that the Forest Service had with local agriculturalists and populations.”⁵¹³

The Forest Service’s decentralized administrative structure and emphasis on localized decision-making successfully cultivated a fierce loyalty among citizens living near federal Forest lands, particularly in southwest Oregon. When the Park Service began announcing their park proposal for the Oregon Dunes, one of the biggest objections of Oregonians was that they didn’t want a distant bureaucratic organization to make decisions for Oregon. One resident of Oregon insisted that “we have more freedom” with existing agencies like the Forest Service, and that Oregonians would prefer to “keep our controlling agencies close to home and not 3,000 miles away.”⁵¹⁴ Other residents, wooed by the Forest Service’s local presence, saw Forest Rangers as “approachable” and the National Park Service as distant.⁵¹⁵ Local residents overwhelmingly supported the Forest Service over the Park Service as the more approachable agency.

Many, fed by WLTA mailings, wondered why the National Park Service needed to take land that the Forest Service already administered.⁵¹⁶ This familiarity between rural Oregonians and the Forest Service turned many against the Park Service. A resident of Florence insisted that “people in this area are used to working with the U. S. Forest Service” and that they would prefer to continue that partnership rather than start a new one with the NPS.⁵¹⁷ Some who sided with the Forest Service went a step further and aggressively opposed the Park Service. The leader of the

⁵¹³ Merrill, *Public Lands and Political Meanings*, 75.

⁵¹⁴ Carol Meyers, MD in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 457. Dr. Meyers continued, “The Government has a right to take anything it pleases, and I wonder if I am in Russia.”

⁵¹⁵ U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 111.

⁵¹⁶ The Western Lane Taxpayer’s Association sent mailing to residents of Oregon’s dunes criticizing the “single use” policies of the National Park Service and advocating specifically against the Oregon Dunes National Seashore plan. “Oregon Dunes National Seashore? NO!” Undated mailing, Box 2, Point Reyes National Seashore Foundation Records, 1959-1962, BANC MSS C-A 362, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

⁵¹⁷ Howard B. Campbell in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 163.

WLTA testified to Congressional offices that “we have visited Yellowstone Park and it is a national disgrace.”⁵¹⁸ The NPS was a “land-grabbing ogre,” but the Forest Service “cares about local wishes.”⁵¹⁹ Unlike the Forest Service, property owners on Oregon’s coast maintained, the National Park Service was “uncooperative.”⁵²⁰

The irony that both the Forest Service and the National Park Service had headquarters 3,000 miles from Oregon did not escape Senator Richard Neuberger. At many times during Congressional debates on Oregon Dunes National Seashore, Neuberger became openly frustrated with what he saw as an unwarranted prejudice of Oregonians against the National Park Service. When John Parker, a leader of the Western Lane Taxpayers Association, compared NPS land purchases to living in the Soviet Union (a common thread in these seashore hearings, as we have seen), Neuberger pressed him on the issue. Why, Senator Neuberger wanted to know, would Parker equate NPS and not USFS administrative and land acquisition policies with communism?

Mr. John Parker: “Upon what grounds is the assertion made that a big Government unit can do a better job than smaller units which are closer to the people and involve less redtape and restrictions? To place everything under one bureau—to coordinate—to have official not responsible to the citizens in charge of local affairs is the political philosophy of the Soviet Union. It is not wanted or needed here.

Senator Richard Neuberger: At this point, Mr. Parker, I would like to ask a question. Are you comparing the recreational philosophy of the U.S. National Park Service to the political philosophy of the Soviet Union?

Mr. Parker: Well, no, Senator, not in a sense, but there is this, I think, that is very hard, for instance, if I lived in a national park—I live near one—if I had a grievance, where would I go? I couldn’t go to my local official or anything. The Government is away from me and I think that is the situation in the communistic countries. I don’t think you can go and meet your representative, or your county commissioners, and talk it over with him like we can in this. That is the general idea. I think that the park officials, and I have come to know them and respect them, certainly . . . I am not talking about the people here. I am talking about the general idea of having a government that you can’t reach.

⁵¹⁸ John Parker in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 107.

⁵¹⁹ Dan Sellard, “Dunes designation came after long, bitter battle,” *Eugene Register-Guard*, April 9, 1972, 2C.

⁵²⁰ Michael E. Shoeman, Attorney for Sparrow Pacific Corporation, in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 119.

Senator Neuberger: Is not the Forest Service and the Park Service administered from Washington, D.C., in very similar fashion?

Mr. Parker: . . . There [is] a certain informality, informal attitude that the Forest Service has . . . I say there is a difference and I think that you said there was a difference, too.⁵²¹

In this exchange, Senator Neuberger pressed the “philosophy of the Soviet Union” point excessively to definitively mark in the record what Parker had said, but also to discredit the park’s opposition as too extreme. The point of including this exchange, however, is not simply to re-hash how the Cold War mentality pervaded the concept of seashore creation, as was the case at Cape Cod National Seashore.⁵²² In Oregon, rather, the Park Service battled something more: a deep belief that the Forest Service was somehow closer to Oregon than the Park Service. Even under aggressive questioning by Senator Neuberger that cast him in an unflattering, McCarthy-esque light, John Parker refused to retreat from his characterization of the National Park Service as a distant bureaucracy, and the Forest Service as an agency of the people—an agency of democracy.

Oregon politicians were acutely aware of the Forest Service’s populist support in Oregon. Even those who favored the more preservationist management philosophy of the National Park Service recognized the need to placate and flatter the Forest Service. A park in Oregon’s dunes, these politicians realized, would be impossible without Forest Service support. Senator Richard Neuberger, who openly contested the Forest Service more than most Oregon politicians of this era, even made sure to sweet-talk the agency that held so much of Oregon’s fate in its hands. After defending controversial historic land transfers from the Forest Service to the Park Service, Neuberger added a sycophantic afterthought to make his anti-Forest Service position more politically amenable to Oregon citizens and leaders:

⁵²¹ U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 288-289.

⁵²² The Cold War rhetoric against Park Service takings occurred at all potential National Seashores and Lakeshore. I draw it out primarily in the Cape Cod Chapter because it is the earliest and most prominent use of that rhetoric.

My point is, I have such respect and admiration for the U. S. Forest Service, and the wonderful job it has done in our State in particular . . . that I would not think of sponsoring a bill which would take from under your jurisdiction anything even remotely approaching the extent of acreage which was wrested from the Forest Service and given to the Park Service in the Western States I have mentioned. I do want to record to show how relatively small is the 12,200 acre transfer here as compared to other transfers.⁵²³

Oregon Dunes National Seashore, Neuberger insisted, would NOT be Rainier or Olympic. The Oregon Dunes proposal involved just a tiny chunk of timbered lands – why should the Forest Service oppose it?

Others joined Neuberger in expressing similar “respect and admiration” for the Forest Service. Roy J. Beadle, the editor of Portland daily newspaper the *Oregon Journal*, supported an Oregon Dunes National Seashore, but reminded readers that “the opposition of the U. S. Forest Service is obviously a serious matter” and should be addressed before moving forward with any park. Beadle, a resident of Portland, supported an Oregon Dunes National Seashore reminded readers that it would only take a small chunk of forested land out of commission. Beadle also made sure to announce, “I defer to none in my admiration and respect for this agency.”⁵²⁴ Yet, his support reflected the divide between rural, resource-extractive Oregon and urban populations, who used rural areas primarily for recreation. The National Park Service had always been better at winning the support of the latter.⁵²⁵ In Oregon, residents of Portland (and Eugene to a lesser extent) supported a National Seashore at much higher rates than did residents of southwest Oregon where the park would be located.⁵²⁶

⁵²³ Richard L. Neuberger in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 60.

⁵²⁴ Roy J. Beadle, U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 139-140.

⁵²⁵ Hal Rothman, “A Regular Ding-Dong Fight,” 147-148. Rothman writes that Park Service Director Stephen Mather “recognized that to thrive, the Park Service first needed broad-based national support. This became the initial goal of the NPS,” rather than cultivating local support near parks themselves. The Park Service cultivated this national support through advertising and marketing promotions.

⁵²⁶ John S. Parker made this point at 1966 hearings. When questioned whether or not a statewide poll on Oregon Dunes National Seashore would pass, he responded, “I must be frank to say that I think probably there would be a

Wary of criticizing the agency whose pro-cut policies had contributed to a huge postwar boom in Oregon's economy, most Oregon politicians were unwilling to support a park that the Forest Service opposed. Mark Hatfield, Oregon's Republican Governor from 1959 to 1967, was the most vocal and high-profile opponent of Oregon Dunes National Seashore. Hatfield had his Natural Resource Board, which represented mining, water, forestry, game, and soil agencies and industries, commission a special study on the Oregon Dunes.⁵²⁷ All of these industries benefitted from Forest Service policies that allowed industrial uses of federal land. The Forest Service had historically been far more successful at gaining the allegiance of agriculture and other resource extractive industries than the Department of the Interior had.⁵²⁸ None of these groups were willing to oppose the Forest Service, as long as the Forest Service opposed the Park Service seashore. Dan P. Allen, the Executive Secretary of Oregon's Natural Resources Board, who represented Governor Mark Hatfield at Congressional hearings on Oregon Dunes in 1959, presented an anti-NPS argument for the Oregon Dunes National Seashore. He managed to get into a spitting match with Richard Neuberger while doing so.⁵²⁹ The exchange was so tense that a full 13 years later, newspapers still recalled what Allen had called "unwarranted abuse" at the time as a "a verbal slugfest with accusations and counter accusations flowing freely."⁵³⁰

majority in favor of it, because, as I tried to point out, people don't know anything about it. Over in eastern Oregon and up in Portland, they would probably say, 'Sure let us have the seashore, we need a new one.'" – in Eugene, ~70 miles away, (page break) "they have not favored the national park" and in Lane County Fair they took a poll and "the majority were opposed to it." To Parker and others in rural Oregon, the "conservation" mindset of the urban populaces was out of touch with the reality of rural Oregon's forestry-heavy economy. U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 110-111.

⁵²⁷ U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 199-310.

⁵²⁸ Merrill, *Public Lands and Political Meanings*, 49.

⁵²⁹ U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 199-310.

⁵³⁰ Marvin Tims, "After Hearings on Dunes: Neuberger Denies Abuse of Witnesses," *Eugene Register-Guard*, October 11, 1959, in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 549-550; Dan Sellard, "Dunes designation came after long, bitter battle," *Eugene Register-Guard*, April 9, 1972, 2C.

Neuberger saw such blanket support for the Forest Service as spineless. He expressed distaste for the blind opposition politicians who (he believed) were in the hands of the Forest Service yielded towards Park Service proposals. Oregon Governor Mark Hatfield was, in Senator Neuberger's eyes, the worst offender. "I am disappointed," Neuberger lamented in 1959, "that we do not have the backing of the Governor . . . for this great National Seashore park which has received such national support."⁵³¹ Neuberger took his fatherly disappointment a step further as he grew more frustrated with what he saw as Oregon politicians' deliberate obstruction of Park Service plans. After being accused in the papers of "McCarthyism," "abuse," an "overbearing attitude," acting in "extremely poor taste," and "deliberate distortion and impugning of witnesses" at a Congressional hearing on the proposal, Neuberger shot back.⁵³² Feeling maligned and targeted by the Forest Service, the WLTA, and state politicians (a local paper, the *Siuslaw Oar*, called Neuberger a "hairless Fidel Castro"⁵³³), Neuberger accused Governor Hatfield of smear tactics and insufficient analysis of the facts:

In my opinion, if the Governor had troubled to read this table, he would have seen very clearly that only Federal funds are listed as contributing to highway relocation. It is my hope that, henceforth, when he discusses or criticizes the proposed national seashore park, that he will take the time to read the factual reports which are prepared in explanation of the proposed national seashore park.⁵³⁴

Neuberger's aggressive questioning of Oregon Dunes National Seashore opponents and his intense criticism of Hatfield expose how strongly he believed that the Park Service would protect Oregon's dunes better than the Forest Service would. It also exposed Neuberger's disdain of Oregon politicians who would not stand up to timber interest, whether Forest Service or private.

⁵³¹ Neuberger, U.S. Senate, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore. Hearings*, (Washington, D.C., U.S. GPO: 1959), 258.

⁵³² Quotes all from newspaper articles inserted in record of Oregon Dunes hearings, U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 400-404.

⁵³³ "Park's New Boundaries Outlined," *Siuslaw Oar*, February 19 1960, 1 and 3, quoted in Larson, *Preserving Eden*, 76.

⁵³⁴ U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 403-404.

Neuberger further estranged himself from Morse and Hatfield in this insistence. Oregon's other politicians feared damaging any of the economic boom that forestry had created in the postwar years far more than they cared about conservation. They resisted the Park Service takeover of the Oregon Dunes on principle; they worried it could continue a dangerous trend of removing forest land from productivity.⁵³⁵

The Wilderness Bill Heats Up the Oregon Dunes Proposal

In supporting the Wilderness Bill in the late 1950s in spite of Forest Service opposition, Neuberger contributed to the decades-long tension between the Forest Service and the Park Service. Because the Forest Service already felt threatened by what it considered Park Service land grabs, the thought of surrendering even more land for non-industrial uses was distasteful to the Department of Agriculture, to say the least.⁵³⁶ To the Forest Service, the initial Wilderness Bill added to the long list of grievances against the National Park Service. Although the Forest Service eventually embraced "wilderness" as a legal designation, the wilderness movement had grown out of anti-Forest Service sentiment in the early twentieth century. Aldo Leopold initially began advocating for wilderness areas in part due to the extensive private development occurring in National Forests.⁵³⁷ Even further back, when John Muir defined the preservationist, non-resource extractive approach to land protection by opposing the Hetch Hetchy Dam in the Yosemite Valley, Gifford Pinchot, founder of the Forest Service, called Muir's opposition a

⁵³⁵ H. R. Glascock of the Western Forestry and Conservation Association's Forest Council, told Richard Neuberger in 1960, "We are concerned with this principle" of taking land away from the Forest Service because "added all together, it makes quite a chunk." U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 380.

⁵³⁶ Turner, *The Promise of Wilderness*, 24, 51-52; Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind*, 220-226.

⁵³⁷ Paul S. Sutter, "'A Blank Spot on the Map': Aldo Leopold, Wilderness, and U.S. Forest Service Recreational Policy, 1909-1924," *The Western Historical Quarterly*, 29, 2 (Summer, 1998): 187-214, here 213; see also Sutter, *Driven Wild*.

“frame-up” and “brand[ed] Interior employees as crooks.”⁵³⁸ Tensions between the Park Service and Forest Service arising from wilderness-related issues had a longstanding history.

That the Wilderness Act’s debate exacerbated tensions between the Park Service and the Forest Service came as no surprise to conservation groups, who increasingly sided with the pro-wilderness Park Service. At a conference of the Outdoor Writers Association of America in 1960, the assistant to the Audubon Society President, Charles Callisan, used the interagency feud as fodder for jokes. Parks in Forest Service-heavy areas like the Oregon Dunes were going nowhere thanks to the feud, he remarked, and perhaps no one could convince the stubborn Forest Service to change their obstinate defense:

I doubt if all the national conservation organizations working in harmony could today pass a bill to create Yellowstone National Park . . . The **Secretary of the Interior** would propose it, so naturally the **Secretary of Agriculture** would oppose it. And their underlings would wrangle for months in secret meetings with the **Budget Bureau** about how to report on the legislation. /

The **Forest Service** would huff defiance and thunder it did not intend to preside at the liquidation of its empire, for surely some national forest lands would be involved. The **timber industry** would run up the banner of ‘multiple use’ and join the **United States Chamber of Commerce** in defense of free, private enterprise. /

The **American Mining Congress** would quietly dispatch a corps of smart **lobbyists** to Capitol Hill, and members of the **Cattlemen’s Association** would threaten to close their gates to all sportsmen. **Public power groups** both would file for **Federal Power Commission** permits on the Yellowstone River, and the **Bureau of Reclamation** would start guerrilla warfare with red tape within the **Department of the Interior**.⁵³⁹

Callisan’s quote identifies the shifting alliances in the wilderness debate at the turn of the decade, noting the political alignment of natural resource development interests like timber, mining, ranching, and energy production with the Forest Service, while conservation groups took the side of the Interior Department. The opposition of politicians in Oregon to a National Park Service proposal fit into a standard pattern of Forest Service-led opposition to the Department of the Interior at the time. Richard Neuberger’s insistence that the Park Service and its wilderness-

⁵³⁸ Steen, *The U. S. Forest Service*, 115.

⁵³⁹ John B. Oakes, “Conservation: Congress’ Record,” *New York Times*, July 3, 1960, X28.

oriented administrative style would better protect Oregon's dunes was an anomaly in a Forest Service stronghold like Oregon.

Neuberger's frustration with Oregon politicians' shunning of the Park Service's style of conservation arose from his strong backing of the wilderness movement. Historians of wilderness have called Neuberger "most ardent advocate" of the Wilderness Bill at this time.⁵⁴⁰ Richard Neuberger retained an idealism about nature that Oregon politicians lacked, since they were more concerned with the day-to-day health of the timber industry than with an idealistic notion of preserved nature.⁵⁴¹ Neuberger also was responding to the changing demographics of Portland and Eugene, where higher urban populations, with non-logging related employment, led to higher support for wilderness conservation in those metropolitan areas.⁵⁴² Still, beyond a few symbolic compromises, Neuberger was unable to sway Oregon politicians towards his vision of conservation at the Oregon Dunes.⁵⁴³ Oregon politicians played to a state audience on conservation issues; Neuberger's audience was national. He saw the support for wilderness and other new environmental measures growing throughout the nation.

Perhaps Neuberger's idealism about wilderness can be attributed partly to his ill health, as well. After battling cancer in the late fifties, he knew that death was an imminent possibility. He took a no-holds-barred approach on issues he felt passionately about, first and foremost of

⁵⁴⁰ Roth, "The National Forests and the Campaign for Wilderness Legislation," 235.

⁵⁴¹ Historian Dennis Roth called Neuberger "the [wilderness] bill's most ardent advocate until his death in 1960." Roth, "The National Forests and the Campaign for Wilderness Legislation," 235.

⁵⁴² Portland's population grew from 305,394 to 372,676 people from 1940 to 1960. Eugene grew from 20,838 to 50,977 in this same period. 18th Census of the United States. U.S., Census Bureau, "Number of Inhabitants: Oregon," (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1960), accessed March 11, 2015, <http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/37749197v1p39ch2.pdf>.

⁵⁴³ Derek Larson, in his dissertation on Oregon's conservation culture since 1960, says that Neuberger "had fought for a conservation vision that Oregonians were not yet ready to accept." Larson argues that they were not ready to accept this type of conservation because widespread population growth and excessive industrial development "had not yet become pressing issues in the minds of a majority of citizens or among all the state's political leaders." Larson, *Preserving Eden*, 85.

which was conservation.⁵⁴⁴ In March of 1960, Neuberger died of a cerebral hemorrhage.⁵⁴⁵ At this point, the Oregon Dunes proposal had been in Congress for two years. Senator Richard Neuberger had designed a compromise between Hatfield, the Forest Service, and the Park Service that required “consent of all federal agencies when land transfer to the National Park Service would occur,” and also provided provisions for some industrial and recreational uses that the NPS ordinarily frowned upon.⁵⁴⁶

However, since Neuberger had been the driving force on the legislation moving through the Senate, it stalled upon his passing in 1960. To the public, too, Neuberger had been the biggest champion of the Oregon seashore proposal. After his death, the *New York Times* devoted part of his obituary to the Oregon Dunes, calling it “dearest to Senator Neuberger’s heart” and urging Congressional establishment of the Oregon Dunes National Seashore. The obituary elaborated, “No more fitting tribute could be paid him by the Congress and the people of the United States than to adopt the Neuberger bill that would set aside forever this area in memory of a fine legislator and great outdoorsman who was determined that future generations should share in the great natural heritage of this country that he knew so well and loved.”⁵⁴⁷ His former-mentor-turned-nemesis, senior Oregon Senator Wayne Morse, called him a “conservationist

⁵⁴⁴ In Smith’s biography of Morse, he includes a section on Neuberger entitled, “Mr. Conservation.” Smith, *The Tiger in the Senate*, 339.

⁵⁴⁵ Neuberger and Rachel Carson were both battling cancer at this time, and both publically linked it to man-made chemicals in the environment. Other historians have also identified Neuberger as an early leader in what was to become the environmental movement, which included preservationist land management philosophies, concerns about chemical pollution and its health effects, and an integrated ecological approach to wildlife management. John M. Swarthout, “The 1954 Election in Oregon,” *The Western Political Quarterly*, 10, 1 (March 1957): 142-150; William Souder, *On a Farther Shore: The Life and Legacy of Rachel Carson* (New York: Randomhouse, 2012).

⁵⁴⁶ These provisions, which ordinarily were not allowed in National Park sites (but which some seashore communities in other parts of the country did win provisions for) included industrial water usage within the park by paper companies, waste pipelines running through the dunes to the ocean, Off-Road Vehicle (ORV) usage, and hunting. Matthew David Ohlen, “The National Park Service under Mission 66: Oregon Dunes and Point Reyes National Seashore,” Master’s Thesis, Department of History, University of Oregon (June 2006), 37. See also legislation itself, U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 1-4.

⁵⁴⁷ Obituary, “Richard L. Neuberger,” *New York Times*, March 10, 1959, 30.

through and through” at his funeral.⁵⁴⁸ A few weeks after Neuberger’s death, the Interior Department took advantage of the increased publicity of the Oregon Dunes and issued an April press release requesting Cape Cod, Padre Island, and Oregon Dunes legislation be enacted.⁵⁴⁹

Senator Richard Neuberger’s widow, Maurine Neuberger, won his senatorial seat to succeed her late husband. Senator Maurine Neuberger carried her husband’s torch on conservation issues, pushing the Oregon Dunes particularly, both nationally and in Oregon. Like her late husband, Maurine Neuberger did shy away from addressing blame for the failure. Governor Mark Hatfield, Senator Maurine Neuberger concluded, “is himself the principle architect of the doom of the Oregon Dunes National Seashore.”⁵⁵⁰ Hatfield’s “ceaseless, though tacit” opposition to an NPS-run coastal park in Oregon caused the Kennedy administration to back off on the proposal in 1962, Maurine Neuberger believed. She wrote that same year:

I believe that the President and the Secretary of the Interior have reached the conclusion that the people of Oregon are not interested in the creation of an Oregon Dunes National Seashore. I believe they have reached this conclusion reluctantly, convinced by the dismal indifference and truculence displayed by the highest officials of the state of Oregon.⁵⁵¹

Maurine Neuberger knew that Portland and Eugene were the strongest bastions of Oregon Dunes National Seashore support, but rural, timber-rich regions near the dunes and statewide politicians spoke louder than supporters, and the Forest Service backed them up.⁵⁵²

⁵⁴⁸ A. Robert Smith, *The Tiger in the Senate: The Biography of Wayne Morse* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), 382.

⁵⁴⁹ “3 Shore Parks Urged: U.S. Would Take Cape Cod, Texas, and Oregon Areas,” *New York Times*, April 16, 1960, 19.

⁵⁵⁰ Maurine B. Neuberger, Letter to the Editor, “Hatfield Opposition Sank Dunes Bill,” *Eugene Register-Guard*, March 16, 1962, 12A.

⁵⁵¹ Maurine B. Neuberger, Letter to the Editor, “Hatfield Opposition Sank Dunes Bill,” *Eugene Register-Guard*, March 16, 1962, 12A.

⁵⁵² Neuberger did not overstate her case regarding the extremely close partnership between the U. S. Forest Service and Oregon politicians. This was not an isolated example of such chumminess.⁵⁵² The Forest Service brought together Oregonians of all political stripes. A Eugene resident noted that Oregon Dunes National Seashore bills were “sponsored by Democrats; the Governor is a Republican; yet I, as a Democrat, sincerely approve of the Governor’s committee report [opposing Oregon Dunes National Seashore].”⁵⁵² Oregon politicians were very reluctant to

Multiple-Use and Forest Service Proposals for the Oregon Dunes

Oregonians and the Forest Service did more than just block NPS suggestions for Oregon's dunes. They offered an alternative to the Oregon Dunes National Seashore: a park managed by the Forest Service. The Forest Service was embarking upon a new program, called "Operation Outdoors," that would prioritize increased recreation on forest lands.⁵⁵³ Oregonians who supported the Forest Service believed that the increased recreation funding available through Operation Outdoors could address expanding visitor use and recreation needs at the Oregon Dunes. Members of the Western Lane Taxpayers Association and other Oregon citizens advocated expanded recreational opportunities under the Forest Service, the agency already in control of the area and its resources, in their letters to the National Park Service opposing Oregon Dunes National Seashore. The debate over who could provide better recreational services—the National Park Service or the U. S. Forest Service – often turned into a debate over which agency embodied the best type of conservation. In advocating for recreation under the USDA, the Forest Service staunchly defended its prerogatives under the mantra of "multiple use." Changing definitions of multiple use added the increasingly vocal wilderness movement to pit the Forest Service against the Park Service with renewed vigor. This time, multiple use would be the Forest Service's weapon of choice.

The concept of "multiple use" had its origins in the Forest Service's Pinchotian conservation ideals, but came into its own with increasing recreational demands on Forest Service lands in the post-WWII era. In earlier decades, the NPS, whose mission statement calls

criticize Forest Service policies or take any positions that may contradict the standard USFS line. Robbins, *This Storied Land*, 149; L.L. Ray in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 437.

⁵⁵³ "Operation Outdoors" was in many ways the Forest Service answer to the National Park Service's Mission 66 program. See Williams, *The U. S. Forest Service in the Pacific Northwest*, 189.

for preservation of land for the “benefit and enjoyment of the American people” often added to its own system through the transfer of Forest Service lands into Park Service hands. Lands meant primarily for recreation purposes, the Department of the Interior and its supporters believed, should be managed by the Park Service.⁵⁵⁴ The Forest Service, never enthusiastic about surrendering lands to the Park Service, realized early on that they would need to develop recreational facilities on Forest Service lands to stave off NPS gains. Increasing recreational activities in the U.S., historian Gerald Williams writes, left the Forest Service “feeling a sense of competition with the National Park Service over recreational opportunities.”⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵⁴ Robert McBride, “Maurine Decries Mark’s Failure to Back Dunes,” *Portland Dairy Reporter*, 1962 (?), Clipping in Carton 68, Folder 7, Sierra Club Member Papers, BANC MSS 71/295 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; John B. Oakes, “Conservation: The Parks Issue,” *New York Times*, November 13, 1960, XX29.

⁵⁵⁵ Williams, *The U. S. Forest Service in the Pacific Northwest*, 189.




Figure 30: Foresters on Pisgah National Forest, North Carolina, discussing multiple-use plan for the Pisgah Ranger District, 1963. (Forest Service Photo Collection, National Agricultural Library. Taken by B.W. Muir., accessed January 31, 2015, http://www.foresthistory.org/ASPNET/Publications/multiple_use/chap3.htm.)

Forest Service Officials, seeking to codify this expanded devotion to recreation, sought passage of a “Multiple Use Act” in the late 1950s. The Multiple-Use Act, which eventually passed in 1960, would be, the Forest Service hoped, the “official balancing mechanism”⁵⁵⁶ for the Forest Service’s many missions. Conservationists had grown more and more skeptical of the

⁵⁵⁶ Steen, *The U.S. Forest Service*, 278.

Forest Service's devotion to recreation and wilderness in the timber harvesting heavy years of the 1950s. Even supporters of the Forest Service like Oregon Senator Wayne Morse admitted that recreation was "far less important to the program of the Forest Service than it is in the National Park Service."⁵⁵⁷ The Multiple-Use Act would officially balance these resources aims, prioritizing timber, wildlife, range, water, and outdoor recreation all equally in a legally binding way.⁵⁵⁸ Passage of the Multiple Use Act exposed deep divisions between conservationists, which played out in the argument over the Oregon Dunes.

The Forest Service and its parent agency, the U. S. Department of Agriculture, never fully endorsed an Oregon Dunes National Seashore under the National Park Service. Instead, area foresters and their Washington counterparts argued that programs like Operation Outdoors positioned the Forest Service – the owner of 14,000 acres of the proposed National Seashore in Oregon—as the best steward of the area's recreational resources. During Oregon Dunes National Seashore debates, the Secretary of Agriculture reminded Congress that camping facilities and boat launches in the dunes area would soon be expanded thanks to his agency's increased funding for recreation.⁵⁵⁹ The regional forester also reminded Congress that Oregon Dunes was "being managed under the principle of multiple use," and that the Forest Service had handled a 72% increase in recreational visits at the Dunes from 1954 to 1958.⁵⁶⁰ Private foresters and timber companies testified of losing their land to the National Park Service, extolled Forest

⁵⁵⁷ Wayne Morse in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: hearings, Eighty-eighth Congress, first session, on S. 1137, a bill to establish the Oregon Dunes National Seashore in the State of Oregon, and for other purposes, May 8, 9, and 22, with testimony taken at Eugene, Oreg., on May 4, 1963* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 68.

⁵⁵⁸ Steen, *The U.S. Forest Service*, 278, 307; Roth, "The National Forests and the Campaign for Wilderness Legislation," 243.

⁵⁵⁹ True D. Morse, Secretary of Agriculture, to Senator James E. Murray, October 27, 1959, in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 6.

⁵⁶⁰ Herbert Stone, Regional Forester, U.S. Forest Service in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 52.

Service campgrounds and hunting facilities, and allowed similar recreational pursuits on their lands.⁵⁶¹

Oregon residents also picked up the language of multiple use in their advocacy.⁵⁶² In adopting Forest Service multiple-use language, many Oregonians criticized the “single use” policies of the National Park Service. John Hayes, a leader of the vocal Western Lane Taxpayers Association, led his organization in its opposition to the “philosophy of land management” of the National Park Service, in which land was “retired to the single use of recreation” and prohibited resource extraction. Setting aside land for recreation and scenic preservation only, Hayes and his fellow advocates believed, was a “waste and waste and conservation are not compatible terms.”⁵⁶³ In saying this, Hayes joined other Oregonians who used multiple use concepts to attach the National Park Service’s version of conservation – increasingly being called preservation—that did not allow for economic gains from natural resource harvesting.⁵⁶⁴ Citizens who opposed what they considered the National Park Service “locking up” of resources for the “single use” of recreation often hailed from logging-dependent communities. They worried about the economic effects of removing land from harvestable acreage. Citizens dependent on the logging economy accused the Park Service of allowing timber to decay and rot in its acreage.

⁵⁶¹ Verne D. Bronson, Chief Forester, Tree Farm Management Service, Inc., Eugene, OR in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 488.

⁵⁶² Howard B. Campbell in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 163.

⁵⁶³ U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 21.

⁵⁶⁴ Criticism of National Park Service policies as “single use” was not singular to Oregon Dunes. In the establishment battles over the Ozark National Scenic Riverways, a joint-agency venture that Interior spokesmen compared to seashore establishment, locals also attacked the NPS for “‘single use’ management plans.” Historian Will Sarvis writes, “NPS supporters accurately recognized that the Forest Service’s primary funding centered around timber management, whereas the Park Service’s priority was recreation” Will Sarvis, “A Difficult Legacy: Creation of the Ozark National Scenic Riverways,” *The Public Historian*, 24, 1 (Winter 2002): 31-52, here: 36, 39, 46-47.

Paper companies, who needed a minimum volume to keep mills profitable, also used multiple-use language to support their interests.⁵⁶⁵ Oregon companies involved in the timber industry opposed any Park Service taking of Forest Service land, despite their interest in land swaps for their own sand-covered, worthless timber average.⁵⁶⁶ The *Lincoln News-Guard*, a paper out of coastal Oregon (just north of the dunes), summed up Oregonians' distrust of the National Park Service and economic dependence on Forestry succinctly in 1959:

We do not like the National Parks administration methods. To lock up an area for recreation only when it might be valuable for other purposes also does not seem good judgment. We would feel better if it were administered under Forest Service rules, of multiple use.⁵⁶⁷

To forest product industries and the communities dependent on them, "locking up" resources for a "single use" and allowing the timber to rot in parkland was directly harmful to Oregon's economy and a symbol of the National Park Service's reliance on out-of-touch Eastern-based, primarily urban, target constituency.⁵⁶⁸

The National Park Service was not impressed. Director Conrad Wirth saw the Multiple-Use Act as defensive posturing by the Forest Service. The opposition of the NPS to multiple use legislation exacerbated general ill-will between the agencies.⁵⁶⁹ As another draft of multiple-use legislation moved through Congress, Park Service opposition became more direct. Director Conrad Wirth saw the concept of multiple use as a direct critique of the Park Service. Wirth

⁵⁶⁵ J. D. Leland, VP, International Paper Co. and C. W. Richardson, Crown-Zellerbach Corp. in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 75-76, 104.

⁵⁶⁶ Editorial, "The Oregon Dunes Belong," *New York Times*, March 26, 1962, Clipping in Carton 68, Folder 7, Sierra Club Member Papers, BANC MSS 71/295 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

⁵⁶⁷ U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 310.

⁵⁶⁸ By 1925, Hal Rothman writes, the NPS and USFS "became engaged in a fight for the role of lead federal conservation agency . . . the Park Service had a wider constituency with an urban base, better promotional materials, a national focus, and an aggressive tradition of acquisitions that it converted into an advantage." Hal K. Rothman, "'A Regular Ding-Dong. Fight': Agency Culture and Evolution in the NPS-USFS Dispute, 1916-1937" *Western Historical Quarterly* 20 (May 1989): 141-161, here 151. For more on the language of "locking up" resources and its historic use by western ranchers and foresters, see Merrill, *Public Lands and Political Meanings*, 193.

⁵⁶⁹ Steen, *The U.S. Forest Service*, 305.

correctly assumed the Forest Service would use its inclusion of recreation goals to combat proposed Park Service expansion at places like the Oregon Dunes.⁵⁷⁰ In a speech Wirth referred to Park Service opponents as “rallying around and beating this old tom-tom called multiple-use.” Wirth told his staff that since expansion of the Park Service was an important part of that agency, the “multiple-use cure-all for land management problems” was an attempt to stigmatize the Park service and prevent future prosperity in the agency. The Park Service saw Forest Service promotion of multiple use legislation as a deliberate attempt to criticize the Park Service and get forestry-dependent economies on their side. Opponents of the Oregon Dunes National Seashore used multiple use to accuse the Park Service “locking up” resources, exactly as the Forest Service hoped they would.⁵⁷¹

Conservation Groups Step into the Oregon Dunes Debate

Conservation groups began to chime in. Some in Oregon, skeptical of an overreliance on the forest products industries, agreed with Wirth and believed multiple-use was merely code for unfettered prioritization of industrial use.⁵⁷² Others, like the Sierra Club, believe that multiple use was a rouse to distract the public from larger conservation problems. Sierra Club members published the following critique of multiple use policies in the Coos Bay *The World* to try to convince other Oregonians of this point:

Recreational use, as a single use policy, is the only assurance that this small amount of the public domain will be protected not only for this year, this decade, this generation, but for the future when an expanding population clamors for more and more industry and commerce.

Ours is an industrial civilization. Raw materials resources must be processed into goods, commerce and payrolls. We dare not hesitate in our production. We dare not

⁵⁷⁰ Rothman, “A Regular Ding-Dong Fight,” 143-155.

⁵⁷¹ Harold Steen, *The U. S. Forest Service: A History* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), 305.

⁵⁷² William M. Tugman in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 100.

hesitate in our consuming. More and more disposable toothpicks, paper towels, napkins; more and more expendable furniture, houses and other products must roll from our factories, quickly through our warehouses, and into our markets. The Forest Service, as the agency entrusted with the management of our National Forests, has done a terrific job as something of a trustee or steward for this ever expanding, hungry industry. Industrial interests—whether they have to do with forests or grazing lands—are powerful. Their weight is mightier, their voices louder than those of recreational interests.

The declaration of ‘multiple use’ as a resources regulation policy can amount to practically a blank check to industry.⁵⁷³

This piece criticized multiple use legislation and attacked its unhelpfulness on problems of materialism, overpopulation, and industrialization at the expense of human and natural health.⁵⁷⁴

In this letter, the Sierra Club incorporated what would become “environmental” concerns to criticize the Forest Service’s definition of conservation at the Oregon Dunes.

This editorial was one piece of a much larger Sierra Club offensive attacking multiple use as a front for industrial forestry interests. The first Northwest field representative (and later, Sierra Club President), Michael McCloskey, identified the U.S. Forest Service’s cozy relationship with forest product industries as the primary reason for delay in Oregon Dunes National Seashore legislation movement.

Many have assumed that an Oregon Dunes National Seashore lacks urgency because the principal lands are in public ownership. But this is not so, for the public agencies in charge are failing in their stewardship. Their failure stems from their uncertain commitment to public values when they conflict with private values. New stewards are needed now who know their duty to the American public and to the future.⁵⁷⁵

McCloskey and the Sierra Club didn’t trust the Forest Service as stewards of America’s natural resources in the early 1960s, but they also didn’t reserve their criticism for the Forest Service alone. When McCloskey accused “public agencies” of “failing in their stewardship,” he directed

⁵⁷³ Editorial, *The World*, 1961 (?). Clipping in Carton 68, Folder 7, Sierra Club Member Papers, BANC MSS 71/295 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. “Congressman Dr. Edwin Durno (R) said NPS management “would put the ‘vast recreational and wood products resources’ of the Oregon coastal area in the ‘ice box.’”

⁵⁷⁴ James Morton Turner says that wilderness advocates remained “deeply concerned about the direction of the Forest Service and its commitment to wilderness” based on their passage of the Multiple-Use Act and the fervent timber cutting the agency allowed in the 1950s. Turner, *The Promise of Wilderness*, 50.

⁵⁷⁵ Michael McCloskey, “The Seashore That Cannot Wait: The Oregon Dunes” (Draft Article), April 3, 1962, 3.

his remarks at both the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management, an agency in the Interior Department. The Sierra Club's main beef was with natural resource attraction on public lands. The Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management, McCloskey argued, were "both agencies bent on manipulating their land cover rather than on preserving its qualities."⁵⁷⁶ The Sierra Club incorporated preservationist anti-resource rhetoric into their conservation strategy at the Oregon Dunes and in so doing challenged conservation policies of both the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Interior.

Others joined the Sierra Club in questioning the Forest Services' and Bureau of Land Management's commitment to truly protecting the country's resources. Groups who believed the Forest Service blindly followed commercial timber groups' priorities believed the National Park Service would do a better job in protecting the land and prioritizing the development of recreational resources. A geologist from Eugene accused the Forest Service of only leaving clear-cut sections of forests available for recreation.⁵⁷⁷ Maurine Neuberger noted that "conservationists [were] . . . skeptical of the U. S. Forest Service's commitment to anything but timber harvests."⁵⁷⁸ Maurine Neuberger took aim at the Forest Service's commitment in other ways, too, noting that, "Forestry schools don't teach recreation."⁵⁷⁹ Even the Regional Forester for the area admitted in 1959 (which, in fairness, was before the Multiple-Use Act passed) that recreation "naturally" lost to timber management priorities in regular Forest Service administration of lands.⁵⁸⁰

⁵⁷⁶ Michael McCloskey, "The Seashore That Cannot Wait: The Oregon Dunes" (Draft Article), April 3, 1962, 2.

⁵⁷⁷ U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 443.

⁵⁷⁸ Larson, *Preserving Eden: The Culture of Conservation in Oregon, 1960-1980* (Doctoral Dissertation, Indiana University, 2001), 80.

⁵⁷⁹ Robert McBride, "Maurine Decries Mark's Failure to Back Dunes," *Portland Dairy Reporter*, 1962 (?), Clipping in Carton 68, Folder 7, Sierra Club Member Papers, BANC MSS 71/295 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

⁵⁸⁰ Historian of wilderness James Morton Turner agrees that the Forest Service's emphasis on logging above all else in the 1950s led conservation groups to doubt its commitment to wilderness preservation and its ability to resist the

The Sierra Club and other conservation groups remained deeply mistrustful of the multiple-use banner helped by the Forest Service at Oregon Dunes.⁵⁸¹ In the October 1959 issue of the *Sierra Club Bulletin*, the conservation group published an article by political scientist Grant McConnell that questioned the motives behind multiple use legislation.⁵⁸² McConnell accused the Forest Service of caving to industrial interests in introducing the legislation. Conservation groups, led by the Sierra Club, began to distance themselves from the Forest Service and its multiple use policies. The Sierra Club ended up withdrawing their objection to the Multiple Use Act when the Forest Service included wilderness among the uses, but their relationship with the Forest Service remained soured.⁵⁸³ After the passage of the Multiple Use Act in 1960, hostility continued to grow between foresters and the burgeoning environmental movement. Historian Harold Steen writes, “Foresters rejected the Browsers and the Carsons instead of recognizing them as forerunners of the rapidly approaching future.”⁵⁸⁴ The Forest Service was losing touch with its conservationist supporters.

Sierra Club members in Oregon felt personally slighted by the Forest Service in its rejection of the wilderness act. Richard M. Noyes of Eugene felt that the Forest Service was being its usual “obstructionary self” in the Oregon Dunes case. Noyes accused the Forest Service

desires of industrial interests. “When the choice was between protecting will lands and logging, the agency chose logging. That became clear when the agency began removing high-value timberland from existing protected areas, as the agency did at the Three Sisters Primitive Area in western Oregon in the mid-1950s. The timber industry and its western political allies seemed to be calling the shots at the Forest Service.” From Turner, *The Promise of Wilderness*, 51. For Regional Forester quote, see U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 57.

⁵⁸¹ Roth, “The National Forests and the Campaign for Wilderness Legislation,” 235. Grant McConnell, “The Multiple-Use Concept in Forest Service Policy,” *Sierra Club Bulletin*, 44, 7 (October 1959), 14-28; David Brower to Richard Neuberger, November 5, 1959, in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 553.

⁵⁸² David Brower sent a copy of Grant McConnell’s article into the 1959 Senate hearings on Oregon Dunes. See David R. Brower to Richard Neuberger, November 5, 1959, in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 553; Roth, “The National Forests and the Campaign for Wilderness Legislation,” 235.

⁵⁸³ Steen, *The U.S. Forest Service*, 306; Steen, *The Chiefs Remember*, 17.

⁵⁸⁴ Harold Steen, *The U. S. Forest Service: A History* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), 322-323.

of advantage of Oregonians who did not yet realize the dire strain on resources that made wilderness protection important:

We have less than ten years before that country is wrecked in a way that it would take two or three centuries to restore. Most of the west slopes of the Cascades are going to have to be cut in the interests of the economy, but I am convinced the last valleys around the snow peaks should be saved.

Conservation interest is growing out here, but it is slow. There is still a lot of the old frontier feeling that resources are unlimited, and there is open resentment of any idea that interferes with a fast way to make a buck. In the East, the problems are ignorance and apathy, but people approve of conservation when they think of it at all.⁵⁸⁵

The Forest Service, in playing to its rural constituents, gradually lost the backing of its urban supporters. Conservation groups defected to the National Park Service quickly in the early sixties.⁵⁸⁶

The blow that stung the Forest Service the most was probably the Izaak Walton League. The League had been some of the staunchest Forest Service supporters—even against National Park Service—but they started straddling their support between the two agencies in the 1950s. In the late 1950s, the Izaak Walton League promoted the Forest Service’s “Multiple-Use” vision while also launching a “Save Our Seashores” campaign designed to advocate for NPS coastal expansion.⁵⁸⁷ Even before they launched the Save Our Seashores campaign, the Izaak Walton League publically advocated for the Park Service’s coastal protection plans. Joseph Penfold wrote in a 1959 editorial in the *New York Times*:

Along our Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coastlines there remain scant areas for public access and use. With private development constantly adding to the capital investment, such lands are soon priced out of the market in so far as public purchase is concerned. If adequate steps are not taken during the next decade to acquire public ownership of key

⁵⁸⁵ Richard M. Noyes, Letter to the Editor, “Pro Conservation,” *New York Times*, November 27, 1960, XX11.

⁵⁸⁶ Paul Hirt, “Back to the Future: The Rise, Decline, and Possible Return of the U.S. Forest Service as a Leading Voice for Conservation in America, 1900-2000,” in *Common Goals for Sustainable Forest Management: Divergence and Reconvergence of American and European Forestry*, ed. by V. Alaric Sample and Steven Anderson (Durham, NC: Forest History Society, 2008), 124-153.

⁵⁸⁷ J. W. Penfold, “Tomorrow’s Conservation,” *New York Times*, May 3, 1959, XX27; U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore Senate Hearings* (1959), 360-361.

areas along our coasts, it will be too late. The vast recreational potentials of our coastal waters will have been lost.

Penfold used the recreation imperative being held up by both the Park Service and the Forest Service. His take on shorelines practically quoted the literature of the Park Service, however. He continued to name three priority coastlines that the Izaak Walton League wanted to see protected: Cape Cod, the Indiana Dunes, and the Oregon Dunes.⁵⁸⁸ The Forest Service and the Izaak Walton League were at odds on the Oregon Dunes debate.

The “Peace Treaty” and Its Aftermath

As conservation groups began supporting the Park Service over the Forest Service, the spat between the agencies grew ever more heated. In his 1961 message to Congress on natural resources, Kennedy himself “ordered the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to resolve certain long-standing disputes between the two departments.”⁵⁸⁹ By 1961, the editorial staff of the *New York Times* thought the feud between the two agencies had grown significant enough for them to publish an editorial recommending its resolution. The editors recounted that Kennedy had directed cooperation in determining “where additional national parks, forests, and seashore areas should be proposed” and mentioned Oregon Dunes by name as a case where the Forest Service was “blocking action” of potential conservation. The feud between the two agencies ran deeper than jealousy – their entire missions contradicted one another. The *New York Times* editorialized:

The Department of Agriculture continues to subsidize the drainage of marshes while Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service seeks additional funds to save marshlands. These interagency conflicts and programs working at cross-purposes are costly in public funds, wasted resources and lost opportunities. The public interest demands that they be

⁵⁸⁸ J. W. Penfold, “Tomorrow’s Conservation,” *New York Times*, May 3, 1959, XX27.

⁵⁸⁹ Editorial, “Conservation at Cross-Purposes,” *New York Times*, July 24, 1961, 22.

resolved. But nothing is likely to happen if the bureaucrats are left to their own devices. The White House must press the issue.⁵⁹⁰

While the Park Service incorporated new concerns about chemicals, marshlands, and ecological preservation – all tenants of what was becoming a new, soon-to-be-called “environmental” movement—the Forest Service instead focused on resource extraction and ecosystem engineering. Conflict over the very definition of conservation lay at the heart of the spat between the agencies.



Figure 31: Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall on the left, Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman on the right. Udall Photo credit: Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior (1961-1969), Official Administration photograph, JFKL, Public Domain, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/OPWqOh87E0G3glnboijsUg.aspx>. Freeman Photo credit: Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture (1961-1969), accessed January 15, 2015, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orville_Freeman#/media/File:Orville_L._Freeman,_Secretary_of_Agriculture_\(1961-1969\).jpg/](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orville_Freeman#/media/File:Orville_L._Freeman,_Secretary_of_Agriculture_(1961-1969).jpg/)

In January of 1963, Kennedy asked Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall and Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman to come to some sort of an agreement on contentious conservation issues of national import, including Oregon Dunes National Seashore, the Wilderness Bill, and Pictured Rocks National Lakeshore. Kennedy hoped this would end the

⁵⁹⁰ Editorial, “Conservation at Cross-Purposes,” *New York Times*, July 24, 1961, 22.

Secretaries' public bickering. The agreement between the two Secretaries later came to be known as the "Peace Treaty" or, sarcastically, the "Treaty of the Potomac."⁵⁹¹

Udall and Freeman published an open letter, declaring that "we have reached an agreement" to enter into a "new era of cooperation" in the management of Federal lands for outdoor recreation." After years of public controversy, the Secretaries declared, "We have closed the book on these disputes and are now ready to harmoniously implement the agreed-upon solutions." One of these points was that "Neither Department will initiate unilaterally new proposals to change the status of lands under jurisdiction of the other Department"—or, in other words, the Park Service wouldn't take Forest Service land without asking first. Most importantly for the Oregon Dunes, the letter gave the go-ahead for the Park Service to pursue a National Seashore there:

An Oregon Dunes National Seashore should be recommended consisting of about 35,000 acres primarily of sand dunes along the central Oregon coast. This land for the most part has been under the protection and management of the Forest Service. Administration would be by the National Park Service under the same criteria as for National Recreation Areas.⁵⁹²

The Park Service wanted an Oregon Dunes National Seashore so badly that they made it one of the main points of negotiation in their treaty with the Forest Service. Park Service/Forest Service agreements in Washington, however, meant little to residents of rural Oregon.

Oregon politicians and Lane County residents, who had agreed to no such truce, continued to fight Park Service land takings in Oregon after the Udall/Freeman peace pact.

⁵⁹¹ "Federal Feud Ends on Recreation Land," *New York Times*, February 2, 1963, 8; Letter, Orville L. Freeman and Stewart L. Udall to John F. Kennedy, January 28, 1963, in The North Cascades Study Team, *The North Cascades Study Report: A Report to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture* (U. S. Department of the Interior and U.S. Department of Agriculture, October 1965), Appendix A. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, "Address By Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall at the Eight Biennial Wilderness Conference, San Francisco, California, March 9, 1963, 3.

⁵⁹² Letter, Orville L. Freeman and Stewart L. Udall to John F. Kennedy, January 28, 1963, in The North Cascades Study Team, *The North Cascades Study Report: A Report to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture* (U. S. Department of the Interior and U.S. Department of Agriculture, October 1965), Appendix A.

Oregon residents and politicians did all they could to prevent Park Service takeover of Oregon's dunelands. The Oregon Dunes National Seashore bill nearly passed in 1963, but Oregon Senator Wayne Morse threatened to filibuster unless the final bill excluded any possibility of land condemnation. That being against Park Service policy, the NPS refused and the bill died again.⁵⁹³ By 1964, most good will between the agencies was used in passing the Wilderness Act and the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act.⁵⁹⁴ By the time that Senator Maurine Neuberger reintroduced Oregon Dunes legislation in 1965, the Forest Service was more confident of its strong footing in Oregon. The Forest Service and timber industry interests and private property owners had extracted so many concessions from the National Park Service that Park Service officials wondered if all of the industrial and residential exceptions left any area worth saving in Oregon's dunes.⁵⁹⁵

The ultimate death of the bill came in 1967, when Stewart Udall agreed that the Department of the Interior would step aside and no longer pursue an Oregon Dunes National Seashore. This came directly after Maurine Neuberger lost her 1966 senatorial election to former Governor Mark Hatfield. With two staunch opponents of the park as the state's only senators, the Department of the Interior knew that passing a bill through Congress would be nearly impossible. They did not want to back a dead horse.⁵⁹⁶ An Oregon Congressional Republican, John Dellenback, formally proposed in 1967 that the Forest Service increase recreational opportunities in the dunes.⁵⁹⁷ He further formalized the proposal when he introduced a "National

⁵⁹³ Derek R. Larson, *Preserving Eden: The Culture of Conservation in Oregon, 1960-1980* (Doctoral Dissertation, Indiana University, 2001), 81.

⁵⁹⁴ Sara Dant, "LBJ, Wilderness, and the Land and Water Conservation Fund," *Environmental History*, 19, 4 (October 2014): 736-743

⁵⁹⁵ George Hartzog, U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, *Oregon Dunes National Seashore: Hearings* (1966), 83-84.

⁵⁹⁶ Larson, *Preserving Eden*, 81-82.

⁵⁹⁷ A. Robert Smith, "Forest Service Planning Oregon Dunes Recreation Area," *Eugene Register-Guard*, February 16, 1967, 6A.

Shorelands” bill for a U.S. Forest Service Park at Oregon Dunes in 1969. By 1972, the bill had passed and Oregon Dunes became a National Recreation Area administered by the Forest Service.⁵⁹⁸

In reflecting on the failed case of Oregon Dunes National Seashore years later, Park Service officials involved in the proposal later identified Forest Service opposition and political sway in Oregon as the deciding factor in the Park Service’s failure to create Oregon Dunes National Seashore – the only location in which the Park Service failed in seashore establishment efforts. George Collins, who had shepherded Point Reyes National Seashore legislation to passage, admitted as much in a 1979 oral history interview:

George Collins: But at Oregon Dunes, we tried hard and we lost. We were whipped on that one.

Interviewer (Ann Lage): What were the forces that whipped you?

Collins: The U.S. Forest Service, the Department of Agriculture . . . The Oregon Dunes start just north of Coos Bay and run clear up to above Florence, quite a long way up there. The Forest Service is entrenched, and they wanted the whole thing. They didn’t want us coming in there at all, and we were not popular. Our good reputation elsewhere suffered quite a bit around the central Oregon coast.⁵⁹⁹

Park Service officials blamed their loss at the Oregon Dunes on the Forest Service’s ability to get coastal Oregonians on their side. Fed up with Park Service land grabs, leaders of the resource-extractive economy of southwest Oregon wanted to keep the Park Service out. Despite Forest Service compromises, Oregon residents themselves continued to resist the Park Service. The “entrenched” Forest Service kept the hold they had on Oregon, even as the Park Service picked up the allegiances of conservation organizations.

The failed case of Oregon Dunes National Seashore shows us how Department of the Interior and Department of Agriculture interagency disputes helped to solidify the early

⁵⁹⁸ Larson, *Preserving Eden*, 82,

⁵⁹⁹ George Collins, *The Art and Politics of Park Planning and Preservation, 1920-1979*, an oral history conducted 1978-1979, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, 244.

environmental movement's coalitions and the Park Service's position therein. In the 1960s, the Forest Service sought multiple use legislation, allowed widespread clear-cutting, and criticized Park Service preservation that exempted resource extraction. The Park Service, meanwhile, began including new "environmental" concerns like pollution, over-population, destructive suburbanization growth, and preservation of wilderness into their particular brand of conservation.⁶⁰⁰ Because these issues were not yet daily concerns of Oregon's citizens, rural Oregonians in the midst of a timber boom sided with the Forest Service. At other National Seashores, much closer to urban centers and with urban residents (many seasonal), these "environmental" issues captivated the populace to a much greater extent than they did in Oregon.⁶⁰¹ The Forest Service's inability to stay abreast of conservationists' concerns left it out of touch with the supporters it first counted as its own. Conservation groups lined up begin the Park Service for the ever more complicated 'conservation' issues of the 1960s. As new coalitions developed, members of the public sought out Park Service help on increasingly difficult conservation issues.

Conservation groups at places like Fire Island and northern Indiana heard about the Park Service's preservationist victories at Point Reyes and Cape Cod, and on the Wilderness Bill. They read Stewart Udall's treatise on the new conservation, *The Quiet Crisis*. They heard Kennedy's conservation speeches and worried, like he did, that "if we delay, time is not our friend – resources are wasted, open areas are urbanized, timber and water and soil are gone that cannot be replaced . . . foresight, prompt action now, can make time our friend on conserving our

⁶⁰⁰ Miller, *Public Lands, Public Debates*, 44. Later clear-cutting led the Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, and other environmental organizations to file lawsuits against the Forest Service.

⁶⁰¹ That would change by the late 1970s, when Oregon became known as one of the most environmental states. Larson, *Preserving Eden*, 87-160. Some tension between loggers and environmentalists still remained, however. For more on that tension, see Richard White, "Are You an Environmentalist or do You Work for a Living?" ed. William Cronon, in *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995), 69-90.

heritage.”⁶⁰² At Fire Island in 1963, the National Park Service would be welcomed – begged—to come in as the new conservationist savior of that small island. The National Park Service was the new embodiment of 1960s conservation. Fire Islanders—many of whom were also New York City residents—saw that and hoped the Park Service would rescue them from the New York State Park System old-fashioned, Robert Moses-style approach to conservation.

⁶⁰² John F. Kennedy, “Remarks to White House Conference on Conservation,” (notes), May 25, 1962, Series 03, Speech Files, JFKL. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-038-029.aspx>.

Chapter Five: A Naturally Disastrous Boost: Fire Island National Seashore
*“Before we know it we will be one giant suburbia of neon signs and gasoline fumes”*⁶⁰³
-Editorial, Suffolk County News, 1957




Figure 32: “Fire Island National Seashore,” Map, Google Maps, Google, March 25, 2015, <https://www.google.com/maps/place/Fire+Island+National+Seashore,+Fire+Island,+NY+11770/@40.6641525,-73.0343349,28599m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m2!3m1!1s0x89e9cb7241beadef:0xf8a80a8670f4bd96>.

Waves lapped gently upon the shore of Jones Beach as the sun warmed Ocean Parkway’s four lanes of asphalt. The beach was crowded, but no more than any other July day at the popular family destination. Today, however, something was different. Protestors held signs that read “Ban the Beep” as they filled the halls of the Jones Beach bathhouse to oppose New York’s plans to build a road on Fire Island. Robert Moses, New York’s master planner, who wanted to extend Jones Beach’s Ocean Parkway to cover the thin strip of sand that was Fire Island. Moses was not the only one with plans for Fire Island; the National Park Service had included it in shoreline surveys for possible parks since the mid-1930s and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had conducted several erosion control projects. In July 1962, however, the only plans that drew the ire of protestors across the nation were those of Robert Moses. The hearings brought the

⁶⁰³ “Editorial: This is Progress?,” *Suffolk County News*, February 14, 1957, 1.

press, from *The New Yorker* to *Sports Illustrated* to NBC.⁶⁰⁴ The *New York Times* even devoted part of their front page to the fiery proceedings. Residents of Fire Island did not want a road, most speakers agreed. Rather, they wanted the National Park Service to establish the area a National Seashore.⁶⁰⁵

The unquestioned apex of the public hearings on the Fire Island Road came when a New York City broadcaster, tanned from the summers he spent at Fire Island, took the podium. The newsman read a letter from 1938, when Robert Moses had used the aftermath of a strong hurricane to promote his plans for a Fire Island road. The letter asserted that Moses' dunal road plans "would save Fire Island the way Hitler is saving the Sudetenland." Moses had never enjoyed widespread public support from Fire Islanders for his road plan, but this criticism went too far. Amid cheers, boos, and catcalls, Moses immediately exited the hearings, unwilling to listen to criticism that devolved into Nazi slurs.⁶⁰⁶

What caused the decades-old Fire Island question to erupt so suddenly in 1962, if groups from the Army Corps of Engineers to the National Park Service to New York State had stalled on their plans for the island for almost forty years? Fire Island ultimately became a National Seashore because Robert Moses resurrected his decades-old plan for a Fire Island road when the national wilderness movement made roadlessness a rallying cry. Fire Islanders used the strength of the wilderness movement and its anti-road language to fight the suburban development that swallowed Long Island just across the bay. On Fire Island, residents were able to successfully advocate for a National Seashore and keep their homes, unlike many nineteenth century locals,

⁶⁰⁴ Arthur Brawley, "The Fire On New York's Famous Little Island: A Controversial commissioner's concrete ideas bring summer residents or a once peaceful sandspit running to the barricades," *Sports Illustrated*, July 23, 1962, 42.

⁶⁰⁵ Byron Porterfield, "Moses Quits Fire Island Hearing: Walks Out as Letter Comparing Him to Hitler is Read," *The New York Times*, July 11, 1962, 1; "Beach Residents Hit Moses' Plan," *Long Islander (Huntington)*, July 12, 1962, 7; "Protection and Preservation," *The New Yorker*, 38, 22 (July 1962): 16-17.

⁶⁰⁶ Byron Porterfield, "Moses Quits Fire Island Hearing: Walks Out as Letter Comparing Him to Hitler is Read," *New York Times*, July 11, 1962, 1; "Protection and Preservation," *The New Yorker*, 38, 22 (July 1962): 16-17.

because of their wealth and strong political voice. The national political connections of Fire Island residents and the strength of the wilderness movement in 1962 provided locals a strong ally in their quest to keep Fire Island roadless: the federal government.⁶⁰⁷

The case of Fire Island shows us how the rhetoric of wilderness brought together a diverse coalition whose ties during the National Seashore movement would later form the environmental movement. Historian James Morton Turner argues that wilderness has been the only conservation-related topic of “constant debate” since the early 1960s.⁶⁰⁸ The huge bipartisan support that the Wilderness Act had in Congress at this time extended beyond legislators and into the general populace. On Fire Island, broad support for wilderness legislation brought together an unusual coalition of underground gay activists, conservation leaders, shellfishermen, anti-urban renewal activists, and wilderness advocates to create a roadless National Seashore park. Members of Fire Island’s covert gay community used the language of wilderness to join the nascent environmental coalition and thereby to preserve the quiet and the quiet and nonjudgmental retreat that so many had found in the gay resort communities of Cherry Grove and Fire Island Pines.⁶⁰⁹

⁶⁰⁷One local history of Fire Island claims that residents of Fire Island supported the road until Robert Moses left his post in the 1950s, which I have found to be incorrect. Rather, no organized and successful efforts emerged to defeat the road until 1962. The author, Lee Koppelman, was a planner on Suffolk County who had worked closely with Suffolk government and with Robert Moses. Lee Koppelman and Seth Foreman, *Fire Island National Seashore: A History* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008). A National Park Service study of land acquisition at Fire Island National Seashore covers its history well, but claims that congressional proposals did not begin before road proposal was effectively dead. This is incorrect, since Wainwright submitted the first Fire Island National Seashore bill as early as 1960 when the road plan was still very strong. See Ned Kaufman and Charles Starks, *Land Regulation at Fire Island National Seashore: A History and Analysis, 1964-2004* (Northeast Region, National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, 2008), 5-45. Both of these histories of Fire Island, however, were very useful in providing a background to the history of the area. Throughout the paper, the term “National Park site” refers to any park that is part of the National Park Service (NPS) but not a National Park, *per se*, such as National Seashores and National Historic Sites.

⁶⁰⁸ James Morton Turner, *The Promise of Wilderness: American Environmental Politics Since 1964* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012), 5.

⁶⁰⁹ “For more on the environmental movement and its formation throughout the 1960s from previous conservation and public health movements, see Samuel P. Hays, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955–1985* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989); Robert Gottlieb, *Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement* (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993); Victor B.

Twentieth century advocates of wilderness preservation rooted their movement in a language of roadlessness. Paul Sutter's book *Driven Wild* explores how the expansion of roads and cars in the interwar period led conservationists to argue for naturally protected areas free of automobiles. When Wilderness Act finally passed in 1964, it included their anti-road language: "there shall be no commercial enterprise and no permanent road within any wilderness area . . . [and] there shall be no temporary road, no use of motor vehicles." The NPS caught on to the roadless wilderness movement in the 1930s. By the 1960s they treated automobiles as "negative agents of change," as David Louter discusses in *Windshield Wilderness*. Like the National Parks that Louter studies, plans for a roadless Fire Island National Seashore would have neighboring parks that acted as "buffer zones." On Long Island, a rush to build roads followed the region's housing boom in the postwar period. Suburban growth created intense development pressures on Long Island, just across the Great South Bay from Fire Island, and provided an impetus for preservation.⁶¹⁰ Long Island's barrier island parks—at Fire Island, Jones Beach and Robert Moses State Park—accommodated roads, automobiles, and high density recreation at a higher rate than Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall wanted at a Fire Island National Seashore.⁶¹¹

Unlike the "working class wilderness" of the nineteenth century Adirondacks, natural resource overuse was not a primary motivation behind the establishment of Fire Island National

Scheffer, *The Shaping of Environmentalism in America* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991); Thomas R. Wellock, *Preserving the Nation: The Conservation and Environmental Movements, 1870-2000* (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, 2007); Philip Shabecoff, *Earth Rising: American Environmentalism In The 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2000).

⁶¹⁰ Sellers, *Crabgrass Crucible*, especially Chapter 2.

⁶¹¹ Paul Sutter, *Driven Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002); For an analysis of the American ideal of wilderness published closer to the passing of the 1964 Wilderness Act, see Roderick Frazier Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind* (2001 reprint; New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1967). For a criticism of American wilderness ideals, see William Cronon, "The Trouble with Wilderness: or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature," ed. William Cronon, in *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995), 69-90; The Wilderness Society, "The Wilderness Act of 1964," Retrieved February 12, 2012 from wilderness.org/content/wilderness-act-1964; David Louter, *Windshield Wilderness: Cars, Roads, and Nature in Washington's National Parks*, Foreword by William Cronon (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2006), 107, 134-163.

Seashore.⁶¹² Rather, opponents coalesced against a road through the island’s small villages and the disruption to the island’s seclusion that such a highway would cause. Senator Jacob Javits, one-time resident of Fire Island, noted that politicians and conservation officials at Fire Island catered to the “very important right of those owning property in the area.”⁶¹³ In contrast nineteenth century parks like Yellowstone and the Adirondacks, most Fire Island residents were wealthy summer home owners, like those at Cape Cod. The twentieth century shoreline “local” at Northeastern beaches—wealthy, politically influential, and well-connected within East Coast power structures—could keep their vacation home and stop development in their natural playground all with the help of the federal government.

At Fire Island, unlike in nineteenth century park preserves, all parties agreed that hunting and fishing should be allowed in some form in a future National Seashore. Commercial fishermen teamed up with recreational fisherman and boaters to advocate for a National Seashore, unlike the nineteenth century “local resistance” to wildlife preservation that Karl Jacoby outlines in *Crimes Against Nature*.⁶¹⁴ Wealthy sportsmen and the strong shellfish industry in the Great South Bay even hoped that protection of Fire Island would “enhance the natural fisheries, shellfishery resources, and wildlife habitat.”⁶¹⁵ In the nineteenth century, the U.S. government criminalized market behavior like hunting and fishing in parks while encouraging land uses like recreation and tourism. By the 1960s the NPS accepted these local economies.

⁶¹² Karl Jacoby, *Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves and the Hidden History of American Conservation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), 33-34; Louis Warren, *The Hunter’s Game: Poachers and Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Mark David Spence, *Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making of the National Parks* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

⁶¹³ Senator Jacob Javits, Subcommittee on National Parks, *Fire Island National Seashore Hearings, April 10, 1964* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964).

⁶¹⁴ Jacoby, *Crimes Against Nature*, 2, 48, 66-73.

⁶¹⁵ John E. Suydam, President, National Party Boat Owners Alliance, Inc. and Fire Island Waterways Association, House Subcommittee on National Parks, *Fire Island National Seashore Hearings, September 30, 1963*, 89.

Eco-political Background of a Sandy Road Proposal.

Or, “If Bob Moses had been around at the time of Genesis he would have paved the Garden of Eden”⁶¹⁶

Fire Island—or “Great South Beach,” as many Suffolk County residents called it in the 1960s—parallels the underbelly of Long Island, a thin strip of sand that hugs the lower side of the larger, longer island like a baby whale shadows its mother. Like most coastal areas, Fire Island’s long history tells the tale of erosion. Ice Age glaciers deposited their silt and sand in the “terminal moraine” that is today Long Island before retreating north. The sandy beaches of Fire Island owe their continued existence to ocean waves, longshore currents, and ocean winds—the same ecological factors that then erode and re-form their sandy coasts. Barrier islands like Fire Island are inherently unstable, even more so than other coastal zones. The slightest storm shifts the island’s boundaries and sea level rises can spell doom. One conservationist notes wryly that “Barrier islands are like geology on amphetamines.”⁶¹⁷ The housing boom of Suffolk County, the fastest growing county in the U.S. in 1960, reached Fire Island’s shifting shores by the early 1960s.⁶¹⁸ These new houses on the unstable barrier island prompted Suffolk County officials to call erosion the “most serious threat” to Fire Island.⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁶ Quoted in Brawley, “The Fire On New York’s Famous Little Island,” *Sports Illustrated*, July 23, 1962.

⁶¹⁷ David Helvarg quoted in Gary Kleppel, et. al, “Trends in Land Use Policy and Development in the Coastal Southeast,” in Kleppel, DeVoe, and Rawson (Eds.), *Changing land use patterns in the coastal zone – managing environmental quality in rapidly developing region* (New York: Springer Verlag, 2006), 8-9.

⁶¹⁸ Information on Suffolk County and Fire Island’s growth from K.C. Lee in U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings* (1963), 37; Kaufman and Starks, *Land Regulation at Fire Island National Seashore*, 45.

⁶¹⁹ “Let’s Get Started,” *Islip Bulletin*, February 6, 1964, 18. In *Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Adam Rome describes how these new building techniques and the suburban sprawl they enabled provoked local movements to fight development in ecologically sensitive hillsides, floodplains, and wetlands (See “Where Not To Build,” 153-189). For more on how suburbanization changed the landscape of America, see Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

As the unstable strip of sand that it is, Fire Island has never been a particularly sage place to build a home. Before 1900, virtually no one lived on the island, despite its use by sailors, whalers, merchants, fishermen, and a few hoteliers in the summer months. The 1892 European cholera epidemic proved the weightiest, if also an unlikely, catalyst in the development of private communities on Fire Island. That year, New York State bought the main hotel on the island and began using it as a quarantine and screening center for European ships. After the epidemic, New York State sold off plots of the hotel site gradually. As builders became more confident in building houses on sand in the 1920s and 1930s, individuals began constructing private homes and communities on Fire Island.⁶²⁰ By 1963, only 4% of Fire Island's homes were seasonal. Only 100 families of 2,500 households lived year-round on the island.⁶²¹

Two towns on Fire Island, Cherry Grove and Fire Island Pines, became clandestinely known as gay retreat spots as early as the 1920s.⁶²² Most visitors came from New York City, and those who disapproved of their lifestyle usually referred to them as the "Greenwich Village type."⁶²³ Fire Island was their escape, a place where gay men and (to a lesser extent at first) lesbian women did not have to worry about being found out, fired, persecuted, or ridiculed for their sexual orientation. The identity of Fire Island as a gay resort area strengthened after a 1938 hurricane's destruction.⁶²⁴ Cherry Grove especially became more homogeneously gay as other

⁶²⁰ For more on how home building in risky areas like coastal zones and flood plains increased in the 1920s onward, see Adam Rome, *Bulldozer in the Countryside*, 153-188.

⁶²¹ Kaufman and Starks, *Land Regulation at Fire Island National Seashore*, 5; E.C. Crafts, Director, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings* (1963), 35. Koppelman and Foreman, *Fire Island*, 7. Numbers on Fire Island seasonal vs. year-round population are approximate because of the temporary nature of their residence and the drives to register seasonal residents as Suffolk County voters in the early 1960s.

⁶²² See Esther Newton, *Cherry Grove, Fire Island: Sixty Years in America's First Gay and Lesbian Town* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993), especially Part 1.

⁶²³ Across the Bay, Long Islanders disapproved of Cherry Grove in coded language. An *Islip Bulletin* article in 1963 called Cherry Grove a town with a "beatnik atmosphere" that could, on a Saturday night, "make Greenwich Village look like a Mormon settlement by comparison." Albert W. Allar, "On the Beam," *Islip Bulletin*, August 22, 1963, 15. See also Esther Newton, *Cherry Grove*, 67, 111.

⁶²⁴ Koppelman and Foreman, *Fire Island National Seashore*, 7.

homeowners chose not to build back after the storm. By the early 1950s, historian of Cherry Grove Esther Newton writes that the “battle for the future direction of the resort has been won by gay men and lesbians.”⁶²⁵

Whether gay or straight, summer resident of year-rounder, all Fire Islanders worried about erosion of the sandy land they loved so much. Robert Moses, Chair of New York’s State Council of Parks from 1924 to 1962, believed the best way to halt erosion and stabilize Fire Island was to build a road down the island’s spine. Moses wanted to pump sand from the bottom Great South Bay onto Fire Island’s dunes and then build a four lane highway on the fill. The proposed Fire Island road was only one small part of Moses’ larger “Ocean Parkway” project, hatched in the 1920s. Moses envisioned an oceanfront road that would stretch from Staten Island, across Fire Island, and all the way to the eastern tip of Long Island’s south shore. If completed, Moses believed that Ocean Parkway would be “a drive comparable to the very finest in the world.”⁶²⁶ In 1929, he built the first stretch of the four lane Ocean Parkway and a high-density state park at Jones Beach with vast parking fields that parked 28,000 cars. Although the road’s expansion almost began in 1930, a few Fire Islanders refused to cede their property and thwarted Moses’ plans.⁶²⁷

⁶²⁵ Newton, *Cherry Grove*, 66. For more on the history of gay activism, see Craig Rimmerman, *From Identity to Politics: The Lesbian and Gay Movements in the United States* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001) and Eric Brandt, *Dangerous Liaisons: Blacks, Gays and the Struggle for Equality* (New York: New Press, 1999).

⁶²⁶ Quote about drive on parkway from Robert Moses, “Memorandum by Robert Moses on the Future of Fire Island,” October 24, 1963, 8, Series 2, Box 78, Senator Jacob K. Javits Collection, Special Collections, Stony Brook University Libraries, Stony Brook, NY (hereafter “Javits Collection, SBUL”).

⁶²⁷ Moses had a strained relationship with then-New York Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt, which added to difficulty obtaining federal funding for a Fire Island Road in the 1930s. Moses once called Roosevelt, “a pretty poor excuse for a man,” while Roosevelt said of Moses, “I don’t trust him. I don’t like him. I don’t trust him . . .,” Robert Caro, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York*. (New York: Random House, Vintage Books edition, 1974), 292-293. Information about plans from 1930 from “Moses Announces State Road Victory: Now Says Extension of Ocean Boulevard Along Fire Island Beach Will Be Built,” *New York Times*, June 25, 1930, 5; “Moses Again Heads State Parks Council,” *New York Times*, January 22, 1930, 7.

Despite setbacks in the expansion of Ocean Parkway to Fire Island, Moses argued that Jones Beach “would have blown away” without the stabilizing force of a road.⁶²⁸ Fellow planners cited similar roads in the Netherlands as proof that a dunal road was the best way to sure the sand against erosion. Ocean Parkway, proponents claimed, acted as a “staunch bulwark . . . not impregnable of course, but firm, unyielding, well-anchored . . . protecting homes, beaches and Long Island’s south shore.”⁶²⁹ Because planners at the time saw a dunal highway as means to prevent erosion, Moses usually advocated for his Ocean Parkway plans when erosion worries escalated the most: in the wake of strong storms hitting Fire Island. Such property-damaging storms hit in 1938, 1944, 1953, and 1962. After the 1938 hurricane, Moses speculated that Fire Island’s beaches would not survive the winter season without the stabilizing force of his \$15.5 million road on its dunes.⁶³⁰

Moses saw his Ocean Parkway plans as the most egalitarian future for Fire Island. Moses spent most of his adult life on Long Island and wrote of his attachment in 1964: “I live most of the year in Suffolk and have been a year-round sailor and boatman, swimmer, fisherman, clam digger, gatherer of wild oysters, scalloper, [and] bird watcher.”⁶³¹ A road, Moses maintained, would provide the most possible public access to the oceanside he loved so much. “How millions could be brought over and accommodated without adequate vehicular access remains a mystery,” he wrote in criticism of federal plans to establish a roadless park.⁶³² Yet, the “millions” of whom

⁶²⁸ Robert Moses, “Memorandum by Robert Moses on the Future of Fire Island,” October 24, 1963, 8, Series 2, Box 78, Javits Collection, SBUL.

⁶²⁹ Editorial, “Ocean Parkway, A Bulwark Against the Sea,” *Islip Bulletin*, March 28, 1963, 1 and 12.

⁶³⁰ “Moses Offers Plan to Save Fire Island: Would Dredge Bay Channel To Fill Ocean Beach Torn By the Hurricane,” *New York Times*, October 3, 1938, 17; Ira H. Freeman, “Dewey to Enlarge Jones Beach Park,” *New York Times*, August 5, 1949, 20. More on the history of Fire Island hurricanes can be found in “Kennedy is Asked to Aid Fire Island,” *New York Times*, March 9, 1962, 18 and Kaufman and Starks, *Land Regulation at Fire Island National Seashore*, 6. For more on how hurricanes prompt governmental action, see Ted Steinberg, *Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

⁶³¹ Moses, “Memorandum by Robert Moses on the Future of Fire Island,” October 24, 1963, title page, Series 2, Box 78, Javits Collection, SBUL.

⁶³² *Ibid.*, 4.

Moses spoke often only included middle class white families. Historians and planners have criticized Moses on this front for years.⁶³³ Moses revealed his problematic definition of the public when he argued that a Fire Island road would provide “easy access by car from eastern Nassau and western Suffolk”—not New York City.⁶³⁴ In the 1960s, New York City residents were more ethnically and socioeconomically diverse than those living in suburban Nassau and Suffolk counties and fewer city than suburban residents owned cars.⁶³⁵ Even a Fire Island with a road would be out of reach for them.

Moses, while a controversial figure who history has not always remembered fondly, truly believed that his plans for a Fire Island Ocean Parkway were the most egalitarian and the best means of erosion control.⁶³⁶ Moses took the often harsh criticism of him in stride, looking towards what he believed was the greater good—or, in his own words, “I am interested in the verdict of history, not the applause of today.”⁶³⁷ Jones Beach, Moses continued, was “initially denounced as an outrage, an invasion, an impossibility and an inaccessible sandbar to which nobody would come,” and yet by 1962 it was one of the most popular and most-visited parks in New York State.⁶³⁸ By 1962 Moses’ methods of circumventing protests had begun to fail and he faced harsh criticism on many fronts. In Greenwich Village, Jane Jacobs led a concerted effort

⁶³³ In 1960, only about 50% of New York City residents owned a car, which was a smaller percentage than Americans as a whole. Statistics from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “1960-61,” *100 Years of U.S. Consumer Spending*, 30. Retrieved from <http://www.bls.gov/opub/uscs/1960-61.pdf>.

⁶³⁴ Moses, “Memorandum by Robert Moses on the Future of Fire Island,” October 24, 1963, title page, Series 2, Box 78, Javits Collection, SBUL.

⁶³⁵ For more on suburban growth and roadbuilding, see Sellers, *Crabgrass Crucible*, especially 39-139.

⁶³⁶ Robert Caro’s biography of Moses, although particularly harsh on Moses, outlines in mind-boggling detail the enormous amount of power accumulated over the forty years that Moses served as an unelected public official in New York State. This, along with Kenneth Jackson and Hillary Ballon’s revised history of Moses that seeks to put his accomplishments in a more complimentary light, informed much of my background on Robert Moses. Caro, *The Power Broker*, Kenneth T. Jackson and Hilary Ballon, eds., *Robert Moses and the Modern City: The Transformation of New York* (New York: W. W. Norton Press, 2007). Moses also wrote an autobiography, Robert Moses, *Public Works: A Dangerous Trade* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970).

⁶³⁷ Moses, “Memorandum by Robert Moses on the Future of Fire Island,” October 24, 1963, 7-8, Series 2, Box 78, Javits Collection, SBUL.

⁶³⁸ Moses, “Memorandum by Robert Moses on the Future of Fire Island,” October 24, 1963, 8, Series 2, Box 78, Javits Collection, SBUL.

against the Lower Manhattan Expressway (where even Eleanor Roosevelt chipped in to oppose Moses).⁶³⁹ Plans for a bridge over the Long Island Sound stalled. The road atop Fire Island met with increasingly public hostility.⁶⁴⁰

While Moses fended off critics, the Park Service had their own distinct plans for Fire Island, which also went back decades. The Park Service conducted aerial surveys of the Atlantic Coast conducted for the *Our Vanishing Shoreline* in 1955. In their report, the Park Service speculated that no public beaches would be left if the federal government did not act quickly to stop development while land prices were still reasonable enough for the feds to afford.⁶⁴¹ *Our Vanishing Shoreline* listed Fire Island as a potential park area. The report emphasized that America's beaches would all be built up by private owners if the federal government did not intervene quickly. New Yorkers used similar doomsday rhetoric. *The New York Times* called Fire Island the "last opportunity in New York to save a substantial stretch of unspoiled seashore and beach as a public playground," especially for New York City residents.⁶⁴² Several other reports at this time by state and federal governments all encouraged preserving land near urban areas for outdoor recreation purposes.⁶⁴³

Mission 66, Park Service Director Conrad Wirth's 1955 funding program for the revitalization of National Parks, emphasized road-building and mass access to recreation sites.

⁶³⁹ "City Puts off Expressway Action as Pickets March," *New York Times*, August 24, 1962, 26; "Mrs. Roosevelt Scores Road Plan: Urges Mayor to Overrule Building of \$100-Million Downtown Expressway, Relocation is Scored," *New York Times*, June 19, 1962, 37; "Gall of Barnes Outrages Moses: Traffic Chief Is Assailed on Expressway Views," *New York Times*, April 26, 1962, 30.

⁶⁴⁰ Murray Schumach, "Jones Beach Gay on 20th Birthday," *New York Times*, August 4, 1949, 25; "Tolls At Jones Beach," *New York Times*, January 11, 1947, 18; For additional specific information on and Jones Beach parks, see Koppelman and Forman, *Fire Island National Seashore: A History*, 63; Statement of K.C. Lee, NPS, Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings*, December 11, 1963, 34; "New Year Resolutions Proffered: GOP Elephant Has Advice For Donkey," *Islip Bulletin*, Jan. 2, 1964, 3.

⁶⁴¹ U.S. National Park Service, *Our Vanishing Shoreline* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955).

⁶⁴² Editorial, "That Fire Island Road," *New York Times*, July 9, 1962, 30.

⁶⁴³ In addition to the ORRRC report, New York's tri-state area commissioned a recreation report specific to the region. The Regional Plan Association, *The Race for Open Space: Final Report of the Park, Recreation, and Open Space Project* (New York: The Regional Plan Association of New York, 1960).

Stewart Udall, upon his designation as Secretary of the Interior in 1961, wanted his Park Service to focus on more ecological preservation to respond to new concerns of the nuclear age. Udall, as discussed in previous chapters, viewed overpopulation and pollution as grave concerns that public lands policies could address. Under Udall's leadership, the National Park Service moved away from high-impact park projects (goodbye to roads to the tops of mountains and parking lots over marshlands) and gravitated toward lower-impact parks where visitor access would be balanced with natural preservation of land and wildlife.⁶⁴⁴ Udall and his boss, John F. Kennedy, anticipated changes in the conservation movement, while Moses stuck to an older type of conservation that emphasized recreation at the expense of ecological health. In 1963, when Udall had already published *The Quiet Crisis* about the perils of overpopulation, chemicals, pollution, and habitat destruction of unique ecosystems, Moses called the former wetlands at Jones Beach "unnatural" and celebrated that his park had fixed the "mosquito-infested swamp."⁶⁴⁵ The two men were of different eras. Moses' parks reflected the optimism of the early automobile era; Udall's parks guarded against what Rachel Carson called the "age of poison" where the "omnipresent symbol of the age," the automobile, contributed to the congestion and destruction of the land parks supposedly protected.⁶⁴⁶

In 1963, Moses said of Udall, "Mr. Udall is at home in Arizona, but lost in Suffolk County."⁶⁴⁷ Stewart Udall didn't seem to want to be home in Suffolk County, however. He frowned upon Moses' style of public recreation that neglected the nature preservation qualities of a park. Udall once said of Moses' largest park achievement that "there's nothing like Jones

⁶⁴⁴ Udall's ideas of lower-impact parks and minimization had its roots in the 1930s formation of the wilderness movement. See Maher, *Nature's New Deal*; Sutter, *Driven Wild*.

⁶⁴⁵ Moses "Memorandum by Robert Moses on the Future of Fire Island," October 24, 1963, 4, Javits Collection, SBUL.

⁶⁴⁶ Udall and Carson quotes from Stewart Udall, *The Quiet Crisis* (New York, Chicago, San Francisco: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1963), 175.

⁶⁴⁷ Robert Moses "Memorandum by Robert Moses on the Future of Fire Island," October 24, 1963, 5, Javits Collection, SBUL, Series 2, Box 78.

Beach in the United States.” Lest his companions think his quote was a compliment, Udall continued, stating that the federal government was not interested in “‘pushing our way into’ the Jones Beach ‘type of thing.’”⁶⁴⁸ Moses fired back and even wrote the NPS Director a letter that called the Fire Island National Park plan “hopeless.”⁶⁴⁹ Although the NPS considered the possibility of a park on Fire Island as early as 1935, disagreements between New York and federal officials prevented any federal action immediately following the 1955 report.

Moses’ hold on Long Island’s power structure initially discouraged New York politicians from supporting a federal Fire Island park. In 1960, U.S. Congressman Stuyvesant Wainwright of Suffolk County introduced the first bill for a roadless Fire Island National Park. Wainwright took a huge political risk in doing so, despite polls that showed 73% of Fire Islanders supported a roadless federal park while only 27% opposed. Wainwright admitted to newspapers, “I might lose my job over this . . . but the principle behind this project is more important than whether I am or am not elected to Congress.”⁶⁵⁰ Wainwright was right: his bill stalled in Congress, lacked local political support, and Wainwright lost his seat the following year. As long as Moses led the State Parks Commission, most Suffolk County leaders would not cross his Fire Island park plans.⁶⁵¹

Fire Islanders worried most about storm-related property damage and the best says to safeguard their homes from the winds and waves of the sea. Fire Islanders realized that they could not go to Suffolk County officials with their complaints about Moses’ road plans, which

⁶⁴⁸ Ronald Maiorana, “Udall Doubts U.S. Will Buy on L.I.: Suggests It Is Too Late for Purchasing Shore Area,” *New York Times*, June 3, 1962, 56.

⁶⁴⁹ Moses quote to Conrad Wirth from “Plan for Parks On Fire Island Scored by Moses,” *Suffolk County News (Sayville)* (hereafter *Suffolk County News*), August 3, 1956, 1.

⁶⁵⁰ Will Oppose Beach Road--Wainwright,” *Suffolk County News*, July 27, 1956, 1; “Stuy Introduces New Bill for Fire Is. Park,” *Patchogue Advance*, April 21, 1960, 1; “Wainwright Submits Bill for Fire Island National Park,” *Long Islander*, April 21, 1960, 1; “Bill Would Okay Federal Park at Beach,” *Suffolk County News*, April 21, 1960, 1; “With Wainwright in Washington,” *Long Islander*, April 28, 1960, 9.

⁶⁵¹ “For a detailed take on how Robert Moses successfully ruined the political careers of New York politicians who opposed his projects, see Robert Caro, *The Power Broker*.

many saw as a path to bulldozing their homes and destroying the exclusivity of their resort, so they began seeking out erosion control and preservation solutions themselves by the 1950s. The Fire Island Erosion Control Committee and the Fire Island Pines Property Owner's Association both formed in 1955 to help fight beach erosion in their communities.⁶⁵² The Citizen's Committee for the Fire Island National Park, established in 1957, decided to buy up parts of the Sunken Forest own its own while New York and the federal government bickered over who would do it.⁶⁵³ The Sunken Forest was an ecologically unique grove of holly trees over two centuries old, sunken between the sand dunes of Fire Island.⁶⁵⁴ A road, locals worried, could destroy this forest, the only of its kind remaining on the Atlantic Coast. Concerned citizens with the finances bought some of the land themselves, taking preservation of Fire Island into their own hands.⁶⁵⁵

Summer residents acted to prevent New York from building a road on Fire Island. A group of summer residents organized the Fire Island Voters Association (FIVA) in March of 1961 to encourage part-time residents to switch their permanent residence (and therefore voting location) to Fire Island.⁶⁵⁶ Club founders hoped that this would give these residents a stronger say in matters of Fire Island's future, especially in regards to Moses' road. Directors of FIVA included "lawyers, real estate brokers and advertising and public relations executives"—all white

⁶⁵² Koppelman and Foreman, *The Fire Island National Seashore*, 65-66.

⁶⁵³ "Citizens Group Backs Fire Island Park," *Patchogue Advance*, March 7, 1957, 1.

⁶⁵⁴ For more on the Sunken Forest, see Henry Warren Art, *Ecological Studies of the Sunken Forest, Fire Island National Seashore, New York* (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, Government Printing Office, 1976).

⁶⁵⁵ Sarah Elkind's book, *How Local Politics Shape Federal Policy: Business, Power, and the Environment in Twentieth-Century Los Angeles* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011) provides great insight to how local issues play out on a national stage. In the case of Fire Island, it was not just the business leaders of the community, but also the wealthy summer residents who had a strong input in federal policy regarding the preservation of Fire Island. "National Park For Fire Island Fails; Committee Quits," *Long Islander*, July 6, 1961, 7.

⁶⁵⁶ The club had begun as the Fire Island Erosion Control Committee, but switched their name along with this new strategy. Home protection from erosion control measures remained the group's primary concern. Koppelman and Forman, *The Fire Island National Seashore*, 68.

collar, middle- to upper-class jobs.⁶⁵⁷ Arthur Silsdorf, a director and Mayor of Ocean Beach, argued that switching legal residency was the best way to provide summer residents with the voice they deserved:

We pay large taxes and we put large sums of our own money into erosion control measures and other services which municipalities ordinarily provide in return for taxes . . . but we have not had the votes. . . We will have a significant number of votes from Fire Island cast in the Islip Township elections this year.⁶⁵⁸

A Suffolk County Congressman also agreed that summer Fire Island residents should be allowed a political voice on the island because of their significant financial contributions to the county through property taxes. At Fire Island, like rural parks in the nineteenth century, part-time vacation-home owning residents had a say in the future park because of their wealth and strong political voice. These grassroots actions, such as the purchase of land and the emphasis of their role as taxpayers, indicated the wealth of Fire Island locals and their interest in keeping the island a haven for those of similar socioeconomic status. What's especially groundbreaking about Fire Island is that this wealthy, privileged enclave included a strong gay and lesbian community. Gay homeowners and business leaders kept their homes and businesses not because of any widespread acceptance of gay rights in New York at the time, but because also were "white, affluent, [and] socially exclusive" like other summer residents of the island.⁶⁵⁹

Advocates of a road-free Fire Island relied on class-based rhetoric in their discussion of wilderness. Preventing a road, some citizens hoped, would keep New York City's "riff-raff" off

⁶⁵⁷ "Beach Residents Form Voting Unit," *Suffolk County News*, March 23, 1961, 6.

⁶⁵⁸ "FI Voters Group Formed to Gain Political Voice," *Patchogue Advance*, March 23, 1961, 22.

⁶⁵⁹ "Fire Isle Holds Concert For Their War Chest," *Long Islander*, August 23, 1962, 9. Congressman Otis Pike wrote to a Long Island paper, "Our summer residents pay taxes all year around for the privilege of owning their homes. They support our schools, our police, our local governments, and yet, our roads. They are basically the only class of residential taxpayers on which we make money, and I can't help feeling that their views should be judged on their merits and not on their voting strength," "Fire Island Road," *Long Islander*, August 23, 1962, 13.

Fire Island's tranquil sands.⁶⁶⁰ In March 1961, one high school student wrote to a Suffolk County newspaper to complain that a second bridge to or a road on Fire Island would "carry cars bearing of transients, sightseers," and "honking automobiles" to the once peaceful island. This class-infused language reflected suburban snubbing of cities in the 1960s.⁶⁶¹ From Suffolk County Executive Lee Dennison to Congressman Stuyvesant Wainwright, everyone agreed that they did not want Fire Island to become too crowded or diverse. They wanted to "keep Fire Island the way it is rather than have it turn into a little Miami."⁶⁶²

Not all concerned about Fire Island's protection were wealthy summer homeowners. Commercial fishermen also advocated for Fire Island National Seashore. The Great South Bay, the calm water between Fire Island and Long Island, housed abundant marine life in the 1960s. Barrier islands protect the bays behind them from stormy weather, which renders them calm and teeming with marine flora and fauna. Oyster populations collapsed in the 1950s due to increased pollution, but the hard clam industry of the Great South Bay remained extremely profitable. In the 1970s, over half of all clams eaten in the U.S. were harvested by shellfishermen in the Great South Bay. These clammers and baymen favored protecting Fire Island and its surrounding waters in the hopes that it would reduce pollution in the Bay. Many baymen also opposed a road on Fire Island because it required dredging the bay floor, which decimated shellfish populations. At Fire Island, the worries of commercial fisherman allied with those of wealthy Fire Island residents against the Moses road plans. Working class voices at Fire Island thus added to the

⁶⁶⁰ Lee Case, "Youth Speaks Its Mind," *Suffolk County News*, April 6, 1961, 9; "Town To Improve Beach," *Suffolk County News*, March 30, 1961, 8.

⁶⁶¹ See Kruse, *White Flight*; Sellers, *Crabgrass Crucible*; Kenneth Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

⁶⁶² "Will Oppose Beach Road--Wainwright," *Suffolk County News*, July 27, 1956, 1.

support for preservation, unlike nineteenth century parks where rural residents' goals for the future of protected areas conflicted with the wishes of wealthy part-timers.⁶⁶³

Some senators had expressed their concerns that erosion might wipe away Fire Island in its entirety. Senator Alan Bible (D-NV), Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, pressed naturalist Dr. Robert Cushman Murphy on whether Fire Island would even exist in fifty years, after more hurricanes had eroded the barrier island. "We would be in rather an awkward position if 50 years from now the seas came in and there was no more island there," worried Bible.⁶⁶⁴ Dr. Murphy maintained that Fire Island's erosion occurred in various directions and the island would still exist for many years to come. A later study backed him up, stating "the barrier-island system itself, however, is in no danger of disappearance."⁶⁶⁵ In the case of erosion problems on Fire Island, the worries of commercial fishermen and property owners coincided. The power of both of these groups at Fire Island enabled them to fight for a roadless Fire Island National Seashore in which the Department of the Interior allowed the Army Corps to conduct erosion control projects.

⁶⁶³ For more on the shellfish industry of the Great South Bay, see Jeffrey Kassner, "The Baymen of the Great South Bay, New York: A Preliminary Ecological Profile," in J.R. Schubel, et. al (eds.), *The Great South Bay* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991), 182-195; ; "New Inlet Proposal is Gaining Support," *Suffolk County News*, September 22, 1960, 1. Carl LoBue and Marci Bortman, "Hard Clams, Hard Lessons: The Shellfish Renaissance," *Solutions*, 1, (Jan. 2011), Retrieved from <http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/849>. Suffolk County's infrastructure lagged behind its rapidly expanding population, which caused sewage to pollute the Great South Bay frequently. See Statement of H. Lee Dennison, Suffolk County Executive, Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings*, December 11, 1963, 47. Rome documents the difficulty of maintaining infrastructure in expanding suburbs in *Bulldozer in the Countryside*. For an overview of Fire Island's ecological history, see Henry Warren Art, *Ecological Studies of the Sunken Forest, Fire Island National Seashore, New York* (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, Government Printing Office, 1976); U.S. Department of the Interior. Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, National Park Service, *A Report on the Proposed Fire Island National Seashore, New York*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 11.

⁶⁶⁴ Senator Alan Bible, Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings*, December 11, 1963, 57-58.

⁶⁶⁵ Dr. Robert Murphy, Resident, Long Island, NY, Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings*, December 11, 1963, 57. James A. Schmid, "Research and Management: The Case of Fire Island National Seashore," *Coastal Recreation Resources in an Urbanizing Environment; A Monograph*, University of Massachusetts, U.S. Department of Agriculture and County Extension Services and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sea Grant Program, 1976): 119-127, here 121.

Clamor against Moses' road atop the Fire Island dunes did not coalesce into coherent opposition until after a hurricane in early March 1962. The "Ash Wednesday Hurricane," considered by geologists the "most damaging" storm of the twentieth century, triggered renewed energy both for and against the road proposal.⁶⁶⁶ The storm pummeled Fire Island for seventy hours and brought 1.3 meter waves onto Fire Island, enough to level dunes and wash away houses. Geologists estimated that Fire Island's sandy coasts shifted from 37 to 61 meters in during the three day storm. *Life* magazine reported that the storm destroyed 100 and damaged 30 houses on Fire Island.⁶⁶⁷ The FIVA and the Cherry Grove Property Owner's Association called for volunteers and donations to build sandbag barriers on the dunes.⁶⁶⁸ In Islip, residents brought in discarded Christmas trees to stabilize the fragile dunes, while Point O' Woods residents played on President Kennedy's policy initiatives as they mustered together a "Pick up the Pieces Corps."⁶⁶⁹ Many homeowners and businesses found that flood insurance covered only wind damage and not the water damage that had totaled their homes. Savvy homeowners, began looking to the state and federal government for publically-funded erosion control solutions. Both governments were quick to respond.⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁶⁶ Keqi Zhang, et. al, "Do Storms Cause Long-Term Beach Erosion along the U.S. East Barrier Coast?" *The Journal of Geology*, 110, 4 (July 2002): 493-502, here 496.

⁶⁶⁷ "Fiery Clean-up on Fire Island," *Life*, April 20, 1962, 52-55.

⁶⁶⁸ Byron Porterfield, "Fire Island Puts Shoulder To Dune: 40 Cherry Grove Residents Pitch In on Sandbag Wall for Mile-Long Beach," *New York Times*, March 19, 1962, 31.

⁶⁶⁹ "While Others Talk About Erosion Control, On Fire Island Our Town Does Something," *Islip Bulletin*, December 13, 1962, 2; Byron Porterfield, "Ocean-Front Suffolk Damage Put at \$8,000,000," *New York Times*, March 12, 1962.

⁶⁷⁰ Kaufman and Starks, *Land Regulation at Fire Island National Seashore*, 6. Starting in 1968 coastal homeowners could apply for federal flood insurance through the National Flood Insurance Program, but as of 1962 government programs did not yet actively subsidize building in marginal coastal areas. See Kleppel, "Trends in Land Use Policy and Development in the Coastal Southeast," *Changing land use patterns in the coastal zone*, 28-35.

The Aftermath of the Storm and Federal Proposals

Post-hurricane clean-up brought publicity back to the Fire Island. Within days of the storm's wake, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller created the Temporary State Commission on Protection and Preservation of the Atlantic Shorefront (hereafter referred to as "the Atlantic Shorefront Commission"), with Robert Moses as Secretary, to map out a plan for erosion control and land preservation on New York's coast.⁶⁷¹ Moses also publically requested \$50 million for a dunal road in order to solve the "age-old problem of Long Island's beach erosion," as he had after previous hurricanes.⁶⁷² The Army Corps of Engineers conducted emergency repair of dune breaks and newly created inlets, but stopped short of enacting their approved erosion control plans. The ACE did not approve of a road as erosion control and stalled on their plans until Fire Island's fate was more certain.⁶⁷³




Figure 33: Army Corps of Engineers 1959 Plans for Fire Island. Source: Army Corps of Engineers, "Atlantic Coast of Long Island, N.Y.: Fire Island Inlet to Montauk Point Considered Plan of Improvement," *Beach Erosion Control Cooperative Study and Interim, Save the Dunes Council Records, Calumet Regional Archive, Indiana University Northwest, Gary, Indiana.*

⁶⁷¹ New York State Temporary State Commission on Protection and Preservation of the Atlantic Shorefront, *Protection and Preservation of the Atlantic Shore Front of the State of New York; Final Report*, 1962.

⁶⁷² John C. Delvin, "Moses Urges Dike to Save L. I. Shore," *New York Times*, March 26, March 7, 1962, 1.

⁶⁷³ "Boos, Jeers Were No Help: Road Still in Fire Island Plan," *Islip Bulletin*, July 12, 1962, 1.

The March 1962 hurricane hit Fire Island just days after the U.S. government began a concerted push for increased federal outdoor recreation. On March 1, 1962, President John F. Kennedy spoke before Congress on conservation. He advocated the recommendations of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission Report (ORRRC), headed by Laurance Rockefeller, which would create a Bureau of Outdoor Recreation under the Department of the Interior and recommended the creation of a “Land Conversation Fund” to fund parkland purchases – what would become the Land and Water Conservation Fund.⁶⁷⁴ Preservation for recreation, especially near the urban areas that the Democrats needed so badly politically, became an official priority of the Kennedy administration.

In mid-April, U.S. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall convened with twelve East Coast Governors in New Jersey to present the Kennedy administration’s “Master Plan” to conserve the nature of the East Coast’s shoreline and provide recreation for urban Americans.⁶⁷⁵ Udall made clear in this and subsequent visits that federal support for a park at Fire Island would cease if New York built a road atop its dunes.⁶⁷⁶ Moses was equally uncooperative regarding federal plans, as Udall later recalled, “I went there and met the very formidable Robert Moses. I was told I was 20 years too late and out proposal had stirred up unnecessary controversy and why didn’t I return to Washington and mind my own business.”⁶⁷⁷ Udall instead began to court Fire Islanders in the hopes that they could convince state and local authorities to support a

⁶⁷⁴ John F. Kennedy, “Special Message to the Congress on Conservation,” March 1, 1962, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed February 5, 2012, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9081>.

⁶⁷⁵ “Udall Offers Master Plan to Conserve East’s Shore,” *New York Times*, April 19, 1962, 1.

⁶⁷⁶ “Fire Island Plan in Congress Seen: Udall Says Members From New York Back Measure for National Seashore, Road Would be Barred,” *New York Times*, July 26, 1962, 29.

⁶⁷⁷ Testimony of Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, House Subcommittee on National Parks, *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings*, 129.

roadless federal park at their home.⁶⁷⁸ Udall and Moses had different ideas of what to do with Fire Island. In the wake of the Ash Wednesday storm, Udall was the one who received public support, just as Moses' was crumbling.⁶⁷⁹

On July 10, 1962 in the Jones Beach bathhouse, the Atlantic Shorefront Commission held hearings regarding their plans to build a Fire Island road. Fire Islanders, Long Islanders, New Yorkers, and national wilderness advocates came out in full force to protest the road plans. Fire Island grassroots groups included the Tenants Emergency Committee to Save Fire Island, the FIVA, the Citizen's Committee for a Fire Island National Seashore, the Fire Island Association, and the Fire Island Pines and Cherry Grove Property Owners Associations. Scores of fishermen and clambers—both recreational and professional—entered the Jones Beach bathhouse to oppose a road, from the Fire Island Waterways Association to the Nassau and Suffolk County Fish and Game Associations and the Captree Council of boat captains. Even the national press came. Across the nation, people wondered: would there be a road in a Fire Island park's final form?⁶⁸⁰

⁶⁷⁸ National Park Service, *A Report on the Proposed Fire Island National Seashore*, New York, 1; Thomas G. Smith, "John Kennedy, Stewart Udall, and New Frontier Conservation." *Pacific Historical Review*, 64, 3 (Aug. 1995): 329-362; ORRRC, *Outdoor Recreation for America*, 121-124. "Udall Doubts U.S. Will Buy on L.I.," *New York Times*, June 3, 1962, 56; "Fire Island Park Pressed By Udall: Governor Urged to Join in Conservation Planning," *New York Times*, March 12, 1962, 25. Poster Hailey, "4 States to Get Storm Aid; New York Withholds Plea," *New York Times*, March 10, 1962, 1;

⁶⁷⁹ In his section on suburbanization on Long Island, Christopher Sellers cites Udall as vital in the passage of Fire Island legislation. He states that Fire Island National Seashore's passage "relied on [preservationists] reaching up past Moses' level of government for federal support." Sellers paints it as much more of a grassroots effort than I do – he says that "Fire Island road fighters were able to secure the endorsement of Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall" and that this endorsement set "political gears . . . in motion." When looked at in the context of the broader shoreline push, it's clear that Udall supported a park at Fire Island long before activists and had shepherded its passage politically even before the storm. I do agree with Sellers on Udall's importance in Fire Island National Seashore. Sellers, *Crabgrass Crucible*, 102.

⁶⁸⁰ P.M.T. (Editorial Page), "Fire Island and the Need for Sound Planning," *National Parks and Conservation Magazine*, 36, 79 (August 1962): 2; Byron Porterfield, "Moses Quits Fire Island Hearing: Walks Out as Letter Comparing Him to Hitler is Read," *New York Times*, July 11, 1962, 1; Brawley, "The Fire On New York's Famous Little Island," *Sports Illustrated*, July 23, 1962; "Protection and Preservation," *The New Yorker*, 38, 22 (July 1962): 16-17.

At the well-attended hearings, only a handful of groups voiced their support of Robert Moses' plan to build a road across the length of Fire Island. Most supporters were Suffolk County officials or professional planners.⁶⁸¹ Suffolk County Executive H. Lee Dennison declared his "repeated endorsement" of Moses' road plan, which was also his plan since he (along with other Suffolk County politicians) served on the Atlantic Shorefront Commission. Dennison joined planners, the *Fire Island News*, and *Newsday* in their praise for Jones Beach.⁶⁸² If Bob Moses had built an affordable dune-topping highway at Jones Beach in 1927, they contended, he could do it again at Fire Island in 1962. Like Moses, Dennison saw roads to and through parks as egalitarian and he echoed Moses' painting of Fire Islanders as wealthy, eccentric, and concerned only about their privacy. He argued that NYS "should not be concerned with the want of privacy by a select few at the expense of the great majority of full time Suffolk residents."⁶⁸³

Dennison joined other Long Island proper residents when he painted Fire Islanders as out-of-touch, wealthy summer residents. Media attention sparked debate over the truth of this charge and whether it discounted the opinions of summer residents. The *Islip Bulletin*, a paper for a town whose boundaries included land both on Long Island and Fire Island, called the vocal opponents of the road "unruly summer residents." These "Militant 'Isolation' Champions," the *Bulletin* contended, were the "fortunate few," the "Moses-haters and beach isolationists," who would prefer to spend tens of millions of dollars to "preserve the summer sanctuary" of their "exclusive domain," rather than to "make the incomparable ocean-front playground truly available to the people who will have to pay the bill." The *Islip Bulletin* editorial staff feared that

⁶⁸¹ "Ocean Parkway, A Bulwark Against the Sea (An Editorial)," *Islip Bulletin*, March 28, 1963, 1, 12;

⁶⁸² "Suffolk Planners Support Moses on Fire Island Road," *New York Times*, August 3, 1962, 25;

⁶⁸³ HERE?

Albert W. Allar, "On the Beam: Why A Road?" *Islip Bulletin*, August 2, 1962, 15; "Hearing on Fire Island Road to Be Stormy," *Islip Bulletin*, July 5, 1962, 3; "Fire Island Holds Clambake Rally: 800 Meet to Score Moses' Plan to Build Road," *New York Times*, August 26, 1962, 71; Harry Grayson, "Letters to the Times: To Save Fire Island Homes," *New York Times*, September 24, 1962, 28.

wealthy locals, concerned about their property values, would spell doom for a road and the business that the *Bulletin* hoped a road would attract.⁶⁸⁴

Fire Islanders argued that a road brought in the commotion of the city and the wrong sort of people. One Fire Islander argued that unlike other National Seashores, Fire Island was “next to New York City and we get a different type of people coming out than they would in Cape Cod.”⁶⁸⁵ Some Fire Islanders who were “normally aloof,” as the *New York Times* characterized them, argued that a road would fundamentally change Fire Island.⁶⁸⁶ “A road means the constant blare and stink of traffic; it would destroy the whole character of the island and the reason why we came here,” one resident argued.⁶⁸⁷ This both echoed the often critiqued upper class characteristic of the wilderness movement and provided fodder for those who characterized Fire Islanders as “isolationists.”⁶⁸⁸ These “isolationists” worried that a road would turn Fire Island into another Coney Island or make the area too “honky-tonk” like Boston’s South Shore—places that Moses would consider egalitarian, but wilderness activists and Fire Islanders considered the wrong type of recreation.⁶⁸⁹

Some Fire Island residents and visitors worked hard to deflect charges that a roadless Fire Island park wreaked of elitism and exclusivity. “We are not wealthy and snobbish,” asserted

⁶⁸⁴ “Road Still in Fire Island Plan,” *Islip Bulletin*, July 12, 1962, 1; “Suffolk Village Officials Turn Thumbs Down On Anti-Road Fight,” *Islip Bulletin*, December 6, 1962, 12.; “Ocean Parkway, A Bulwark Against the Sea (An Editorial),” *Islip Bulletin*, March 28, 1963, 1 and 12; “The Peril Continues,” *Islip Bulletin*, March 7, 1963, 10; Albert W. Allar, “Time and The Tides,” *Islip Bulletin*, July 19, 1962, 15.

⁶⁸⁵ William B. Hoffman, House Subcommittee on National Parks, *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings*, September 30, 1963, 60.

⁶⁸⁶ Byron Porterfield, “Storm on Fire Island: Normally Aloof Residents Join in Fight On Moses’ Plan for Ocean Boulevard,” *New York Times*, July 17, 1962, 15.

⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸⁸ On the critique of wilderness as an upper-class movement, see Cronon, “The Trouble With Wilderness,” 85; Turner, *The Promise of Wilderness*, 31; Carolyn Merchant, “Shades of Darkness: Race and Environmental History,” *Environmental History*, 8, 3 (July 2003): 380-394, here 381.

⁶⁸⁹ For more on the use of anti-road and -automobile language in the wilderness movement, see Sutter, *Driven Wild*. For an analysis of how the character of National Parks reflected the sentiment towards automobiles and roads in America, see Louter, *Windshield Wilderness*, and in Canada, see MacEachern, *Natural Selections*. Brawley, “The Fire On New York’s Famous Little Island,” *Sports Illustrated*, July 23, 1962; “Dem Candidate, Town Leader, Is Charged With Major Fire Island ‘Land Speculation,’” *Islip Bulletin*, October 24, 1963, 10.

members of the Tenants Emergency Committee to Save Fire Island. Comprised of renters rather than owners, the Tenants Emergency Committee maintained that “people of modest means can and do rent cottages and apartments on Fire Island.” They even held a clambake rally to raise money for a campaign against the Moses road.⁶⁹⁰ The Tenants Committee maintained that a diversity of communities on Fire Island, from wealthy villages to the popular gay resort towns of Cherry Grove and Fire Island Pines, opposed the idea of a road bisecting the natural paradise.⁶⁹¹ After the hearings, *The New York Times* reported that New York State officials prevented locals from testifying in order to create the “impression that only summer residents of Fire Island opposed Robert Moses’ plan.”⁶⁹² Local organizations comprised of many year-round residents, such as the Suffolk and the Nassau Fish and Game Associations, Conservationists United for Long Island, and the Long Island Beach and Buggy Association, all opposed Moses’ road.⁶⁹³ One Fire Islander wrote angrily to the *New York Times*, pitting Moses’ park planning against the very heritage of the American conservation movement: “If Mr. Moses could have his way, I’m sure he would build a four-lane circumferential highway around every Walden Pond his engineers might find.”⁶⁹⁴

Robert Cushman Murphy, a former ornithological curator at the American Museum of Natural History and a resident of Long Island, argued that a road was not elitist, but an alternative to the excess of roads in Moses-era New York. “Why must we supply traffic arteries to shunt everywhere people who want to sit on their bottoms? Is there no virtue in cherishing something that has to be won by purposeful desire and a little effort?” Murphy asked New

⁶⁹⁰ “Fire Island Holds Clambake Rally: 800 Meet to Score Moses’ Plan to Build Road,” *New York Times*, August 26, 1962, 71; “Fire Island Group To Show How ‘Other Half’ Lives,” *Islip Bulletin*, August 16, 1962, 2.

⁶⁹¹ For more on the history of the gay community at Fire Island, see the documentary by Crayton Robey, *When Ocean Meets Sky*, 2003.

⁶⁹² “Foes of Shore Plan Criticize Hearing,” *New York Times*, July 21, 1962, 18.

⁶⁹³ “Fire Island Holds Clambake Rally: 800 Meet to Score Moses’ Plan to Build Road,” *New York Times*, August 26, 1962, 71; See Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Fire Island National Seashore; Hearings*, December 11, 1963.

⁶⁹⁴ Roger A. Purdon, “Letter to the Editor: Fire Island Highway,” *New York Times*, June 30, 1962, 18

Yorkers.⁶⁹⁵ Other locals agreed, contending that accessing Fire Island by ferry did not make the island accessible only to a minority. “There are many fast ferries to transport the public to Fire Island whenever they wish” wrote one Islip resident. Most Fire Islanders came from New York City, a city of islands accustomed to reliance on ferries for daily transportation. Fire Islanders used this familiarity with ferries to counter Moses’ charges of selfishness, stating that the “public is welcome—as long as it comes by ferry and leaves its cars on the other side.”⁶⁹⁶

In 1962, most gay Fire Island residents and visitors approved of the national seashore plan, realizing that it “fixed the geographic limits” of Cherry Grove and Fire Island Pines and would “forever separate the two communities from more “closeted attitudes.”⁶⁹⁷ One of the earliest and most influential gay organizations, the Mattachine Society, had worked to improve the life of homosexual men and women on Fire Island during the 1950s.⁶⁹⁸ In the immediate postwar period, Suffolk County’s local papers “looked at gays with tongue and cheek amusement,” but the 1950s brought routine and often brutal police raids to popular gay establishments in Cherry Grove. The Mattachine Society’s work helped to minimize the raids, which had led to sodomy arrests and could ruin the careers and personal lives of those implicated. A National Seashore would help to preserve the seclusion of Fire Island’s gay

⁶⁹⁵ Robert Cushman Murphy, Naturalist, House Subcommittee on National Parks, *Fire Island National Seashore*, New York: Hearings (Islip, New York), September 30, 1963, 75.

⁶⁹⁶ E. F. Bach, “Letter To The Editor,” *Islip Bulletin*, April 11, 1963, 18; Brawley, “The Fire On New York’s Famous Little Island,” *Sports Illustrated*, July 23, 1962; Harry Grayson, “Letters to the Times: To Save Fire Island Homes,” *New York Times*, September 24, 1962, 28;

⁶⁹⁷ Newton, *Cherry Grove*, 121-122.

⁶⁹⁸ On the Mattachine Society negotiating truces with Suffolk County police to decrease the frequency of raids, see Newton, *Cherry Grove*, 114. For more on the history of the Mattachine Society, see John Loughery, *The Other Side of Silence: Men's Lives and Gay Identities: A Twentieth-Century History* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1998); Martin Meeker, *Contacts Desired: Gay and Lesbian Communications and Community, 1940s-1970s* (University of Chicago Press, 2006); John D. Poling, *Mattachine Midwest: The History of a Chicago Gay Rights Organization, 1965 to 1986* (thesis, M.S., Illinois State University, 2002); James T. Sears, *Behind the Mask of the Mattachine* (Harrington Park Press, 2006).


communities and build upon the tenuous peace these communities had found with Suffolk County officials in the extremely homophobic postwar period.⁶⁹⁹

While the gay community supported Fire Island National Seashore to maintain a secluded and safe retreat, others advocated for a National Seashore park to preserve the unique ecology of Fire Island. The federal government agreed that the Northeast needed more “natural” forms of recreation opportunities for urbanites. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, a strong proponent of the wilderness movement, stated that the NPS was “interested in taking large areas and preserving them as nature intended”—not Jones Beach-style recreation.⁷⁰⁰ Senator Jacob Javits, who had lived on Fire Island year-round for four years with his family, echoed this sentiment in the months following the July 1962 hearings as he supported Udall’s push for “diversity of recreational opportunity. . . in particular, we need to provide for the preservation of natural open spaces free of automobile traffic, parking lots and hot dog stands.” The federal government responded to the argument of a road as elitist by citing the diversity of recreation that urbanites could enjoy in a roadless park.

⁶⁹⁹ On local perceptions of Fire Island’s gay community, see Newton, *Cherry Grove*, 56. For more on the intense homophobia of the postwar U.S., see David Johnson, *The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government* (University of Chicago Press, 2004).

⁷⁰⁰ Ronald Maiorana, “Udall Doubts U.S. Will Buy on L.I.: Suggests It Is Too Late for Purchasing Shore Area,” *New York Times*, June 3, 1962, 56;

Moses Quits Fire Island Hearing



Charles Collingwood, opponent of road at Fire Island, speaks at hearing at Jones Beach

Walks Out as Letter Comparing Him to Hitler Is Read

By BYRON PORTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times.
JONES BEACH, L. I., July 10—Robert Moses walked out of a public hearing today when a speaker quoted a twenty-four-year-old letter comparing him to Adolf Hitler.

The comparison had been made in a satirical letter written to The New York Times by the late Elmer Davis on Oct. 3, 1938. In the excerpt read today Mr. Davis asserted that Mr. Moses "would save Fire Island the way Hitler is saving the Sudetenland."



Robert Moses reading Fire Island News at hearing. Later, when Mr. Collingwood quoted an old attack on him, he left.

the wording of the Constitution and excerpts from the writings of Alexander Hamilton.

The question arose when a defendant convicted in a narcotics case challenged the conviction on the ground that he had been deprived of a constitutional trial. He said this was so because the trial judge had received an interim appointment from former President Dwight D. Eisenhower on Aug. 17, 1955, fifteen days after the Senate had adjourned.

The defendant, Dominic Aiocco, contended that the commission of the judge, John M.

Continued on Page 26, Column 7

Dr. King Is Jailed For Georgia Protest

By The Associated Press
ALBANY, Ga., July 10—The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Negro integration leader, and a fellow minister went to jail today to emphasize their nonviolent defiance of racial barriers.

Dr. King and the Rev. Ralph Abernathy, both of Atlanta, were convicted in Recorder's Court of having violated a street and sidewalk assembly ordinance by leading a street demonstration without a permit last Dec. 16.

Recorder A. N. Durden sentenced them to pay \$178 fines or spend forty-five days in jail. They spurned both the fines and freedom on bond through appeals and went to

Figure 34: The New York Times front page article, Byron Porterfield, "Moses Quits Fire Island Hearing: Walks Out as Letter Comparing Him to Hitler is Read," The New York Times, July 11, 1962.

What road supporters considered the caustic elitism of Fire Island road opponents peaked when NYC broadcaster Charles Collingwood compared Moses to Hitler at the July 1962 Atlantic Shorefront Commission hearings. Collingwood later expressed surprise that Moses had construed this "transparently humorous" jibe as a "personal and offensive attack on him."⁷⁰¹ Supporters of Moses' road condemned Collingwood's behavior, but by 1962, those supporters only included Suffolk County officials, New York planners with ties to Moses, members of the Atlantic Shorefront Commission, and the ever-faithful editors of the *Islip Bulletin*.⁷⁰²

⁷⁰¹ "Protection and Preservation," *The New Yorker*, 38, 22 (July 1962): 16-17.

⁷⁰² "Beach Residents Hit Moses' Plan," *Long Islander*, July 12, 1962, 7; Porterfield, "Moses Quits Fire Island Hearing: Walks Out as Letter Comparing Him to Hitler is Read," *New York Times*, July 11, 1962, 1; "Letters to the Times: Robert Moses Praised: His Proposal to Build Road on Fire Island Is Supported," *New York Times*, July 21, 1962, 12

After the March 1962 Ash Wednesday Storm prompted anti-Moses protests, New York politicians quickly jumped off the Fire Island road bandwagon. Savvy New York politicians realized that the National Seashore had the support of the Kennedy administration, conservation groups, the New York City elite, and the Greenwich Village counterculture – both in the form of anti-urban renewal activists like Jane Jacobs and the rest of the Greenwich Village community that vacationed in Cherry Grove and Fire Island Pines.⁷⁰³ Within a month, U.S. Representative John Lindsay, who was currying favor with New York City residents for a future mayoral bid, introduced legislation in Congress for a Fire Island National Seashore.⁷⁰⁴ This was the first legislation on Fire Island since Stuyvesant Wainwright’s 1960 Fire Island National Park bill. After Lindsay’s bill, politicians came out of the woodwork to support Fire Island National Seashore. Even Governor Nelson Rockefeller, as his Atlantic Shorefront Commission drummed up support for their plans for a Fire Island road and state park, began to publically weigh the merits of a road against those of a “forever-wild concept that is talked of by Secretary of the Interior Udall.”⁷⁰⁵ The “forever wild” concept reflected the 1960s wilderness movement, but also harkened back to New York’s long tradition of preserving nature in the 1894 “forever wild” designation of the state’s Adirondack Park.⁷⁰⁶

⁷⁰³ Newton, *Cherry Grove*, 67, 111.

⁷⁰⁴ “U.S. Park Urged For Fire Island: Lindsay Offers Bill in House to Set Aside 7,500 Acres,” *New York Times*, August 21, 1962, 35; William M. Blair, “Udall Criticized Over Fire Island: Lindsay Accuses Secretary of ‘Hedging’ on Plans,” *New York Times*, July 27, 1962, 22; “U.S. Park Urged For Fire Island: Lindsay Offers Bill in House to Set Aside 7,500 Acres,” *New York Times*, August 21, 1962, 35; “Fire Island Parkway Opponents Launch Delaying Tactic With Bill in Congress,” *Long Islander*, August 23, 1962, 1.

⁷⁰⁵ Byron Porterfield, “Governor Visions Fast L.I. Ferries: HydroFoil System on Sound Will Be Studied by State, He Says on Area Tour,” *New York Times*, July 19, 1962, 29.

⁷⁰⁶ For more on the history of preservation in the Adirondacks, see, *Philip G. Terrie, Contested Terrain: A New History of Nature and People in the Adirondacks* (Blue Mountain Lake, NY: Adirondack Museum, 2008).

MOSES QUILTS 5 STATE POSTS, CHARGING GOVERNOR ASKED ONE OF THEM FOR BROTHER

PARK JOB AT ISSUE

'Invidious' Mention of Laurance Rockefeller Scored by Governor

Statements and exchange of
letters are on Page 13.

By **RICHARD P. HUNT**

Robert Moses, long a driving force behind power, parks and parkways in New York State, said yesterday that he was giving up all five of his state posts after a disagreement with Governor Rockefeller.

He said Mr. Rockefeller had



Robert Moses



The New York Times
Laurance S. Rockefeller

Figure 35: Front Page Coverage of Moses' Replacement by Laurence Rockefeller. "Moses Quits 5 State Posts, Charging Governor Asked One of Them For Brother: Park Job at Issue," *New York Times*, December 1, 1962, 1.

Heeding political winds, Governor Rockefeller ousted Robert Moses from five state posts in December 1962. Laurance Rockefeller, brother of the Governor and fresh off his work with the Kennedy administration on the ORRRC report, replaced Moses as Chair of New York State Council of Parks.⁷⁰⁷ Moses had always used his resignation as a threat when he wanted to complete a controversial project, but he never expected the Governor to accept. By January

⁷⁰⁷ Caro, *The Power Broker*, 1070-1080; "Moses Quits 5 State Posts, Charging Governor Asked One of Them For Brother: Park Job at Issue," *New York Times*, December 1, 1962, 1 and 13; "Text of Statements by Moses and Rockefeller," *New York Times*, December 1, 1962, 13.

1963, Governor Rockefeller announced a budget without money for a Fire Island road.⁷⁰⁸ Now that Moses was “no longer the ruling force in the state’s park system,” Suffolk County officials finally declared their support for a National Seashore in April.⁷⁰⁹ They hoped that a National Seashore would relieve Suffolk County residents of the “heavy and continuing tax burden” that came with maintaining Fire Island’s shoreline.⁷¹⁰ Within days of Suffolk County’s announcement of support, Senator Jacob Javits and Kenneth Keating introduced the first Fire Island National Seashore bill in the U.S. Senate as a companion to Rep. Lindsay’s House bill. With Moses gone, his Ocean Parkway plans became a “dead issue” overnight.⁷¹¹

With Laurance Rockefeller at the helm, New York State entered a new phase of park planning, one emphasizing recreation in the same way the ORRRC report did. Laurance Rockefeller also enjoyed the backing of the Kennedy administration, since his recreation work had been for them. In one swift move, Governor Nelson Rockefeller replaced the primary obstacle to a Fire Island National Seashore with someone who was on the same team as Stewart Udall. Moses’ exit signaled the decline of parks like Jones Beach—with huge parking lots and prioritization of recreation over natural preservation—and the beginning of an era of ecological preservation with a greater emphasis on wilderness than in previous Moses-era parks.⁷¹²

⁷⁰⁸ “Gov.’s Neutrality On Fire Island Parkway A Blow To Militant ‘Isolation’ Champions,” *Islip Bulletin*, February 28, 1963, 1.

⁷⁰⁹ Warren Weaver, Jr., “Fire Island Bill Appears Stalled,” *New York Times*, June 5, 1963, quoted in Kaufman and Starks, *Land Regulation at Fire Island National Seashore*, 33.

⁷¹⁰ “U.S. Park Is Urged For Fire Island: Suffolk Board Asks Bill for a National Seashore,” *New York Times*, April 9, 1963, 49; “County Board Urges Federal Govt. Move To Claim Fire Island,” *Islip Bulletin*, April 11, 1963, 1.

⁷¹¹ James R. Grover, Jr., “Grover Capitol Notes: Six Bills Before Congress On Fire Island Preserve,” *Islip Bulletin*, June 20, 1963, 15; Senator Jacob K. Javits Press Release, “New York Senators Introduce Fire Island National Seashore Bill,” April 25, 1963, Series 2, Box 78, Javits Collection, SBUL; “Conservationists Comment On Local Threats To Nature,” *Long Islander*, November 15, 1962, 24; Bill Wurtenburg, “Around the County,” *Islip Bulletin*, February 21, 1963, 15.

⁷¹² One Suffolk County resident described the small wilderness like this: “We put ‘wilderness’ in quotes. Those of you familiar with the magnificent grandeur of the West might more adequately describe what we have as semiwilderness, but it’s all we have, and to us it is our wilderness.” Statement of Mrs. Donald H. Larson, Suffolk County League of Women Voters, House Subcommittee on National Parks, *Fire Island National Seashore, New York: Hearings*, September 30, 1963, 63.

Laurance Rockefeller and the Park Service wanted Jones Beach to act as a “buffer zone” that accommodated huge crowds and allowed Fire Island National Seashore to remain a roadless, semi-wilderness park.⁷¹³ Fire Islanders recognized the relatively small size of their wilderness, but Rockefeller and the Park Service wanted to preserve it nonetheless. Rockefeller offered a small conciliation prize to Moses by renaming four state parks—including one on Fire Island—after Moses. “All his life he has been truculently calling other people names,” *The New York Times* editorialized, “Now they’re naming things for him. It’s going to take a lot of new bronze plaques if this idea catches on.”⁷¹⁴

On September 11, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the bill that created Fire Island National Seashore. One week before he signed the Fire Island bill, Johnson signed The Wilderness Act and the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) into law. The LWCF made the Cape Cod formula possible by creating the funding for piecemeal purchase of parks in already settled areas. Money from the LWCF made the purchase of expensive shoreline real estate possible, at least in limited form, for the federal government. The wilderness movement helped to create not only Fire Island National Seashore but also the funding mechanism that made the purchase of land on Fire Island possible.⁷¹⁵

The fight to preserve Fire Island National Seashore shows how urban interest groups incorporated ecological concerns, wilderness rhetoric, and issues of overpopulation to ally with the Kennedy administration’s idea of conservation. Many Fire Islanders utilized the language of

⁷¹³ National Park Service, *A Report on the Proposed Fire Island National Seashore*, 6. Moses quote from “A Map Full of Moses,” *New York Times*, June 29, 1963, 22; Senator Jacob K. Javits Press Release, “New York Senators Introduce Fire Island National Seashore Bill,” April 25, 1963, Series 1, Box 29, Javits Collection, SBUL. On “buffer zones,” see Louter, *Windshield Wilderness*, 134-163.

⁷¹⁴ Editorial, “A Map Full of Moses,” *New York Times*, June 29, 1963, 22.

⁷¹⁵ “Udall Will Settle For Fire Island,” *Islip Bulletin*, July 4, 1963, 1 and 3; The Wilderness Society, “The Wilderness Act of 1964,” Retrieved February 12, 2012 from wilderness.org/content/wilderness-act-1964; Acting Director, Department of the Interior, to Senator Jacob K. Javits, August 10, 1964, Javits Collection, SBUL, Series 2, Box 78.

the nascent environmental movement in order to protect their houses and their secluded way of life. Regardless of their motivation, Fire Islanders' alliance with the federal government against Robert Moses helped to turn the tide nationally away from high-impact, early automobile era parks and towards more ecologically-focused parks. Fire Island helped Stewart Udall bring together diverse factions in support of the Kennedy administration's conservation goals. At Indiana Dunes, the reverse happened just a few years later: Hoosiers utilized this new type of conservation to promote a park that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations did not necessarily want.

Chapter Six: Industrial Wasteland or Ecological Sanctuary? The Indiana Dunes



Figure 36: "Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore," Map, Google Maps, Google, March 25, 2015, <https://www.google.com/maps/place/Indiana+Dunes+National+Lakeshore/@41.6380359,-87.0730101,21154m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m2!3m1!1s0x8811be838b1641e5:0x33ab95f9d65d070e>.

Against Indiana Dunes Park

To the Editor of the New York Times:

In your editorial of June 26 'Protecting Fire Island' reference was made to the preservation of the Indiana Dunes. Several facts must be indicated about this lost cause of the conservationists.

With the exception of the present state park area, virtually none of the dunes is any longer pleasant or educative. The establishment of a national park would truncate the economic growth of the area, which is rapidly being populated with lakefront steel plants and wharves. Northern Indiana desperately needs more industry to support its urban population, not more parks – there are already plenty in the area.

Furthermore, the 'Save the Dunes' campaign was never supported by a majority of Hoosiers, but was primarily the product of residents of Chicago and of Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois. It is noteworthy that during the height of this campaign the Governor of Indiana spent many days in Pennsylvania persuading industrialists to build plants in the dunes. The creation of this national park was not favored by the people of Indiana, who much preferred the industrial development they so badly need. Hoosiers must be allowed to decide such matters for themselves, without Federal or outside interference.

-Gerard T. Keilman, East Orange, N.J., June 26, 1963.⁷¹⁶

⁷¹⁶ Gerard T. Keilman, Letter to the Editor, "Against Indiana Dunes Park," *New York Times*, June 26, 1963, 16.

In June of 1963, Gerard Keilman had company in his skepticism of Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore's eventual realization. As of 1963, legislation for Cape Cod, Padre Island (Texas), and Point Reyes National Seashores had already passed Congress. Fire Island and even Oregon Dunes legislation appeared imminent. Although Kennedy had mentioned Indiana's dunes as a priority site for coastal conservation in his March 1962 speech on conservation, by 1963, the newest bill in Congress with an Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore also included provisions for a public port within the park's area. To citizens like Keilman, an Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore seemed beyond all hope and against all economic trends. While Stewart Udall spoke to Governors about Fire Island's potential merits as a park, two steel companies built steel mills atop plowed Indiana dunes. Northwestern University carted away the excess sand for fill at its lakefront campus, and State of Indiana officials acted on plans for an eventual public port on their state's sandy shore. Although Interior officials had eyed Indiana's dunes as a potential National Park site since 1915, few government officials – or public observers like Keilman—believed that a park could ever be possible on Indiana's coast now that industrial interests had entrenched themselves so thoroughly on the state's coast. Yet, couched in steel mills, the Indiana Dunes passed Congress and became the nation's most urban National Lakeshore even when more “pristine” areas like the Oregon Dunes could not. Why?

The successful passage of Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore legislation shows how National Seashore creation became a national movement throughout the early 1960s, one that tapped into coalitions of the growing environmental movement. Save the Dunes advocates incorporated issues like chemical pollution, overpopulation, and ecological preservation to broaden their support nationally for a dunal park, even when the chances for a federal park in the dunes seemed low. Ecologically-minded Hoosiers in the 1950s and '60s used land conservation

means to accomplish antipollution ends on Indiana's coast. Save the Dunes advocates did all of this while facing national pressure to give up the fight, told again and again that other shoreline areas were more promising, had a better chance at passing, and had more natural qualities. By 1966, the environmental movement had gained enough strength to establish a national seashore from the ground up. Unlike any other federal coastal park, Indiana Dunes passed not through federal cultivation of local support, but because local interest groups put enough pressure on Congress, the Department of the Interior, and private industries to convince them that the Indiana's dunes were worth saving. The increasingly complex coalitions built in earlier national seashore legislative battles made this grassroots activism effective, even after repeated failures by Indiana Dunes park advocates in previous decades. Movements to create national seashores actively aided in the coalition building that made the environmental movement possible. Indiana Dunes shows the final progression in that chain of events.

Conservation activists, as they would likely call themselves, in Indiana's dunes also utilized the traditional strategy of land conservation to deal with a problem that still lacked legal pathways to address: pollution. Northwestern Indiana's air and water quality in the early 1950s was dismal and yet, the first Clean Air Act would not pass for another 10 years, until 1963.⁷¹⁷ Save the Dunes advocates saw creation of a park as a way to slow down steel's expansion, almost as a holdover from previous "dilution as a solution to pollution" strategies.⁷¹⁸ In an era before the National Environmental Policy Act, activists in the dunes used existing political

⁷¹⁷ For more on air and water pollution in northern Indiana in the postwar period, see Andrew Hurley, *Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana 1945-1980* (Chapel Hill, London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995). For a thorough look at environmental justice issues in the 1980s, see Robert D. Bullard, *Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, Inc., 1990). For a recent study on how park distribution in urban and suburban areas create environmental justice issues, see Christopher G. Boone, et.al, "Parks and People: An Environmental Justice Inquiry in Baltimore, Maryland," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 99, 4 (2009): 767-787.

⁷¹⁸ Martin Melosi, *The Sanitary City: Urban Infrastructure in America from Colonial Times to the Present* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Scott Hamilton Dewey, *Don't Breathe the Air: Air Pollution and U.S. Environmental Politics, 1945-1970* (College Station: Texas. A&M University Press, 2000).

channels to tackle new complex issues. Their activism straddled Progressive Era conservation and the “new environmentalism” that Samuel Hays identifies as incorporating ecological values and environmental justice issues. They built off the newly complex conservationism that Neil Maher grounds in New Deal policies.⁷¹⁹ At Indiana Dunes, conservationists used traditional land conservation methods to argue for stricter controls of industrial development and pollution.⁷²⁰

The citizens fighting for these new environmental controls at Indiana Dunes, like at other seashores, were not activists or students of the New Left; rather, suburban women's groups did much of the organizing and fighting for preservation in the often wealthy neighborhoods near the shore. Adam Rome calls the activism of women “crucial” in making environmental issues a concern of communities across America in the 1960s.⁷²¹ In northwest Indiana, women began advocating for pollution controls, land conservation, and other environmental causes as early as the 1950s, and they often did it from the home.⁷²² Much as middle to upper class suburban women led the charge for a new grassroots *conservatism* in the 1950s and 1960s, they also developed strong networks of volunteer groups that helped build a new brand of *conservation* in

⁷¹⁹ Maher, *Nature's New Deal*; Hays, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence*. For more on how homeowners straddled these two eras of environmental movements, see Rome, *The Bulldozer in the Countryside*.

⁷²⁰ James Morton Turner discusses how, a decade after the dunes fight, Sierra Club members used wilderness to tackle concerns of the environmental movement like “population, pollution, and pesticides.” At the Indiana Dunes, women had begun using land conservation tactics from the Progressive Era to tackle those issues as early as 1952. See Turner, *The Promise of Wilderness*, 101-136.

⁷²¹ Adam Rome, “Give Earth a Chance: The Environmental Movement and the Sixties,” *Journal of American History*, 90, 2 (September 2003): 525-554, especially 534-541. Women’s history has only recently been seen as a major part of environmental history. Virginia Scharff argues that her environmental historian colleagues have “failed to see gender at work because they have told, almost exclusively, men’s stories and have examined, nearly as exclusively, men’s activities.” Virginia Scharff, ed. *Seeing Nature through Gender* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2003), xv.

⁷²² Rome notes that environmental activism in the 1960s allowed women a resolution to “tension between traditional expectations and unfulfilled ambitions: Because they acted to protect the home and the family, they could enter the public sphere—they could be more than ‘just; housewives—without rejecting the claims of domesticity.” He notes that other women used environmental activism as a stepping off place for responsibilities outside of the home – “Though many did not consider themselves feminists, they helped advance the feminist cause.” Rome, “Give Earth a Chance,” 541.

the 1960s.⁷²³ Women who advocated for a National Park site in Indiana, led by Dorothy Buell, used their outsider status to advocate freely and then partnered with male allies inside the system to pass their legislation agenda. David Kinkela notes a similar phenomenon in the work of Jane Jacobs and Rachel Carson, other leaders in the burgeoning environmental movement. Although seen as outsiders, both Carson and Jacobs, and Buell at the Indiana Dunes, “were connected to a community of insiders—biologists, ecologists, urban planners, and architects.” For Carson and Jacobs, the insiders provided support for written work. At the Indiana Dunes, Paul Douglas provided support and a channel into primarily-male Washington in order to pass park legislation in their backyards.⁷²⁴

Ecological Heritage of Indiana’s Dunes

Northwest Indiana’s coastline earned the title “birthplace of American ecology” at the turn of the twentieth century after pioneering ecologist Henry Chandler Cowles published seminal works on ecological succession in Indiana’s dunes.⁷²⁵ Sand dunes presented an optimal place for the study of the succession of ecological communities because of the rapid speed with which dunes change. Strong winds, longshore currents, and anchoring dunal grasses propel coastal ecosystems through transitions at geologic light-speed while also allowing for rich biodiversity of flora and fauna.⁷²⁶ Since the predominant winds across Lake Michigan gust

⁷²³ I build on the work of Lisa McGirr, who, in *Suburban Warriors*, notes the phenomenon of female leadership in 1950s and 1960s grassroots conservatism. Lisa McGirr, *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001). For

⁷²⁴ David Kinkela, “The Ecological Landscapes of Jane Jacobs and Rachel Carson,” *American Quarterly*, 61, 4 (December 2009): 905-929, here 910. For more on Washington, D.C. as a collection of the same 400 Ivy League, prep-school educated men during this Cold War period, see Robert D. Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst, Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).

⁷²⁵ Henry Chandler Cowles, “The Ecological Relations of the Vegetation on the Sand Dunes of Lake Michigan. Part I—Geographical Relations of the Dune Floras.” *Botanical Gazette* 18 (1899): 96.

⁷²⁶ Indiana’s idiosyncratic dunal flora fascinated Cowles and other ecologists and it remains one of the most biodiverse parks in the National Park Service. Armanis F. Knotts, *The Dunes of Northwest Indiana*, (Gary, Indiana: Indiana Geological Report, 1916), 13; Alfred H. Meyer, “Circulation and Settlement Patterns of the Calumet Region

northwest to southeast, piles of sand accumulate on the southeastern shoreline of Lake Michigan to form the largest fresh water coastal sand dunes in the world.⁷²⁷




Figure 37: Pre-Settlement Vegetation of Indiana's Dunes. Indiana Lake Michigan Coastal Program (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Indiana Department of Natural Resources), 2009.

As early as 1916, advocates fought for the preservation of Indiana's sand dunes at a national level. Advocates for a Sand Dunes National Park (which would have been the Midwest's first National Park) included famous Midwestern landscape architect Jens Jensen and millionaire industrialist Stephen Mather, who would soon become the first Director of the National Park Service.⁷²⁸ Jensen, as we discussed in the introduction, advocated for saving the dunes by appealing to sympathy for the Midwest's otherwise ostensibly mundane landscape, claiming, "The 200 feet of Mount Tom look just as big to me as the Rocky Mountains did when I visited them some year ago, and bigger to me, in fact, then did the Berkshires when I made my

of Northwest Indiana and Northeast Illinois (The Second Stage of Occupation-Pioneer Settler and Subsistence Economy, 1830-1850)," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 46, 3 (Sep. 1956): 324-345.

⁷²⁷ A. F. Knotts, *The Dunes of Northwest Indiana*, 13-15; Jerry S. Olson, "Rates of Succession and Soil Changes on Southern Lake Michigan Sand Dunes." *Botanical Gazette*, 119, 3 (March 1958): 132.

⁷²⁸ Mather's fortune had been made as the president and founder of the Thorkildsen-Mather borax Company, which mined for Borax primarily in southern California. Robert Shankland, *Steve Mather of the National parks* (New York: Knopf, 1951); George H. Hildebrand, *Borax Pioneer: Francis Marion Smith* (San Diego: Howell-North Books), 88. U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), *Report on the Proposed Sand Dunes National Park, Indiana*. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917), 24.

pilgrimage to those wonderful hills of Massachusetts.”⁷²⁹ Comparisons of the Indiana dunes to the vertical landscapes of Western National Parks did not result in the formation of a Sand Dunes National Park in 1916. Historian Alfred Runte identified the lack of early 20th century Midwestern parks as part of a larger trend where the NPS blocked parks with “ordinary scenic credentials.”⁷³⁰ In its early years, the Park Service bypassed the plains, fertile soil, and “commonplace” nature of the Midwest when preserving land. As of 1956, only one of the twenty-nine National Parks was in the Midwest (Isle Royal National Park in Michigan). The Midwestern inferiority complex regarding the National Park Service went back to these perceived jiltings in the first years of the NPS.⁷³¹

In the first push for a federal park in Northwest Indiana, women had played a prominent role. Bess Sheehan of Gary, Indiana had been very active in the 1910s initiative to establish a Sand Dunes National Park. A Progressive Era woman, Sheehan threw herself into causes common for women of that era. Local historians Kay Franklin and Norma Schaeffer write, “Soon after her marriage, Bess became a clubwoman, rising quickly to positions of leadership. From local membership in the Pioneer Society of Gary, Woman’s Club, YMCA, Historical Society, and College Club, she climbed, after four years, to chair the State Federation of Woman’s Club’s Committee on Forestry and Waterways in 1916.” One biographer called Sheehan “the best

⁷²⁹ U.S. DOI, *Report on the Proposed Sand Dunes National Park, Indiana*, 24.

⁷³⁰ Alfred Runte, “Review: Sacred Sands: The Struggle for Community in the Indiana Dunes,” *The Journal of American History*, 71, 1 (June 1984): 157-158.

⁷³¹ Ron Cockrell, U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Midwest Regional Office, Office of Planning and Resource Preservation, Division of Cultural Resource Management, *A Signature of Time and Eternity: The Administrative History of the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, Indiana*. (Omaha), Ch. 1. For more background on the dunes, see Kay Franklin and Norma Schaeffer, *Duel for the Dunes: Land Use Conflict on the Shores of Lake Michigan* (Urbana, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983). “Vertical landscapes” term in reference to National Parks is from Paul Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion: An Administrative History of Point Reyes National Seashore* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007). U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, “View All Parks A-Z.” http://home.nps.gov/applications/contacts/contacts_atoz.cfm.

known woman in Indiana.”⁷³² Part of the National Dunes Park Association in the 1910s alongside pioneering ecologists Henry Chandler Cowles and Armanis F. Knotts, Sheehan organized pageants on the sand and created the “Gary *Dunes Park Post*” to drum up support for the dunal park.⁷³³ Sheehan, a “Gary Clubwoman,” took charge of the dunes movement after the 1917 death of the Sand Dunes National Park legislation.⁷³⁴

After the death of the 1916 national movement to save the dunes, Bess Sheehan took charge of the movement on a local level. As secretary of the National Dunes Park Association and Chair of the Dunes Park Committee of the Indiana Federation of Women's Clubs (which included over 600 women's clubs), Sheehan mobilized a small army of women. Her highly organized movement resulted in the creation of the Indiana Dunes State Park in 1923. That year, Indiana designated three miles of shoreline (about 3,000 acres total) a State Park—much less than the 13,000 acres for which Mather had asked, but a park nonetheless.⁷³⁵ For the next thirty years, the dunes movement lay dormant. The State Park creation placated early activists with the recreation space and scenic sand dunes they wanted, satiating their dreams of a national park in Indiana. For the next thirty years after their success, the movement for a National Park in the Indiana Dunes lay dormant.⁷³⁶

⁷³² Franklin and Schaeffer tie Sheehan's identity closely with her club membership, Franklin and Schaeffer, *Duel for the Dunes*, 86-87.

⁷³³ Franklin and Schaeffer note that the special edition dunes paper included editorial backing from the *Gary Post* and even the endorsement of Indiana Governor James Goodrich. *Duel for the Dunes*, 39-45.

⁷³⁴ Franklin and Schaeffer, *Duel for the Dunes*, 86-87.

⁷³⁵ Support for a dunal park from Indiana politicians was much stronger in the 1910s and 1920s than in the post-WWII period. Franklin and Schaeffer note that the Indiana Governor in 1923, Warren T. McCray, was a “long-time Dunes support.” Like in the 1950s, notably, the National Dunes Park Associations members were primarily women by the early 1920s, yet the insider politics of the organization was conducted by a male ally (in this case, Indiana conservationist Richard Lieber). Franklin and Schaeffer, 87-95. For more on Lieber, see *Duel for the Dunes*, 74-78; Robert Allen Frederick, “Colonel Richard Lieber, Conservationist and Park Builder: The Indiana Years” (PhD diss, Indiana University, 1960).

⁷³⁶ Ron Cockrell, U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Midwest Regional Office, Office of Planning and Resource Preservation, Division of Cultural Resource Management, *A Signature of Time and Eternity: The Administrative History of the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, Indiana*. (Omaha), Ch. 1.

A legacy of steel on Indiana's shifting sands

Even as Indiana's dunes became a symbol of Midwestern natural beauty in the early 20th century, steel companies leveled these same mountains of sand in a rush to construct mills and generating plants that would power Chicago's growing megalopolis. North Chicago Railway Mill Company opened what would become U.S. Steel Corporation's Chicago South Work as early as 1882, and Standard Oil built its refinery in Whiting, Indiana in 1889. The U.S. Steel Gary Works went into business in 1906 and Indiana Harbor in East Chicago began accepting ships by 1916.⁷³⁷ Industrialization and its sooty smokestacks worried concerned Midwesterners long before massive environmental clean-ups of the 1970s. Ecologists like Cowles took note of the adverse effects of pollution in the dunes as early as 1899, noting, "In the neighborhood of the oil refineries at Whiting, Ind., the pine trees especially have been injured or destroyed."⁷³⁸ Northern Indianans had long coped with industrial pollution, even during the areas' establishment as an ecological heritage site.

What some Midwesterners found beyond the pale in the 1930s was the proposal of a deep-water port at "Burns Ditch"—a waterway whose un-majestic name pointed to its limited potential as a port site. Land preservation activists kept an eye on the Burns Ditch issue, for the proposed port sat directly in the middle of a planned Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore. Burns Ditch was originally cut in 1926 by a Mr. Randall W. Burns of Chicago to connect the Little Calumet River to Lake Michigan. Calling the Little Calumet a "river" was generous; before the digging of Burns Ditch the Little Calumet had "two mouths connected with Lake Michigan, and the current might move either to the east or to the west end of the stream, depending on which

⁷³⁷ To this day the Whiting Refinery (now owned by BP) is the largest oil refinery in the Midwest. Harold M. Mayer, "Politics and Land Use: The Indiana Shoreline of Lake Michigan," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 54, 4 (December 1964): 508-523. For more on Gary's steel works, coke plants, harbors and the environmental changes that building them wreaked on the sand dunes, marsh, and Grand Calumet River (not the same river as the Little Calumet), see Hurley, *Environmental Inequalities*, 15-20.

⁷³⁸ Cowles, "The Ecological Relations of the Vegetation on the Sand Dunes of Lake Michigan," 110.

way the wind blew.”⁷³⁹ The Army Corps of Engineers first surveyed Burns Ditch as a potential public harbor site in 1931. They ruled unfavorably, then re-surveyed and re-refused Burns Ditch as a possible Indiana port in 1935 and 1944. Because of the constant sand accrual on Lake Michigan’s southeastern shore – fed by the same winds that created Indiana’s sand dunes in the first place – any Indiana port would have to be dredged constantly to keep it functional. Constant dredging made projects costs for a channel as unpromising as Burns Ditch ludicrously expensive.

Tables turned in 1949, when the St. Lawrence Seaway project neared approval. A St. Lawrence passageway to the Atlantic substantially reduced shipping costs from the Great Lakes to international markets. Midwestern steel mills that could not reap profits with railroads as primary shipping avenues could become lucrative overnight with a Seaway in place.⁷⁴⁰ In 1949, banking on the promise of the St. Lawrence Seaway, the Army Corps finally approved Burns Ditch as a deep-water port, albeit ahead of federal and state funding approvals.⁷⁴¹ Bethlehem and Midwest Steel, the two steel companies who owned the majority of land at Burns Ditch and had been lobbying for a public port for decades, were delighted with the news.

Bethlehem Steel, founded in 1905 by Charles Schwab, was one of the nation’s largest steel companies in the 1950s and the proposed plant at Burns Harbor was to be its largest works. The twenty-three million tons of steel Bethlehem produced in 1960 accounted for 16% of U.S. total capacity. Bethlehem proudly touted their adverse environmental impacts—the company’s

⁷³⁹ Meyer, “Circulation and Settlement Patterns of the Calumet Region of Northwest Indiana and Northeast Illinois,” 343; Mayer, “Politics and Land Use,” 512.

⁷⁴⁰ Construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway officially began in 1954. For more on the St. Lawrence Seaway, see several recent publications, including Daniel Macfarlane, *Negotiating a River: Canada, the US, and the Creation of the St. Lawrence Seaway* (University of British Columbia Press, 2014); Jeff Alexander, *Pandora’s Locks: The Opening of the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2009); Claire Puccia Parham, *The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project: An Oral History of the Greatest Construction Show on Earth* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2009); Ronald Stagg, *The Golden Dream: A History of the St. Lawrence Seaway at Fifty* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2009).

⁷⁴¹ Mayer, “Politics and Land Use,” 511-12; Dorothy Buell, “Port of Indiana [notes on port timeline].” Save the Dunes Council Records, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN.

plants used more than 1.25 billion gallons of water a day—“enough to supply the entire city of New York,” and 394 million kWh of electricity—“roughly equal to the requirements of a city the size of Cleveland, Ohio.”⁷⁴² Bethlehem publicized these numbers in a 1960 informational pamphlet in an attempt to wow Midwesterners into accepting the industrial promise of the steel giant into Indiana’s struggling economy. In the words of a Midwest Steel official, “the Bible says not to build your house on sand, but the Bible never had to reckon with a steel mill.”⁷⁴³

The confidence of steel companies in their ability to build new facilities in Indiana bordered on arrogance. Companies like U. S. Steel, Midwest, and Bethlehem had enjoyed free rein to exploit northwest Indiana’s environment in the name of economic growth since U.S. Steel’s arrival in Gary in 1906. Intense air pollution and ill-health effects touched most of Gary’s residents and those downwind of Gary’s sand dunes. Yet, the smokestacks remained a sign of progress, of Indiana keeping up with Chicago’s industrial might. Andrew Hurley writes that northwest Indiana’s complete faith in steel companies as economic engines only changed when the “middle-class environmental reform movement of the 1950s” came to Gary. Hurley calls these reformists the “First significant challenge to industrial exploitation of Indiana’s environment.”⁷⁴⁴ Even in the 1910s-20s fight to save the dunes, conservationists like Sheehan and Mather did not try to disrupt steel’s dominance in Northwest Indiana; it was the region’s primary economic engine.⁷⁴⁵ The confidence of steel executives in the postwar period thus had

⁷⁴² Bethlehem Steel, “This is Bethlehem Steel,” Booklet 526-A, 1960, Thomas Dustin Papers, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN.

⁷⁴³ Ronald Kotulak, “Dunes Entice Developers: industry and conservation groups covet Indiana’s shore acres.” *The NIPSCO Picture*, 7, 5 (October, 1960), ed. Raymond L. Hill, Thomas Dustin Papers, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN.

⁷⁴⁴ Hurley, *Environmental Inequalities*, 45.

⁷⁴⁵ Sheehan and her fellow conservationists were concerned about highway building and subdivision of lakefront land, but did not go head-to-head with industrial interest in the area. In fact, U.S. Steel supported an Indiana Dunes State Park – in 1919, William Gleason, Superintendent of the Gary Works, became President of the National Dunes Park Association. Engel, *Sacred Sands*, 247; Franklin and Schaeffer, *Duel for the Dunes*, 89-90;

deep roots in decades of unwavering Hoosier support. As the 1950s went on, however, that support began to falter.

Women resurrect plans for a sand dunes park in Indiana

As the population of Northwest Indiana grew, ever greater numbers of women noticed with disgust the destruction of duneland around them. The three largest communities in the Indiana Dunes—Beverly Shores, Ogden Dunes, and Dune Acres—included many summer cottage homes owned by Chicago residents.⁷⁴⁶ These three towns were the three largest (non-industrial) resort communities in the Indiana dunes. Dune Acres and Ogden Dunes incorporated around the time Indiana created the Indiana Dunes State Park (1923 and 1925). Beverly Shores entered townhood in 1947, on the early end of the next dunes movement. In a 1952 letter, would-be Dune Acres residents Wilma West expressed her righteous indignation at the wilderness-destroying plans to build more ports and steel mills in the dunes area, and ensured that she and her husband would “certainly not consider building any home adjacent to an industrial harbor.”⁷⁴⁷ A property-owner in Miller, the dunal town closest to Gary, remembered “beautiful beaches” at the dunes, but “some of that was threatened by pollution. Sometimes we couldn’t go swimming.”⁷⁴⁸

Women like West and Meyerson were part of the group Hurley calls “middle-class environmentalists”—they grounded their opposition to industry and pollution in an effort to protect the ideal of suburban life and the “fresh air, pastoral landscapes, [and] open spaces” that

⁷⁴⁶ While some lived full-time in Indiana, many Save the Dunes leaders in the 1950s (including Dorothy Buell, Naomi Ireland Svihla, and Paul Douglas) spent only summers in the Indiana Dunes area. Stephanie Smith and Steve Mark, “Alice Gray, Dorothy Buell, and Naomi Svihla: Preservationists of Ogden Dunes,” *The South Shore Journal*, 1 (2006): 3. Dune Acres’ town history cites the late 1950s and early 1960s as a transition period where the town went from being “a summer colony with few year-round residents” to a more year-round community.

⁷⁴⁷ William and Wilma West to Dorothy Buell, August 24, 1952, Save the Dunes Council Records. Town of Dune Acres, Indiana, “Town History,” Accessed March 6, 2015 at <http://www.duneacres.org/townhistory.html>.

⁷⁴⁸ Lotte Meyerson, quoted in Hurley, *Environmental Inequalities*, 58.

were at the root of that identity.⁷⁴⁹ This new resistance to unrestrained industrial growth arose from northwest Indiana's growing middle class, made possible (ironically) by the prosperity of U. S. Steel in Gary from 1945-1970.⁷⁵⁰ More white collar jobs, especially for women, allowed families to move into Gary's suburbs, the nicest of which were in the still unspoiled sand dunes. As they moved into the dunes, middle-class families realized that they could not escape the industrial pollution of Gary. In northwest Indiana, the first protests of industrial pollution came in the 1950s, and they came from women.⁷⁵¹ Gary's chapter of the League of Women Voters successfully advocated for local smoke abatement ordinances, water fluoridation, water pollution minimum standards, and stricter air pollution controls for U. S. Steel. The League's members saw membership in the group as an antidote to the malaise of the postwar suburban housewife's life and allowed them a "way of feeling productive," in the words of one member.⁷⁵²

⁷⁴⁹ Hurley, *Environmental Inequalities*, 47. For more on how suburban lifestyles promoted environmental activism, see Adam Rome on "open space" activists in the 1950s suburbs. *Bulldozer in the Countryside*, 119-152.

⁷⁵⁰ Hurley identifies Miller as one of the most desirable Gary suburbs at this time. Miller, still nestled between sand dunes at the time, was where Henry Chandler Cowles first conducted his ecological studies. Hurley, *Environmental Inequalities*, 53.

⁷⁵¹ Hurley, *Environmental Inequalities*, 57-68.

⁷⁵² Hurley, *Environmental Inequalities*, 57. Suffolk County Chapters of the League of Women Voters were also very active in the political struggle over Fire Island. Doris C. Saunders, Corresponding Secretary, Brookhaven Chapter, League of Women Voters, to Senator Jacob Javits, October 3, 1964, Series 2, Box 78, Javits Collection, SBUL. For more on the League of Women Voters and the environmental movement nationally, see Rome, "Give Earth a Chance," 535, 541. See also "Women Voters Taken on Fire Island Tour," *Patchogue Advance*, October 3, 1963, 17.



Figure 38: Dorothy Buell. Photo Courtesy of the Save the Dunes Council (still in existence today), accessed March 25, 2015, <http://savedunes.org/2014/04/21/the-northwest-indiana-times-on-dunes-history/>.

The League of Women Voters were one of many northwest Indiana's women's groups advocating industrial reform and land preservation in the 1950s. In response to Bethlehem and Midwest Steel's proposal to build on the Burn's Ditch site, Dorothy Buell, a resident of Chicago and Ogden Dunes, revived the dormant crusade for the dunes in 1952. Buell hoped that designating Indiana's dunes as a National Park site could stave off future industrial expansion in the area. Buell first joined a Chicago-based group called the Indiana Dunes Preservation Council (IDPC), started by Chicago Professor Myron Rueben Strong in response to the 1949 Army Corps favorable report on Burns Harbor, Chicago professor Myron Reuben Strong began a group called the Indiana Dunes Preservation Council (IDPC) Strong's group never got off the ground,

attracting only a few Chicago environmentalists and ecologists.⁷⁵³ Strong wrote to Buell in 1952 that the group “lacked aggressive leadership” and asked her if she would be willing to fill this void. Middle-class women in the dunes had something Strong and his professorial colleagues did not: time.⁷⁵⁴

Buell decided to create an all-women’s group that focused “exclusively on the creation of a park,” on the model of Bess Sheehan’s successful State Park preservation movement in the 1920s.⁷⁵⁵ Twenty-seven women attended the first meeting in 1952 at Dorothy Buell’s Ogden Dunes home, including the legendary Bess Sheehan. School teachers, local residents, wives of higher-ups in the steel industry—all fairly well-to-do, white women—convened to save the dunes for their educational benefits, their recreation potential, and their scenic and spiritual beauty. The sheer amount of time that these women could contribute to the cause of preserving the dunes contributed heavily to the success of the Save the Dunes movement.⁷⁵⁶

Buell and her women’s group immediately began aggressive letter-writing campaigns.⁷⁵⁷ When Buell wrote NPS Director Conrad Wirth, he dismissed her revival of a National Park proposal at the dunes and encouraged her to work for state preservation, something Buell had already attempted to no avail.⁷⁵⁸ Condescending letters like Wirth’s convinced Buell that to go national, she would need to help of something her group lacked: men. A women’s group in 1955 could be locally effective with one-dollar dues, letter-writing, and private fundraising, but any national-scale movement at the time needed powerful men who could publicize issues and garner

⁷⁵³ Engel, *Sacred Sands*, 254-155.

⁷⁵⁴ Rome, “Give Earth a Chance,” 540-541.

⁷⁵⁵ Herb Read and Charlotte Read, “Creating and Protecting a National Park,” in *Eternal Vigilance: Nine Tales of Environmental Heroism in Indiana*, ed. Steven Higgs (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995): 193.

⁷⁵⁶ Stephanie Smith and Steve Mark, “Alice Gray, Dorothy Buell, and Naomi Svihla: Preservationists of Ogden Dunes,” *The South Shore Journal*, 1 (2006): 3.

⁷⁵⁷ Smith and Mark, “Preservationists of Ogden Dunes,” 15-21.

⁷⁵⁸ Conrad L. Wirth to Dorothy Buell, October 26, 1955, Save the Dunes Council Records, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN.

votes. Female activists organized, advocated, and brought issues to the fore, but to gain legislative legitimacy they needed a male ally—often only one would do—to adopt their cause.⁷⁵⁹ Knowing that the promise of a port smelled sweeter to Hoosier politicians than the prospect of parks, Buell went to another state to fund a powerful male politician who could legitimize the cause of the Save the Dunes Council: Illinois, home of Senator (and Indiana dunes summer resident) Paul Douglas.⁷⁶⁰

And thus, Dorothy Buell began her correspondence with some of the leading male figures of the environmental movement in the 1950s. In 1955 she began correspondence with Richard Pough, who had co-founded the Nature Conservancy the previous year. Pough at first wrote off Buell's requests, but joined her cause after Buell emphasized the historical and biological wealth in northwestern Indiana's coast.⁷⁶¹ Dorothy Buell wrote letters requesting publicity help from the Izaak Walton League, Save the Redwoods, and Rachel Carson, to name a few.⁷⁶² Buell also took a trip to California to see Donald Peattie, the famous environmental author, to see if he would support her cause. Peattie was ill and his wife advised against him helping Buell, but his wife did Buell a favor and called Emily Taft Douglas, wife of Illinois Senator Paul Douglas. The

⁷⁵⁹ Susan R. Schrepfer notes a similar phenomenon in the immediate postwar period, where women were in leadership positions but the spokesperson role suddenly went to men. See *Nature's Altars: Mountains, Gender, and American Environmentalism* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005). Andrew Hurley discussion of 1950s middle class female activists in Indiana includes this phenomenon, but Hurley does not really address it directly. Most of the activists were women, but the elected officials who ultimately passed the laws for which they advocated were men.

⁷⁶⁰ Marguerite Dice to Clint Murchison, November 10, 1955. Save the Dunes Council Records, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN; Dorothy Buell to Frank N. Wallace, Supt. Of Division of Entomology, IN State Department, Sept. 16, 1952, Save the Dunes Council Records, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN; Smith and Mark, "Preservationists of Ogden Dunes," 15.

⁷⁶¹ Dorothy Buell and Richard Pough, Correspondence, May 23, 1955 to December 2, 1955. Save the Dunes Council Records.

⁷⁶² Rachel Carson to Dorothy Buell, Sept. 14, 1963, Save the Dunes Council Records; Newton B. Drury of the Save-the-Redwoods League to Dorothy Buell, May 1, 1964, Save the Dunes Council Records.

Douglasses owned a vacation home in Ogden Dunes and were sentimentally attached to Indiana's dunes.⁷⁶³

Networks of women once again came through in northwestern Indiana activism. Douglas agreed to take up Buell's cause in Congress once it gained more widespread—and male—national acknowledgement. Douglas presented the first Senate Bill for the establishment as an Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore in 1958, S. 3898. While Douglas and the Save the Dunes Council sought solutions outside of Indiana, Indiana politicians still sought the port that would bring increased revenue to the state.⁷⁶⁴ In 1957, the State of Indiana granted \$2 million to industrial groups in Northwest Indiana for land acquisition. Buell and Douglas knew from these pro-industrial, pro-public port moves that Indiana's state government would not agree to the expansion of the Indiana Dunes State Park.⁷⁶⁵

After Douglas introduced his Senate Bill 3898 in May of 1958, national spotlight for the Indiana Dunes skyrocketed. Save the Dunes Council's income doubled between 1958 and 1959 to over \$4,000. The Council sent out invitations to its members for the May 11, 1959 House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs hearings on the bill. The invitations urged members to make the ten-hour drive to Washington, D.C. for the educational experience— and to “bring the kids!” This child-friendly approach to the hearings suggests that even in 1959, the majority of Save the Dunes Council members remained women – specifically, upper-middle class women with families who could afford to take a weekend trip to D.C.⁷⁶⁶

⁷⁶³ Jacqueline Widmar Stewart, “Carrying on a Conversation: A talk with Bob Buell,” Lexicus Press, http://www.lexicuspress.com/art_files/Convo_Buell.pdf.

⁷⁶⁴ Correspondence between Dorothy Buell and Richard Pough, May 23, 1955 to December 2, 1955. Save the Dunes Council Records.

⁷⁶⁵ Dorothy Buell, “Port of Indiana,” Save the Dunes Council Records.

⁷⁶⁶ Ann A. Sims, “Statement of Income of Save the Dunes Council for the Ten Year Period Beginning November 1953 to December 1963, Inclusive.” Save the Dunes Council Records; Save the Dunes Council, Announcement of Washington Hearings, Save the Dunes Council Records. Hurley, *Environmental Inequalities*, 70.




Figure 39: "Proposed Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore," Save the Dunes Council, 1960. Save the Dunes Council Records, Calumet Regional Archives, Indiana University Northwest, Gary.

Steel, Pollution, and Unions: Harsh Realities of a Northwest Indiana Park

Douglas' bills in the Senate got steel companies moving just as fast as the Save the Dunes Council. By 1959, NIPSCO had finalized its plans to build a \$30 million generating plant (two coal-fired generating plants with a total capacity of 523,900 kW), a 345,000 kW substation, and "a transmissions corridor as well as support facilities to serve the port needs of its industrial neighbors, Bethlehem and Midwest." Midwest had owned their land in the Burns Ditch area since 1929, and Bethlehem was only beginning to enter the picture in a series of deals sealed with the State of Indiana. NIPSCO's case for a generating plant, therefore, only made sense if Midwest and Bethlehem built mills at Burns Ditch, which would only be cost-effective if Burns Harbor was approved; and Burns Harbor could only really attract enough traffic to merit creation if the 1959 opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway delivered on its promises of increased international trade. Thus, as the push for saving the Indiana Dunes began, so began the push to industrialize the dormant, cheap, industrially-zoned land along Indiana's northwestern shoreline.

Changing motivations made the moves of any side—residential, industrial, or preservationist—unpredictable, much as the dunes themselves evaded any firm forecast of future events.⁷⁶⁷

One way to get Hoosiers on board to a park proposal was to relate the debate to an issue on everyone’s mind with the sustained industrial activity in their area: air pollution. In the coal-powered Chicago-Gary industrial complex, concentrations of sulfur dioxide were 1.6 ppm, a full **25% more** than London’s levels during the deadly “Great Smog” incidents of the 1952.⁷⁶⁸

Suburban women’s groups in northwest Indiana used suburban ideals of pastoral landscapes and land conservation to argue for pollution controls in the 1950s.⁷⁶⁹ By emphasizing land preservation, the Save the Dunes Council could address pollution through a slightly less controversial issue: parkland.⁷⁷⁰

Save the Dunes Council members suggested that a park in Indiana would help remedy air and water pollution problems the state faced. Sylvia Troy of Indiana referenced the example of Britain’s 1956 Clean Air Act, which controlled air and water pollution by establishing “smokeless and unpolluted zones near industrial areas.” Troy suggested that an Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore would function similarly, as a non-industrial buffer zone.⁷⁷¹ Her husband,

⁷⁶⁷ Franklin and Schaeffer, *Duel for the Dunes*, 109, 229; Mayer, “Politics and Land Use,” 512.

⁷⁶⁸ London’s smogs caused about 12,000 deaths and accounted for illness in an additional 100,000 people. Michelle L. Bell et al. “A Retrospective Analysis of Mortality from the London Smog Episode of 1952: The Role of Influenza and Pollution,” *Environmental Health Perspectives*, 112, 1 (January 2004): 6-8; Hurley, *Environmental Inequalities*, 158; Jerry S. Olson, “Rates of Succession and Soil Changes on Southern Lake Michigan Sand Dunes.” *Botanical Gazette*, 119, 3 (March 1958): 132.

⁷⁶⁹ Hurley, *Environmental Inequalities*, 45-48.

⁷⁷⁰ Throughout the 1960s, relatively broad bipartisan support existed for land conservation measures and the wilderness movement. See Turner, *The Promise of Wilderness*, 39-40; J. Brooks Flippen, *Nixon and the Environment* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000); Thomas G. Smith, *Green Republican: John Saylor and the Preservation of America’s Wilderness* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006). For a more recent popular culture look at this early bipartisan support for the environment, see William Cronon’s 2001 op-ed, “When the G.O.P. Was Green,” *New York Times*, January 8, 2001.

⁷⁷¹ Sylvia Troy, House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 538. In his discussion of women on the environment, Adam Rome mentions Sylvia Troy by name. Rome uses Troy as an example of a housewife-turned-activist: Though often attracted to the environmental cause as an extension of their traditional responsibilities as housewives and mothers, many women found the work liberating. Sylvia Troy is a good example. Until her late thirties, Troy was content to be the wife of a doctor. She had little interest in politics. But in 1960 she went to a dinner meeting of the Indiana Save the Dunes Council, and she was impressed by the spirit of the group . . . she soon realized that she had the

Jack Troy, argued that a park could help pollution control through mitigating problems like industrial slag, industrial water pollution in the lake, and over-flowing septic tanks. Flammable Lake Erie waters might take \$5 billion to clean, but Indiana could prevent future pollution by asking for \$30 million in land acquisition costs.⁷⁷² This could even be a federal expense; the Department of the Interior wanted coastal parks anyways and had proved willing to pay for them at places like Cape Cod.

The proximity of the proposed Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore to Chicago's huge population led supporters to bill it as a "democratic" park. While many who fought for the park belonged to the upper-middle classes, most northern Indianans outside of dunal resort communities resided in steel towns and industrial areas. Traveling to National Parks was a status symbol that these Americans could not afford. During the congressional hearings on the Indiana Dunes, Congressman Morris Udall reminded a steel union representative that those with the greatest stake in Midwestern recreation areas "are not the upper classes because they can afford to go to Florida or Yellowstone or Canada or Europe. The people who have the greatest stake are people like your members who work for a living and can't afford to go long distances." As of 1966, Indiana had only 49,000 acres of public parkland – less than Cook County's forest reserve system.⁷⁷³

This lack of recreation opportunities in Indiana led most unions with a presence in Indiana to support the Lakeshore proposal. United Steel Workers publically backed Indiana

skills to be a leader. She could network, lobby, recruit, motivate, and negotiate. When the group's first president stepped down, Troy was chosen to succeed her. She then served as president for more than a decade. 'The Save the Dunes Council experience changed me dramatically,' she recalled. 'It became a vehicle for my personal growth. I learned a lot about my own capabilities, my own strengths, and my own assertiveness on behalf of a cause.' Rome, "Give Earth a Chance," 539-540.

⁷⁷²Testimony of Mr. Jack M. Troy of Munster, IN, House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 539.

⁷⁷³ Congressman Morris Udall to Toby Bocanegra (Port and Industrial Development of Northern Indiana), House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 506; Testimony of Robert A. Mann of Michigan City, House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 531; Terrence Young, "Modern Urban Parks," *Geographical Review*, 85, 4 (1994): 535-551.

Dunes National Lakeshore, citing recreational opportunities from which their Gary plant workers and managers would benefit.⁷⁷⁴ The United Auto Workers Union (UAW) also supported a park in Indiana's dunes for the benefit of Midwestern recreation. Walter P. Reuther, President of the UAW, wrote to the White House in 1963 that the Kennedy Administration should "explore ways to encourage industrial and harbor development which will not destroy priceless scenic values and outdoor recreation for millions of Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois residents."⁷⁷⁵

Hammond, Indiana's Chamber of Commerce also lobbied for the park. Gary and Hammond already had their mills; their workers now wanted recreation opportunities—plus, no one wanted the extra competition. Elmer Rose from the Hammond Chamber of Commerce encouraged residents to support the National Lakeshore because "Lake County [site of Gary and Hammond] is now totally committed to industrial development" and "there has been, practically speaking, no effective regional planning [in the Midwest] to effect a good balance between industrial development and recreational areas to assure the health, well-being, and inspiration of the exploding population."⁷⁷⁶ Rose saw Indiana and Chicago as both benefitting from the park. He didn't worry about missing industrial opportunities because Hammond already had their "bathtub in the sand."⁷⁷⁷

⁷⁷⁴ Testimony of Clyde D. Bolen (Union Pier Michigan for the Carpenter's District Council of Lakes County and Vicinity), House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 466; Testimony of Toby Bocanegra (Chairman of the Northern Indiana Port and Industrial Development Organized Labor Committee), House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 502.

⁷⁷⁵ Telegram, Walter P. Reuther to President John F. Kennedy, April 22, 1963, Box 657, "PA 3, 2-21-63 – " Folder, White House Central Subject Files, JFKL. For more on the intersections of the labor and environmental movements, see Brian K. Obach, *Labor and the Environmental Movement: The Quest for Common Ground* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004); Fred Rose, *Coalitions across the Class Divide: Lessons from the Labor, Peace, and Environmental Movements* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000).

⁷⁷⁶ Testimony of Elmer Rose (Hammond Chamber of Commerce), House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 460. Gary and Hammond often function *de facto* as part of Chicago, although they are both in Indiana. When Indiana switched to EST in 2006, Gary and Hammond stayed on Chicago time.

⁷⁷⁷ "They haven't got their bathtub in the sand yet, and I don't think the project has the public favor it might once have enjoyed. . . The latest news—which we've been telling for a couple of years—that the ditch port cost has been understated comes as just a ho-hum event to us. since they have lost National Steel as a major possible port user, the news keeps getting a little worse every day. I see now, with something of a smirk, that they're trying to draw western sugar beets in to a sugar refinery, in order to provide justification. That's a real gasser as far as I'm

Several Steelworkers unions, mostly those who would benefit from a Midwest-Bethlehem controlled port in Indiana, opposed the Lakeshore proposal. Toby Bocanegra, Chairman of the Northern Indiana Port and Industrial Development Organized Labor Committee, testified for fourteen labor organizations that opposed the National Lakeshore. Those like Bocanegra who stood a chance to benefit from the proposed port at Burns Ditch saw the Lakeshore proposal as a way for wealthy residents of the area to stunt opportunities for economically struggling locals. The Carpenter's District of Union Pier, Michigan argued that Indiana's "15 parcels of land which totals 8,894 acres" in which "swimming is prohibited, except for approximately 1 ½ miles," required more recreation areas to qualify for federal recreation funding.⁷⁷⁸ To steel unions like Bocanegra's, saving the dunes was simply a way for wealthy residents to enclose their expensive homes with land federally zoned as "pristine nature."⁷⁷⁹ Unions like Bocanegra's saw the involvement of Illinois Senator Paul Douglas as particularly offensive because of his outsider status.

Douglas's involvement prompted debate over the historically contentious relationship between neighbors Chicago and northern Indiana. Chicago had witnessed intense industrial and economic growth from 1850-1950, which made Indiana's industrial growth in the same period seem modest by comparison.⁷⁸⁰ By the 1960s, Indiana's politicians grew ever more determined to reap their share of Midwestern industrial growth that Chicago, in their view, hoarded. When

concerned. . ." Thomas Dustin to Irving Leibowitz (Indianapolis Times), January 16, 1963. Thomas Dustin Papers, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN; Telegram from Paul Douglas to Dorothy Buell, Feb. 4, 1963, Save the Dunes Council Records, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN.

⁷⁷⁸ Recreational funding was flowing in the mid-1960s, thanks to the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission's (ORRRC) Report and the newly created Bureau of Outdoor Recreation that came from ORRRC's recommendations. See ORRRC, *Outdoor Recreation for America: A Report to the President and to the Congress* (Washington, D.C.: The Commission, 1962); The Regional Plan Association, *The Race for Open Space: Final Report of the Park, Recreation, and Open Space Project* (New York: The Regional Plan Association of New York, 1960); George B. Hartzog, Jr., *Battling for the National Parks* (Mount Kisco, N.Y.: Mover Bell, 1988).

⁷⁷⁹ Testimony of Clyde D. Bolen (Union Pier Michigan for the Carpenter's District Council of Lakes County and Vicinity), House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 466; Testimony of Toby Bocanegra (Chairman of the Northern Indiana Port and Industrial Development Organized Labor Committee), House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 502.

⁷⁸⁰ William Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991).

wealthy Chicagoans fought for a park in lieu of a port on Indiana's coast, Hoosiers saw their actions as that of a greedy neighbor. Indiana had sat on the sidelines while Chicago built their factories and skyscrapers; now Chicago wanted to prevent Indiana from doing the same, from catching up?⁷⁸¹

Hoosiers were very vocal about what they saw as the immorality of Chicagoans farming Indiana for parkland and stripping them of their own economic opportunity. Illinois Senator Paul Douglas became the biggest target for these accusations. "He owes Indiana nothing," began a scathing editorial on Indianan radio in 1963, "He owes Illinois much." The editorial continued and vocalized the anger of some Hoosiers towards "meddling" national politicians like Douglas:

he turns his back on the conservation problems of his own State, preferring to keep the industrial status solid in Illinois. . . and let his fellow Illinois residents 'play' in Indiana. If the Senator feels that he must interest himself in conservation of Natural resources, he might consider starting with the 325 mile long Illinois river, which runs nearly the length of his own state. Into this river is dumped the filth and garbage of Industry, and the wastes of Chicago's sewers and privies. The river, which once abounded with fish, and provided boating, swimming and recreation along its 600 miles of shoreline, is now nearly a major public health nuisance through much of its length, carrying only a few catfish, oil from barges, stench and filth beyond description. . . Why can't Chicago. . . clean its own privies and provide its own recreation for its millions of citizens, rather than 'steal' the land from Indiana for its use.⁷⁸²

Many Hoosiers saw Douglas' focus on the dunes as hypocritical. They worried that Chicagoans saw Indiana's dunes as a hinterland playground for Chicago, rather than one of Indiana's only opportunities to expand industrially.⁷⁸³ If Douglas wanted to fix Indiana's public health issues, maybe he should tidy his own state's pollution problems first, many Hoosiers felt.

⁷⁸¹ This argument is similar to that which developing nations have taken in debates of global climate change in recent years. See James Gustave Speth, *Red Sky at Morning: America and the crisis of the global environment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); David Held, Charles Roger, and Eva-Maria Nag, *Climate Governance in the Developing World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013); W. Neil Adger, et al., "Adaptation to climate change in the developing world," *Progress in Development Studies* 3,3 (2003): 179–195.

⁷⁸² WIMS Editorial. July 26, 1961, 2, Save the Dunes Council Records, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN.

⁷⁸³ Parks were created as playgrounds for major cities by the early 20th century ,creating a sort of "tourist hinterland" to metropolitan areas. I take the language of hinterlands from Bill Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991). Several historians have written about how New York City's

That much of the land that these wealthy Chicagoans wanted to preserve was marshland added insult to injury for Hoosiers opposed to the Lakeshore. Urban Chicagoans, especially those working as botanists and ecologists who advocated for an Indiana Dunes park, were more up to date with the latest ecological research that emphasized the ecological importance of marshes to healthy biotas. Many rural Hoosiers, however, remained in the mindset of a previous era (like Robert Moses had been at Fire Island), one of simple land conservation and industrial expansion that saw no use for much.⁷⁸⁴

Marshes, like those in Indiana's backdunes, have historically been the stepchild of ecosystems, drained and "made useful," cleansed of their deathly malarial mosquitoes. Only after the relative eradication mosquito-borne illnesses in the U.S. could we even consider preserving marshes, and still, strong anti-marsh sentiment remained. Clyde D. Bolen of the Union Pier Michigan Carpenter's District Council saw no value in preserving Indiana's swampy backdunes:

These are botanist bills rather than park bills as the proponents want the public to believe . . . there are many streams, bogs, marshes, mucks, et cetera, in other parts of Indiana and the Midwest, which would meet the desires of the botanist, except they be of selfish motive.⁷⁸⁵

In Indiana, people saw marshes as "mucks" and "et ceteras" more than habitats for living and endangered species— "not bogs with highly valuable flora but simply swamps that breed mosquitoes." Bolen and others saw the ecological argument for the National Lakeshore a cheap way for the Chicago *intellegista* to play with science in the dunes, thus blocking industrial

leisured classes shaped the Northeast and contributed to its reforestation, including Ellen Stroud, *Nature Next Door: Cities and Trees in the American Northeast* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2012); David Stradling, *Making Mountains: New York City and the Catskills* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2007). See also David Potter, *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

⁷⁸⁴ For a great history of urban muck, both cultural and natural, see John Waldman, *Heartbeats in the Muck: The History, Sea Life, and Environment of New York Harbor* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013). On wetlands and government land use policies, see Nancy Langston, *Where Land and Water Meet: A Western Landscape Transformed* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003); Ari Kelman, *A River and Its City: The Nature of Landscape in New Orleans* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003). 153-160.

⁷⁸⁵ Testimony of Clyde D. Bolen, House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 456.

opportunities for Hoosiers. Indiana already had a state park on Lake Michigan; why stop industrial plants to save a few of the photosynthesizing variety?⁷⁸⁶

Indiana Support for a Federal Park in Indiana

Buell and Douglas recognized that drumming up Indiana support for the lakeshore—especially from locals who valued the unique ecosystems of the dunes—was essential to passing the park bill in Congress.⁷⁸⁷ Finding Hoosiers who approved of a federal park in northern Indiana did not always prove simple. At October 1965 Congressional hearings, Valparaiso’s conservative Indianapolis-influenced politicians and Chamber of Commerce were some of the most ardent opponents of the lakeshore. In Laporte County to the east, Michigan City (Indiana)’s government also opposed the National Lakeshore, and worried that it placed “an economic barrier between Michigan City, the largest city in the immediate area, and the Burns Harbor complex.”⁷⁸⁸

The Save the Dunes Council Public Relations guru, Thomas Dustin, praised the efforts of Indiana politicians whenever he could. Dustin often lauded Rep. Vance Hartke, Sen. Birch Bayh, Rep. Edward J. Roush, and Gov. Matthew E. Welsh and asserted that “the people of Indiana will

⁷⁸⁶ H. B. Snyder, President (*Gary-Post Tribune*) to Rep. Wayne Aspinall (D-CO), House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 708. University of Chicago botanists were very active in the Save the Dunes fight, most notably Charles E. Olmsted, whose papers are at the University of Chicago Special Collections Research Center.

⁷⁸⁷ The Save the Dunes Council countered anti-Douglas arguments by insisting that Douglas did not feel pro-industrial pressure from Indianapolis that Hoosier politicians experienced, so he possessed the luxury of long-term ideals of a park without having to worry about short-term consequences. The Save the Dunes Council made sure their administration was overwhelmingly from Indiana (or at least summer home owners there):

1. All Officers from Indiana (Portage, Chesterton, Gary, Dune Acres)
2. All Chairmen from Indiana (Chesterton, Portage, Ft. Wayne, East Chicago)
3. All Regional Chairmen from Indiana (Munster, Indianapolis, Hometown)
4. Advisory Board: 5 of 23 from IN, 10 from IL, one Nobel Prize Winner (Prof. James Watson, Harvard Biology)

Ann A. Sims to Mr. and Mrs. Donald P. Moore of Knightstown, IN, March 10, 1962; 1963 Save the Dunes Council Letter Back, Save the Dunes Council Records, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN.

⁷⁸⁸ Testimony of M.O. Shake of the Michigan City Chamber of Commerce, House Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore: Hearings on H.R. 51, H.R. 4412, and related bills*, 89th Cong., 2nd sess, April 4, 1966, 335.

be indebted to these public officials” for their support of “great principles” . . . [an] ocean gateway to world trade. . . [and a] national park for Indiana on our Lakes Michigan shoreline.”⁷⁸⁹ After the October 1965 hearings in Valparaiso, hearings for H.R. 51 moved to Washington, D.C. Dustin insisted that those giving testimony “MUST BE CERTIFIED RESIDENTS OF HOMES NOW WITHIN THE PROPOSED LAKESHORE BOUNDARIES” (his caps). Park supporters needed to convince Congress that residents of the dunes actually wanted the National Lakeshore.⁷⁹⁰

The State of Indiana did not help the Save the Dunes Council’s case. While steel unions, conservation groups, and Chicago botanists bickered over park proposals, the State of Indiana began a long process of scantily-publicized land deals and right-of-way agreements with Midwest and Bethlehem Steel. In 1960, Indiana and Midwest Steel agreed that if Burns Harbor became a reality, Midwest would not have to pay public terminal charges in perpetuity. The state also bought sixty-eight acres at \$3,119 an acre to make room for the port. This came after the 1959 land swap between Bethlehem Steel and the Northern Indiana Public Service Company (NIPSCO) that would allow the power-generating company to build a coal-fired plant next to Bethlehem to power its steel facilities.⁷⁹¹ Both steel companies at Burn’s Ditch threatened that they would proceed with construction even without public funding, the massive dredging required for the port made that unlikely. Opponents argued that because the Corp’s calculations

⁷⁸⁹ Thomas Dustin, “Save the Dunes Council Press Release,” July 1964, Save the Dunes Council Records, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN; Save the Dunes Council Press Release, “Save Dunes Council Leader Praises State Senator Christy,” February 5, 1964; John B. Nicosia (Mayor of East Chicago, Indiana) to Dorothy Buell, January 20, 1964, Save the Dunes Council Records, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN.

⁷⁹⁰ Thomas Dustin to Alton Lindsey, January 20, 1964; Thomas E. Dustin to Sen. Paul Douglas, February 11, 1964, Save the Dunes Council Records, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN.

⁷⁹¹ A.J. Berdis, “Affidavit,” *City of Gary vs. National Steel Corporation*. Northern District of Indiana Court, Hammond Division, Civil Action No. 3162 (November 24, 1961), Thomas Dustin Papers, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN; Buell, “Port of Indiana,” 1961, Save the Dunes Council Records, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN; Mayer, “Politics and Land Use,” 508-523.

estimated Midwest and Bethlehem would account for over 97% of the traffic in the port, public financing was immoral, as the port would effectively be private.⁷⁹²

Aware of these backroom deals, the Save the Dunes Council Engineering Committee submitted detailed plans for an “Outer Indiana Port” in the Gary, Whiting, and Hammond area as an alternative to the Burns Ditch site. This area already housed extensive industry, and was therefore was not prime for recreational use or ecological preservation, the two strongest points for setting aside Indiana duneland. However, neither Midwest nor Bethlehem wanted to build at a site other than Burns Ditch, where the companies already owned land. Additionally, real estate any closer to Chicago was prohibitively expensive. As Indiana’s surreptitious steel ties surfaced, Indiana legislators who wanted the park but could not politically survive a vote against Indianan industry toyed with middle ground.




Figure 40: Proposed Indiana Outer Harbor. Gary Post Tribune, August 11, 1961. Save the Dunes Council Records, Calumet Regional Archives, Indiana University Northwest, Gary, Indiana.

A Port for a Park

On July 26, 1961, Senator Vance Hartke (D-IN) proposed the “Burns Ditch Compromise.” Hartke reasoned that steel companies had already built on or had definitive plans to build on their Burns Ditch sites. Because the building had already commenced, Indiana could

⁷⁹² Gordon Englehart, “Who Would Gain From Hoosier Port?” *The Louisville Courier-Journal*, February 10, 1963. Thomas Dustin Papers, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN: “The Engineers estimate that it would cost Midwest \$12,000,000 to build a private port of its own—almost three times the \$4,500,000 Midwest-Bethlehem share of the public port cost. . . Midwest would not pay one cent of the cost of the construction or maintenance.”

only save its less degraded dunes through combining the National Lakeshore initiative with the port public financing campaign. Hartke also cited the recent successful historic preservation of Indiana's first National Park Unit—a National Monument at Abraham Lincoln's boyhood home. He insisted that Indiana possessed national heritage sites, both cultural and natural. Hartke wanted the federal government to preserve its heritage in conjunction with the creation of new industry and jobs, a welcome compromise to many Hoosiers.⁷⁹³

Hartke's compromise did not catch on immediately. The ultimate approval of Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore owed itself to the example of Cape Cod. In a story mythologized by northwestern Indianans, Senator Paul Douglas kept the entire dunes movement from going under in a valiant, last-ditch. In October 1962, Douglas heard that President Kennedy had the allocation for a federally-financed Burns Harbor on his desk, ready for signing within the day. Douglas headed for the White House with no scheduled meeting and he took a stroll through the Rose garden with President Kennedy (Douglas had been pestering Kennedy's office with telegrams and letters regarding the dunes for months). Douglas argued that Indiana's dunes, so similar to the National Seashore that the President held so dear, was worthy of the same national preservation that Cape Cod had attained in the previous year—*with the help of federal funds*. Thanks in part to Kennedy's soft spot for Cape Cod, Douglas's pleading convinced Kennedy to scratch the Burns Harbor allocation from the 1962-3 fiscal year budget. The port was stalled.⁷⁹⁴

Throughout the legislative wrangling over the dunes, the Save the Dunes Council continued extensive letter writing campaigns to Congress and the President. One member had her gradeschool class in Morton, Illinois write letters to President Kennedy asking him to save the

⁷⁹³ Vance Hartke Office, "Senator Vance Hartke Reports from Washington, D.C.," February 23, 1962, Save the Dunes Council Records, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN; WIMS Editorial (Radio, Michigan City, IN), Broadcast July 26, 1961, 12:15 PM, 5:05 PM, 10:05 PM. Save the Dunes Council Records, CRA, IU Northwest, Gary, IN.

⁷⁹⁴ Telegram from Thomas Dustin to Senator John F. Kennedy, October 4, 1962, Box 657, "PA 3, 8-26-62 – 10-31-62" Folder, White House Central Subject File, JFKL; Franklin and Schaeffer, *Duel for the Dunes*, 165;

dunes. Some, like Andrea Bloch, admitted, “I have not been there yet,” but since “Our whole class is for saving the Indiana Dunes,” she supported it, too.⁷⁹⁵ Their teacher had briefed the children on the situation: bad industrialists try to destroy pretty dunes, complete with flowers and dunes fun for sliding down. Little Bobby Hollinger (of the same Morton Grove class), wrote to the President, “I wish the rich people would build their ports and steel mills some place else, don’t you?”⁷⁹⁶ Like their teacher (presumably), the children were okay with a port at Indiana’s Dunes – but they pleaded for a compromise like the ones Hartke and Douglas had proposed. “Why don’t they make the port a couple of miles away?” asked Bruce Thompson. He, like his classmate Linda, had never been there (“I wish I could go there for a little while,” little Linda Gerard wrote), but both agreed that the steel companies were in the wrong. “I bet they wouldn’t like it if there was something that they liked and didn’t want it to go away. 76 kinds of trees they want to spoil. And all those flowers!”⁷⁹⁷

In December of 1963, Senators introduced a more detailed port-park compromise.⁷⁹⁸ The Save the Dunes Council continued their activity, gathering signatures of over 100 Indiana scientists to ask that the area adjacent to Gary’s steel mills remain in the bill’s boundaries to absorb recreation, thus allowing the rest of the park to better preserve the ecology of the dunes.⁷⁹⁹ All parties had begun to realize that some sort of steel would be in the dunes, even

⁷⁹⁵ Andrea Bloch to John F. Kennedy, February 16, 1962, Box 657, “PA 3 – 1-1-62 – 3-31-62” Folder, Presidential Papers, White House Central Subject Files, JFKL.

⁷⁹⁶ Bobby Hollinger to John F. Kennedy, February 16, 1962, Box 657, “PA 3 – 1-1-62 – 3-31-62” Folder, Presidential Papers, White House Central Subject Files, JFKL. Other students also wrote of the “rich people” who were “making steel mills.” Marlee Wolf to John F. Kennedy, February 16, 1962, Box 657, “PA 3 – 1-1-62 – 3-31-62” Folder, Presidential Papers, White House Central Subject Files, JFKL.

⁷⁹⁷ Linda Gerard to President John F. Kennedy and Bruce Thompson to President John F. Kennedy, February 16, 1962, Box 657, “PA 3 – 1-1-62 – 3-31-62” Folder, Presidential Papers, White House Central Subject Files, JFKL. Another student, Leah Adams, had actually been to the dunes. ““I would do almost anything to save the dunes,” she wrote to Kennedy. Adams to Kennedy, February 15, 1962, Box 657, PA 3 – 1-1-62 – 3-31-62” Folder, Presidential Papers, White House Central Subject Files, JFKL.

⁷⁹⁸ Thomas Dustin to Senator Vance Hartke, December 26, 1963, Thomas Dustin Papers, CRA, IU Northwest.

⁷⁹⁹ Most of the scientists on the attached petition of were male. All did hail from Indiana, at Universities like Notre Dame, Purdue, and Indiana. Dustin wrote to Kennedy that “conservationists are specifically opposed to exclusion of

amid heavy recreation, if the ecological preservation sought by park advocates could ever be realized.⁸⁰⁰ Two years after Douglas' talk with Kennedy, Douglas ensured the inevitability of a port and park compromise with a proviso into the Public Works Omnibus Bill of 1965. The proviso read: "No federal funds shall be spent on the port until such time as the Indiana Dunes have been preserved and protected as a national lakeshore by an act of Congress."⁸⁰¹ The bill passed, and the few remaining dunes—devastated by the bulldozers of steel companies, of housing contractors, and of speculative citizens in the last five years—appeared finally ripe for federal preservation.

The port/park compromise ensured that some part of the dunes would be preserved, even if it would not "keep the Indiana men away from building a harbor," in the words of student Judy Wamsley.⁸⁰² Lyndon B. Johnson carried on Kennedy's push for seashores after his death. Johnson had declared the 1960s a "Parks for America" decade as a part of his Great Society movement, promoting policy suggestions from the ORRRC report of 1962. Johnson included Indiana Dunes and Michigan's Sleeping Bear Dunes in a 12-park priority list for preservation in a 1965 conservation speech.⁸⁰³ In 1966, President Johnson reconciled ecological preservation with industry in the same way that pragmatic preservationists in northwestern Indiana had learned to do:

any areas of the dunes originally cited in your original proposal , . . . Without these areas, it would be almost impossible to preserve any of the more unique features of other areas." Thomas Dustin to John F. Kennedy, November 3, 1963, Box 657, "PA 3, 2-21-63 – ____" Folder, Presidential Papers, White House Central Subject Files, JFKL.

⁸⁰⁰ Franklin and Schaeffer, *Duel for the Dunes*, 167-176.

⁸⁰¹ U.S. Congress, Senate. (S. Rpt. 464), 89th Congress, 1st Session, Oct. 21, 1965, 9.

⁸⁰² Judy Wamsley to John F. Kennedy, February 15, 1962, Box 657, PA 3 – 1-1-62 – 3-31-62" Folder, Presidential Papers, White House Central Subject Files, JFKL.

⁸⁰³ Lyndon B. Johnson, "Special Message to the Congress on Conservation and Restoration of Natural Beauty," February 8, 1965, accessed March 14, 2015, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27285>.

There is little doubt that the great industrial complex of America will continue to grow, but it is a necessity that measures such as this be developed which will, at the same time, allow the areas dedicated to scientific, esthetic, and recreational use to keep pace.⁸⁰⁴

At the Indiana Dunes, America's "great industrial complex" grew directly adjacent to and simultaneously with development of a natural park dedicated to "scientific, esthetic, and recreational" uses. The two existed because of, not in spite of one another.

President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the bill establishing the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore into law on November 5, 1966. Three days after the bill became law, Senator Paul Douglas lost his seat in the U.S. Senate in a tough re-election campaign. His eight years of fighting for the dunes lives on in the stories that Hoosiers and dunes visitors natives tell. Douglas sacrificed his political career for the dunes, despite the criticism he faced as an Indiana outsider. He did this because Dorothy Buell and the Save the Dunes Council continuously drummed up public support and political pressure for a park in Indiana's dunes. Douglas and Buell encouraged Hoosiers to support the bill, even when the situation looked hopeless. Douglas and the Save the Dunes Council were the first to fight for the Indiana Dunes on a national political level. The initial idealism of the Save the Dunes Council women and the Senator from Illinois provided a strong enough negotiating point for his later pragmatism to accept a port/park compromise rather than no park at all. The overwhelming Hoosier support for a public industrial port ended up facilitating the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore because of the legislative strings with which Paul Douglas tied the two together.

⁸⁰⁴ Cockrell, *A Signature of Time and Eternity*, Ch. 4; Testimony of Anthony Wayne Smith (President of National Parks Association), presented by Paul Tilden (Editor and Asst. to the President), House Committee, *Indiana Dunes*, 451.



Figure 41: View of Burns Harbor Complex from Cowles Bog, Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore. Photograph by Michelle Fordice.

A Park, but Few Protections

In the years following the establishment of the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, NIPSCO tried to build a nuclear power plant in Michigan City, Gary wanted a “jetport,” steel companies tried to dredge Markowitz Ditch, the South Shore Rail Line wanted to build a marshaling yard, and Midwest Steel continued to expand its mill. Both the NPS and the Save the Dunes Council fought against these industrial developments. None of the attempts, save the expansion of Midwest Steel, were ultimately successful. The NPS also helped regulate local industries by requiring NISPCO at Burns Harbor “to place a clay like dike insert into clay till to seal off any discharge of water or fly ash into Cowles Bog,” and demanding Michigan City replace its breakwaters with groins “to slow down and/or redirect the current.”⁸⁰⁵

Despite the optimistic expansion of steel companies and other Midwestern industry in the early 1960s, America’s steel industry began to decline in the 1960s. Foreign competition, poor public relations, and disorganized management tipped steel companies over the breaking point,

⁸⁰⁵ Bill Firtch, “Fear Daly may Block Area Jetport,” *Michigan City News-Dispatch*, January 31, 1970, Thomas Dustin Papers; U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, “West Beach Expansion,” National Lakeshore Prototype Study Committee Report, March 20, 1972, Thomas Dustin Papers.

even as they continued to build huge integrated works—like that at Burns Harbor—and argue that new plants meant job creation.⁸⁰⁶ In 1983, Midwest laid off twenty percent of its workers and Bethlehem slashed management salaries fifteen percent. U.S. Steel neglected American mills as they invested in foreign markets, which “imposed depression conditions” in Gary when coupled with the automation that enabled the same steel production as 1960 at one-third of the work force.⁸⁰⁷

The promise of economic prosperity that Midwest and Bethlehem spoon-fed Indiana’s state politicians in the 1960s failed; far fewer jobs existed than predicted, and Indiana found itself left with a failing industry and toxic pollution problems. Federal air and water quality violations brought EPA toxicity police into northwest Indiana, furthering the federal regulation of Indiana’s coastline. Industry at Burns Harbor had provided a villain to make the National Lakeshore possible, but the severe environmental and economic aftereffects of mighty steel pulled Indiana’s Rustbelt cities into deep economic depression from the 1980s onward.

A Statement from the Public Officials Council in 1969 foreshadows the environmental quagmire the dunes became, despite the fact that it argued against a jetport that never happened:

Our concern for past and present pollution damage is surpassed only by our dread at the damage that will come from a lake airport by way of additional pollution, shifts in lake currents, stagnation of our beaches, and destruction of the valuable fish and animal life of the lake.⁸⁰⁸

Locals and ecologists had made scientific arguments for the preservation of these sand dunes for nearly a century, but not until rigid federal protection could ecological rights actually supersede industrial speculation. The land preservation push in the 1950s

⁸⁰⁶ Paul A. Tiffany, *Decline of American Steel: How Management, Labor, and Government Went Wrong* (London: Oxford University Press, 1988); Franklin and Schaeffer, *Duel for the Dunes*, 259.

⁸⁰⁷ Hurley, *Environmental Inequalities*, 177.

⁸⁰⁸ Public Officials Council, “Statement on Proposed Lake Michigan Site,” December 29, 1969, Thomas Dustin Papers.

impelled industry to build while they still could at the Burns Ditch, and the ensuing conflict between preservation and industrial expansion created enough power to ensure the success of each movement. Since the mills already existed, the NPS prioritized ecological, recreational, and scenic values, thanks to federal priorities and to the 1970s environmental movement that began to address pollution head-on.

Even after the building of homes, steel mills, and the creation of a park, sand dunes continue to constantly move. New sand still piles on old dunes, even after the federal government decides to preserve them for future generations. Since the Park Service could not preserve the morphing dunes as a fixed entity, they instead focused on conserving species and ecologies found in the dunes. Of the 392 units in the NPS, Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore ranks seventh in plant diversity with “more than 1,135 native plant species distributed over six plant communities.” Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore’s size of little more than 15,000 acres (after expansions in 1976 and 1980); renders this diversity even more amazing: of other Park Service units, Yellowstone consists of over two million acres and even Cape Cod National Seashore on its crowded peninsula in Massachusetts encompasses 43,500 acres. The Dunes took over fifty years to push through Congress (dating from Mather’s early attempt for a Sand Dunes National Park), but Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore was no second-tier nature preserve.⁸⁰⁹

Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore passed Congress in 1966 because of, not in spite of, industrial development at Burns Ditch and suburban expansion into northwest Indiana. To get to the beaches or see the dunes, visitors drove past steel mills and

⁸⁰⁹ U.S. Department of the Interior, “Maple Sugar Time,” <http://www.nps.gov/indu/planyourvisit/mst.htm>. On the biodiversity of the Indiana Dunes, see .S. National Park Service, Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore *Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore: Final White-Tailed Deer Management Plan/Environmental Impact Statement* (April 2012) , 4. For a concise list of park acreage, that best, most concise source is actually Wikipedia, unfortunately. See Wikipedia, “List of National Parks of the United States,” accessed March 30, 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_national_parks_of_the_United_States. It is also possible to look up the exact acreage of each park individually one the website of each park site from nps.gov.

smokestacks. Park proponents were successful because they convinced skeptics of the Lakeshore's relative good: its fragmented rescue of sections of Indiana's wilderness.⁸¹⁰ The Park Service created buffers and divides in their noncontiguous park—intersected by highways, railroads, towns, and industrial complexes—but no breakwater or tree barrier could completely hide the effects of the mills. Bathers at the dunes still saw distant smokestacks, pollution-colored sunsets, and toxic waste warning signs in the water. Indiana Dunes was a new type of park, one where conservationists and politicians took what they could get before it was all gone.

⁸¹⁰ Testimony of Stanley A. Cain (Asst. Secretary to the Interior for Parks, at Congressional Hearings), House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 301-304; Testimony of John Oliver Johnson, Jr. of Chesterton, IN, House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 480; Testimony of George K. Lowry of Chesterton, IN, House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 365; Edmund F. Martin (Bethlehem Steel Corp.) to Lee McElvain (House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs), House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 605.

Epilogue: A Slow and Contested Path for Coastal Parks

In 1964, the *New York Times* wrote that land conservation was an important issue for President Johnson in urban areas. “Democratic strategists,” the *Times* wrote, “are anxious to give the President as much exposure as possible in major urban centers, on the theory that he will need the support of voters there in the fall election campaign.”⁸¹¹ Johnson agreed, and wrote in a policy paper in 1964 that “conservation must move from nature’s wilderness to the man-made wilderness of our cities.”⁸¹² With Southerners beginning to vote Republican as Kennedy and Johnson backed Civil Rights legislation, northern urban votes became essential for Democrats.⁸¹³ After Kennedy’s assassination, politicians referenced his “enthusiastic support of the Cape Cod National Seashore” and claimed that establishing other National Seashores was “perhaps the best memorial to his vision for America.”⁸¹⁴ Johnson continued Kennedy’s urban and suburban conservation initiatives and praised Congress in 1964 for doing the same: “If the 88th had not earned already so many honorable titles, such as the education Congress, the health Congress, the full prosperity Congress, it would be remembered as the conservation Congress.”⁸¹⁵

Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall helped make coastal conservation a priority during the Kennedy and Johnson Presidencies. Udall called for “every sea-touched country . . . to preserve for its people portions of shoreline with the unique opportunities which they hold for

⁸¹¹ “Johnson Studies Fire Island Visit: Udall Urges Stop on Tour of Conservation Projects Planned Later in Year,” *New York Times*, February 8, 1964, 25.

⁸¹² Lyndon B. Johnson, “Presidential Policy Paper No. 3: Conservation of Natural Resources,” November 1, 1964. *The American Presidency Project*, University of California, Santa Barbara, accessed April 10, 2012, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26705#axzz1rY9XfLod.

⁸¹³ Kruse, *White Flight*, 253-255. Joseph Crespino, *In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 6-10, 90.

⁸¹⁴ Maurice Barbash, Chairman, Citizens’ Committee for a Fire Island National Seashore, Senate Committee on Public Lands, *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings*, December 11, 1963, 41.

⁸¹⁵ Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks Upon Signing the Wilderness Bill and the Land and Water Conservation Fund Bill,” September 3, 1964. *The American Presidency Project*, University of California, Santa Barbara, accessed April 10, 2012, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26481#axzz1rY9XfLod.

human refreshment and restoration of the soul.”⁸¹⁶ Udall and the Kennedy and Johnson administrations saw coastal conservation as the one of the last great frontiers of conservation in the United States, and across the world.⁸¹⁷ Even Stewart Udall’s brother, a Congressman from land-locked Arizona, agreed with the importance of coastal conservation. Morris Udall identified seashores as an essential component to a third major wave of conservation in the United States:

The whole conservation movement in the country has been in about three steps. The first was in the early days when Teddy Roosevelt and Mr. Pinchot and others set aside the national forests and made some beginnings in the national park system. Another big jump was made in the thirties. In my judgment, we are in a third and probably the last major leap forward in this field and we will either set aside some of these acres now or it will be too late.⁸¹⁸

Legislators, presidential administrations, and the public saw federal conservation of coastal areas as central to the surge in conservation thinking in the 1960s. Thanks to the success of Cape Cod National Seashore and the recommendations in the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission report in 1962, both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations prioritized coastal parkland creation. Their success led to a ten year period that saw more federal purchases of coastal land than any other point in American history.

National Seashore and Lakeshore creation was central to the conservation initiatives of the 1960s because of the strength and diversity of coalitions supporting coastal conservation in this period. Rather than a focus purely on land conservation like National Park creation in the Progressive Era, the initiative to create national seashores incorporated concerns about pollution, recreation for mass urban populations, overpopulation, and ecological health. Because these new National Seashores and National Lakeshores were often in the vicinity of major metropolitan

⁸¹⁶ Stewart L. Udall, “Address of the Secretary of Interior Stewart L. Udall at the First World Conference on Parks at Seattle, Washington, July 4, 1962,” University of Arizona Library, 20–21.

⁸¹⁷ Thomas G. Smith, “John Kennedy, Stewart Udall, and New Frontier Conservation,” *Pacific Historical Review*, 64, 3 (Aug.1995): 329-362.

⁸¹⁸ Congressman Morris Udall, House Subcommittee on National Parks, *Indiana Dunes*, 504.

areas, their establishment attracted more publicity and a greater spread of interest groups than earlier national parks had during their establishment. Coastal conservation brought together bipartisan coalitions of wealthy summer homeowners, blue-collar urban residents with the recently acquired means to take day trips to the beach, shellfishermen, gay communities, and traditional conservationists. The Department of the Interior cultivated these coalitions in many cases, encouraging organization and lobbying for coastal park creation whose roots had come out of the bureaucracy. These alliances, between diverse conservation coalitions embracing new issues in the realm of conservation, and federal government promoting conservation initiatives, developed the partnerships and pathways that culminated in the emergence of a unified environmental movement in the late 1960s.

The strength of support for coastal conservation in the 1960s made establishing the parks the easy part. After Congress authorized the land purchases of these areas, the difficult next step was actually buying the land. At Cape Cod National Seashore, the Park Service paid independent assessors to evaluate the land and then followed up on their valuations by hiring a full-time employee as the Chief Land Acquisition Officer.⁸¹⁹ Compounding the difficulty of purchasing thousands of tiny plots in these coastal areas was the ever-increasing price of coastal real estate. This had been happening throughout the postwar period – a Senator remarked in 1961 that “the value of shoreline lands skyrockets every year. A 30-mile tract of land on the east coast which was offered to the Government in 1935 for \$9,000 a mile was appraised at \$110,000 a mile 3 years ago, an increase of 1,100 percent in value.”⁸²⁰

⁸¹⁹ George Thompson, “Official Report of Proceedings before the U. S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, February 16, 1962, Meeting 1, Cape Cod National Seashore Advisory Committee,” Series 3, Box 2, Folder 1, Cape Cod National Seashore Collection, Nickerson Archives, Cape Cod Community College; Burling, *The Birth of the Cape Cod National Seashore*, 10.

⁸²⁰ Senator Clinton P. Anderson (NM), Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 87th Congress, First Session, *Shoreline Recreation Areas: Hearings on S.543*, March 8 and 9, 1961, 8;

Coastal park creation added to these skyrocketing prices; land that might have been overbuilt and gone the way of low-class development and hot dog stands now had hard federal assurances of protection. Senator Kenneth B. Keating of New York, who co-sponsored Fire Island National Seashore legislation, recognized this paradoxical reality as he pushed for coastal protection: “The longer we wait the greater will be the cost of preserving and protecting the area.”⁸²¹ At the Indiana Dunes, the Park Service figured they would pay between \$500 and \$600 an acre to purchase residential real estate, or roughly twice what it would have cost had they successfully established a Sand Dunes National Park in 1917.⁸²² Steel companies goaded the Park Service on this point: “A Bethlehem spokesman, who indicated his company valued its property at more than 60 million dollars, said it would be cheaper for the government to buy the towns [(than the steel companies’ properties)] and make them into national preserves.”⁸²³

Widespread coastal conservation thus could not have been possible without an equally innovative funding mechanism. The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF), signed into law by President Johnson on September 3, 1964 – the same day he signed the Wilderness Act – ensured that coastal parks could become realities by providing substantial funding for land purchases.⁸²⁴ The LWCF taxed offshore oil and gas drilling and funneled those revenues into a sort of environmental trust fund. Historian Sara Dant recently called it “green-pork environmentalism” that was universally popular because it “created a win-win situation for

Report on the Proposed Sand Dunes National Park Indiana (Washington: Department of the Interior, Government Printing Office, 1917), 13.

⁸²¹ Testimony of Senator Kenneth B. Keating, Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings*, December 11, 1963, 30.

⁸²² The 1917 estimate was \$300 an acre, with total acquisition costs estimated in the tens of thousands rather than the tens of millions. Stephen T. Mather, *Report on the Proposed Sand Dunes National Park Indiana* (Washington: Department of the Interior, Government Printing Office, 1917), 13.

⁸²³ Ronald Kotulak, “Dunes Entice Developers: industry and conservation groups covet Indiana’s shore acres,” *The NIPSCO Picture*, 7, 5 (October, 1960), ed. Raymond L. Hill. Calumet Regional Archives, Thomas A. Dustin Files.

⁸²⁴ Sara Dant, “LBJ, Wilderness, and the Land and Water Conservation Fund,” *Environmental History*, 19, 4 (October 2014): 736-743.

legislators, who could pick and choose the projects they wished to fund.”⁸²⁵ For National Seashores and Lakeshores, the LWCF provided a funding source that could handle the tens of millions of dollars appropriated by Congress for each park. Charles H.W. Foster, first Chair of the Cape Cod National Seashore Advisory Commission and later Dean of the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, called the LWCF the “most significant land acquisition development” in the successful establishment of Cape Cod National Seashore.⁸²⁶ The LWCF made long-range acquisition plans possible for new coastal parks.⁸²⁷ A funding mechanism now existed to support national seashore legislation, but how would that play out in local politics?

Living in a Federal Coastal Park

When buying up land authorized to become a part of coastal parks, the Park Service needed diplomacy as much as it needed money. Private citizens owned much of the land within the authorized boundaries of all national seashores, usually in the form of subdivided lots (Point Reyes was the major exception to this rule). In order to buy this land, the Park Service needed to convince individuals to sell their homes to the federal government. Many residents of the coastal areas either owned homes that had been in the families for decades, or were wealthy urban residents who had built a cottage in the sands or marsh. Neither group itched to give away their homes. The Park Service used eminent domain laws sparingly in an attempt to retain local goodwill. In order to purchase most homes, the NPS used a system called Reservations of Use and Occupancy, or RUOs.

⁸²⁵ Dant, “LBJ, Wilderness, and the Land and Water Conservation Fund,” 737-738.

⁸²⁶ Foster, *A Landmark Alliance*, 27.

⁸²⁷ “Udall Will Settle For Fire Island,” *Islip Bulletin*, July 4, 1963, 1 and 3; The Wilderness Society, “The Wilderness Act of 1964,” Retrieved February 12, 2012 from wilderness.org/content/wilderness-act-1964; Acting Director, Department of the Interior, to Senator Jacob K. Javits, August 10, 1964, Series 2, Box 78, Javits Collection, SBUL; Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks Upon Signing the Wilderness Bill and the Land and Water Conservation Fund Bill,” September 3, 1964. *The American Presidency Project*, University of California, Santa Barbara. Retrieved from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26481#axzz1rY9XfLod.

The Park Service devised RUOs as a system used in populous areas where individuals might not want to give up their homes away. With an RUO, the resident sold his land to the federal government immediately, but retained the right to use and occupancy of his home and land for a period of time set by the Park Service—usually 25 or 40 years, or the life of the tenant. At most National Seashores and Lakeshores, the federal government paid fair market value for the house. The tenant did not receive the full amount, however. The actual purchase price gave the federal government a 1% discount for each year the former owner remained in the house – sort of like paying advanced rent. That meant that an individual with a 25 year RUO would receive 25% less than the fair market value of his or her home. RUOs only applied to “improved property” as defined in Cape Cod National Seashore and all subsequent legislation: a “detached, one-family dwelling constructed before a certain date,” which excluded “taverns owners, restaurant owners, . . . storekeepers, and a lumberyard” from retaining rights to occupancy and use.⁸²⁸

⁸²⁸ Testimony of John Oliver Johnson, Jr., *House Subcommittee, Indiana Dunes*, 480. The full code concerning RUOs reads: “Any owner or owners, including beneficial owners (hereinafter in this section referred to as “owner”), of improved property on the date of its acquisition by the Secretary may, as a condition to such acquisition, retain the right of use and occupancy of the improved property for noncommercial residential purposes for a term ending at the death of such owner, or the death of his spouse, or at the death of the survivor of either of them. The owner shall elect the term to be reserved. The Secretary shall pay to the owner the fair market value of the property on the date of such acquisition less the fair market value on such date of the right retained by the owner,” from “U.S. Code, Title 16, Chapter 1, Subchapter LXX, §460m-2: Reservation of use and occupancy of improved property for noncommercial residential purposes; term; valuation,” Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/usc_sec_16_00000460---m002-.html. For more on RUOs, see Laura Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, Draft (Chapter 4), 1.



Figure 42: Dedication of Cape Cod National Seashore, 1966, Cape Cod National Seashore Archives, SPVC. Included in photo are Stewart Udall, Charles Foster, Quincy Adams Shaw, Jr., First Superintendent George Gibbs, . . . House behind them belongs to Elliot Richardson.

Cape Cod set the precedent for RUOs. By the time of Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore’s establishment in 1966, Park Service Director George Hartzog referred to RUOs as the “usual provision that we put in.”⁸²⁹ Yet, Cape Codders living within park boundaries got a much better deal than those living within the boundaries of Indiana Dunes, Fire Island, and Point Reyes’ coastal parks. At Cape Cod, many residents were given the option to indefinitely suspend condemnation of their homes, provided that towns adopted and enforced approved zoning laws. At other parks, this was not always the case. At the Indiana Dunes, for example, no clause

⁸²⁹ Testimony of George B. Hartzog, Jr. (Director of National Park Service), House Subcommittee, *Indiana Dunes*, 597-635.

existed that permanently removed the threat of condemnation.⁸³⁰ Cape Codders wielded an inordinate amount of influence in national political circles, especially once Kennedy won the White House. The indefinite protection from condemnation that most Cape Cod homeowners enjoyed did not exist in any other National Seashore or Lakeshore legislation. Cape Codders' worst case scenario – the Park Service forcing sale of one's home, after which the resident would have a 25 year RUO – was the best case scenario at most other parks.

Even within parks where no freedom from condemnation existed for private inholding, the location of one's home affected the likelihood of retaining private ownership. . Most RUOs ran out in twenty-five or forty years, but some lasted the lifetime of the seller or another specified period of time. At the Indiana Dunes, residents of less wealthy towns faced displacement from their homes, while residents of more established communities sat comfortably in their towns that enjoyed a perimeter of federally protected land. Three towns existed within the outer area of the National Lakeshore, but were drawn out of the park's final boundaries thanks to the collective political power of their residents (for instance, Dorothy Buell and Paul Douglas both had homes in Ogden Dunes, which remained officially outside of the park despite being surrounded by it). Congressional park bills excluded these communities from the Lakeshore in order to garner enough support among residents of the towns to strengthen the movement for the National Lakeshore. The grassroots work of women in Indiana did not just create a park: it created a park that allowed these same women to retain their homes provided they lived in certain communities.

⁸³⁰ *An Act to provide for the establishment of the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, and for other purposes*. Public Law 89-761, Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second session, November 5, 1966, accessed March 27, 2015, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-80/pdf/STATUTE-80-Pg1309.pdf>; *An Act to establish the Fire Island National Seashore, and for other purposes*. Public Law 88-587, Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second session, September 11, 1964, accessed March 27, 2015 <http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/88/587.pdf>.

At Fire Island, residents were better able to manipulate the system to continue expanding their residential communities even within the park area.⁸³¹ Despite calling their island “still frontier . . . mostly roadless, trackless, isolated, and alluring,” Fire Islanders continued to build on the fragile barrier island to the point that the some Park Service officials in the 21st century saw Fire Island National Seashore’s land management plans as a failure. Even at the time of the legislation’s passage, Park Service officials called Fire Island’s land management plans “the Cape Cod formula on a more generous basis.”⁸³²

Federal studies since the establishment of Fire Island National Seashore have criticized this leniency—in particular, the provision in Fire Island National Seashore legislation that allowed future development within city limits. As one government study criticized in 2007 (emphasis added):

Despite its name, the so-called Cape Cod Formula differed in important ways from the system previously adopted at Cape Cod. . . In particular, it **exempted all of the land within the Seashore’s most heavily developed areas from condemnation and opened all vacant land within these delineated areas to future development.** The system thus promoted or at least accommodated significant growth and was in fundamental conflict with Congress’s own vision of a stable and lasting balance between public land and private development. As the environmental effects of growth became clearer, it became increasingly evident that the system was also **in conflict with Congress’s mandate to protect the Island’s fragile environment.**⁸³³

Fire Island’s expensive real estate and vocal residents led Congress to draw park boundaries that favored the priorities of the residents over the Park Service priority of nature conservation. The sheer cost of the homes of Fire Island’s influential residents enabled them to continue to live in a roadless, sandy nature preserve. Congress allocated \$4 million for land acquisition costs for the

⁸³¹ Robert Cushman Murphy, Naturalist, House Subcommittee on National Parks, *Fire Island National Seashore, New York: Hearings (Islip, New York)*, September 30, 1963, 75.

⁸³² James K. Carr, Undersecretary of the Interior, Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings*, December 11, 1963, 26.

⁸³³ Kaufman and Starks, *Land Regulation at Fire Island National Seashore*, xi. For more criticism on land acquisition practices at Fire Island, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *The National Park Service should improve its land acquisition and management at the Fire Island National Seashore: Report to the Honorable Daniel P. Moynihan, United States Senate* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981).

first five years of the park's existence, but even this would be nowhere near enough to buy all of Fire Island's private residences. Yet, the continued presence of these same residents who wanted a roadless wilderness preserve undermined the quality of nature preservation on the island. In the 1970s, Senator Jacob Javits introduced legislation to halt "inappropriate development" on Fire Island, but despite his efforts, development continued.⁸³⁴

At Point Reyes, most of the "inappropriate development" was proposed by the National Park Service as part of their plan to sell off some of the potential parkland in the late 1960s (see Chapter 3). Ranchers did not receive quite as good of deals as residents of East Coast shorelines. Most ranchers ended up with twenty or forty year RUOs. As the RUOs expired, the Park Service usually still allowed the continuation of ranching in the area. Because Point Reyes National Seashore ended up including the interpretation of the pastoral landscape into their General Management Plan, these ranchers are a part of the story that the Park Service tells. The way the Park Service has extended the RUOs of ranchers is through "leases," or special use permits, which incrementally extended the ranchers' rights to continue farming on the land that the Park Service now bought in the late 1960s and early 1970s.⁸³⁵

⁸³⁴ Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings*, December 11, 1963, 6; The land on Fire Island of the 5,700 acres (total) in the proposed Fire Island National Seashore was split by many different owners: 90 acres= Federal, 1,000 acres =State, 800 acres=county, 22 acres= Town, 15 acres= Village, 3,722 acres= Private, according to "Exhibit 3," Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings*, December 11, 1963, 24; Senator Jacob K. Javits Press Release, "Javits Introduces Legislation to Halt 'Inappropriate Development' on Fire Island," August 20, 1974, Series 1, Box 59, Javits Collection, SBUL; "Curbing Fire Island Speculation," *National Parks* 38 (1964): 15.

⁸³⁵ Watt, *The Paradox of Preservation*, 9 (of Chapter 6); Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 77-78.

Ecological parks for the 20th century?

When RUOs ran out, the Park Service usually demolished the houses and “restored [the homesites] to their natural condition.”⁸³⁶ After demolition, archeological surveys, and ecological surveys, the Park Service returned the piece of land to its “pre-developed state.” Reclaiming for nature the home plots usually meant tearing down the house and other unnatural structures and letting the land “go back” to swamp or dune. As one drives along the roads running through the Cape Cod National Seashore or Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, day lilies and hydrangeas still bloom in oddly rectangular plots—the remnants of old flower beds that once adorned front entrances to homes. These living cultural remnants are a reminder of the former presence of homes in coastal uplands. As the Park Service bought up private houses, they encountered a problem: to which nature would the Park Service choose to go back?

To live surrounded by protected wilderness areas raised property values, but also presented problems for residents. At the Indiana Dunes, residents of the community Dune Acres cited as their “major concern” in 1970 “being completely surrounded by the park and the effect on its access roads, community changes and loss of land.”⁸³⁷ Living enveloped in a park meant higher land values and a stop to the threat of suburbia, but it also caused problems in basic town management. Other towns within the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore also experienced several administrative challenges, foremost among them sewage and water-level problems as the water table rose with the reinstatement of the “Great Swamp” behind the back dunes.⁸³⁸ The rising of the water table caused basements to flood and sewage to overflow, about which Beverly Shores

⁸³⁶ U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, “Questions and Answers on Land Acquisition in the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore,” <http://www.nps.gov/indu/parkmgmt/land-acquisition.htm>.

⁸³⁷ “Dunes National Lakeshore Committee Polls Residents,” *Michigan City News-Dispatch*, January 30, 1970, Thomas Dustin Papers.

⁸³⁸ The “Great Swamp” refers to the stretch of marshland from Chicago to Michigan that existed before industrial and residential drainage and agricultural irrigation. Armanis F. Knotts, *The Dunes of Northwest Indiana*, (Gary, Indiana: Indiana Geological Report, 1916). See also Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, “Cowles Bog Restoration Project,” accessed March 27, 2015, <http://www.nps.gov/indu/learn/nature/great-marsh-restoration.htm>.

residents complained to Park Service officials. As the Park Service reclaimed a natural area from its previous structures, they met resistance from the very supporters of their lakeshore. Settlers had first drained the marsh because living in marshland presents headaches in upkeep and sanitation. The residents of Beverly Shores have had to re-learn this the hard way with the return of nature in their back yards.



S. Wilson Avenue, Cape Cod National Seashore, Wellfleet, Massachusetts, USA
(N 41.9223°, W 69.97761°)

Figure 43: Lot Three is a former homesite. The day lilies still grow there every summer. Photographs and collage by author.

In addition to coping with the nature in their backyards that their own Save the Dunes campaign created, Indiana Dunes locals after 1966 had to face the real pollution that new mills at Burns Harbor generated. Conservationists could no longer fight to set aside land in lieu of a steel

mill or in conjunction with a steel mill; now they needed to address the sticky problem of the pollution of the steel mill itself. The Park emphasis on ecological quality and the federal regulations that govern the state of nature in National Park units provided a mechanism to deal with industrial pollution. The Park Service's regulations worked in concurrence with the Clean Air Act of 1963 (and its tooth-giving 1970 and 1977 expansions), and Clean Water Act of 1972. In the case of industrial pollution, the National Park Service's mission to "preserve unimpaired the natural and cultural resources" of America helped to combat the air and water pollution by nearby mills and power plants.⁸³⁹ In many ways, the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore and the strict regulations guiding its ecological health aided in the mitigation of pollutants for surrounding areas before the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency.

At Fire Island, pollution also threatened the temporary conservation victory of the National Seashore. Stewart Udall warned shortly after the park's congressional passage that the Great South Bay's

marshy-islands and reedy shores –the nesting place of so many migratory birds –are threatened by the hoses of developers who are spewing fill from the bay bottom on to the marshes. Its fish are threatened by the pollution from the unwise shoreline development. And with this contamination and destruction, the glory of Fire Island is threatened.

Could Congress have intended a National Seashore to be bordered by a fuming, barren bay on its back side? What favor would that be to the recreation seeking populace? I hope that the conservationists who saved Fire Island will now focus on this broader problem.⁸⁴⁰

A National Seashore or Lakeshore could prevent building on the area designated on parkland, but pollution around the park would still exist. Because Indiana Dunes and Fire Island sit all amid relatively heavy development, whether residential or industrial, the environmental issues

⁸³⁹ U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service. "The National Park System: Caring for the American Legacy." <http://www.nps.gov/legacy/mission.html>.

⁸⁴⁰ Stewart Udall, speech, Long Island Industrial Breakfast Club at the Sky Club, Garden City, NY, October 21, 1964.

that activists hoped to address through traditional land conservation methods still plagued the parks.

At Fire Island, Cape Cod, and the Indiana Dunes, residents secured continued permission to hunt and fish in specific zones on the island despite the wilderness rhetoric used during coastal conservation debates. Conservation advocates never viewed hunting and fishing as serious threats to these eastern and Midwestern shores. At Fire Island, Park Service officials and park advocates hoped that coastal conservation would enable conservation of wetlands and water that would ensure the health of shellfish populations and the clamming industry in the Great South Bay. Because the Park Service promoted Fire Island National Seashore as a wilderness alternative to the high-density recreation at Jones Beach, advocates saw fishing as a “low density” recreational use in little need of restraint. The Fire Island National Seashore legislation allowed both commercial and recreational fishing in contrast to earlier parks that only allowed recreational hunting and fishing. At Fire Island, advocates clarified, “wilderness designation” would not preclude “the repair of breaches that occur in the wilderness area, in order to prevent . . . severe economic and physical damage to the Great South Bay and surrounding areas.” To park advocates, wilderness meant roadlessness, not the end to the fishing economy of the Great South Bay.⁸⁴¹

In 1980, Congress officially acknowledged the work of wilderness proponents at Fire Island in the 1960s by designating part of Fire Island federally protected wilderness. Senator Jacob Javits, in his last full year of public service, introduced legislation in order to designate a portion of Fire Island National Seashore the “Otis Pike Wilderness Area.” The legislation passed

⁸⁴¹ Hunting and fishing provision from Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings*, December 11, 1963, 5-6, (5); “Low density” quote from Kaufman and Starks, *Land Regulation at Fire Island National Seashore*, 22; Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, *Fire Island National Seashore: Hearings*, December 11, 1963, 61-65. Wilderness designation quote from United States Federal Government, “Public Law 96-585—December 23, 1980.” Available from http://www.nps.gov/fiis/parkmgmt/upload/PL_96-585.pdf. Retrieved February 12, 2012.

in the same year and established 1,363 acres of Fire Island National Seashore as federally recognized wilderness. With the Congressional designation, Fire Island's Otis Pike Wilderness became the first federal wilderness area in New York State. Without the Suffolk County residents, Fire Island locals, and federal officials who had fought against Robert Moses' plans for an Ocean Parkway almost twenty years before this 1980 wilderness designation, Fire Island's sands would not have met the roadless requirements needed to become a wilderness area.⁸⁴²

At Point Reyes, wilderness designation came not to its land, but its water. Congress officially designated Drakes Estero a potential wilderness site in 1976 under the provision that all work would eventually cease in the area. Because the Johnson Oyster Company operating in the area had just signed a forty year lease, the land could not officially become wilderness until after the cessation of oystering. The fight over a Point Reyes wilderness led to a decade-long court battle whose final decision came in 2014. The Department of the Interior ultimately did not renew the permit of what had then become the Drakes Bay Oyster Company (the Johnson Oyster Company sold to the Drakes Bay Oyster Company in 2005).⁸⁴³ A series of court battles pitted wilderness advocates against local food supporters. Park Service officials drafting Point Reyes legislation in the early 1960s had stalled on issues of work in Point Reyes, allowing ranching to continue for political expediency. Oystering, at the time, had cultural value to the Park Service and was not a problem in potential National Seashores. However, the growth in status and statutes of the wilderness movement in the late sixties and early seventies led to a Park Service that did not condone oystering at Point Reyes. The Park Service still allows commercial shellfishing at Cape Cod and Fire Island, but at Point Reyes no more. Even with the limited

⁸⁴² Senator Jacob K. Javits, Press Release, "Javits Moves to establish New York's First Wilderness Preserve at Fire Island," August 19, 1980, Series 1, Box 79, Javits Collection, SBUL; United States Federal Government, "Public Law 96-585—December 23, 1980." http://www.nps.gov/fiis/parkmgmt/upload/PL_96-585.pdf. Retrieved February 12, 2012.

⁸⁴³ Sadin, *Managing a Land in Motion*, 248.

wilderness designation at Fire Island, East Coast National Seashores operate under the assumption that work is nostalgic and part of a cultural landscape. At Point Reyes National Seashore, as at other West Coast National Park sites, wilderness trumps cultural resources in Park Service interpretations.

Under the Forest Service, the other West Coast potential National Seashore has not veered toward wilderness designation. Far from it, actually – the Oregon Dunes has become a hot spot for Off-Highway Vehicle (OHV) use in Oregon. Whereas at National Seashores and Lakeshores, the Park Service educates visitors extensively that climbing on sand dunes is forbidden, driving motorized vehicles on Oregon’s sand dunes is the most popular pastime in this Forest Service-controlled recreation site.⁸⁴⁴ Oregon Dunes National Recreational Area incorporates much higher intensity recreational uses than the Park Service usually deems appropriate.⁸⁴⁵ This shift against unrestrained recreational uses is an interesting turn of events, since the Park Service appeared more recreation-intensive than the Forest Service in the Oregon Dunes debates.

In the 21st century, an era of rising sea levels and increasingly intense coastal storms, what can we learn from the federal initiative to protect coastal land in the 1960s? Unlike other policies in the late twentieth century that actually incentivized building on coasts (like the 1968 National Flood Insurance Program), National Seashores and National Lakeshores minimized building on coasts. By limiting future building and buying back some existing homes, the National Park Service allowed large swaths of coastal land to be beaches, essentially. With no

⁸⁴⁴ U.S. Forest Service, “Oregon Dunes National Recreation Area: OHV Riding & Camping,” accessed April 1, 2015, <http://www.fs.usda.gov/activity/siuslaw/recreation/ohv>.

⁸⁴⁵ For critiques of OHV usage and the effect it has on ecosystem and animal health, see John C. Tull and Peter F. Brussard, “Fluctuating Asymmetry as an Indicator of Environmental Stress From Off-Highway Vehicles,” *The Journal of Wildlife Management* 71, 6 (August 2007): 1944-1948; Daniel C. Barton and Aaron L. Holmes, “Off-Highway Vehicle Trail Impacts on Breeding Songbirds in Northeastern California,” *The Journal of Wildlife Management*, 71, 5 (July 2007): 1617-1620.

houses or hotels in the way, sandy beaches could ebb and flow as they naturally do. Widespread coastal protection initiatives like that undertaken by the Department of the Interior in the postwar period provide a solid model for coastal conservation today. While the costs of coastal land has risen, making the creation of new seashore parks an even more expensive proposition than in the 1960s, buying up land and preventing building remains cheaper than bailing out homeowners after every major storm. Some states like New York have actually begun to buy out homeowners in coastal flood plains to mitigate future disaster recovery costs. Coastal land acquisition for park creation, while initially expensive, also can be a smart long-term investment for states and communities who will see increasingly severe storms in coming years.

The Park Service turns towards ecological protection in the last fifty years has meant that coastal parks under the Park Service have actually protected ecological integrity over recreational uses in coastal parks. They have done so to a much higher degree than Park Service officials laid out in late 1950s proposals. At the time of establishment of the nation's National Seashores and Lakeshores, the Park Service used recreation as the primary political driver of coastal park creation. Yet, coastal parks from Cape Cod to Point Reyes, from the Indiana Dunes to Fire Island, slowly became preserved areas that today prioritize natural conservation and wilderness above recreational pursuits. Coastal conservation initiatives helped to catalyze the Park Service's shift towards a more ecological land and water management strategy, and in so doing contributed to the formation of the diverse coalitions of environmentalism. Ironically, it was thanks to the recreational fervor fueling coastal conservation processes that conservation ended up trumping recreation in National Shorelines after all. Arthur Schlesinger would be so proud.

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